




"^o <:.*^ 

vP 7 







\:*'S 






^"V 





^0' ^^^%3"'\/ "-^^^•'%o'> V^^'V "V — 










//Ao % c^ '^^i^- ^- -^ ^VO 

,G^ \3 *'T:^* v'^ 















^°V 



y ,. \;*^'\/ V^^^-"V %'*-^'*/ 




















^ o 











<*. 

















FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 
OF 1870 



SOURCE BOOK 



THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS 
THE GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL 




2 i - 2 (o ^ 3 S' 



THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 



19 2 2 






S ^■■- ' ■ '■ Z:' " "■ \[ ■•■1 ■\ 4' 



1-4^ ii I: 






1^^l 



UBRA-AY r,r cO^'-^m^' • 












. PREFACE 

This book contains extract copies of documents relating 
to the Franco-German war of 1870 taken from the School 
Library. The selection of the documents has been made 
with a view to the use of this book for the study of the 
strategy and leadership of corps, armies and groups of 
armies during certain parts of this war. Matter concerned 
with tactics has been omitted except where necessary to 
bring out or explain some point of strategy or leadership. 
The documents given are not all that are important. They 
have been limited to what is thought may be studied in the 
time that has been generally assigned at these Schools to 
the consideration of this campaign. 

The operations of the Germans in 1870 should be com- 
pared with that of the French in 1800 and 1806, and the 
leadership of von Moltke contrasted with that of Napoleon. 
Students should be prepared to discuss this at any time dur- 
ing the course. « 

Conrad H. Lanza, 
Colonel, Field Artillery. 
May 1, 1922, 



111 



Index 

Part I 

Page 
Precis of the Franco-German War, by Captain 

C. S. Pratt 1 

Map of Battle of Woerth 12 

Part II 

GERMAN ACCOUNTS 

Page 

Order of Battle ^-__ 41 

Moltke's Correspondence 43 

Situation Map, Evening of August 31, 1870__ 292 

Operations of the Second Army, by von der Goltz 295 

Plan of the Battlefield of Spicheren 306 

Map of the Attack on the Red Hill, Spicheren. 306 
Situation Map at Gravelotte-St. Privat la 

Montagne, 7:00 PM, August 18 434 

General Map of Operations, August 16 to 18__ 442 
The III Corps at Vionville-Mars la Tour, by the 

German Great General Staff 443 

Map of Battle of Vionville-Mars la Tour 462 

Memoirs of General P. H. Sheridan 465 

Map of Battle at Gravelotte, 5 :00 PM, 

August 18 472 

Siege Operations, by von Tiedeman 477 

Strasburg 477 

Map of Strasburg 512 

Sedan ^ 513 

Map of the Battle of Sedan 516 

Metz . 518 

Map of Metz and vicinity 538 

Paris 541 

Map of Paris and vicinity 608 

Graphic G2 Estimates 609 

Position Sketches, First Army 618^ 

V 



INDEX 

Part III 
FRENCH ACCOUNTS 

Page 

E^'pc]amation of the Emperor 625 

Graphic G2 Estimates ._._ _l__- .629. 

Messages and Orders on the Battle of Spicheren _ 641 

Map of the Battlefield of Spicheren ^ 646 

March of the V Corps, August 4 to 6 649 

Map of the Battlefield of Worth 652 

Orders and Messages, August 13 to 15 . 653 

Battles around Metz, by the French General Staff, 

discussed by Colonel vbn Schmid . 665 

Part IV ^-.r:-' ^..^ivl^-K 

MISCELLANEOUS ACCOUNTS - 

Page 

"jThe London Daily News Correspondence 743 

In Pocket : 

General Plan. 

Map of the Theatre of Operations. 



VI 



French and German Names for Some 
Important Places 



French : 
Basle. 
Bitche. 
Boulay. 
Cologne. 
Faulquemont. 
Herny. 
Liege. 
Longeville. 
Mayence. 
Meuse, 

MOSCQU. 

Moselle. 

Saarguemines. 

Saint Jean. 

Sarrebruck. 

Thionville. 

Treves. 



German : 
Basel. 
Bitsch. 
Bolchen. 
Coin. 

Falkenberg. 
Herlingen. 
Luttich. 
Lubeln. 
Mainz. 
Maas. 
Moskau. 
Mosel. 

Saargemund. 
Johann. 
Sarrebriicken. 
Diedenhofen. 
Trier. 



ERRATA 

Page now reads should read 

238 No. 118. Date 8 August 7 August. 

263 No. 178. in conjunction simultanfeously. 

4th line from 

bottom 

402 13th line four miles four [English] miles. 

449 8th line from 6th Infantry 6th Infantry Division. 

bottom 

476 2d line August 15 August 16. 



Parti 

EXTRACT FROM THE 

Precis of the Franco-German War 

By 

Captain S. C. Pratt, R. R. 



SAARBRUCKEN TO METZ 

To review the political causes of the war of 1870, and 
sketch the tortuous course of policy which placed Prussia 
in the position of leader of the German race, would entail 
a study of Continental politics from the commencement of 
the century. By violation of numerous treaties, by whole- 
sale annexation of the minor states, and finally by the 
expulsion of Austria from Germany, she became invested 
with the military supremacy, and a popular war with a for- 
eign power was all that was necessary to re-establish the an- 
cient German Empire and secure the long desired unity 
of the German peoples. In France, on the other hand, the 
growing power of her ancient enemy, the astounding suc- 



*This short precis of the 1870-1 campaign has been written in 
the belief that it will be acceptable to many officers who would not 
consult a more lengthy account. It may also be of advantage to those 
entering upon the study of the campaign; forming, as it does, a 
framework the details for the filling up of which are at hand in the 
many histories now issued. Some difficulty has been experienced in 
finding out the actual numbers engaged in the several battles. The 
German official accounts, though perfectly accurate in the detail they 
give, do not take into consideration the troops outside the zone of 
fire, who in many cases affected the result of the engagement. For 
this reason, in more than one instance, the approximate numbers 
given by Lecomte have been adopted. To compress the description 
of several distinct campaigns into a few pages necessitates the omis- 
sion of many minor facts and the suppression of much detail. How 
far the judgment of the writer has been sound in his work of excision 
must be left to the opinion of the military student. 



— 1- 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

cesses of the six weeks' war, and the unsuccessful attempts 
to obtain a rectification of the Rhine frontier, had aroused 
a feehng of bitter hostility. France alone was determinedly- 
hostile to German unity; Prussia was open to an arrange- 
ment, Austria was too enfeebled by the Sadowa campaign 
to interfere, and England had notoriously withdrawn her- 
self from the complications of Continental politics. The 
pretensions of the two great rivals had to be decided on 
the battle-field and the immediate cause of rupture is a 
matter of little importance. A diplomatic quarrel arising 
from the offer of the Spanish throne to the Prince of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen afforded a plausible pretext for 
war, which was formally declared by the French on the 
19th July, 1870. 

Previous to entering upon a description of the cam- 
paign, it will be necessary to refer briefly to the system of 
recruitment and the comparative military position of the two 
rival armies. 

The military organization of the German forces was 
based on territorial divisions corresponding more or less 
to the civil ones ; thus the provinces each furnished a corps 
d'armee, the districts a brigade, and the circles or parishes 
a battalion. Every German was liable for service, no sub- 
stitution was permitted, and persons unfit to serve under 
arms were allotted to the non-combatant branches as hos- 
pital attendants, military tradesmen, &c. Liability to army 
service lasted 12 years, of which 3 were passed in the stand- 
ing army, 4 in the reserve, and 5 in the Landwehr. In case 
of invasion, the Landsturm, or entire able-bodied popula- 
tion (up to the age of 42), could, in addition, be called to 
arms. To alleviate the burden of compulsory enrollment, a 
system of liberal exemptions was organized; the bulk of 
the men passed over, forming what was called the Ersatz 
Reserve. The army in peace time was thus composed of 
four distinct classes: — 

1. The standing army; or the men actually in the ranks. 

2. The reserves, or men who had passed through the ranks and 
were liable to be re-called at once to the colors, and bring up the 
army to its war strength. 



ICxtract 

3. The Landwehr; or men who had passed through both army 
and reserve — who were separately organized in Landwehr battalions 
and constituted a 2nd line of defense. 

4. The Ersatz Reserve or untrained men who could be called into 
the depots when required. 

An intimate connection was maintained between the 
line and the Landwehr; to each three-battalion regiment 
of the standing army there being attached a Landwehr 
regiment of two battalions. A German passed the first 3 years 
of his life in the service of the regular army ; he then returned 
to civil life, but was borne on the books of the regiment as a 
reservist for the next four years ; after which period he was 
transferred to the ranks of the corresponding Landwehr bat- 
talion. The address of each man was registered, and at 
the order to mobilize he was required at once under heavy 
penalties to present himself at the nearest military centre 
for the purpose of taking his place in the ranks. Every 
civilian knew exactly the position he would have to fill if 
suddenly called upon. By maintaining an efficient organi- 
zation at all the military centres, it was apparent that an 
order to mobilize could be rapidly passed on from the Head- 
quarters at Berlin through all the several grades of terri- 
torial divisions till it finally reached every able-bodied man 
liable for service in the country. At each of the local cen- 
tres, stores of clothing and material were kept ready for 
issue. Equally complete arrangements with regard to the 
mustering of horses, the formation of trains, the collec- 
tion of supplies, combined with a detailed transit organi- 
zation, enabled each army corps to be assembled completely 
armed and equipped and ready to take the field within a 
few days after instructions had been telegraphed through- 
out the country. As a result of this almost perfect system, 
the army of the North German Confederation, combined 
with those of the affiliated states, was enabled to reach the 
gigantic total of 1,180,000 men within a fortnight after the 
outbreak of hostilities. 

The French army was organized on a very different 
method, there being no regular peace formation of the 
higher tactical units. The country was certainly divided 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

into a number of commands; but these, with the exception 
of the army corps at Paris and Lyons, formed territorial 
and not tactical combinations of troops. On declaration of 
war, the staff of the army was chosen and the regiments 
apportioned to each corps, but necessarily the component 
units of so disunited a mass could not work together at 
first without a great deal of friction. In 1866 it was ap- 
parent that, owing to many causes — the principal of which 
were the longer service in the ranks, exemptions by pay- 
ment, and the "plague of substitutes" — the Imperial army 
was vastly inferior, both in numbers and jnorale, to that 
of Germany. To remedy this state of things the recruiting 
law of 1868 initiated a system of trained reserves, abolished 
exemption by payment, and provided for the formation 
of Gardes Mobiles — corresponding somewhat to a combina- 
tion of the German Landwehr and Ersatz Reserve. By 
making the Act partially retrospective it was hoped that 
large additions could be at once made to the defensive 
forces of the country, but the premature declaration of war 
prevented these reforms being carried out in their entirety. 
On the 1st of August, the total of the available troops, in- 
cluding many partially-trained men, amounted to 567,000. 
After making the necessary deductions, the utmost field 
force that could be assembled consisted of 300,000 men 
with 924 guns, and behind these in second line there were 
no trained reserves. In addition to numerical ii^feriority, 
the general condition of the French army was by no means 
satisfactory. The general officers had no experience in 
the leading of large bodies of troops, the staff was ineffi- 
ciently educated, the regimental officers had not sufficient 
authority over their men, the mass of the soldiery were 
contaminated by the evils of substitution, and the bonds of 
discipline were relaxed owing to the enervating effects of 
the Algerian and Mexican campaigns and the pernicious 
spread of democratic principles among all ranks. To rap- 
idly mobilize the • army was a matter of some difficulty, 
owing to the excessive over-centralization of the adminis- 
tration. Every matter of petty detail had to be referred to 



—4— 



Extract 

the Paris War Office, and the machinery capable of con- 
trol in time of peace was utterly unable to cope with the 
exigencies of war. Whereas in Germany the men of the 
reserves joined at once their local corps, in France the 
reservist was sent first to the depot companies, however dis- 
tant they might be, to receive his equipment, and then 
hurried back to his regiment, which in many cases was 
close to his home. The system of mobilization was not 
sufficiently elastic for (modern war requirements, and the 
first days after the declaration of hostilities, which should 
have been employed in the general interest of the army, 
were frittered away in dealing with minor administrative 
details. To the German system of decentralization of large 
localized units, was opposed an excessively concentrated 
machinery working a mass of petty isolated elements. 

The Prussians, fully aware of their superiority in num- 
ber determined from the first to anticipate any attempt of 
their adversaries to carry the war on to German soil. It 
was obvious that if the French took the initiative they 
would be forced, owing to the situation of the neutral ter- 
ritories of Luxemburg and Switzerland, either to advance 
into Rhenish Prussia or cross the upper Rhine. There was 
no valid reason for expecting a rapid mobilization ; though, 
from the existence of the eastern camps and garrisons, a 
part of the Imperial forces might be ready to take the field 
in a very short time. To counteract a possible invasion 
over the upper or lower Rhine, and at the same time re- 
serve the power of employing their numerically superior 
forces in an offensive effort, was the problem to be solved 
by the Prussian staff. In accordance with a pre-arranged 
plan, it was decided that three large armies should be as- 
sembled in the Palatinate.* 

If the Emperor invaded the Rhenish provinces, he 
would encounter the whole of the German forces; if he 
crossed the Upper Rhine, his line of communications and 
further advance would be seriously imperilled by the pres- 
ence of powerful hostile bodies on his flank. To make full 



*Rhein Pfalz on map. 

—5— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

use of their railway system for rapid concentration, the 
French would presumedly be obliged to assemble in two 
main groups at Metz and Strassburg, with the Vosges 
separating them. In the Palatinate the Germans would 
stand on interior lines to masses thus formed, and be able 
to act against either or both simultaneously. If the Em- 
peror massed his forces for a defensive effort, it was evi- 
dent that Alsace would have to be evacuated, as the advance 
of the troops of the Confederation on both sides of the 
Vosges completely turned the first defensive line formed 
Iby that mountain chain. In this case a wheel to the right 
of the three armies would be necessary,' preparatory to a 
general advance westward against the Imperial forces. 

But little danger was to be apprehended from the sepa- 
ration of the German forces by the Vosges. If the armies 
on either side of the mountains were defeated, they would 
fall back on their own troops ; while the French forces, in 
case of disaster acting from divergent bases, would naturally 
be driven away from one another. The sole remaining diffi- 
culty was as to whether the German armies could be con- 
centrated beyond the Rhine in the Palatinate without en- 
countering the risk of being beaten in detail by a rapid 
offensive movement of the French. The plan of campaign 
projected by the Emperor was to mass 150,000 men at Metz, 
100,000 at Strasburg, and 50,000 at Chalons as a reserve. 
The two first-mentioned fractions were to amalgamate, 
cross the Rhine at Maxau, force the southern German states 
into neutrality, and advance towards the Main to seek a 
general action with the Prussian forces. To carry out this 
idea it was obvious that the passage of the Rhine would 
have to be effected before the German armies were mobi- 
lized. Assuming this was possible, it is difficult to see how 
further successes were to be obtained. To force South 
Germany into quiescence, and at the same time mask the 
Rhine fortresses, would absorb a large proportion of the 
invading troops. "^Vith a line of powerful fortified cities in 
rear, a large entrenched camp on the flank (Mainz) and a 
numerically superior army in front, the prospect of a suc- 
cessful advance to Berlin seems somewhat visionary. 

—6— 



Extract 

To carry out their preconceived plans, the armies of 
the two nations were gradually assembled on the frontier. 
The order to mobilize the North German forces was issued 
on the evening of the 15th July, for both the line and Land- 
wehr simultaneously; it being apparent that the coming 
struggle would in all probability assume gigantic propor- 
tions. Within ten days the local mobilizations of the army 
corps were complete, and on the 23rd the transport by rail 
to the frontier commenced. Precise details as to the way 
in which each corps was to be forwarded — including the 
very hours of departure and arrival, and the number of 
carriages in each train — had been prepared long beforehand, 
and on the 30th July the German forces, divided into three 
large armies, took up with their leading troops the line of 
the Rhine from Coblenz to Germersheim. 



Commander 



Numbers 



II 



Army. — Prince Frederick 
Charles 



III Army. — Crown Prince 



Position on 
31st July 

Treves 



Mayence, 
& S. of it 



Landau 



Army. — General Steinmetz. VII and VIII Corps, 

50,000 inf., 
4800 cav. 

Ill, IV, IX, X, and 

XII Corps, and Gd. 
152,000 inf., 
22,200 cav. 

V, XI, I Bav.i and II 
Bav. Corps, 
Baden Div. and Wur- 
temburg Div. 
126,000 inf. 
14,800 cav. 

Total 328,000 inf., 41,800 cav., with 1,20^ guns. 

The I Corps joined the I Army, the II Corps the II 
Army, and the VI Corps the III Army a few days later, 
forming with the addition of the 17th Inf. and four Landwehr 
divisions, a total of 462,000 Inf., 56,800 cav., and 1584 guns.* 



*The German corps consisted on an average of 25 battalions, 8 
squadrons, and 15 batteries, and including the cavalry divisions may be 
valued at 30,000 combatants. Officers and noncombatants not in- 
cludad in above totals. 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

The French forces at this period consisted of 210,000 
men,* divided into three main groups in the neighborhood 
of St. Avoid, Strasburg and Chalons. Though nominally 
one army, it was practically tvi^o, the right v^ing of vi^hich 
(47,000 men) was east of the Vosges, under the command of 
Marshal Macmahon, while the left 128,000) was superin- 
tended by the Emperor personally at St. Avoid. The seven 
corps comprised in these totals were bivouacked in a very 
dispersed order, and echeloned along the whole frontier, 
from Thionville to Strasburg. Besides these troops, there 
was a reserve corps of about 35,000 men, chiefly at Chalons. 
It must be remembered, however, that the French numbers 
were increasing daily, owing to the constant influx of the 
reserves, and at the commencement of August the strength 
may be put down at from 260 to 270,000 men. 

The difference between the two systems of concentra- 
tion is strikingly apparent. Each German army corps, com- 
pletely furnished with men, horses and equipment, in its 
own local district, was forwarded to the front an effective 
unit of the army of which it was to compose a part. On the 
other hand, the French corps were actually mobilized on the 
frontier. 

Difficulties first arose about calling in the reserves, after- 
wards in their transport and equipment, and the events of 
each succeeding day accumulated evidence as to the state of 
insufficient preparation and the other evils inherent in the 
French system. The railways were blocked with trains of 
reservists unable to get forward, the regimental and corps 
transport was incomplete, horses had to be taken from the 

* Strength of French army the 29th July: 

Guard (Bourbaki) 20,500 

1st Corps (Macmahon) 37,000 

2nd Corps (Frossard) 23,430 

3rd Corps (Bazaine) 35,800 

4th Corps (Ladmirault) 26,000 

5th Corps (De Failly) 23,000 

6th Corps, (Canrobert) 29,900 

7th Corps (Douay) 9,900 

Reserve Cavalry and JEngineers 4,550 

Total 210,080 men 




K 



& 



o 

K 


C 

o 


in 





(0 


^. ^ 


C 


c 


0) 


c 


(D 
O 

c 


in 


«3 


o 


i_ 


E 


o 




O 

1 




O 


o 
o 


(D 




c 
o 


e 


h 


l_ 






L- 


(D 





Extract 

artillery to bring forward the necessary food supplies, and 
the actual necessaries of bread and meat were in many 
cases not forthcoming. In addition to the failure of the 
field administration, it was found that the fortresses were 
in a most defective condition. Around Metz, the detached 
forts were neither revetted nor armed, the depots for provi- 
sions had not been filled, nor any arrangements made for 
standing a siege. Strasburg and the minor fortresses fared 
but little better ; armed with obsolete weapons, and deficient 
in men and stores, the energies of their Commandants were 
taxed to the uttermost. 

Veiled by a thin cordon of outposts, the Germans formed 
their armies on the bank of the Rhine, and pushed for- 
ward, strong, compact, united, to the frontier; while in 
front of them, sprinkled along the whole line, stood detached 
French corps, weak in men, deficient in equipment and 
swayed to and fro by contradictory orders. 

Up to the 2nd August there was no serious fighting on 
either side, but on that date the Emperor determined to 
make a reconnaissance in force towards Saarbrucken, with 
the left wing of the army. From lack of preparation, his 
plan was not cai-ried out in its entirety, but resulted in an 
offensive movement of the 2nd Corps (Frossard) alone. 
Neither the I and II German armies having yet received 
the orders to advance to the frontier, the defence of the 
town was left to a few outpost troops, who made a gallant 
stand but were naturally obliged to evacuate their position. 
The capture of Saarbrucken, to effect which an entire 
French army corps was deployed in battle order, was there- 
fore but a trifling success. It is diflScult to see what object 
was gained by this military demonstration, as no further 
offensive movement was made, and the French forces re- 
mained in quietude on the banks of the Saar. Great uncer- 
tainty as to military situation appeared at this period to 
exist on the French side as to whether their strategy should 
be of an offensive or defensive character, and even at this 
early stage their movements seem regulated by those of their 
opponents. 



-9— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

In the beginning of August, Marshal MacMahon, in 
obedience to orders from Headquarters, pushed forward 
his troops to northern Alsace, directing his main forces to- 
wards a chosen position at Froeschwiller and sending a 
division under General Douay to the ancient fortress of 
Weissenburg. 

On the German side all ideas of defensive measures 
had been abandoned, and the armies were gradually de- 
ploying into an east and west line, preparatory to forcing 
the frontier. It was evident that the III Army would 
have the arduous task of passing through the mountain 
roads of the lower Vosges, and eventually have to force the 
defiles of the main range. To allow sufficient time for this 
extra work, the army of the Crown Prince was put into 
motion on the 4th August, with orders to advance into Al- 
sace, and the bulk of the army marched accordingly in four 
columns to the Lauter stream, which, formed the frontier 
line. On arriving at Weissenburg, it was found that the 
town and a line of hills south of it was held by the troops of 
Douay's division, about 5000 in number. The old fortress 
was speedily captured, and a general frontal attack made 
on the defensive position held by the French General. The 
gradually advancing German forces reinforced the assault- 
ing troops, and enabled a flank movement to be directed 
against the right of the French line. Completely outnumbered 
after a stubborn and gallant resistance, the French gave 
way, and retired precipitately on their main body, then as- 
sembling in the neighborhood of Worth. 

The baneful effect of the undue dissemination of 
forces is here fully exemplified. The detachment of General 
Douay's small division to the frontier must be looked on as 
a strategical error. If the German forces were making an 
inroad into Alsace, it was clear that 5000 men would not 
stop them; if, on the other hand, the French troops were 
employed merely as an advanced post, their role should 
have been more clearly pointed out to them. 

On the evening of the 4th all contact with the enemy 
was lost, and the next day, in rear of large bodies of recon- 
noitering cavalry, the III Army advanced, prepared to con- 

—10— 



Extract 

centrate for battle in either a southerly or westerly direc- 
tion. Information was received on the 5th that the French 
were assembling in force in the neighborhood of Worth, 
with the evident intention of disputing the passes of the 
Vosges, and orders were issued in consequence for a con- 
centrated advance in that direction. 

On the French side confusion reigned supreme. Owing 
to the defective and tardy concentration, the original plan 
of campaign could not be carried out. Reduced to defensive 
measures by the threatening advance of the German forces, 
it was obvious that a general union of the dispersed corps 
would be advisable. It was clearly impossible for the left 
wing of the army to advance through the Vosges and leave 
the I and II German Armies on its flank. If, however, the 
French right wing was to retire westward, the whole of 
Alsace would be given up without a general engagement — a 
proceeding likely to be received with little favor by the tur- 
bulent spirits in the capital. The independent command of 
the right wing was accordingly bestowed on Macmahon, with 
the clear understanding that he should endeavor to make 
head against the invader. Telegraphing to the corps of 
De Failly at Bitsch, which had been placed under his orders, 
and hurrying up available troops from Strassburg, were 
the measures he adopted preparatory to taking up at Worth 
a tactically strong position, which defended, both directly 
and indirectly, the main passes through the mountains. 

The French troops facing east (left wing retired), oc- 
cupied a line about 314 niiles in extent along the undulating, 
partly wooded, partly vine-clad spurs of the western Vosges. 
In front, within musketry range, was a valley of flat mead- 
ow land traversed by the Sauer — a stream fordable with 
difficulty in consequence of recent rains. The range of 
heights on the eastern side of the valley afforded but little 
shelter*to an advancing force, the right flank was open and 
could be swept with artillery fire, but the existence of wooded 
ravines rendered a refusal of the left necessary. A main 
chaussee, running at right angles to the defensive line, 
passed through the villages of Worth on the Sauer and 
Froeschwiller in rear of the centre of the position. 

—11— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

On the morning of the 6th the leading troops of the III 
Army came in contact with the French outposts, and at- 
tacked impetuously. On neither side was it intended to fight 
a general action, but the serious engagement initiated by the 
German advanced guards rendered a withdrawal from the 
fight rather compromising. Up to mid-day isolated attacks 
attended with great loss were made against the position, 
finally culminating in an artillery duel between the batteries 
of both armies. Supported by the concentrated fire of their 
massed artillery, and the hourly increasing numbers of 
their troops, the V and XI German Corps made a general 
advance against the French right and centre. The fire-swept 
low-lying meadows were traversed with heavy loss, and a 
footing gradually gained on the western side of the valley. 
The central attack made but slow progress, but ground was 
gradually gained in the Niederwald — a wood on the French 
right — and a portion of the Imperial troops were cut off 
and retreated in disorder toward Haguenau. The attack- 
ing line gradually converged towards Froeschwiller — the key 
of the position — the great superiority in numbers of the 
Germans leading to the gradual envelopment of the French 
flanks. Heroic attempts were made to change the fortunes of 
the day by charges of cavalry; but the. nature of the ground 
was too unfavorable to admit of the slightest success. Over- 
matched in artillery and completely outnumbered, the 
French at last gave way, and fled to the rear in the greatest 
confusion. Some of the fugitives took the road to Bitsch, 
many made their way to Strasburg, but the bulk of the army 
retreated to Saverne, where they were eventually reduced 
to a semblance of order. Owing to the impossiblity of push- 
ing unsupported cavalry through the mountain passes, and 
the rapid forced marches of Macmahon, all contact be- 
tween the two armies was lost. The 7th was a day of rest for 
the German forces, with the exception of the Baden Divi- 
sion, which was sent off in the direction of Strassburg, 
which was summoned to surrender on the 9th August.* 

Suddenly given command of an army dispersed along 
the frontier from Bitsch to Strassburg, with an enemy of 

*The siege of Strasburg is referred to subsequently. 

—12— 



BJLTTLE or WOEKTH 




Extract 

threefold strength within a day's march, the position of 
Macmahon was certainly unenviable. Exception may, 
however, be fairly taken to his stand at Worth; though 
tactically strong, the position was strategically defective. 
For an inferior force to offer battle with a series of defiles 
in its rear cannot but lead to disaster in case of retreat, and 
to defend the passes of the Vosges in such a manner when 
they were practically turned by the advancing I and II Ger- 
man Armies seems injudicious. If from political causes 
it was necessary to fight east of the Vosges, it would appear 
that the retention of Strassburg as a base would give the 
opportunity of striking an offensive blow on the flank of an 
army attempting to cross the mountains, and at the same 
time secure a safe retreat. The non-appearance of De 
Failly's corps on the field has been the subject of much com- 
ment, arising as it did from the reception of contradictory 
orders from the Headquarters of each wing of the army. 
Although the defeated troops were much disorganized, it 
seems scarcely necessary for them to have taken such a cir- 
cuitous route westward, or retreat so far. It has been sug- 
gested that a better course would have been to gain Metz 
by the left bank of the Moselle and join the forces of Ba- 
zaine, or retreat southward on Belfort. In the one case the 
union of the entire French army would be effected, in the 
other the presence of regular troops in the south would un- 
doubtedly compel a division of the German forces, and 
possibly arrest the general advance. 

In the meantime, the I and III German Armies ad- 
vanced side by side to the frontier. Acquainted with the 
success of the II Army and suspecting a retreat of the 
French forces in their front, they pushed forward their 
advanced guards towards Saarbrucken and the line of the 
Saar. It was intended that the main body of the II Army 
should pass through the town while the I Army was utiliz- 
ing points of passage lower down the river. 

On the 6th of August, General Frossard (the commandant 
of the corps that made the demonstration on the 2nd), with- 
drawing his outposts, took up a position on the Spicheren- 
Steiring heights, opposite the town of Saarbrucken. De- 

—13— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

eeived by the apparent retreat of the French, and under the 
impression that a weak rear guard had alone to be 
dealt with, the leading German troops boldly crossed 
the river. A heavy fire of artillery, however, soon made it 
apparent that the nearly impregnable heights were held in 
force. In spite of great inferiority in numbers, a bold 
attack was made on both flanks of the position, but without 
success; and the small German force (a division), fought 
unsupported against the whole of Frossard's corps for more 
than two hours. Gradually accruing reinforcements gave a 
new impetus to the attack, which became general along 
the whole line. The steep slopes of the plateau were grad- 
ually surmounted, in spite of the murderous fire of the 
Chassepot, and with incredible exertions twelve guns were 
eventually hauled up to the crest. As at Worth, a wood on 
the right of the French line was successfully utilized in the 
advance, and the superior direction of the German artillery 
plainly evinced. Against the Prussian position on the edge 
of the plateau, frontal attacks in force were repeatedly 
made. Disheartened by their want of success, and threat- 
ened on their left flank by newly arriving troops, the French 
gave way at nightfall and retreated in good order on Saarge- 
mund. 

It is not difficult to attribute to its true causes the 
double defeat suffered by the French on this day. Superior- 
ity in numbers and organization, combined with the advan- 
tage of taking the offensive, were on the German side. The 
advance of their powerful armies on both sides of the Vosges 
■with their flanks covered by Luxemburg and the Rhine, 
was a safe operation; and though either wing might have 
received a check, a disaster was impossible. On the French 
side a defective administration nullified all the attempts 
to carry out the original plans of the Emperor. The dispo- 
sition of the several corps seems, moreover, very injudicious, 
and to violate the sound principle that inferior forces 
should be massed. Whether for offensive or defensive pur- 
poses, it was essential that the French troops should be 
concentrated ; and while effecting that object it was unsafe 



— =14- 



Extract 

to place isolated corps, liable to defeat, so close to the fron- 
tier. Distributed, however, as they were, the lack of com- 
mon reconnoitering precautions seems inexcusable. In the 
several engagements, notably at Spicheren — ^the want of mu- 
tual co-operation of corps on the French side is especially 
remarkable, while the sound of firing apparently hurried 
all available German forces to the field of battle. This prin- 
ciple seems, however, to have been carried to excess at 
Worth, where the German outflanking troops lost sight 
of their proper objective. 

After their defeats, the beaten armies retreated in a west- 
erly direction in two large masses. The greater portion of one 
of these bodies consisted of the troops routed at Worth, 
whose retirement was compulsory and attended with dis- 
aster. The left wing, on the other hand, was composed of 
the main Imperial army, only one of whose corps had yet 
been in contact with the enemy. With their right wing 
utterly disorganized, and their main body threatened in 
front with superior numbers, it was obvious that all of- 
fensive action was impossible, and that immediate meas- 
ures had to be taken to secure the defense of the country. 
To effectually utilize their inferior forces, it was necessary 
to unite the two separated portions (now bearing the names 
of the armies of Chalons and Metz) . Owing to the disor- 
ganized state of MacMahon's troops, it was hopeless to 
expect a concentration east of the Moselle, and a general 
retreat to that river was ordered. There was much dis- 
pute as to the best course to pursue — whether to retire 
direct on Chalons, and thereby unite the two armies ; or to 
retreat on Metz with the main body, and endeavor to close 
in the right wing to it; or to take up a defensive position 
south of Metz, and dispute the passage of the Moselle. As 
a consequence, between the 6th and 12th of August, orders 
and counter orders succeeded one another with lamentable 
rapidity; but eventually the retreat on Chalons was defin- 
itely decided on. The main body retired from the district 
of St. Avoid directly on Metz, the vicinity of which was 
reached on the 12th inst. The 6th Corps (originally a 

—15— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

portion of the reserve), was hurried up to the fortress, 
and on the 13th an army of 176,000 men was assembled 
under the detached forts lying to the east of Metz. Mac- 
Mahon, in the meantime, was retreating via Luneville on 
Chalons, where he eventually* succeeded in collecting about 
120,000 men, the greater portion of whom consisted of the 
1st, 5th, and 7th Corps. 

While the two armies were in full retreat, strenuous 
efforts were made by the Government to increase the de- 
fensive power of the country. The Gardes Mobiles were 
called out throughout the whole of France, old soldiers were 
recalled to the ranks, the troops destined for the Baltic 
expedition (including marines), were hurried to the capi- 
tal, and provisions laid in with the utmost despatch. 

Whether it was necessary to give up the whole of the 
country east of the Moselle without resistance is a matter 
for discussion, but under the circumstances it was probably 
advisable. The defensive positions on the Nied were not 
suitable for an army so large as that of Bazaine, and the 
co-operation of MacMahon could, moreover, scarcely be 
expected. At Frouard, however, on the Moselle, both armies 
might easily have been concentrated by the 13th, and the 
position would have been both strategically and tactically 
powerful. On the other hand, the fortress of Metz was in 
a most defenceless state, and urgent appeals were made to 
secure its safety by the detachment of a large force. By 
marching the troops of Bazaine through the town, time 
and opportunity would be given for strengthening the 
works and reinforcing the garrison of the virgin city. 

After their successes at Worth and Spicheren, the 
three German armies occupied with their leading troops 
a south-easterly line passing through the two places, the 
III Army (Crown Prince) being separated from the other 
two by the mountain chain of the Vosges. Owing to the 
hurried retreat of the French forces, contact was lost for 
the time ; but it was naturally supposed that a serious stand 
would be made on the line of the Moselle. To effectually 

*21st August. 

—16— 



Extract , 

link the armies together and make a simultaneous advance 
towards the retreating troops, it was necessary to make a 
strategical wheel to the right on the pivot of Saarbrucken. 
To carry out this measure the I Army (Steinmetz) had to 
remain halted, the II Army (Prince Frederick Charles), 
gathering up its rearmost troops, had to push forward 
south to form the centre of the line, while the III Army 
(Crown Prince), forming the outer flank, had to traverse 
the difficult defiles of the Vosges, and close in on to the left 
of the II Army. The passes through the mountains which 
the Crown Prince had to utilize were closed by small forts, 
none of which proved a real obstacle with the exception of 
Bitsch and Phalsbourg.* Advancing in five different col- 
umns, the mountain range was crossed in two days, and 
union with the left of the II Army effected on the line 
of the Saar. As soon as the wheel was completed, the 
three armies marched westward through Lorraine, linked 
together in one homogeneous body, with their front covered 
by a numerous cavalry, two days' march ahead. On the 
12th of August the positions marked in the map were 
reached, the right of the whole force resting on the Nied, 
the left somewhat withdrawn at Saarburg. 

The same evening the French Emperor, constrained 
by public opinion, handed over the command to Bazaine, 
with definite instructions to retreat at once through Metz 
on Chalons. Numerous temporary bridges had been pre- 
viously thrown across the Moselle, but were rendered use- 
less for the most part on account of heavy floods. The 
whole of the 13th was occupied in arranging the details of 
a passage, which was not commenced till the following- 
morning. The French troops were encamped on the right 
bank of the river in a wide semi-circle, within range of the 
detached forts. The cavalry patrols sent out in the morn- 



*Bitsch — a strong isolated fort — was invested by Bavarian 
troops, and did not fall into German hands during the war. 

Phalsbourg, commanding the high road through Vosges, was 
bombarded by the XI Corps and eventually invested by Landwehr 
troops. The commandant made a most gallant resistance with the 
small garrison at his disposal (1200 men), and held the fort up to 
the 12th December, when famine forced him to capitulate. 

—17— 



Precis of the. Franco-German War 

ing did not report the presence of an enemy, and the re- 
treat was leisurely begun from both flanks of the line of 
bivouacs. By 3 o'clock half the French forces had crossed 
the river. 

In the meantime, the three German armies, steadily 
advancing, had reached with their advanced troops the 
vicinity of Metz and the general line of the Moselle. 

The General commanding the advanced guard of the 
VII Corps (I Army) arriving at Laquenay saw the French 
troops gradually defiling to the rear. Aware that it was 
highly important that the French retreat should be delayed 
as much as possible, in view of the contingency that a flank 
attack might be made on the leading troops of the II Army 
now crossing the Moselle, he determined to assault at once 
with the small force at his command (a brigade), inform- 
ing at the time the commanders of the corps nearest him 
(the I, VII, and IX) of his intention. Covering the French 
retreat was the 3rd Corps (Decaen), deployed in two lines 
facing to the east on the heights above the village and 
valley of Colombey. These troops were in the act of re- 
tiring when attacked impetuously on their centre by the 
Goltz brigade. On the German side were advancing in 
support the leading troops of the I and VII Corps, on the 
outer flanks of which were two cavalry divisions. The 
gradual reinforcement of the fighting line eventually con- 
verted into a battle what was originally but a vanguard 
action. To meet the increasing hostile forces, a portion of 
the French 4th Corps (Ladmirault), which had crossed 
the river, was repassed to the right bank, and in conjunc- 
tion with the troops of Decaen resisted the German ad- 
vance with success. The Imperial Guard was available for 
offensive purposes, but was employed solely as a reserve. 
As night closed neither side had given way, and in accord- 
ance with the orders of the morning the French retreat 
was continued, and the remainder of the army passed across 
the river under the ' protection of the detached forts. 

This battle — commenced at an hour at which engage- 
ments often terminate — may be cited as a successful ex- 

—18— 



Extract 

ample of an advanced guard action, where a small body 
of troops initiated a strategical victory by arresting the 
retreat of an army, maintaining at the same time, without 
retiring, the forward position to which a bold attack had 
committed them. Victory has been claimed bj^ both sides, 
and tactically it may fairly be considered to be a drawn 
fight. The strategical importance of the engagement was, 
however, clearly seen by the German Headquarters, as 
evinced by the order issued on the morning of the 15th : — 
"The fruits of the victory (i. e. Borny) can only be gained by 
a vigorous offensive by the II Army towards the Metz-Ver- 
dun Road (east of Metz)." The attack of General Goltz 
with his advanced guard brigade was certainly justified by 
its success but it is an open question whether in case of 
failure it would not have incurred much hostile criticism. 
The conduct of Bazaine at this period has been much com- 
mented on. It has been urged that if he was bent on re- 
treating, he should not have fought at all on the 14th, but 
let the guns of the Metz forts keep the enemy at a distance ; 
or if he accepted battle, he should have taken a vigorous 
offensive against the inferior forces in his front. On the 
other hand, he has stated as his opinion that he was com- 
mitted to a retreat, but that the outer detached forts were 
in such a defenceless state that they were liable to be taken 
by assault, and that therefore the onward pressure of the 
Germans had to be resisted up to a certain point. 

On the following day the march westward of the 
French was continued. From Metz two main chaussees lead 
towards Verdun — ^the northern passing through Woippy, 
St. Privat, and Briey, the southern through Longeville to 
Gravelotte, where the road bifurcates. It was intended 
that the retreat should take place by the southern of these 
roads as far as Gravelotte, and thence by the chaussees 
leading through Doncourt — Conflans and Rezonville — 
Mars-la-Tour. On the Rezonville Road the 2nd Corps 
(Frossard) was to lead, followed by the 6th (Canrobert) 
and the Guard; on the more northern route the 4th Corps 



-19— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

(Ladmirault), followed by the 3rd (Leboeuf ) * which was 
again to act as rear guard in anticipation of an attack from 
the north of Metz by the I Army. Great delay was caused 
in passing through Metz, owing to the encumbrance of quan- 
tities of unnecessary baggage,t and the insufficient bridg- 
ing of the Moselle. Some additional time was also undoubt- 
edly lost on account of the action of Borny. The troops 
on the most southern road were ready to advance, but were 
obliged to wait until the rest of the forces had reached 
their assigned positions. On the evening of the 15th, the 
2nd and 6th Corps were bivouacked in the neighbourhood of 
Rezonville, the Guard being to their rear on the Gravelotte 
plateau. During the day the presence of German cavalry 
and artillery on the left flank made itself apparent, but 
the importance of the fact does not appear to have sug- 
gested itself to the French staff. Aware that Bazaine was 
in full retreat, the German II Army pushed forward with 
alacrity in the direction of Verdun, in order to intercept 
him. It was necessary to keep some troops on the eastern 
side of Metz, to prevent sallies of the garrison — a duty 
which naturally fell to the I Army, which was already in 
position. 

On the evening of the 15th, the II German Army had 
four of its corpsj on the line of the Moselle (Metz to 
Frouard) one division having reached the advance position 
of Thiancourt. Further south, the general line of advance 
was taken up by the troops of the III Army. 

The French retreat was to have been resumed at 4 
A. M., but owing to the 4th Corps not having come up into 
line was deferred till midday. Early in the morning a 
reconnaissance in force was made by the 5th (German) 
Cavalry Division, and four batteries of horse artillery. Ad- 
vancing at a gallop, the batteries unlimbered on a hill south- 
west of Vionville, and rapidly shelled the French cavalry 

* General Decaen was mortally wounded at Borny. 

fAccompanied by large trains of personal baggage, luxurious 
mess equipages, and crowds of servants and adventurers, the army 
of Bazaine has with some severity been entitled the army of Darius. 

JThe II, X, IX, and IV. 

—20— 



Extract 

camp to the west of that village. Taken completely by sur- 
prise, the French squadrons galloped to the rear in com- 
plete disorder, and eventually re-formed behind the line 
of their infantry bivouacs at Rezonville. More to the east- 
ward, from the direction of Gorze, the 6th Cavalry Divi- 
sion now drove in the outposts in front of them, and com- 
pleted the arc of observation. Against the wide circle of 
cavalry, extending from the Bois de St. Arnold to the 
Tronville heights, the French infantry advanced to attack 
in lines radiating from the centre — Rezonville. At 10 
o'clock, at the extremities of the cavalry arc, the first 
Prussian infantry appeared on the ground — the 5th and 
6th Divisions of the III Corps. An immediate advance was 
made by these troops, and the villages of Flavigny and Vion- 
ville captured with heavy loss. At noon the French, act- 
ing generally on the defensive, occupied the heights west 
of Rezonville with two corps facing westward. Bazaine, 
apprehensive of being cut off from Metz, kept his reserves 
on the Gravelotte plateau. The French right (3rd and 4th 
Corps) were moving southward towards the line of battle. 
It will be seen that one German corps, preceded by two 
cavalry divisions, had thus placed themselves across the 
road in front of the whole French army. At 2 : 00 P. M. the 
French 3rd Corps came into action, and it was apparent 
that an advance was about to be made by the right of the 
French line. In order to effect delay, and give time for 
reinforcements to come up, a brigade of German cavalry 
was launched against the threatening troops, and their dar- 
ing charge, in spite of enormous loss,' effected its object. 
At 3 o'clock the X Corps arrived in time to reinforce the 
threatened German left, and about the same time the 
French right was increased by the addition of the 4th 
Corps. The line of battle, which formerly stood nearly 
west, now faced due south. A series of attacks with vary- 
ing success were made by the newly arriving French troops, 
and finally led to a great cavalry engagement in the vicin- 
ity of Mars-la-Tour, for which both nations claim success. 
On the other side of the battle-field a desultory fight was 



-21— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

kept up as long as daylight lasted. The losses of the con- 
tending forces were very heavy — amounting on each side to 
about 16,000 men. 

The true importance of this day cannot be judged of 
by its tactical results. The Prussians had certainly not been 
able to drive the French out of their main positions; but, 
on the other hand, the French had not been able to recover 
the ground lost before noon, nor re-continue their march. 
The victory, however, clearly lay with the Germans in a 
strategical point of view. By a bold employment of their 
numerically inferior forces they had stopped the French 
retreat, and given time for their main body to effectually 
interpose between the junction of the two Marshals. Much 
criticism has been expended on the unnecessary delay under 
the eastern forts of Metz, and the time occupied in crossing 
the Moselle. It is difficult to understand why the northern 
route by Briey was not utilized. Every moment was of con- 
sequence, and to endeavor to march the greater part of a 
large army by one route out of Metz could only lead to great 
loss of time. There appears to have been an idea that an 
attack would be made to the northward by troops crossing 
the Moselle lower down than Metz. At the same time, it 
was well known that the bulk of the II Army was approach- 
ing the line of the Moselle above Metz, and common precau- 
tion might have suggested the destruction of the permanent 
bridges at Ars and Pont-a-Mousson. Bazaine (who took 
over the command of the army on the evening of the 12th) 
did not apparently realize the necessity of a retreat west- 
ward, but was more inclined to rest on Metz as a base from 
which offensive operations might be directed. This view 
was perhaps not unnatural, particularly when the weak 
state of the detached forts was considered ; but still it was 
against the spirit of the orders he had received and mili- 
tated against their being effectively carried out. The 
French forces were , considerably inferior in numbers to 
those of their adversaries, and the best hope of success lay 
in a retreat for the purpose of combination. It is diffi- 
cult to see why the fatal delay in marching off was per- 

—22— 



Extract 

mitted. Assuming that the previous loss of time was un- 
avoidable, the reason for a further stoppage seems insuffi- 
cient. The presence of the German cavalry was well known 
and if an uninterrupted retreat was desirable, every mo- 
ment was of value. Admitting that the 4th Corps was late 
in its appearance, this defect might still have been partially 
obviated by directing it to act as a rear guard on the more 
direct southern road, while the Guard could have been 
shifted to the more northern chaussee. When committeed 
to the engagement at Rezonville, why was a continuous 
defensive so sedulously maintained? The German troops, 
if attacked with the vigour naturally in accord with the 
French spirit, during the morning must have been defeated. 
Even in the afternoon, when their reinforcements came up, 
they were numerically much inferior to the troops of the 
Marshal. The bulk of the German forces were in the act 
of crossing the Moselle, and a vigorous effort directed 
southward must have driven back their leading troops in 
confusion, and possibly allowed the army to pursue its re- 
treat. A defensive line was, however, taken up instead, 
and the reserves kept on the left flank. Bazaine allows 
himself that he was afraid of being cut off from Metz ; but 
that surely cannot be admitted as a valid plea. His orders 
were to retreat on Verdun, and in natural concurrence with 
this would be a departure from Metz. The fear of leaving 
the fortress which he avowedly shows, demonstrates how 
completely he failed to realize the exigencies of the strate- 
gical situation. With regard to the bold attack of the III 
German Corps, it may be fairly questioned — despite most 
of the German accounts — whether its commander was at 
all aware of his having the whole French army in front of 
him. Throughout the battle the Germans laid themselves 
open to be beaten in detail, and that they were not so must 
be attributed more to the inaction of the French Marshal 
than to any tactical combination of their own. 

On the night of the 16th both armies bivouacked on 
the field of battle, but at daybreak the French forces retired 
according to orders towards Metz — the retrograde move- 

—23— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

ment being adopted ostensibly on the ground of want of 
ammunition and food supplies. The army eventually took 
up a position on the continuous chain of heights to the east 
of and overlooking the Mance rivulet (extending from 
Rozerieulles to St. Privat-la-Montagne). On the evening 
of the 16th orders were issued for the concentration of 
the II Army on the battle-field. The III and X Corps, and 
a portion of the VIII and IX were already on the ground. 
There was little danger to be apprehended from a sortie 
from the fortress to the south or east, so the VII and VIII 
Corps of the I Army were ordered to cross the river and 
form with the IX the right of the bivouacked troops. The 
XII Corps and Guards were directed northward to the left 
of the line in the neighborhood of Mars-la-Tour. The I 
Corps was left as a precautionary measure on the right 
bank of the river, and the II Corps, which was somewhat 
in rear, hurried forward to Pont-a-Mousson. 

There was some uncertainty at the German Head- 
quarters as to whether the French intended to attempt 
pursuing their retreat by a more northerly route, or offer- 
ing a defensive battle under the forts of Metz. Equally 
prepared for either contingency, the order was given for 
an advance in echelon of corps from the left in a northerly 
direction, the XII Corps, leading, followed by the Guards 
and IX Corps, the X and III Corps following in second line. 
The VIII Corps was to move on the right rear of the IX 
and the VII still further to the right, forming the pivot 
in the case that a wheel to the right towards Metz should 
be necessary. 

The French position extended for 7 miles along the 
crest of an open and broad ridge, the western slope of 
which mostly fell with a gentle declivity. The left wing- 
was very strongly posted, owing to the nature of the 
ground and the protection afforded by the fort of St. 
Quentin and the Moselle valley. The right wing rested on 
no natural or artificial obstacle, and but few temporary 
arrangements were made for its protection, owing to the 
absence of engineering tools. The reserve was posted in 
rear of the left wing. 

—24— 



Extract 

As the German echeloned corps marched northward, 
covered by their cavalry scouts, it soon became apparent 
that the French had delayed their retreat and taken up a 
defensive position resting on Metz. Orders were accord- 
ingly issued to move up into line in order to attack, it 
being intended that the two leading corps (the VII and 
Guards) should envelop the French right flank. The sim- 
ultaneous assault on the whole of the front line was pre- 
vented principally from a misconception as to the limit to 
which the French defensive position extended, and the 
battle was commenced at midday by the artillery of the IX 
Corps. In order to afford support, the VI and VIII Ger- 
man Corps advanced against the left of the French line, 
while the left wing of the II Army continued its steady 
movement onward. The artillery of the Guards by 2 P.M. 
came into action on the left of the IX Corps, its infantry 
advancing against St. Marie-aux-Chenes. At 5 o'clock the 
French army held intact its whole main position, after a 
frontal attack, chiefly of artillery, had been raging for 
five hours without intermission. Soon after this time an 
advance across the- gently sloping glacis of St. Privat (the 
right of the French line) was made by the Prussian Guard, 
but was repulsed with heavy loss. The XII Corps by 6 :30 
o'clock eventually carried out its flank movement, and com- 
menced the attack of St. Privat from the north. A second 
advance — this time successful — was made at the same mo- 
ment by the Prussian Guard, and the French right was 
thrown back in utter confusion, just as darkness set in. 
Early on the 19th the beaten French troops took up their 
bivouacs in a concentrated position under the Metz forts. 

The objective of the two armies was at this period the 
same — an advance towards Paris — The French for the pur- 
pose of combination, the Germans to reach their natural 
goal, the Capital. If Bazaine could have left a sufficient 
garrison in Metz forts and have resumed his march, the 
double advantage would have been gained of detaining a 
large investing force round the fortress and uniting the 
two French armies. Success depended on the factor of 

—25— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

time ; and how this element was on the one side frittered 
away in baneful hesitation, and on the other utilized to 
its fullest extent, is study replete with interest. 

On the 18th August retreat westward was impossible, 
unless preceded by a decided success, for the obtention of 
which it was obviously necessary that more than purely 
defensive measures should be taken. A defeat to the Ger- 
man forces might have been most disastrous, and it is a 
question whether Bazaine did not lose a valuable oppor- 
tunity in not taking the offensive against the centre of 
the allied line. Whether it was expedient for the Germans 
to accept battle at all is somewhat doubtful. The inter- 
ception of the French retreat was complete on the 16th, 
and the French General could only resume his march by 
becoming the assailant and laying himself open to be at- 
tacked in flank. In lieu of taking up the Amanvillers posi- 
tion, it has been suggested that Bazaine might have passed 
his troops through Metz to the right bank of the Moselle 
on the 17th and taken the offensive in a south-easterly direc- 
tion, pushing his army towards Strassburg and cutting the 
German communications. That this course was possible 
with a well-led army has been pretty generally admitted; 
but it is doubtful whether under the inferior direction that 
signalized the warfare round Metz any such attempt could 
have been successful. 

The position of the combatants in this battle is espe- 
cially striking. Each army was facing towards its orig- 
inal base — the Prussians having their back to Paris, while 
the French faced towards it. As at Rezonville, the dispo- 
sition of the French reserve seems very faulty, and to have 
arisen from an entire misconception of the value of the 
supporting fortress. If the Imperial Guard had been sent 
in time to the assistance of the right wing, it is very doubt- 
ful whether the turning movement of the Saxons would 
have resulted in success. 

The retreat of Bazaine having been effectually put a 
stop to, the next object of the German leaders was neces- 
sarily to make innocuous the flower of the French army, 

—26— 



Extract 

so recently beaten, while a rapid advance was made against 
the troops of MacMahon. Orders were accordingly issued 
by the King, on the morning of the 19th, detailing a certain 
number of corps (comprising the I Army, and the II, III, 
IX and X Corps of the II Army), for the duty of investing 
Metz ; while the Guards, IV, and XII Corps were constituted 
into a fourth Army,* destined to operate with the already 
advancing III Army against Chalons and Paris. A circle of 
investment about 32 miles in extent was formed outside 
effective range of the detached forts, and diligently 
strengthened by means of earthworks and obstacles. Owing 
to the heavy losses of the preceding days, the German corps 
were much reduced in numbers, and the investing force 
may be estimated at from 160 to 170,000 men — an effective 
the total of which was daily increasing, on account of the 
arrival of reinforcements. The army of Bazaine numbered 
about the same, inclusive of a large number of wounded 
and noncombatants. 

The III Army, in the meantime, had advanced nearly 
to the Meuse (south of Toul), and was awaiting the issue 
of the engagements about Metz. On the 19th it received 
orders to continue its march westward, and on the 20th 
the main body, in four columns, protected by cavalry on 
the left flank, had crossed the river. MacMahon's troops, 
consisting of the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, were at this 
period at the camp of Chalons. 

Part II 

(20th August to 31st October) 

METZ TO PARIS 

The original left wing of the French army, under 
the command of Marshal MacMahon, which was concen- 
trating since the middle of August at the camp of Chalons, 
consisted of the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, with the 
cavalry divisions of Bonnemain and Marguerite. Con- 



^Called the Army of the Meuse. 

—27— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

tinuous retreats and defective administration had exer- 
cised a most demoralizing influence on the morale of the 
troops already engaged, but the newly formed 12th Corps 
contained an excellent nucleus of well-trained men hitherto 
unshaken by defeat. A futile endeavor was made to utilize 
the Parisian Gardes Mobiles, who proved mutinous and 
unmanageable, and were obliged to be sent back to their 
homes. At the capital itself two more corps (the 13th and 
14th) were in process of formation, though they were not 
organized in sufficient time to take the field. Exclusive of 
these last mentioned troops, the Army of Chalons had an 
effective on the 20th inst. of 120,000 men with 324 guns.* 

The position of the French General was undoubtedly a 
difficult one; on the one hand it was his object to cover 
the capital, on the other to assist Bazaine and enable him 
to break through the formidable circle of investment that 
surrounded him. To risk the defeat of his troops by offer- 
ing battle at Chalons would be dangerous, and but tempo- 
rarily check the German advance ; to retreat on Paris would 
undoubtedly lead to the fall of the Napoleonic dynasty, the 
prestige of which was already severely shaken. The 
exigencies of the political situation demanded an attempt 
to succour Bazaine, while purely military grounds dictated 
the necessity of a retirement to the capital. The plan of 
campaign suggested by the War Ministry was to advance in 
three main columns through the Argonne towards Ver- 
dun, and thus gain the valley of the Meuse. Such an opera- 
tion could only be effected by making a flank march be- 
tween the III German Army and the Belgian frontier, and 
incurring the risk of a simultaneous attack on front and 
flank. Taking the most favorable view, it might possibly 
lead to the corps of the Meuse Army being beaten in detail, 
and as a probably consequence enforce the raising of the 
Metz investment. The hazardous nature of such a move- 
ment, combined with the fact that in case of Bazaine break- 
ing out southwards it would be perfectly futile, was fully 



*0n the 25th, 408 guns and 84 mitrailleuses, the total number 
of combatants being slightly increased. 



-28- 



Extract 

apparent. The absence of the authentic information as to 
the exact position in which the army of the Rhine was placed 
increased the difficulties of the situation and MacMahon, 
to temporarily escape his dilemma, determined on the 
medium course of marching on Rheims, to take up a posi- 
tion which would enable him to await the development of 
the enemy's plans, and at the same time flank the direct 
approaches on Paris. 

On the 21st the march northward was commenced, the 
camp being evacuated in such haste that large stores of 
food, forage and clothing had to be burnt. On the morning 
of the 22nd a telegram from Bazaine, stating that he be- 
lieved he could continue his retreat in a north-westerly di- 
rection through Montmedy, was received, and led to the can- 
celling of previously issued orders for retirement towards 
Paris.* Influenced by this despatch, and fortified by the 
unanimous opinion of the War Ministry, the Marshal start- 
ed in column of corps on the morning of the 23rd in a north- 
easterly direction towards Dun and Stenay,t having pre- 
viously warned Bazaine of his movement.$ In consequence 
of the difficulties experienced in feeding the troops, it was 
found necessary to approach the line of railway, and the 
whole of the 25th was occupied in rationing the army in 
their bivouacs at Vouziers-Rethel. 

Whilst the I and II German Armies were taking part in 
the decisive struggles before Metz, the III Army was ad- 
vancing slowly westward on the capital. Its main body had 
crossed the Meuse on the 20th of August, the three leading 
corps having reached the line of the Ornain. To co-operate 



*This despatch was dated 19th August, and written the morning 
after the battle of Gravelotte. It appears there was also a sec- 
ond telegram, couched in somewhat less hopeful language, dated the 
20th August, which MacMahon declares he did not receive. As a 
duplicate of this second message (which Col. Stoffel was accused of 
intercepting), did not strike the Parisian War Ministry as containing 
any additional information, it is dilRcult to conceive why so much im- 
portance has been attached to it. (Vide "Proces Bazaine. La de- 
peche du Vingt Aoiit," by Stoffel.) 

fThe direct route through Verdun being already intercepted. 

JA duplicate of this despatch reached Metz on the 30th August, 
and led to the sortie towards Noisseville the following day. 

—29— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

with these troops, three army corps were — as before men- 
tioned — detached from the forces investing Bazaine, and 
formed what was called the Army of the Meuse, under the 
command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. The III Army 
was obliged temporarily to halt, to allow this new body — 
which started from the Gravelotte plateau on the 19th — to 
come up into line. The entire German force destined for 
the advance on Paris was eventually, on the evening of the 
22nd, in a line facing west extending from Etain to Gondre- 
court (50) miles ; the Meuse Army forming the right wing, 
and the cavalry on the left being pushed forward as far as 
the Marne valley. Aware that the French forces were in 
the vicinity of Chalons, the advance was continued on a 
broad front in a westerly direction. On the 24th the gen- 
eral line of Verdun — St. Dizier was reached; on the 25th 
that of Dombasle — Vitry, the cavalry of the right wing be- 
ing pushed through the Argonne to St. Menehould. 

Reviewing for the moment the position at this date, 
it will be seen that a French army of more than 100,000 
men was moving eastward towards Montmedy, while the 
Prussian forces, two days' march to the south and unaware 
of the circumstance, were marching westward towards 
Paris. The first information the Germans received of the 
evacuation of the Chalons camp arrived late on the night of 
the 24th, in the form of a telegram, which stated that Mac- 
mahon had taken up a position at Rheims, and was about to 
relieve Bazaine. As the direct road to Metz was barred by 
the Meuse army, it was obvious that the only means of car- 
rying out such a plan would entail a hazardous flank march 
in close proximity to the Belgian frontier. As this seemed 
a somewhat improbable course, the German leaders con- 
tented themselves with directing their general line of ad- 
vance in a north-westerly direction towards Rheims. 

MacMahon, on the other hand, was on the 21st un- 
doubtedly aware of the existence, numbers, and general sit- 
uation of both the German armies. His flank march was 
made with a full knowledge of the danger incurred, and it 
was easily apparent that its only chance of success lay in 



-30- 



Extract 

extreme rapidity of execution. The delays at Rheims and 
Rethel had already imperilled the movement, and the fur- 
ther causes that led to the disaster of Sedan can be best 
traced by following the movements of both armies for the 
next few days. 

On the 26th, the French army wheeled leisurely to the 
right on the pivot of Vouziers, for the purpose of advanc- 
ing in two main columns on the Beaumont and Buzancy 
roads. In the afternoon, the cavalry of the right column 
(7th Corps, under Douay) reported the presence of hostile 
troops at Grand Pre, and this corps, in consequence, formed 
up in battle order, somewhat unnecessarily, at Vouziers. 

Owing to information received late on the 25th as to 
the movements of MacMahon, provisional orders were is- 
sued to both German armies, depending on the reports to 
be brought in by reconnoitering cavalry. As a result, the 
Meuse Army changing its front, moved northward in anti- 
cipation, and with its leading troops reached Varennes. 
The III Army closed in their corps to their right flank, so 
as to be ready either to advance toward Rheims or follow 
the movement of the Saxon Crown Prince. Covering these 
changes of direction, the cavalry extended in arc from Dun 
to Chalons; their persistence and daring forming a strong 
contrast with the inaction of their opponents. 

Apprehensive of an attack from the south, MacMahon 
moved three of his corps into the line Vouziers-Buzancy ; 
but as no attack was made, counter-orders were issued for 
the resumption of the march in a northeasterly direction. 
Resulting from these conflicting movements, but little 
ground was gained on this day. 

. From the reports of the German cavalry, the presence 
of hostile troops of all arms at Vouziers and Buzancy was 
clearly established, and the orders for a march northward 
accordingly confirmed. The Meuse Army seized with its 
leading corps the river passages at Dun and Stenay, while 
the III Army, a long day's march in rear, reached with its 
advanced troops the line Clermont-St. Menehould. 

In view of the threatening advance of the enemy, a re- 
treat northward was determined on, and the relief of Ba- 

—31— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

zaine abandoned. Unfortunately, the persistence of the 
War Ministy again constrained MacMahon to a course op- 
posed to his military judgment and counter orders were is- 
sued for a continued advance eastward. The objective of 
Montmedy was clearly pointed out to the corps comman- 
ders, and the necessity of seizing the bridges over the 
Meuse at Stenay and Mouzon insisted upon. These con- 
stantly changing instructions led naturally to much discom- 
fort and confusion; the roads were encumbered with bag- 
gage and provision columns in inextricable disorder, and 
but short marches were made at nightfallthe 5th Corps 
reached Bois-des-Dames (south of Beaumont) on the south- 
ern road, and XII Corps the neighborhood of Stonne on the 
northern, the two corps in rear gaining the line of the Bar. 

The IV Army meanwhile moved up its rearmost corps 
along the left bank of the Meuse,, still holding the river pas- 
sages with its advanced troops, while the IJI Army steadily 
advanced up the valley of the Aisne. 

On the evening of the 28th information was received 
that Stenay was occupied in force by Saxon troops, and the 
bridge blown up. . As the army of Chalons had no pontoon 
train, it was decided to retire northward, making use of the 
bridges at Mouzon and Remilly and eventually gaining Metz 
through Carignan. 

The troops on the northern road were unmolested, but 
the 7th Corps, harassed in rear by cavalry and impeded by 
bad roads, only succeeded in reaching Oches — half its des- 
tined march. The 5th Corps (owing to the capture of the 
officer carrying the order for retreat) continued its march 
on Stenay, was attacked by the Saxons at Nouart, and re- 
tired fighting, eventually reaching Beaumont much disor- 
ganized by its night march. 

On the German side there was a general tendency for 
the Meuse Army to halt till the III Army came up into the 
line Grand Pre-Dun,_the French movements being watched 
by cavalry. The XII Corps was, however, pushed somewhat 
forward, and brought on the action above alluded to. Both 
German armies completed their deployment in the evening, 

—32— 



Extract 

and between the Meuse and the Argonne six corps stood 
ready for advance northward — a general forward movement 
towards Beaumont being projected for the following day. 

To effect the passage of the Meuse at all risks with the 
greatest promptitude was the burden of the French in- 
structions. In spite of the efforts of the staff, the troops 
on the northern road, though unmolested, did not succeed 
in crossing at Remilly till late at night.* The columns on 
the southern road were still more unfortunate, and had to 
pay the inevitable penalty of mismanagement. The 5th 
Corps, owing to the fatiguing countermarches of the last 
few days, and the demoralizing effect of the night retreat 
it had just concluded, was very tardy in its movements, 
and shortly after noon was brusquely awakened from a 
fancied security by vigorous shell fire. It appears that De 
Failly, its commander, was under the impression that the 
German forces were marching towards Stenay, and that his 
retirement would be uninterrupted. As a fact, the whole 
German armies were advancing down the Meuse, expecting 
to find MacMahon in a defensive position ; and it was some 
of the batteries of the Meuse Army that spread such con- 
sternation through the bivouacs at Beaumont. The advance 
of the XII and I Bavarian Corps into line rendered a re- 
treat through the village compulsory, and the position tak- 
en up north of Beaumont had to be relinquished with heavy 
loss. Pressed in front and flank by superior numbers, De 
Failly retreated fighting on Mouzon — a movement much 
facilitated by the woody and intersected nature of the 
ground. Eventually the river was crossed, under the pro- 
tection of a portion of the 12th Corps, after severe losses 
had been sustained. 

The 7th Corps, harassed in rear by cavalry, left its 
camping grounds at Oches at 9 a. m., and marched by two 
roads to the river. The rear of its leading division, mis- 
taking its way, approached close to Beaumont, and was 
utterly routed by the advancing troops of the I Bavarians. 



*The 1st Corps — the 12th having crossed at Mouzon the previous 
day. 

—33^— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

The main body of the corps, after a tiresome march, crossed 
the river late at night at Remilly. Under the influence of 
the defeats sustained by his rearmost troops, MacMahon 
gave orders for an immediate retreat on Sedan, for the pur- 
pose of procuring them food, ammunition, and rest. 
Throughout the night troops of all arms, intermingled pell- 
mell, strove each man for himself to reach the required 
destination, and early the next morning the greater portion 
of the French army was bivouacked in an exhausted con- 
dition around the fortress. 

The two German armies, in a concentrated mass on the 
left bank of the Meuse, occupied meanwhile with their lead- 
ing troops the line of Mouzon-Raucourt. 

The French fugitives came pouring into Sedan from 
both banks of the river during the early morning. The 12th 
Corps, which was somewhat in rear, did not arrive at Ba- 
zeilles till 9 a. m., when it was fired on from the opposite 
bank of the Meuse. A brisk contest with some Bavarian 
troops was carried on, finally resulting in the railway bridge 
being left intact in the enemy's hands. The 1st Corps, 
which had acted as rear guard, made from mistaken orders 
a circuitous march, and did not reach its camping ground 
till late at night. 

It was apparently intended to give the troops rest dur- 
ing this day, as no arrangements were made or orders 
given for further movement. Several courses were open 
now to the French commander — either to break out towards 
Carignan and Metz, retire on to Belgian soil, retreat towards 
Mezieres, or fight in the positions already taken up. Of 
these undoubtedly the retreat westward was most in favour, 
and it was considered that plenty of time was still available 
for its execution. 

The 13th Corps, which had been forwarded from Paris 
under the command of General Vinoy, was assembling at 
this time at Mezieres. 

The German armies continued their march northward, 
detaching two corps (XII and Guard) to the right bank of 
the Meuse, in order to bar the space between that river and 

—34— 



Extract 

the frontier. On the evening of the 31st the contending 
forces were facing one another with their advanced troops 
in immediate contact. The badly conceived flank march of 
Macmahon had, owing to defective organization, utterly- 
failed, and his army now stood assembled in a curve round 
the small fortress of Sedan. Pressing it back against the 
neutral Belgian frontier, advanced the numerically superior 
German forces, deployed on a broad front. 

The position taken up by the French was tactically a 
strong one, and well calculated to ensure a stubborn de- 
fence. Its eastern boundary was formed by the valley of 
the Givonne, from the western heights of which effective 
fire could be maintained over any direct approach. Continu- 
ous ranges of hills formed parallel lines of defence to the 
north-west, and the south and west were protected by the 
broad valley of the Meuse. The fortress of Sedan, com- 
manded by the higher ground on the opposite side of the 
river, w^as but of little defensive value. Two corps overlooked 
the Givonne valley facing east, one corps (the 7th) , faced 
north-west on the Illy plateau, the remaining 5th Corps, 
under De Failly forming the reserve. In order to advance 
against the position from the west, a detour had to be made 
round the bend of the Meuse, through a single road pre- 
senting the characteristics of a defile. The country lying to 
the north was hilly and intersected, but towards the east 
was practicable for large bodies of troops. 

In accordance with orders, the German forces moved 
forward to the attack during the early morning of Septem- 
ber 1st. Three army corps moved from the eastward 
against the Givonne position, while two crossed the Meuse 
at Donchery and advanced towards the Sedan-Mezieres 
road. South of the fortress, on the opposite side of the 
river, one corps kept guard.* 



*Towards Givonne Valley. — Guard, XII and I Bavarian. 

Towards Sedan-Mezieres Road.— V and XI Corps. 

Watching southern exit. — II Bavarian. 

In Reserve. — IV Corps, Wurtemburg Division, and four cavalry 

divisions. 
The VI Corps and 6th Cavalry Division remained in rear near 

Vouziers, covering the left flank. 

—35- 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

It will thus be evident that two distinct attacks were 
to take place — one on each flank of the French lines. No 
special orders appear to have been issued for this day by 
MacMahon, it being intended to give a rest to the troops, 
and eventually lead them either to Carignan or Mezieres, 
according to force of circumstances. 

The engagement commenced at an early hour in the 
morning by an attack of the I Bavarian Corps on Bazeilles 
— the village, occupied by the French right, which was 
shelled the previous evening. After six hours desperate 
fighting the town "was captured, and accruing reinforce- 
ments led to the French being forced back to the heights 
south of Fond-de-Givonne. Between Bazeilles and Daigny 
the XII Corps (Saxons) entered into line, while further 
north the Prussian Guard captured the village of Givonne. 
By noon the whole of the Givonne Valley was in German 
hands, the French holding the general line of the western 
crest. This loss of ground was mainly attributable to un- 
fortunate changes in the supreme direction. Marshal Mac- 
Mahon, wounded in the early morning, handed over the 
command to General Ducrot, who at once issued orders for a 
withdrawal westward, with a view to immediate retreat on 
Mezieres. General Wimpfen, a senior officer, considering 
the retreat impracticable, countermanded the movement 
whilst in process of execution, and endeavored to re-occupy 
the valley, in order to make an offensive sortie towards 
Carignan. 

On the western side, the V and XI Corps crossed the 
Meuse at Donchery and advanced through Vrigne-au-Bois 
skirting the bend made by the Meuse. 

The artillery of both corps d'armee came into action on 
the hills north of Floing, and canonaded the position held 
by the 7th Corps under Douay. As the infantry came up, 
they deployed along the heights and pressed forward strong- 
ly, especially against the French left at Floing. This vil- 
lage was carried, after hard fighting, and a general ad- 
vance made against the French line. The cavalry of Mar- 
guerite's Division sacrificed themselves in a vain attempt 
to turn the fortune of the day, and the troops of Douay 

—36— 



Extract 

gave way in all directions. On the eastern side the French 
were also losing ground, and the German right and left 
wing pushed forward north till they came in contact. 

On the south side of the fortress, the batteries on the 
opposite bank of the Meuse were during the battle firing at 
long ranges on the reserves and large fugitive bodies. 

By 3 o'clock the circle of investment was complete, and 
overwhelmed by the fire of nearly 500 guns, the French 
retreated in confusion to the nearest cover. A bold sortie 
towards Bazeille was attempted, but with little success, 
and by 4 o'clock all the main positions had been abandoned. 
To show the futility of further resistance, the guns of the 
victorious army were turned on the mass of fugitives in- 
side the fortress, and about 5 o'clock the white flag of sur- 
render was hoisted on the Citadel. 

Negotiations were carried on with a view to capitula- 
tioning the night, and the terms finally arranged by 11 a. 
m., the following day, by which the French Emperor and 
83,000 men became prisoners of war.* 

The ten days' campaign against the Army of Chalons 
forms one of the most striking episodes of the war of inva- 
sion. The plan projected in Paris for the relief of Bazaine 
was undoubtedly bold in its conception, though difficult to 
defend on strategical grounds. To successfully evade the 
blow of the advancing German armies by a flank march, two 
conditions were necessary, suflficient time to gain a fair 
start, and ample space to carry out the movement in. When 
the advance was made from Chalons, the most northern 
German corps was in the vicinity of Verdun, a march had 
to be effected through the narrow band of territory ex- 
tending between that fortress and the neutral Belgian fron- 
tier. Assuming the greatest expedition to have been used, 
it would have been impossible, under ordinary circum- 



f Killed 3,000 

*In the Battle -i Wounded 14,000 

[ Prisoners 21,000 

Prisoners at Capitulation 83,000 

Disarmed in Belgium 3,000 

Total 124,000 

—37— 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

stances, to escape the notice of the cavalry of the Meuse 
Army, and contact between the contending forces would 
have taken place, in any case, more to the eastward in the 
vicinity of Montmedy, Etain, or Thionville. If an extensive 
territory had existed to the northward, it might have been 
possible to make a long detour and successfully avoid ob- 
servation; but the limited zone for maneuvering forbade 
hope of any such advantage. To gain the requisite time on 
the enemy, it was necessary to draw him further away from 
Metz, either towards Paris or the south, or by a feint de- 
ceive him temporally as to the projected movement. As 
it happened, the German armies were in a central position, 
and were enabled to take advantage of the lesser space they 
had to traverse on the interior lines they occupied. In ad- 
dition to the strategical difficulties of the situation, the 
Army of Chalons was not in that thoroughly prepared state 
to make it equal to the requirement demanded of it. In 
spite of these unfavorable circumstances partial success 
was at one time by no means impossible. On the 25th Au- 
gust the French army of over 100,000 men Was on the flank 
of the German advance, and might, if expedition had been 
have beaten in detail the northern corps of the Meuse 
Army. Whether Metz could have been reached is a matter 
of opinion, but undoubtedly a well-timed sortie from Ba- 
zaine would have given an impulse towards success. To 
an amiy incapable from its nature of rapid maneuvering, 
the safest movement was assuredly towards the fortified 
capital, where a prolonged stand might be counted on and 
an investment rendered nearly impossible. As, however, in 
the political situation this course was impolitic, it would 
seem that a retreat to the north-west through Rheims, 
drawing the German army after it, would have been advis- 
able. If a forward movement towards Metz was a neces- 
sity, it would have been safer to make a detour southward 
and endeavor to conceal the movement by a feint towards 
the northern Argonne. Paris would have been left to de- 
fend itself (as it was afterwards compelled to do) with the 
nucleus of regular troops it possessed, and the further ad- 



—38— 



Extract 

vance of the German forces been endangered by the posi- 
tion of a powerful field army on their flank. The deplorable 
slowness of the marching and the insufficient scouting of 
the cavalry, that led to the surprises at Nouart and Beau- 
mont have already been alluded to, and combined with the 
want of unanimity in direction, formed a series of secon- 
dary faults that conducted in no small measure to the dis- 
astrous capitulation. 

The unfortunate delay at Sedan on the 31st is not easy 
to understand. The retreat on Mezieres would have been 
practicable on the following day, according to MacMahon's 
opinion ; but it is inexplicable that (as a precautionary meas- 
ure) more care was not taken in destroying the permanent 
bridges over the Meuse and scouting along the flank of the 
projected movement with cavalry. The successive changes 
in the supreme direction during the engagement undoubted- 
ly influenced its result ; but, at the same time, the order of 
battle was in itself defective, as it did not cover the line 
of retreat. 

It has been maintained that the German strategy was 
over cautious, and that a portion of their forces might have 
been, after the 25th of August, detached towards Paris. It 
is difficult, however, to see what advantage could have been 
gained. The French capital was too strongly fortified to 
have been taken by storm, and the great advantage of nu- 
merical superiority over the sole French army in the field 
would have been thrown away. With a portion of the Im- 
perial army closely invested at Metz, and the remainder 
compelled to capitulate, no further obstacle opposed itself 
to an advance on Paris. Within an hour after the capitula- 
tion was signed, orders were issued for the march west- 
ward, the I Bavarian and XI Corps being left behind in 
charge of the prisoners, for the conveyance of whom to 
Pont-a-Mousson and Etain arrangements were at once made. 
At these two places they were despatched for internment 
in Germany. 

The first measure to be effected was the opening out of 
the two armies from their closely concentrated position 



—39- 



Precis of the Franco-German War 

round Sedan. The order of march had been somewhat in- 
verted, the Hnes of communication of several corps having 
crossed, and this inconvenient displacement had to be recti- 
fied. The III Army started in a south-westerly direction 
to gain its former position on the left flank, while the Saxon 
Crown Prince with slower marches advanced westward. By 
regulating the length of the stages the different corps re- 
gained their respective positions in line, and on the 15th the 
whole force, preceded by four cavalry divisions, occupied 
a line 30 miles to the east of Paris, extending on both banks 
of the Marne from Villers-Cotterets to Rozony-en-Brie. 

As a result of the catastrophe of Sedan, the French em- 
pire was overturned by a bloodless revolution on the 4th 
September, and a Provisional Government formed for the 
national defence, under the presidency of General Trochu. 



—40— 



Part II 



German Accounts 



Order of Battle of the German Armies on the 1st 

August 1870 Under the Supreme Command of 

H. M. King William of Prussia 



Headquarters of H. M. King William 

Federal Chancellor and Minister President: Major-General Count 
V. Bismarck-Schonhausen. 

Chief of the General Staff of the Army: General of Infantry 
Baron V. Moltke. 

Quartermaster General: Lieutenant-General v. Podbielski. 

Inspector General of Artillery: General of Infantry v. Hinder. 

Inspector General of Engineers : Lieutenant-General v. Kleist. 

Adjutant General to H. M. the King: General of Infantry v. 
Boyen. 

Principal Adjutant and Chief of the Military Cabinet: Lieuten- 
ant-General V. Tresckow. 

Intendant General of the Army: Lieutenant-General v. Stosch. 

General attached to H. M. Staff: Major-General v. Steinacker. 



General Staff 
Adjutants to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army: 



(1) 



Major de Claer, attached to 13th Dragoons; (2) 1st Lieutenant v. 
Burt, 60th Regiment. 

Chiefs of Sections: (1) Lieutenant-Colonel Bronsard v. Schellen- 
dorf; (2) Lieutenant-Colonel v. Verdy du Vernois; (3) Lieutenant- 
Colonel V. Brandenstein. 

War Ministry 

Ministry for Foreign Affairs 

War Minister : General of Infantry v. Roon. 
Chief of Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel Hartrott. 

Summary of Forces (1st August) 





p 


P 










o 




















•a 

3 


d) 


§ 




d 


W 


S 






m 


m 


n 


O 


1st Army 1 


50 


32 


30 


180 


lid Army 


156 


148 


91 


546 


Hid Army 


128 
140 


102 
100 


80 
63 


480 


Other field troops L 


378 


Total of German Armies 


474 


382 


264 


1584 



—41- 



EXTRACTS FROM 

Moltke's Correspondence 

PERTAINING TO THE WAR OF 1870-71 

CHAPTER I 



TRANSLATED BY 

HARRY BELL 

Master Signal Electrician, U.S.A. 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

General von Moltke's first work concerning location and position 
of the Prussian forces in a probable war between France and Ger- 
many was written in 1857, when that general was detailed as chief of 
the general staff of the army. In that year an assembly of the Ger- 
man Confederation in Frankfurt on the Main had under consideration 
conditions of the garrison of the Confederate fortress of Rastatt. 
Being requested by the minister of war, Count v. Waldersee, to give 
his opinion concerning the right of Prussia to participate in the gar- 
risoning of that fortress and concerning the advisability of abandon- 
ing Landau as a Confederation fortress and constituting Germersheim 
as such, General v. Moltke composed the following memorial, which 
also considered in its scope the possibility of a war with France: 

MEMORIAL NO. 1 

Berlin, 28 November, 1857. 

The military frontier between Germany and France 
divides itself into two main sectors ; one, the line of the 
Rhine from the Wesel to Mayence, made extraordinarily 
strong by numerous fortresses, and the other, the line from 
Mayence to Switzerland, which is protected only by the 
fortresses of Germersheim and Rastatt and the Black For- 
est. 

In case of war between France and Germany it is al- 
most certain that the French main attack will be made on 
the line Strassburg — Ulm, while a secondary deployment 

—43— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

of forces from direction of Metz and Valenciennes will be 
made in the hope of containing the Prussian forces on the 
lower Rhine. 

Not counting on the neutrality of Belgium and the at- 
titude of the Netherlands, the chain of fortresses along the 
Rhine forms a serious obstacle to an advance farther north. 
On the other hand, the ease wiith which France can con- 
centrate an enormous mass of troops at Strassburg, and 
the projected building of a permanent bridge there across 
the Rhine, the splitting up of Southern Germany into small 
states and before all the isolation of the Vllth and Vlllth 
German Confederation Corps, leaves no doubt but that 
France will be successful at the start in this very theater 
of operations. 

Existing conditions clearly define Prussia's attitude 
in case of a French attack. 

Two army corps, presupposing that they are mobilized 
at the proper time, will dispute possession of the advantage- 
ous terrain on the left bank of the Rhine with the opponent 
until the mass of our forces and the Xth Confederation 
Corps are concentrated between Cologne and Mayence. Two 
hundred thousand men then will enable us to relieve Jiilich 
and Saarlouis and to take the offensive, be that on the right 
or the left bank of the Rhine, which at the same time will 
call a halt to any advance of the enemy into Southern 
Germany. 

It was just this view of things and of course the firm 
confidence in the power of Prussia and in its good will 
which, in 1831, caused the South German States to send the 
Vllth and Vlllth Confederation Corps not to the Lech 
(thereby leaving themselves unprotected), but to the Main, 
where an army was there concentrating numbering at least 
300,000 men, while one Prussian and the IXth Confedera- 
tion Corps assembled at Bamberg as a reserve. 

Since then conditions have changed. Prussia is no 
longer regarded in the same light, and Austria's influence 
In Germany has increased. The fortified places Ulm, Ras- 
tatt and Germersheim give the South German States greater 
independence. As far back as 1853 Austria, supposing a 

—44— 



Preparations for War 

threatened attack by France, insisted that Germany take a 
combined, so-called central, position on the Main. 

The Vllth and Vlllth Confederation Corps, from Ba- 
varia, Wiirtemberg, Baden and the Grand Duchy of Hesse, 
are to assemble between Germersheim, Rastatt and Stutt- 
gart, and the theater of war is to be prepared on the central 
Rhine by a fortified camp, the cost of which is estimated at 
12 million gulden. Austria says it will send 150,000 men 
there in the shortest time possible, and follow these up with 
50,000 reserves. It approved the location and position of 
the Prussian and of the IXth and Xth Confederation Corps. 
As a matter of fact these are two central stations with 
entirely diverging lines of retreat. Still Prussia will al- 
ways have its own army and its separate theater of war, 
which, for defensive purposes, is bounded by the Main. 

The organization of the Prussian army, its readiness 
for war and Prussia's own interests guarantee that Prussia 
will be on the Main with all available forces within six or 
eight weeks. 

In the convention Austria declared that, under unfavor- 
able circumstances, it would take twelve weeks to concen- 
trate 120,000 men on the Rhine. It is of course true that the 
completion of the railroads from Linz via Munich, Ulm and 
Stuttgart will facilitate matters, but in this case not only 
is the distance a great factor, but also the time required by 
Austria to organize new formations, especially should it 
have greatly reduced its army in the meantime. 

If France has decided on an attack on Germany, that 
attack will be in the nature of a surprise. 

In time of peace there are some 150,000 men garri- 
soned between Paris and the northwestern frontier ; Strass- 
burg is connected by rail with Metz, Paris and Lyons and is 
but half the distance from Stuttgart as from Munich 
and Nuremburg, the southern central position between 
Stuttgart and Rastatt — therefore Germersheim would be 
entirely too near the hostile frontier to serve as a point of 
concentration. Only if Austria places an army before or 
at the outbreak of war on the upper Rhine, may the South 
German States hope to directly protect their domains. If 

—45— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Austria does not do this, the retrograde, movement of the 
Vllth. and Vlllth Confederation Corps will come to a stop 
in favorable conditions at Ulm, and possibly only behind the 
Lech or still farther to the rear. 

An impartial estimate of the situation would lead the 
South German Governments therefore to the conclusion that 
their immediate succor may be found in Prussia and that 
the first retreat must be directed not eastward but north- 
ward towards the Main. 

Prussia's position on the Rhine protects Northern 
Germany. If Austria can not take over this role of pro- 
tection for Southern Germany, then the fortified places 
there will have to rely on their own resources. 

Considered from a mere military point of view, it does 
not appear desirable that Prussia should extend its original 
position beyond the Main, and we can but designate it a dis- 
advantage if we would weaken our forces in the field — al- 
ready much exhausted by participation in garrisoning fort- 
resses — by an additional or new participation in garrison- 
ing a Confederation fortress in Southern Germany. 

But, if political conditions imperatively require a par- 
ticipation in the peace garrisoning, then sight must not be 
lost of the fact that just Rastatt may be invested in the 
first few days after the outbreak of war and threatened by 
a formal investment. 

This is almost certain considering the proximity of 
this fortress to the left flank of the probable hostile line of 
operations, the supplies now in Strassburg, and the facility 
of communications. To draw off the Prussian garrison in 
such an event will only lead to the loss of the fortress. In 
case of an unfortunate outcome Prussia will have to bear 
all the blame. 

Landau and Germersheim are a little closer to the 
Prussian central position and can therefore be more easily 
reinforced. 

If we have the choice whether to make one or the other 
of these places a Confederation fortress, we undoubtedly 

—46— 



Preparations for War 

will decide on Germersheim*, it being, provided the garrison 
is equally strong, a better point and of more strategical im- 
portance on account of its position on the Rhine. It is 
evident that Landau, after Germersheim has been properly 
fortified, will be of little importance to the general interest 
of the German Confederation, considering that it is sur- 
rounded by dominating hills, that it can be reached directly 
from Strassburg over an unprotected railroad, and that it 
covers or protects no material sector. 

Still, as in the case of Rastatt, the same holds good for 
Landau, i.e., none of the Prussian troops stationed there 
in peace can be diverted from there in case of outbreak of 
hostilities. 

In how far these mere military disadvantages may be 
offset by permanent political interests of peace, has to be 
decided by higher authority. 



The following memorial of October 1858 seeks, in connection with 
an exposition of the relation of Germany to its smaller neighboring 
States, to outline Prussia's primary military measures in a probable 
war with France. 

MEMORIAL NO. 2 

Berlin, October 1858. 

I. Military — Political Conditions 

It is hot possible to state accurately the attitude of 
two large powers in the event of outbreak of war, even if 
only in general outlines, without at the same time paying 
proper attention to the military-political situation of the 
smaller states adjoining the theater of war. 

In case of war between France and Germany the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Sardinia would 
have to be considered. 



*H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Prussia made the following no- 
tation in the margin: "This point of view, originated by me, is just 
now very important to Prussia and should be pressed in the convention, 
that is, to insist on Prussia's right of transferring the garrison of 
Landau to Germersheim and to enlarge it already in time of peace 
and thus to transfer to another field the entire question of the fortress 
of Rastatt." 

—47— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The Netherlands are apparently outside of the probable 
theater of war — only Maastricht and Luxemburg being 
within it. The main point to consider is whether it would 
be friendly or hostile to Belgium. It is confined to a 
strictly defensive attitude, which is also favored by the con-, 
ditions of the terrain. 

It is true that a Dutch army might appear offensively 
from this state (which is hard to traverse and is protected 
by streams and overflows and is not endangered on any 
side) and to defend — in conjunction with Belgium and 
Prussia — its domain more surely outside its frontiers. But 
the state of the Dutch army makes it impossible to count 
on success in a campaign. 

Undoubtedly the Schiitterie (i. e. the Netherlands 
Militia), supported by line troops, may help to defend the 
half ruined fortresses, the dikes and dams of the father- 
land against invasion. 

Considering the actual strength of the army in winter 
time — 10,000 men — the mobile army can hardly amount 
to more than 30,000 men. And for this organization there 
is an absence of necessary cadres and equipment. The 
greater part of the men only serve four months with the 
colors. Cavalry horses can be obtained only from Hanover 
and Oldenburg and that requires six months time. Only 
the artillery is up to date. 

Under these circumstances it seems certain that the 
intention is to merely defend the so-called Utrecht line. 
Bergen, Breda and Herzogenbusch are already considered 
merely as advanced posts and Maastricht, so important for 
the entire Rhine country, is to be abandoned. It appears 
that the defensive works at that place are intentionally 
allowed to deteriorate and that the munitions of war stored 
there are being transferred. 

It is doubtful whether or not the king of the Nether- 
lands, as a German Confederation Prince, will, under these 
conditions, furnish .his contingent for Luxemburg. It 
would not be at all improbable, that Prussia wpuld have to 
take over the defense of this important place by itself and 



Preparations for War 

even have to occupy Maastricht in order to prevent it from 
becoming a French depot to serve as a base for an advance 
towards the Rhine. 

It is hardly to be expected that Holland would take 
sides against Germany in order to regain, with the help of 
France, Belgium or a part of it. In such a case we may 
certainly count on Belgium to fulfill its obligation under 
the treaty of the Confederation. 

To occupy Holland at the very start by Prussian troops, 
to make sure of having in our possession the very rich 
sources of supplies offered by that country, would mean an 
unjustifiable splitting up of our forces and would undoubt- 
edly lead to war with England. 

Belgium, since gaining its independence, has made 
more progress than any other European State. In spite 
of its different elements there has arisen a strong" feeling 
of nationality. The original feeling of absolutely necessary 
dependence on France no longer exists. Belgium sees in 
France its only actual enemy to its national independence; 
it considers England, Prussia and even Holland as its best 
allies. 

If we respect Belgium's neutrality we would protect 
thereby the largest part of our western frontier. 

It is of course true that France can concentrate with 
ease and in the shortest time a large army at our immediate 
frontier in Metz. Still, operations against the lower Rhine 
require a broader base, which can be furnished only by 
Belgium. As it is not probable that Belgium will ally 
itself with France, France's first step will always be to in- 
vade that country in order to take serious measures against 
Prussia. - 

To protect its neutrality, Belgium intends to organize 
a force of 100,000 men. Peace measures, however, have 
not been taken in such a manner as to allow us to hope that 
it could put an efficient army in the field. The Belgian 
fortresses require an army of 40,000 men. Entirely aban- 
doning/the rest of the country and the capital, it is the in- 
tention to concentrate the rest of the army in a fortified 



Moltke's Correspondence 

camp at Antwerp and to make a stand there until outside 
support arrives. 

Considering the extended net of railroads it is possible 
that in a very short time 50,000 to 60,000 men— the larger 
part of them being reserves — can be assembled, who have 
served but a few months. The cavalry will be very inferior 
and the artillery will form the best part of the army. 

But even if this army occupies the best permanent 
works, help for it must not be too long delayed. There is 
no hope to expect such help from Holland. 

England's army is in India and will be required there 
for years to come. Even if 10,000 to 15,000 British can 
make a landing at Ostend or Nieuport, which is very diffi- 
cult, or even if their ships go as far as Antwerp, that would 
not mean that it would be possible to proceed offensively 
against a French army. 

Belgium can expect help only from Prussia. 
But for this purpose the fortified camp at Antwerp is 
badly chosen. With the means which remain in the open 
field to the Vllth and Vlllth Prussian Army Corps after 
occupying the Rhine and Confederation fortresses, and 
eventually also Maastricht and Venloos, there is no chance 
of direct support within twenty miles [German miles=4^ 
English miles]. Now, however, the recommendations of 
the government to build a fortified camp at Antwerp has 
been rejected by the House of Parliament, and the Belgian 
army will be disappointed in its expectation to find protec- 
tion behind the present works there. 

On the other hand, a fortified camp at Namur would 
cover the larger part of the country, and even the capital in 
some manner, and secure the direct support of the Prussian 
troops, or eventually their falling back on that camp, while 
there is no chance to fall back on Antwerp at all. The flank 
position on the Maas, in connection with the fortified Na- 
mur, protected on the left by the Ardennes, but a day's 
march from the fortresses of Charleroi, Dinant and Huy, 
with the rich Liittich and the railroad in rear, seems very 
suitable for the offensive as well as for the defensive, as 

—50— 



Preparations for War 

also for the subsistence and reinforcement of the Belgian 
army. 

It is unquestionable that the location of the Belgian 
army at Antwerp is also of advantage to us in so far as the 
French attack will have to leave there a large corps, and will 
be considerably weakened in consequence when reaching 
our frontier. Still we must consider that Belgium, the 
frontier places of which are in bad condition, will be lost 
sooner than our corps can reach the Rhine from the center 
of the Monarchy and that it will have to be retaken. 

Consequently the question arises as to whether the 
Belgian Government, without our entering into definite 
agreements with it, can be induced to concentrate its army 
on the Maas instead of at Antwerp. 



More unfavorable than in the northern, are the political 
conditions in the southern part of the large theater of war 
in case of a war between France and Germany. 

In similar manner as the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
Sardinia, in the Paris Peace Convention, was made a bul- 
wark against future attacks by France on Germany. Sar- 
dinia is in possession of the important passes across the 
Alps from Mont Blanc to the sea ; it received ten millions of 
French contribution money to secure these passes by fort- 
resses, while on the other hand Alessandria, close to Lom- 
bardy, was deprived of many things. Still, conditions since 
those days did not develop in accordance with the policies of 
the different cabinets; and the latter themselves have been 
brought to a different standpoint partly by national and 
social ideas taking possession of the people. 

For a number of years the national movement has been 
increasing in Italy, having for its aim the confederation of 
all Italian states under one general government. 

Sardinia feels called upon to be the champion of this 
movement. The domination of Austria in Italy is the main 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the object. At the Euro- 

—51— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

pean Congress at Paris in 1856 a Sardinian minister pro- 
tested, in the name of Italy, against that domination : "There 
can be no understanding between Sardinia and Austria, as 
long as the latter owns an inch of Italy." The Sardinian 
army waits impatiently for the moment when it can even, 
in a new campaign, scores with Austria. Alessandria and 
Casale, now fortified, are the supporting points for the ex- 
pected war. 

In Italy, with this national tendency, is felt far-reach- 
ing republican sentiment. In case of conflict both will 
separate, will oppose each other. Even now the Sardinian 
government, which is the most powerful of the Italian de- 
. pendencies, cannot shake off its suspicious ally. More than 
once a breaking off of diplomatic relations with Austria 
was imminent, in place of the government having the cour- 
age to muzzle the press. If in a probable war the goverii- 
ment or the Mazzini faction will control the movements is 
doubtful and will mainly depend on conditions under which 
France enters the theater of war. So far, however, and up 
to a certain point all the different parties are in accordance 
and relentlessly insist on war with Austria. 

On account of its excellent military system, Sardinia 
is a formidable opponent. It does not at all profess to await, 
inactively, foreign interference. It can concentrate within 
four or five weeks an army of 60,000 men at Turin, ready 
to take the field, which can reach Stradella within a few 
marches and there, based on Casale, Alessandria and Genoa, 
cover the entire country in a strong position, flank a hostile 
crossing over the Ticino, immediately threaten Milan, and 
also can be reinforced for an offensive operation by a part 
of the very important fortress garrisons (40,000 men) . 

So much for the threatening position of Sardinia. The 
remaining Italian powers are of less importance, but as 
long as France keeps troops in the "Church Domain" the 
southern frontier of Lombardy cannot be considered secure. 

It is clear that in this case Austria cannot appear in 
Germany in force nor in a short time. 



-52- 



Preparations for War 

Of special importance, finally, is Switzerland, which 
forms a bulwark in the center between the German and 
Italian line of defense. 

Neutral Switzerland separates the armies which Aus- 
tria can place in Germany and in Lombardy; it is the key 
to the interior of Fi-ance, to the "Franche-Comte." If we 
may now assume that a French army will enter this moun- 
tainous country, then it will find itself there in a central 
position difficult to attack, from which it can debouch via 
the upper Rhine against Southern Germany or via the easy 
Alpine passes against Upper Italy, in which case not only 
Austria's offensive against Sardinia but also its defensive 
in Lombardy can be taken in rear and from which even the 
Tyrol can be threatened. 

The consequence of hostile occupation of Switzerland 
would be that the Rhine and the Ticino would no longer 
form the original defensive line of the German armies but 
rather the Iller and the Mincio. The line of the first posi- 
tion would be from Rastatt via Ulm, Feldkirch and Peschiera 
to Mantua and the rich countries of Suabia and Lombardy 
would at the very start be abandoned to the enemy. 

Consequently the question, whether Switzerland can 
maintain, and will maintain its neutrality — assured to it 
since the peace of Westphalia — becomes of the utmost im- 
portance. 

Switzerland emerged from the war of 1847 as a Con- 
federation State and with a well organized army of some 
100,000 men; it is true that this people's army has many 
defects, has hardly any cavalry, but it is well suited to the 
defense of the fatherland and can be concentrated in a very 
short time — that is within three weeks. 

Even though the fortifications of Geneva have been 
razed, and those of Basel are useless, and though France 
dominates the approaches to Lyon and Besancon in French 
Switzerland, still the Jura and the Aar compose a very 
strong defensive line. If now Switzerland intends to main- 
tain its neutrality, France must, in its very serious war 
against Germany, detach a special army for operations, the 

—53— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

outcome of which is doubtful and which will be of great 
advantage only if the operations can be quickly ended and 
before the German armies are able to take up the offensive. 

Liberal and radical principles have also found a foot- 
hold in Switzerland. As is known, France has sympa- 
thetic followers in the Waadtland, and in Geneva it has in- 
creased its influence with success and has, as a matter of 
fact, furnished the arbitrator lately in a matter of great 
importance to Switzerland. There seems to exist no fav- 
orable sentiments towards Germany. Public opinion and 
the press will apparently take France's side in case of 
hostilities. Still Switzerland's interests are well estab- 
lished. In giving up its neutrality the independence of the 
country is endangered ; the country will immediately become 
the theater of war, in which it can gain nothing because 
additions to its country are entirely beyond the interests 
of Switzerland. 

We may therefore reasonably assume that the Swiss 
Government, at the decisive moment and in spite of all 
party opinions and sympathies, will guard its neutrality 
and protect it with the entire forces at its command. 

If the policies of the Sardinian Government are in en- 
tire opposition to those of the Austrian Government, if on 
the other hand the Kingdom of the Netherlands has dropped 
down to military unimportance, still we cannot deny that it 
is of the utmost importance to pave the way in the very 
start to a friendly understanding with Belgium and Switzer- 
land. In this the question is: Shall Germany, in case of 
war with France, have two armies of 100,000 men for or 
against it, and shall we have to defend the lines from Lux- 
emburg to Basle or from Ostend to Geneva? 



Germany, with its two world powers, has an army of 
over a million of men. If we consider the number only, we 
are justified in coming to the conclusion that France by 
itself alone is far from being strong enough to wage a war 
against Germany. This conclusion is entirely justified, if 

—54— 



Preparations for War 

we may assume that Germany will be united, or will in the 
end be united — i.e., that Austria and Prussia will form a un- 
ion. The greatest danger to the peace of Europe lies in the 
unity of the two German world powers, and, if circum- 
stances still demand war, that unity guarantees a favorable 
outcome. 

In order to take up an enormous war with German 
Central Europe, in which war England might finally par- 
ticipate, France needs to take additional preparatory steps 
— i.e., the spreading of its power in the Roman West (Ro- 
manischen Westen). 

The situation in the Italian peninsula furnishes an op- 
portunity (which France will not allow to go to waste, as 
soon as interior conditions show this to be advisable) to oc- 
cupy the attention of the different parties with exterior 
matters. 

By an armed interference in Italian politics France 
threatens in the first place neither Prussia nor the main 
part of the German Confederation States. The operation is 
first of all directed against Austria, and that is, only against 
that part of Austria outside of Germany. In this France 
probably does not insist on an addition of terrain, it ostensi- 
bly fights for national ideas, and the primary question is to 
reestablish Italy. 

No matter how weak Southern Germany is on account 
of its disunion, France will there, between Austria and 
Prussia, seek no addition of terrain, but only, as in Italy, 
influence, prestige and protectorate. On the other hand it 
will concentrate all its force for the recapture of the Rhine 
line, the loss of which has never yet been forgotten. And 
this Prussia will have to prevent by itself alone, if Austria, 
driven out of Italy, has no longer the will nor the power to 
engage in a new campaign. 

In quiet times Prussia's prestige in Germany may be 
minimized or forced into the background by Austria's riv- 
alry, but in case of threatened danger it will always come to 
the front. If Prussia should show its disapproval of the 
pressure on Austria in Italy by it (Prussia) placing its 
army on the Rhine, then the smaller German states cannot 

—55— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

decline to participate in the general battle, which then will 
assume threatening proportions as far as France is con- 
cerned. 

It is difficult to say in advance in which manner this 
participation will be made. In the year 1830 the South 
German states were very glad to believe that Prussia would 
be their first support. They diligently sought that support. 
Later discussions, treaties and conventions did not bring a 
definite agreement, and the question as to the supreme com- 
mand will always be a difficult one. In accordance with the 
treaties of 1848, the IX and X Confederation Corps are to 
join the Prussian army, and, on the other hand, the VII and 
VIII Confederation Corps are to concentrate at Rastatt. 
To support these corps, Austria expects to immediately pro- 
ceed with 150,000 men to the Rhine, or to at least behind 
the Black Forest, to be followed by a reserve of 50,000 men 
as shortly thereafter as possible. The actual carrying out 
of that plan would correspond entirely to the general in- 
terest ; we shall see in how far it will actually be carried out. 

It is of course true that the VII arid VIII Confederation 
Corps can be assembled at Ulm or Wiirzbui"g in about the 
same time as they can be at Rastatt and Germersheim — 
that is, between the thirtieth and the forty-first day. In this 
matter the deciding factor will be the difference that in one 
case the separate contingents will advance against a con- 
centrated hostile army, while in the Other case they will 
march away from that army. 

If we, as undoubtedly appears to be the case, leave the 
initiative to France, a concentration at Rastatt — Germers- 
heim is impossible, and consequently there remains but a 
choice between Ulm and Wiirzburg as points of concentra- 
tion. 

If the South German contingents intend to seek Aus- 
tria's help, then, no matter whether that help is met at the 
Iller, on the Lech, or even at the Inn, the retreat and sub- 
sequent advance will make Suabia and Bavaria the perma- 
nent theater of war. If, on the other hand, the contingents 
can count on finding Prussian support at Wiirzburg, then it 



-56- 



Preparations for War 

is very doubtful if a French army will try to penetrate 
deeper into South Germany. 

No matter how desirable it is to ascertain all these 
conditions in. advance, conventions treating with that matter 
would, at the present time, hardly come to a satisfactory 
agreement. But when forced by necessity the South Ger- 
man Governments will not very long vacillate between the 
far off and uncertain support which will result in making 
their country the theater of war, and the nearby support 
which will protect their domain. In the latter case the im- 
portant and difficult question as to supreme command will 
answer itself. 

II. First Position of the Prussian Armies 

Eventually to he in Connection with the German 
Confederation Corps 

The above views seem to i^iake it advisable, after leav- 
ing the observation troops on the western frontier, to divide 
the balance of the army into three larger detachments, of 
which the first takes over, on the lower Rhine, the defense 
of the Rhine Province and its line of fortresses ; the second 
forms on the Main the offensive army proper, and the third 
being held in readiness on the Saale to march toward the 
one or the other directions according to how the hostile at- 
tack develops. 

It should be stated how strong each army detachment 
is to be, what army corps are to compose it, and when it 
can be concentrated. 

The army on the lower Rhine, in addition to the Vllth 
and Vlllth Army Corps already there, would consist of the 
Hid Army Corps and finally also of the Xth German Con- 
federation Corps. 

The Hid Army Corps is selected for this army de- 
tachment because it is the most suitable one in the center 
of the Monarchy and can be sent to the Rhine even before 
the general mobilization, to protect there the concentration 
of the Vllth and Vlllth Corps. 

If the Xth German Confederation Corps can be counted 
on at all, its geographical situation makes it advisable to 

—57— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

designate it for the lower Rhine, where it will protect the 
districts of its separate contingents. 

There would arrive in the vicinity of Diisseldorf : 

the Hid Army Corps on the 30th day, 
the Xth Army Corps on the 44th day, 

after orders for mobilization are issued. Consequently there 
would be at our disposal on the Rhine, within four weeks, 
three Prussian army corps; or about 100,000 men, not 
counting the strong fortress garrisons, and in about six 
weeks more than 135,000 men which, based on the Rhine 
line, will have to bring each and any hostile operations to a 
standstill. 

Even in case we cannot reckon on the participation of 
the Xth German Confederation Corps, it does not appear 
advisable to send a larger force than three Prussian army 
corps to the lower Rhine in the start and before conditions 
have better developed. The line of Prussian fortresses there 
is so strong that it can for a long time be held even against 
superior forces, and it has already been shown that the 
enemy can hardly reach that line without having materially 
weakened his force by detachments. 

France can secure to itself permanent possession of 
the left bank 6f the Rhine only by taking Cologne and 
Coblenz, and this would mean sieges connected with the 
utmost difficulties considering the activities of the defensive 
army and the fact that the French army would have the 
Wesel and Mayence on its flank. 

It would not be advisable to engage in battle on the 
left bank with superior forces, still we can not abandon 
that part of the Province without resistance. 

Conditions in Belgium will have to decide whether the 
Vllth Army Corps is to be advanced as far as Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle and the Vllth to Trier, or if it will be possible to merely 
observe the frontier (for the present covered by neutral 
terrain) and to meet at the Mosel with our entire force the 
advance coming from Metz. 

The army on the Main is to be formed of three 
Prussian with later on the IXth German Confederation 
Corps. Of these the former will arrive : 

—58— 



Preparations for War 

The IVth Army Corps on the 36th day, by marching, 

The Vth Army Corps on the 32d day, by rail. 

The Vlth Army Corps, it leaving the 12th Division behind on the 

42d day. 
The IXth Confederation Corps on the 33d day, 

after orders for mobilization have been issued. 

Consequently, by about the same time the concentra- 
tion of the Rhine Arrny has been completed, an additional 
86,000, or respectively 120,000 men, would be consolidated 
on the lower Rhine, and of these the larger part would 
already be there when the contingents of the Vllth and 
Vlllth Confederation Corps leave for their points of con- 
centration. It is clear, that this available force will give 
greater protection to the concentration of the two men- 
tioned corps at Wiirzburg or Bamberg, than were that con- 
centration made at Ulm, where the Austrian corps will 
arrive only one or two months later. If the Vllth and 
Vlllth Confederation Corps join the main Prussian army 
on the Main, there will be formed, by the 42d day, an army 
of over 200,000 men, which will protect the territory of the 
South German States. 

The Reserve army on the Saale consists of the lid 
Army Corps and the Guard Corps, a total of 66,000 men, 
for which we recommend the vicinity of Halle and Weis- 
senfels as a point of concentration because the most impor- 
tant railroads center there and by the utilization of which 
roads the corps can reach in a very short time either Diis- 
seldorf, Frankfort or Bamberg, as also, in case of need, 
Breslau and Hamburg. 

The Guard Corps can reach Halle — Weissenfels on the 
4th day, the lid Army Corps on the 46th day. 

Only by that time some conditions, uncertain until then, 
will be cleared up ; first, the steps taken by Russia, and the 
necessity of taking steps against Denmark. By that time 
we can ascertain further whether France makes its main 
attack against Belgium and consequently against Prussia; 
if we can count on an active participation of the Belgian 
army, provided we give that country open support; if the 
South German States have actually received Austria's 
promised help and if their contingents have joined the 

—59 — 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Austrian army ; and finally, if we can not count at all on the 
support of Germany and Austria in the ensuing war. In 
all these cases an immediate move of the Reserve Army to 
the lower Rhine via Hanover and Cassel would appear neces- 
sary. The army on the Main, in that case but 86,000 men, 
would under such conditions, by a defensive attitude, cover 
the left flank of the Rhine Army, which would be reinforced 
to at least 165,000 men, which latter army then would be 
charged with the offensive to be made in Belgium and, if 
ever possible, in France. 

If, on the other hand, the Belgian army remains in 
passive defense of its fortified camp at Antwerp and thereby 
draws a part of the French army to it, while the contingent 
of the Vllth and Vlllth Confederation Corps, possibly after 
an unsuccessful attempt to concentrate at Rastatt, are fall- 
ing back on Franconia, the Reserve Army, to give them a 
rallying place, would have to be sent to either Wiirzburg, 
Bamberg or Bayreuth, and to join thereafter the Army of 
the Main. 



In the spring of 1860 General v. Moltke composed a memorial 
which treated of the political and military situation of Prussia, as 
well as of the advance of its army in case of a war with either 
Russia or Austria or France. The following is that part of the 
memorial treating of a war with France. 

MEMORIAL NO. 3 

Berlin, Spring of 1860. 

Positions of the Prussian Army in a War With 
France 

The skillfulness of Emperor Louis Napoleon accom- 
plished the separation of the politics of the European Cab- 
inets. The dismembering of the treaties of 1815, fundamen- 
tally declared and actually accomplished, did not conduce 
to again bring the cabinets into harmony. 

With the help of other first class powers Russia had 
been humbled, without that help, Austria. From that first 
campaign France emerged without any material result 

—60— 



Preparations for War 

whatsoever, and with but little from the second. But the 
moral success obtained is immense. The emperor has 
strengthened his position in the country, the army has 
gained the feeling of invincibility. France not only has 
become the head of the Roman world, it has also chained 
the entire German territory to its policies, whether or no. 
Neither Russia nor Austria found help anywhere, and they 
on their part will hardly give any help. The one, engaged 
in reconstruction, will require years before it again can 
bring its force to be felt outside its territory; the other, 
deprived of some of its territory, shaken in its finances, 
disarms and lets things around it take their own course. 
There is no reasonable hope to expect the Idees Napoleonnes 
to stand still ; a European coalition which could oppose their 
advance is now less possible than heretofore. Up to now 
France has battled for others, now it will fight and conquer 
territory for itself. Theories of peoples' elections, of nation- 
alities and of the natural frontiers are excuses for all pur- 
poses ; the army and navy are the means for carrying them 
out. It is now England's and Prussia's turn; Cherbourg 
and Chalons threaten both of them. 

There can be no doubt at all but what the French are 
able to land on the other side of the Channel and that there 
they can cause serious damage. But it is impossible that 
the emperor can capture England or incorporate a part of 
it permanently in France. An actual increase in territory 
is only possible on the Rhine. There Prussia stands, and 
probably Prussia alone. The French navy is the forceful 
means to keep England quiet, while the French army de- 
mands back the once possessed and never forgotten Rhine. 
That once accomplished, Europe will acquiesce in the fact, 
as it did in the case of Belgium, Krakau, Neuenburg and 
Savoy. 

The help, on which we may count from outside, should 
not be estimated too high as to its effect. 

Even if Russia should decide on participation, we must 
remember that the mobilization of its army is very slow, 
that concentration takes time, that it stands a hundred 
marches behind the front, which we will have to defend in 

—61— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

the start. In any war, especially a war with France, Russia 
dare not leave the kingdom of Poland unprotected, and 
cannot disregard Turkey. A Russian auxiliary corps of 
even only 66,000 men could hardly reach, by rail, the Rhine 
within four months. 

From the entire territory of Great Britain and Ireland, 
England at the present moment cannot assemble 60,000 
men to defend the Channel; it cannot utilize its militia on 
the main land. Seriously threatened in its own country, 
it cannot support us directly. 

More important to us than these two powers in a war 
are the two small powers on the Rhine, Belgium and Holland, 
on account of their immediate participation, for with them 
it is a matter of absolute existence should France reach out 
toward the Rhine, and, though thus far they have shown 
little inclination to support Prussia, they will undoubtedly 
perceive at the decisive moment that they can expect help 
only from Prussia. 

The census shows that Belgium has 80,000, Holland 
30,000 able-bodied men. If this force could be timely 
assembled in time at Liittich and Maastricht and supported 
at Aix-la-Chapelle by a few Prussian corps, we could exe- 
cute an excellent defense of the Maas [Meuse] . 

But we cannot count on this. Both armies, especially 
that of Holland, have been neglected in the highest degree. 
In Brussels and at the Hague nothing is thought of but the 
strictest defense. The Belgian army is to be assembled 
at Antwerp in a position yet to be made, and there, abandon- 
ing the entire country and its capital, without possibility of 
retreat, its back to the sea, wait for help from England, 
which latter cannot help, itself. The Hollanders hope to 
finally arrive there and to engage in a passive defense 
behind the Utrecht line until somebody or other saves them. 

Prussia is a member of the German Confederation. 
Attacked by France, it may expect help from the Confed- 
eration, the help of half a million soldiers in the field. 

We will assume that the Confederation war is declared 
in Frankfurt and that none of the German states evades 
its duty. Prussia now will be required to place half of 

—62— 



Preparations for War 

its fighting force at the disposal of a still unknown com- 
mander-in-chief at a moment when it, attacked on its own 
frontiers, needs all its means to save its very existence. The 
immense Confederation help can shrivel down to an Aus- 
trian — South German army passively defending the Black 
Forest. 

Of the North German States, we cannot count at all on 
Saxony, but on the other hand Hesse and Nassau cannot 
prevent their countries from being garrisoned by Prussian 
troops. The states of the Xth Confederation Corps are 
also compelled to join us; the corps itself, in the start, 
ought to be held at our disposal for protection of the coast. 

It is not probable that Sardinia will emancipate itself 
from France in the near future and demand back Savoy. 
If it, continuing the inaugurated liberation of Italy, should 
turn against Venice, it will undoubtedly hold the four Aus- 
trian corps, at the present time still mobile and which are 
now stationed at Verona, Treviso, Padua and Laibach. It 
is true that in that case the mobilization and start of the 
corps intended for Germany will not be very quick, but 
just through this fact conditions in Germany will take a 
shape more favorable to us, for the South Germans will 
be compelled to seek on the Main and on the Neckar the 
help which they will not find on the Iller and on the Lech. 

It is clear, on the other hand, that France will, in its 
attack on Prussia, find no active ally except in Sardinia and 
possibly Denmark. 

The time has not yet arrived for Russia when com- 
bined action of the Slavic East and the Roman West against 
Central Europe can transform the situation of the world. 
Such an advance would unite all German elements and 
would require the complete and free development of power 
of all our neighbors to carry out that Titantic struggle. 
Russia is not in such a situation at present. 

If we could believe that Austria would ally itself with 
France against Prussia, that step would immediately unite 
all Germany under Prussia, for the annihilation of Prussia 
and supremacy on the part of Austria are not to the best 
interests of the minor states. Austria itself would be but 

—63— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

a weak ally to France. Its power would be lamed in the 
highest degree by Russia and Sardinia as well as by interior 
conditions in Hungary and also in the German countries. 

Emperor Napoleon and his official journals will un- 
doubtedly easily prove that a war against Prussia is the 
latter's own doing and that war does not concern the Con- 
federation. But in the case of actual invasion of other 
than Prussian territory, this argument would hardly be 
sound. Although the preparations for war in the Confed- 
eration may not indicate very active steps, still they are 
very disquieting to France, as those preparations will chain 
a part of the attacking army in the Vosges. If France is 
now enabled to come into contact with Prussia, without 
invading other Confederation territory, it will be because 
an entire passiveness of our German allies is not entirely be- 
yond the realm of possibility. 

France can come into contact with Prussia in two diff- 
erent ways. One of » them would be a direct landing on the 
Baltic Sea coast. It is said that the French navy can trans- 
port 60,000 men, possibly even a greater number, if the 
question is one of a journey of but a few hours to land a 
force on the other side of the Channel. Different are con- 
ditions of transport over foreign seas. History since the 
Crusades shows but expeditions of 30,000 men, and only 
then where an attack by land was absolutely impossible. In 
the Crimean war, to make this possible, it required the fleets 
of two great European sea powers to do this. 

The distance from Cherbourg through the Kattegatt 
on the Pomeranian coast is 250 miles (1000 English miles). 
A steam fleet towing transports can cover that distance even 
under favorable conditions in hardly less than eight days. 

What is England's attitude as to such an undertaking? 
The preparations on a grand scale in the French ports can- 
not be kept secret ; they threaten England as well, in such a 
degree that even the most positive promise would not alto- 
gether allay uneasiness. England would have to put its 
Channel fleet into commission and reenforce it from dis- 
tant stations. 



-64- 



Preparations for War 

Would England allow such a favorable opportunity to 
destroy the entire dangerous French fleet at one fell swoop, 
which, having an army on board, would be unable to fight? 

Still, we will assume that this fleet passes the Downs un- 
molested, that its further objective is unknown, that it 
would anchor- in the Griefswald Deep, that it would not 
encounter any forces preventing a landing, and that 60,000 
French disembark at Riigen. Even the undisputed pos- 
session of this island, as long as no naval establishment 
exists there, would not justify the expense. Sixty thousand 
men, who would have to invest Stralsund and Stettin, could 
hardly attempt further operations toward Berlin. The fleet 
would have to return and bring another contingent after 
an interval of weeks, during which time the corps first 
landed would be left helpless in hostile country, without a 
possible chance of retreat. 

If France at all decides on a naval attack, it is far more 
probable that the Elbe will be the objective. The distance 
is but half of that to Riigen, a landing could be made near 
Gliickstadt, and after taking Hamburg and Liibeck the 
French, based on Denmark and in connection with the Dan- 
ish army, could try to advance towards Berlin on the right 
bank of the Elbe. That these allies then, during the 14 
days' march or even in Holstein, will experience a complete 
catastrophe before the arrival of the next contingent is so 
apparent that such an undertaking could only be very de- 
sirable to us. 

But it is hardly possible that a main operation will be 
based on the sea, as long as there is a land base. 

France joins Prussia directly, and the second method 
to attack us without entering anything but Prussian terri- 
tory would be an advance from Metz across the Saar; that 
means on a front ten miles long from Luxemburg to Saar- 
louis, while the shortest line of operation to Coblenz and 
Cologne leads twice that distance across the Mosel and the 
mountains along that stream. Any attack from Mayence 
would flank such an advance and bring it to a halt. Even 
if the Palatinate is drawn into the French base, it will make 
no difference, for from Bingen to Trier we can, in three 

—65— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

marches, cut through all communications with France; the 
enemy's main operations consequently will undoubtedly come 
from the lower Rhine towards the Main; that is, towards 
Southern Germany. 

As a matter of fact France needs a larger base to attack 
Prussia. It dare not violate Belgium's neutrality. It cannot 
capture the Rhine without traversing Belgium, and it can- 
not hold the Rhine without possessing Belgium. The Em- 
peror has the choice in an attack on Prussia to either have 
the German Confederation or Belgium and England against 
him. Now, we must not place too high a value on the help 
of either the one or the other, for France is strong enough 
to carry out its operations against Germany, Belgium and 
England by itself without allies if Prussia does not prevent 
it therefrom with the forces at its command. We may only 
hope that our neighbors will occupy a part of the enemy 
north and south and hold him — we will have to bear the 
main attack. For this we must keep together all of our 
fighting forces. We must not detach either towards Bel- 
gium or Holland, nor give any corps to the Confederation 
army, the Confederation contingents should rather join the 
Prussian army. Not treaties with the Confederation but 
the necessity of the moment will require this. 

As is known, in time of peace the largest part of the 
French artillery and cavalry, whose transportation by rail 
is more difficult, is now in garrisons in France. The ex- 
cellent railroad net allows all fighting forces of the country 
to be concentrated at Paris on six or eight special main 
lines. 

Chalons is in direct connection by rail with Basle, 
Strassburg, Mannheim, Saarbriicken, Mezieres, Lille and 
Calais. A primary concentration in a prepared camp there 
threatens at the same time Southern Germany, Prussia, Bel- 
gium and even England. 

A more distant concentration of troops behind the Seille 
at Nancy leaves us in doubt whether the attack will be made 
via Strassburg or Metz. On the other Jiand, if Belgium be 
the objective, a concentration must be made at Maubeuge, 
Valenciennes and Lille and we must regulate our primary 

—66— 



Preparations for War 

concentration in such a manner that we are prepared for 
an attack from Liittich, Metz and Mannheim. 

It has been recommended in case of a war with France, 
to concentrate under any and all conditions the Prussian 
army at Trier, to reinforce the country there by fortifica- 
tions and thus to protect the entire country by means of an 
impregnable flank position which no enemy could afford to 
pass. It is true that the Saar, Mosel, Sauer and Kyll, which 
flow together here in a very confined space, are of themselves 
no very important streams, but, having deep mountain 
passes, form important defiles of extraordinary power of re- 
sistance even against very superior forces. The bridges at 
Conz, Wasserbillig and Trier, as well as crossings to be con- 
structed, facilitate crossing if they should be fortified and 
even without being so ; and as in Trier, considering the prox- 
imity of the Rhine line, we are in direct communication with 
Wesel, Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence, we can always have 
towards the south, west and north a line of retreat perpen- 
dicularly behind our front, which on and of itself promises 
an unusual freedom in maneuvering. Thereto should be 
added, that finally the retreat in all directions leads through 
a terrain which allows avoiding superior numbers, before 
these can fully deploy. 

The theory goes still further; it does not want to re- 
treat to the Rhine; it wants to advance offensively from a 
flank position, but also return to here. It also wants to 
front towards the east and to base on Trier. 

An absolute requirement for such a procedure is the 
neutrality of Belgium. Could we now be certain of that, 
the concentration at Trier would answer all purposes. It, 
better than any other position, would directly protect the 
Rhine province and would flank any advance of the opponent 
towards the Main. In connection with Luxemburg and 
Saarlouis it would allow the shortest and most effective 
offensive against Lorraine. But we know that the neutrality 
of Belgium is questionable, almost improbable. If a French 
army could cross the Maas at Luttich and Maastricht, it 
would not allow itself to be prevented from operating against 
Cologne by the fact that the Prussian army, double the dis- 

—67— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

tance away, is in a flank position at Trier. As a matter of 
necessity, we would have to leave that. flank position, ad- 
vance through the Eifel and in doing so lose our base at 
Trier. For, should we be thrown back in that direction, 
we would be completely cut off from the rest of the Mon- 
archy and would enter into most unnatural and most 
disadvantageous conditions. This fact confines into narrow 
limits the value of Trier in theory; in practice the concen- 
tration of our main force there is absolutely impossible, 
because, considering the readiness for war of our neighbors, 
we have no time therefor. 

For the defense of the Rhine province the Rhine will 
remain the base, even if an army detachment, to defend the 
country on the left hand as long as possible, cannot be con- 
centrated better than at Trier. 

The Rhine forms an obstacle forty miles long from 
Mayence to Cleves which on account of the breadth of the 
stream is hard to overcome, and this barrier is advantageous 
to defensive as well as offensive purposes on account of 
four important fortresses. Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne and 
Wesel are on the average but three days' march from each 
other. A hostile crossing between them is. threatened on 
both banks in flank and rear at one and the same time. Each 
one of the Rhine bridges, held by us, forms a flank position 
for the next one. 

The front of the Rhine line can be enveloped only on the 
left flank. Considering its extraordinary strength it would 
be neither necessary nor advisable to concentrate all our 
fighting forces behind it. Far rather will the larger half 
of them remain at our disposal to secure on the Main the only 
vulnerable flank. 

This shows that: 

1. We will place two armies in position under all cir- 
cumstances, which will directly support each' other in the 
defensive or disengage themselves by the offensive. 

2. The first concentration of these armies can be ef- 
fected only with certainty under the protection of the Rhine 
fortresses behind the Rhine and the Main, where also rail 

—68— 



Preparations for War 

transportation ceases and where the operations, that is 
marching, must commence. 

A French attack may be considered under four combi- 
nations : 

1. Exclusively against Prussia, avoiding Belgium and 
South German territory; we have already stated that this 
operation is very improbable. 

2. France respects Belgian neutrality and advances 
directly against the Mosel and through Southern Germany 
towards the Main. 

This attack is improbable, considering political rea- 
sons, because, as already stated, France cannot per- 
manently keep the Rhine province, without also possessing 
' Belgium. The danger will not be lost sight of in Brussels, 
and Belgium would always have to be observed, even if 
only with a small force at the start. We assume that for 
this purpose the army at Lille would remain — 40,000 men. 
On the other hand, the army of Paris would effect a junction 
with that of Chalons and would form an army of some 
140,000 men at Metz for an attack on the Mosel, and further- 
more, the armies of Nancy, • Lyons, Tours and Toulouse 
with that of Strassburg, in similar strength of 140,000 men, 
would be disposable for operations against Germany and the 
Main. 

This combination allows the concentration of our entire 
fighting forces between Coblenz and Frankfurt. In the de- 
fensive we could hold the Rhine or the Main, according to 
whether we would advance through Mayence or Coblenz 
offensively with superior forces against either the one or 
the other of the hostile armies. 

Trier would be the point of assembly for those of our 
fighting forces which are ready. The Mosel and its branches 
assure the retreat of these corps on Coblenz and Cologne, 
if they have to retreat before superior numbers. As soon 
as our fighting forces are concentrated, the Rhine army, re- 
inforced as much as possible, would advance toward Trier, 
ths Main army, for the time being behind the Main, in case 
of need behind the Lahn and the Sieg, would confine itself 
tjO the defense or even fall back to the left bank of the Rhine. 

—69— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The offensive of our Rhine army from the Mosel will soon 
bring the operations of the French on the right bank of 
the Rhine to a standstill. 

Such a procedure is mostly to the best and exclusive 
Prussian interests, it best protects our own domain. On 
the right bank of the Rhine the enemy would have to ad- 
vance as far as across the Lahn before he could reach this 
domain. 

Should the South German contingents have joined our 
main army, then that army would become of such strength 
that it would be far superior to the Strassburg army and 
could, instead of falling back, advance toward the Neckar. 
It would press back the enemy on Strassburg and would 
get into connection with our Rhine army via Mannheim and 
Germersheim and would disengage that army should it be 
thrown back on the Mosel. 

3. France advances through Belgium against Prussia 
without touching the rest of Germany. 

This case is probable, if Southern Germany, favoring 
Austria or even France, should declare its neutrality under 
the pretext that Prussia has forced the war. 55,000 men 
from Lyon and Toulouse, concentrated at Strassburg, would 
be sufficient for the present for observation. There could 
be assembled : From Paris, Tours, and Lille, at Lille 145,000 
men; from Nancy, Chalons and Algiers, at Metz, 120,000 
men. The French in that case would be compelled to occupy 
Belgium, to hold the Belgian army in Antwerp, possibly 
also to observe the Hollanders behind the Waal, and thus 
they would reach Aix-la-Chapelle with hardly more than 
100,000 men. The Metz army will have to invest Luxem- 
burg and Saarlouis, to observe Mayence and Coblenz, and 
would have finally but 200,000 men or less to advance against 
the Rhine. As in that case our flank is secured, the main 
army may be called up to defend the Rhine and we would 
be enabled, before the armies of Metz and Lille could unite, 
to take the offensive in greatly superior numbers against 
the one or the other from Coblenz or from Cologne. 

It appears to be of more advantage if we carry on a 
defensive war on the Mosel if we, based on Cologne and 

—70— 



Preparations for War 

Wesel, attack the enemy advancing via Aix-la-Chapelle, in 
order to disengage by victory the Belgians at Antwerp. 
In this case we would have to occupy Trier with our fight- 
ing forces first ready, and to support them from Coblenz so 
as to keep our hold on the Mosel. 

4. France attacks Belgium, Prussia and Germany. 

This case is the most probable one. In the war against 
Prussia there is such danger for Belgium and Germany that 
France cannot count on a permanent neutrality of these 
countries. Both would gain time to complete their arma- 
ment and a change in politics can become exceedingly 
dangerous. An English auxiliary corps would lead the 
Belgian army to active operations, and in Southern Ger- 
many the sentiment of the people might easily make it im- 
possible for the Cabinets to entertain anti-German politics. 

If it is necessary to guard Belgium and Germany by sep- 
arate armies, it appears to be advantageous for France to 
increase these armies in the very start, to advance offen- 
sively and thus to prevent assemblies of hostile fighting 
forces, to gain territory,* to support the war from foreign 
sources and to gain a larger base. 

It will have to be the first endeavor of the French to 
reach the Prussian army as the center of gravity of the 
German forces and to defeat it. An advance towards the 
Main would disrupt the concentration of the South German 
contingents and would endanger the strategic advance of 
the Prussian army, which advance in that direction is not 
protected by a strong line of fortresses. Consequently there 
is for France no more favorable operation than to appear 
as quickly and as strong as possible on the lower Main. 
To protect its left flank a weaker army would have to ad- 
vance toward the Mosel and advance against us through 
Belgium, and a stronger army to advance against the Maas, 
which latter the French should endeavor to take immediate 
possession of; this advance would also draw off a part of 
the Prussian army from the Main. 

We imagine the division of the French fighting forces 
to be about as follows : 

— 71— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

40,000 men at Lille against the Belgian army which is falling 

back on Antwerp; 
80,000 men at Valenciennes and Maubeuge against the lower 

Rhine ; 
40,000 men at Metz against the Mosel; 
100,000 men at Nancy { as main army 

90,000 men at Strassburg ) against the Main. 



Total 350,000 men 

These forces could be opposed by: 

300,000 Prussians 
1,000,000 Austrians 
120,000 Confederation troops 

50,000 Belgians 

30,000 Hollanders 



Total 600,000 men 

If we assume that for the time being the Belgians and 
Hollanders will be held back by from 40,000 to 50,000 
French, this will leave 300,000 French against more than 
500,000 Germans. 

If, however, for the present the Xth Confederation 
Corps has to remain where it is, opposed to Denmark, if 
the Austrians do not come at all or come too late, if the 
Belgians and Wiirtembergers have to concentrate first at 
Ulm or Wiirzburg, if we cannot count at all on Saxony, 
then only the Badeners, the Hessians and Nassauers would 
join us with 25,000 men. 

Even under these assumptions we will be numerically 
equal on the Rhine and the Main to the French fighting 
forces, and even superior, not counting that the latter will 
be weakened by the investment of Luxemburg, Saarlouis, 
Landau, Germersheim and Rastatt. 

Taken as a whole, we would have to remain on the de- 
fensive on the Rhine, and advance offensively from the Main. 

By the defensive we do not mean a passive waiting. 
Four fortresses of the first class assure to the Rhine not 
only an extraordinary power of resistance, but also make 
a crossing of the stream possible. The defender may change 
his base from one to the other bank without danger. Should 
the attacker have actually forced a crossing at some point, 
he sees all his communications endangered at the same 

—72— 



Preparations for War 

moment. To invest fortresses in such a case is impossible. 
The Mosel and Erft, the Lahn and Sieg form sectors on 
both their banks against which the enemy will have to 
deploy, while we can either accept the attack or avoid it. 
Should the armies of Valenciennes and that of Metz have 
joined, then 100,000 Prussians would suffice to prevent 
them, by an active defense, from taking a foothold on the 
Rhine. It is of course true that in such an event our Rhine 
province would be the theater of war and that it would 
have to be relieved therefrom from the Main. 

And there the entire rest of our fighting forces must 
be concentrated. 

An army on the Main, which is strong enough to take 
the offensive, secures at one and the same time Southern 
Germany and the eastern provinces of our Monarchy, but an 
eventual retreat must not be made on those but on the Rhine 
Province. No matter if the French advance from Strass- 
burg to Wiirzburg, Nuremberg or even to Ulm, as long 
as we hold the Rhine our advance from the Main will 
threaten their communications; each battle will threaten 
their flank. Before the enemy has gained a larger victory 
it is impossible for him to penetrate into Franconia or into 
Suabia. He is absolutely attracted by our flank position 
on the Main and he must attack it. The right flank of that 
position is impregnable on account of the fortresses of 
Mayence, and, to gain that position farther up the Main, our 
opponents must endanger all of his communications, es- 
pecially when by additions to the works of Mainspitz a de- 
ployment from that place is more facilitated. 

We may accept with more confidence the decisive battle 
on the Main, because we can, in that case, reinforce the 
Main army in the shortest time by one corps of the Rhine 
army and because in case of absolute necessity that army 
can be received by the Rhine army on the Lahn. A victory 
in our favor will throw the French back on Strassburg, 
and if we pursue in that direction, we would be enabled at 
the same time to transfer the main offensive via Mayence 
to the left bank of the Rhine. Conditions then existing 
will decide whether the offensive then can be directed. 

—73— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

against the Eifel in order to disengage our Rhine army or 
at once against the Vosges. 

A concentration on the Main is imperatively required. 
It covers the left flank of our Rhine position, directly covers 
the North and indirectly the South of Germany and affords 
them the possibility to concentrate their fighting forces and 
to have them join the Prussian army. An offensive start- 
ing from the Rhine would lead to Belgium, where we can- 
not acquire anything for ourselves; one from the Main 
would lead towards Lorraine and Alsace, the only part of 
France where we will be enabled to get a foothold by an 
investment of Metz and Strassburg. 

. Still, the offensive effect of the Main army is dependent 
on the fact of its being strong enough. We have seen that 
the French can send 190,000 men towards the Main, who 
of course will have to invest Rastatt, Landau and Germer- 
sheim. 

We cannot hope that in a war with France we can do 
with but a part of our army; we cannot form a reserve 
army for eventual cases, but will have to concentrate all of 
our forces at once and await a decision on the Rhine or on 
the Main. 

Without help from the Confederation, three of our 
army corps would suffice to carry on the defensive on the 
Rhine and that would leave us six corps for the Main. 

We think the first position to be about as follows : 

The Vlllth Army Corps at Trier, to protect as far as 
possible the Rhine Province against immediate and most 
pressing danger; the 15th Division will join the 16th there 
by marching on the 21st day. 

The Vllth Army Corps at Aix-la-Chapelle to observe 
there our frontier and to be a factor in Belgium's policies. 
The corps will reach that place by marching mainly, on the 
24th day. 

The IVth Army Corps at Cologne, which it can reach 
hy rail on the 28th day and where it will go into cantonments 
at Enskirchen. 

If the authorities in Brussels decide to concentrate the 
Belgian army not in Antwerp but at Luttich, then by draw- 

—74— 



Preparations for War 

ing the IVth Army Corps to the Maas an army of 120,000 
men would be formed. 

If France respects Belgium's neutrality, the Vllth and 
IV Army Corps should be concentrated, in five days' march- 
ing, at Trier, and there would be 100,000 men on the Mosel. 

About the same time, with help of the railroads, the 
Hid and Vth Army Corps could reach a point between 
Mayence and Frankfurt, could be reinforced by troops from 
Baden, Hesse, Nassau, and consequently there could be 
90,000 men on the Main. 

This shows that we will require thirty-three days for 
the first stages of the defense. The center of gravity, 
however, will be formed only with the arrival of the Vlth 
and the Guard Corps, which will reach Frankfurt on the 
Main by rail on the forty-seventh day; it may be possible 
that we could not assume a vigorous offensive until the 
arrival also of the 1st and lid Army Corps, which will take 
about two months. 

If we once have our fighting forces together then we 
may expect to be equal, with God's help and our own means, 
to any French attack. Our only danger lies in time condi- 
tions. We must not hide the fact from ourselves that 
France can easily surprise us strategically. We must not 
await the enemy's initiative. 

It is of the utmost importance to show our forces 
on the Main as soon as possible in case of war in order 
to dominate the sentiments of the South German govern- 
ments; even should our Vlllth Army Corps arrive in time 
at the Mosel, it would not be strong enough to permanently 
hold its position there against the forces which, may be ex- 
pected to come from Metz. 

This clearly shows how important it is for us at this 
moment to have a greater part of our army on the Rhine 
than is furnished by the Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps. To 
call up a mobile corps from the central provinces would 
result in expense and evil and would appear as a provoca- 
tion. 



^75- 



Moltke's Coirespondence 

On the other hand, we might gain our object by the 
establishment of a maneuver camp. As France occupies 
a camp at Chalons with 60,000 men, it could not raise a 
protest against such a procedure. 



In close connection with the line of thought in the preceding 
memorial, General v. Molke composed a memorial in November 1861, 
in which he treated of the importance of the Prussian fortresses 
for the defense of the country in a war with France. This mem- 
orial reads: 

MEMORIAL NO. 4 

Berlin, November 1861. 

Concerning the Strategical Importance of the 

Prussian Fortresses in Regard to the 

Defense of the Country in a 

War With France 

Only the strategical value of a fortress in regard to the 
defense of the country should decide whether larger sums 
are to be expended for its upkeep or enlargment. Only 
the conditions of the place in regard to facility of building 
and fortification decide in the second place what should be 
done for it with due consideration of requirements of the 
times. 

We cannot construe in advance the course a war will 
take, and consequently it will be impossible to judge the in- 
fluence of fortresses on the war ; still, certain definite condi- 
tions may be considered as permanent or guiding for a short 
duration. 

The political situation of States changes, but it re- 
quires larger periods of time to materially change their 
relations to each other. No one will deny that Russia or 
Austria, being engaged now and for decades to come in 
internal renovation, are less dangerous neighbors than is 
France with its immense available force, and that consider- 
ing this fact our fortresses on the Rhine are more impor- 
tant than the ones on the Vistula or those in the Silesian 
mountains. 

—76— 



Preparations for War 

The strength of the armies of the neighboring states, 
and the points where they can be advantageously assembled, 
are well known and based on permanent considerations. The 
railroad net, following up the main requirements of com- 
merce, is clearly defined for all time to come. It may be 
added to but never materially changed. 

The large rivers which traverse our land from south 
to north form an unchangeable form of defense. By all 
these permanent conditions, the direction of transportation 
and the first concentration of the Prussian army are gov- 
erned. These can be ascertained in advance, and prepared 
for accordingly, and the value of fortresses in event of 
war can be definitely ascertained. 

However, what course our own operations will take 
is more uncertain the more we study out their probable 
course. Still we may ascertain in advance probable events, 
because they are connected with probable or permanently 
existing conditions. 

We cannot neglect to consider experiences of former 
wars, even if they give us no definite standpoint for future 
action. Half centuries and whole centuries have passed 
since then and have materially changed the political and 
strategical situation. What a different importance had 
Schweidnitz in the newly conquered Silesia, and Graudenz 
as the single Vistula fortress, in the time of the Great King, 
than it has for us now, and who may assume that Stettin 
will again have the importance it had in 1806? 

In order to arrive at our probable aim, we must study 
military events as they will presumably happen in the future 
and consider present conditions as much as possible. In 
this case we have to reckon partly with unknown and 
changed conditions and also with known and permanent 
ones. We cannot arrive at a material and correct result, 
still we can arrive at a probable result, and in war that one 
will always remain the only base on which we have to 
take our measures. 

A war with our neighbors on the west is just one which, 
considering our present conditions, is the most probable. 

—77— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

France can hardly put more than 350,000 men in the 
field for an attack against us ; it might, in case of need, put 
twice that number in the field to defend its home country. 
The French army is in a very efficient state to take the field ; 
in time of peace, it is stationed prepared against the east 
and may be concentrated in a very short time by utilizing 
the net of railv^^ays. We cannot reckon on taking France 
by surprise. 

These very conditions show that an offensive war 
against France promises success only under special un- 
usual conditions. 

Such a war may be avoided, supposing our entire fight- 
ing forces were concentrated on the Rhine and would not 
be attacked, a situation which would have been brought 
about even without the Peace of Villafranca in 1859 ; it 
may be executed, if, as at that time, a larger part of the 
French fighting army were held in some other theater of 
war. But in most other cases we should have to be con- 
tented if we should succeed in concentrating our main 
forces under the protection of the Rhine line, in order to 
form there, probably on our own territory, for battle with 
the invading enemy and drive him back. 

According to our calculations, there could arrive: 
100,000 French at Trier on the 21st day ; 80,000 French at 
Aix-la-Chapelle on the 31st day ; 100,000 French at Mayence 
on the 35th day; consequently, the defensive war against 
France comes into the foreground which, however, does not 
preclude an offensive continuation of the same. 

In order to attack Prussia only, France can advance be- 
tween Sierck and Saarbriicken without violating non-Prus- 
sian territory. But such a base misses but seven miles (31 
English miles), while the operations against Cologne, which 
must be made on the same base, cover four times that dis- 
tance, lead across the Mosel and the Eiffel against the 
strong Rhine barrier and can be flanked by the latter. As 
an additional matter of fact, France can never permanently 
hold the Rhine province if it captures it, without at the 
same time holding Belgium. 



-78- 



Preparations for War 

Consequently there are but two lines of action possible : 
one through Belgium towards Cologne, the other through 
the Palatinate or Southern Germany towards Mayence. To 
connect the two, or to cover the flank of one of them, a sec- 
ondary operation via Trier will have to be made. And this 
already shows the necessity of a concentration of the Prus- 
sian field forces at Cologne and Mayence and the desirability 
of a position in observation at Trier. 

A French advance on the lower Rhine threatens the 
very existence of Belgium as well as Holland and endangers 
England's interests. And still the Belgian army confines 
itself to its camp at Antwerp, the Holland army behind its 
Utrecht lines, and England, which is hardly able to protect 
itself, cannot bring help either by land or sea which will 
amount to anything. We ourselves, considering the times, 
cannot afford to protect Belgium's frontiers and have there- 
fore less need to engage in treaties, because it will always 
be advantageous to us to have a French army weaken itself 
in advancing through Belgium and because it will have to 
leave at least 40,000 men in front of Antwerp. Such an op- 
eration will in the end lead to our very strong Rhine front. 

The advance through Southern Germany would bring 
France into conflict with the German Confederation. As 
long as Austria must use all its forces to maintain its po- 
sition at the southern foothills of the Alps and to dominate 
conditions in its interior, it cannot at all be counted on to 
appear for the protection of the upper Rhine, even not if it 
is threatened at the Mincio only by the Italian army. Prus- 
sia also, in the start, cannot meet a French invasion coming 
from Strassburg, it can only drive off the invading enemy 
by an operation. Therefore the Vllth and VIHth Confed- 
eration Corps will be too weak to defend Germany's frontier 
against very material superior forces. 

Which of the two operations France will choose is hard 
to say in advance and may possibly not be ascertained at the 
very moment of mobilization. The first leads directly to the 
objective, the latter promises the better assured success. An 
invasion of Southern Germany might easily be but the pre- 
paratory campaign for the execution of an attack on Bel- 

—79— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

gium and Rhenish Prussia in order to first split up Germany, 
to isolate Prussia, and then to defeat the latter. 

A concentration of the Prussian armies requires ad- 
vance preparations, which have to be made even before we 
know the enemy's intentions. Therefore the first position 
must meet the requirements of different eventualities and 
must be made in such manner that the enemy cannot inter- 
fere with it. 

Cologne and Mayence are the terminals of large rail- 
ways, which traverse North and Central Europe towards 
the west ; on these railways transportation can be had with 
surety under the protection of the Rhine fortresses. From 
the Rhine on, marching will begin; there the operations 
commence. 

If proper preparations are made, it will be possible to 
concentrate three army corps on the lower Rhine, three on 
the Main, a total of 200,000 men, within three weeks. In 
this we need not fear that we will be disturbed in our pri- 
mary concentrations by a French attack. Conditions are 
not the same at the Mosel, where 25,000 men from Metz can 
arrive within ten days at Trier, that is earlier than the 16th 
Division can be mobilized there. 

By the time the railroads leading toward the Rhine 
will again be free, the mobilization of the other three Prus- 
sian army corps will be completed. They of themselves will 
form a reserve, possibly on the central Elbe or on the Saale. 
It is possible that a part of them has to be held back there 
for the present; for instance, to oppose a landing of hostile 
forces on the German north coast — the advance prepara- 
tion of which cannot be concealed in the French harbors — 
in order to exercise a necessary cosrcion in Germany, to 
meet interior conditions. But as a matter of fact these 
corps should not be used to operate by themselves as a re- 
serve army or to take up rallying positions, but they should, 
as soon as communications are opened, advance to the rein- 
forcement of the first line of the armies. After these three 
first weeks we may be able to see in which direction this 
reinforcement has to be made, whether towards Cologne, 
towards Mayence, or supposing misfortune in Southern Ger- 

—80— 



Preparations for War 

many, towards Wiirzburg or even towards Bamberg. If 
in a war towards the west, France must be assumed to be 
taking the initiative, its operations have to be a governing 
factor in the matter of using our reserves. 

But even should the French main operations be directed 
through Belgium, it would be a question if the lower Rhine 
army ought to be reinforced. 

We can count with assurance on the fact that the Xth 
Confederation Corps will join the Prussian position on the 
lower Rhine, which position protects the entire district of 
the North German States which furnish this corps. Then, 
after deducting the Holstein-Lauenburg contingent, there 
will be 130,000 men concentrated there, which will be suffi- 
cient for defense behind the strong Rhine line in any case, 
and which will make the siege of a fortress there impos- 
.sible. 

A further reinforcement of the Rhine army would be 
justifiable only if we wanted to take the offensive with it. 
This offensive through Belgium would in the first place re- 
lieve Antwerp and would consequently be reinforced by 
some 60,000 men; but a further continuation of the same 
would lead through the French line of fortresses to the forti- 
fied Paris. It can have no objective, cannot come to an 
earlier stand until the French capital is taken and the 
French Monarchy overthrown. Direct captures and acqui- 
sitions of territory we cannot make or maintain either in 
Belgium or between Belgium and Paris. Consequently we 
could arrive but on an indirect road to the object of war 
indemnification, by dictating peace terms either on the 
Seine or on the 'Loire. 

The offensive from the Main has a less important but 
more easily attainable objective. It is directed against the 
weaker fortified part of the French frontier. If the prov- 
inces of Lorraine and Alsace, in prior times belonging to 
Germany, should be recaptured, it is quite reasonable to 
assume that we will keep them. A requirement for this is 
that the French army be defeated first in one or more bat- 
tles, that Metz and Strassburg are invested, and that 
these investments are protected by our main forces in the 

—81— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

field. If this is successful, then we would have an advantage 
in peace negotiations which cannot be attained in operations 
through Belgium. 

A concentration of as many troops as possible on the 
Main is necessary, however, not only for the offensive but 
also for the defensive. 

The defensive task of the Main army is the protection 
of the lower as well as of the upper Rhine by offensive 
flank operations. Advancing through Mayence, making the 
Mosel a base for a continuous movement towards the north, 
it will threaten all communications of a French army which 
may have advanced from Belgium against the lower Rhine. 
Such hostile movements may be met more effectively in such 
a manner than by a direct advance of the same numbers 
from the Rhine line itself. 

An offensive advance of the Main army, on the left or 
on the right bank of the Rhine, as circumstances may dic- 
tate, will most effectively stop any operation of the French 
main army which may be directed against the upper Rhine 
or which may have already been commenced. 

In all these cases we do not consider the Main as a 
flank position but as the base for a flank operation. 

If the South Germans intend to directly defend the 
upper Rhine or the Black Forest, they would completely 
scatter their fighting forces, which are far from sufficient 
for all purposes. Neither an Austrian nor a Prussian 
army could support them there in the start. They have 
only the choice to retreat on Ulm or to advance on Mayence 
in order to draw close to the one or to the (Jther army. 

The retreat of the upper Rhine army in the first di- 
rection would draw along the enemy into the interior of 
Germany, would make Suabia the theater of war and would 
force Baden and Wiirtemberg to treat with the enemy to 
save their very existence. And just the fortified camps 
proposed by Austria offer the best opportunities for such 
treaties with the enemy. If opposed by a strong French 
army the retreat would not come to a halt even at Ulm 
should the Austrian forces not be there. 

—82— 



Preparations for War 

At the first glance, an advance of the upper Rhine army 
in the direction of Mayence appears to abandon Southern 
Germany. It is true that Karlsruhe and Stuttgart may be 
occupied or endangered by the enemy, and even Munich 
may also be in the same danger from flying columns. But 
it would be impossible for the enemy to remain there or 
even to advance farther from there if 300,000 men were to 
be in his immediate flank by the advance of the Main Army 
and its junction with the upper Rhine Army. Such a force 
in such a position would draw the enemy and would liberate 
Southern Germany. 

It is the intention of the South German governments 
to concentrate their troops between Rastatt and Germers- 
heim. If this, considering the probability of a rapid French 
advance, will be possible, if the concentration can be made 
possible only on the Jagst or on the Main, is an open ques- 
tion. An absolute requirement for joining Prussia will al- 
ways be the certainty of finding a Prussian army on the 
Main. 

This clearly shows how important it is for us, in a 
military as well as political respect, to appear on the Main 
as rapid and as strong as possible. In most cases three 
corps will be sufficient for our purposes on the lower Rhine, 
but we cannot be too strong on the Main. Only there can 
Prussia protect Southern Germany, only there can it assure 
to the smaller states the possibility of sticking to Germany, 
and only there can Prussia stand at the head of all German 
fighting forces. 

Not counting the German general interests, and only 
considering mere Prussian conditions, it will be clear that 
the French can not advance even with the strongest army 
from Southern Germany on Berlin as long as Prussia stands 
on the Main with large forces. The worst step we could 
take would be marching oif in an easterly direction to oppose 
such an advance. There is no doubt but what our fighting 
force on the Rhine will draw the hostile fighting force as a 
magnet will iron. Back of the Main, between Mayence and 
Frankfurt, we find an excellent position to await the attack 
of even superior forces in which we can reinforce our force 

—83— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

by parts of the lower Rhine Army. The right flank of that 
position is protected by the fortress of Mayence and by the 
Rhine, and a French Army can envelop the left flank only 
by endangering its own communications. This would be 
even more difficult of execution if Mayence should, more 
than is the case now, facilitate an offensive advance between 
the upper Rhine and Mayence. 

The very great importance of Mayence is clearly shown 
by what has been said above. 

In a war against the West, Mayence is a shield and a 
sword at the same time for Prussia. It protects the primary 
concentration of our army on the Main, secures the left 
flank of our entire Rhine position, compels the enemy who 
has invaded Southern Germany to an attack on an almost 
impregnable position or forces him to an enveloping move- 
ment which uncovers all of his communications and, finally, 
forms the supporting point for our offensive in the only di- 
rection promising success. We might say that Mayence, 
without being Prussian property, is now the most important 
fortress for Prussia. Its loss would shatter our entire hold 
on the Rhine and give the unprotected southern part of 
Germany to the enemy. 

If we now assume that the Prussian army, in its strong 
position at Mayence and behind the Main, could be over- 
come, then such an assumption necessarily presupposes that 
we are opposed by the French main force and that at the 
same time the lower Rhine cannot be attacked in superior 
numbers. 

The retreat of the Main army across the Taunus can 
not be endangered, as only the left flank of the Main posi- 
tion can be enveloped. Consequently we would unite on the 
Lahn or on the Sieg with the lower Rhine army for renewed 
opposition, and finally, after subsequent defeats, retreat 
from superior numbers through Coblenz or Cologne. On 
the left bank of the Rhine we also find a country entirely 
sufficient to support the army, and after the army has been 
reorganized for renewed operation under the protection of 
the river, it would utilize for the offensive the crossings 
which are protected by fortresses. 

—84— 



Preparations for War 

If the Prussian fighting force on the Rhine is not com- 
pletely annihilated, which would presuppose grave errors in 
leadership, the French army can not operate against Berlin. 
If an advance by us through Coblenz or Mayence were made, 
the French army would find its communications with France 
endangered on the right bank of the Rhine, while we would 
have the western half of the Monarchy behind us. Ac- 
cording to my views, Berlin and the Provinces are protected 
in the surest and most effective manner by a continuous 
stand on the Rhine. The retreat from the Main to the 
eastern Provinces would easily take the form of a dangerous 
parallel march with the enemy and would hardly come to a 
stand at the Thuringian Forest at Erfurt, but far rather 
only behind the Elbe. 

There now remains to be considered the case of the 
French main attack being made through Belgium towards 
the lower Rhine and probably supported by a secondary 
operation from Metz. 

Undoubtedly the French will find but little resistance 
in Belgium, but they will have to occupy Brussels and will 
have to invest Antwerp with its new, immense fortifications. 
The highroads and the railroads indicate that a further ad- 
vance will be made in direction of Liittich and Aix-la- 
Chapelle. 

Maastricht then would become of great importance. 
But this place, which requires a very large garrison, the 
Hollanders have intentionally allowed to fall into decay and 
have evacuated. A defensive position on our part between 
Diiren and Jiilich is not without military value. On the 
left are the mountains accompanying the Roer as far as 
Gemiind, a distance of some three to four miles ; these moun- 
tains have no road suitable for an army which has to be 
accompanied by wagons, and on the right Jiilich forms a 
very strong flank protection, even in the state it is now after 
having been razed. 

If we will conduct a decisive TDattle on the Roer to pro- 
tect our province on the left bank of the Rhine depends en- 
tirely on the question whether or not we have had time to 



-85— 



Moltke's Coirespondence 

throw a fighting force there which is equal to that of the 
enemy, and on this we cannot reckon with any certainty. 

The hostile operation from Metz would have for us the 
disadvantage of being made at a time when the mobilization 
of the 16th Division has not been completed. Still, if that 
operation is to have a far reaching result, it can be made 
only with the employment of enormous forces. 

The necessary investment, or at least the observation, 
of Luxemburg and Saarlouis, will weaken the attack by 
about 20,000 or 15,000 men, and an absolute superiority of 
forces is required to overcome the resistance of a Prussian 
detachment at Trier. A division in position there can front 
towards the south as well as towards the west behind strong 
sectors, and can allow an enveloping movement to take its 
course, before giving up its position, as it has a freedom 
of choice to fall back on Cologne, Coblenz or Mayence by one 
or the other bank of the Mosel, and because it will find, in 
any direction taken, a support in the terrain for renewed 
resistance. 

In a further advance the army from Metz will have 
its rear to Luxemburg and the Ardennes, and, as long as 
the main French force has not deployed beyond the Maas, 
it will get into the most difficult situation if we on our part 
take the offensive in force from Mayence or Coblenz. 

Of course we know that Luxemburg and Saarlouis 
cannot prevent the invasion of the enemy, but can merely 
hold a force of the enemy equal to about their own garrisons. 
This small effect is not on account of the construction, but 
on account of the situation of the two places. The fortresses 
will gain their full importance only in connection with the 
army of operations. All places on the extreme frontier (or 
as in this case, Luxemburg beyond the frontier) have the 
disadvantage that in the face of an enemy ready for war, 
the army of operation cannot be concentrated in their vicin- 
ity, and that consequently they will attain their actual im- 
portance only in the later phases, if the offensive is taken 
by us, if that offensive can be made in their direction, and 
if until that happens they have not been taken (being left 
to their own resources). We may of course expect from 

—86— 



Preparations for War 

Luxemburg that it can hold out for several weeks after be- 
ing invested ; this, however, is doubtful of Saarlouis, con- 
sidering its small extent and the well known peculiarity of 
the place. To this comes, that our offensive, in case of an 
attack on the lower Rhine, will be made probably against the 
right flank of the French main army in its advance across 
the Maas, that is towards the northwest, and that time and 
forces on our part may easily be insufficient to make de- 
tachments at the same time towards the southwest to re- 
lieve Saarlouis. 

Trier, of itself much more important than Saarlouis, 
is not so close to the frontier, can consequently be easier 
reached and supported, and would have a far greater value 
as a fortress. 

In our entire military-political relation to France it 
would undoubtedly be desirable to have a larger force than 
two of our army corps permanently stationed in time of 
peace in the western half of the Monarchy. A permanent 
maneuver camp, but far better a fortress of the first class, 
at Trier would fulfill all requirements. A peace garrison 
there of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, which would be joined 
at mobilization by the 16th Divison, would be sufficient to 
protect this part of our frontier, the only part which di- 
rectly joins France. 

We have already mentioned the operation so important 
for the defense of our Rhine front, which the main army 
will make through Mayence toward the Mosel. If Trier does 
not furnish sufficient support to the detachment concentrat- 
ing there, then that detachment will already have started its 
retreat towards the Rhine, and the Main Army will un- 
doubtedly find the difficult defiles of the Mosel already oc- 
cupied by the enemy. In that case it could advance only via 
Coblenz. If, on the other hand. Trier were fortified, then a 
body of troops could maintain itself there even against 
greatly superior numbers, a second crossing over the Mosel 
would be assured to the Main Army, and its further ad- 
vance would have, on the base Coblenz — Trier, a far greater 
freedom of movement and far greater security for the re- 
treat. 

—87— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

We undoubtedly could abandon Saarlouis as soon as 
Trier becomes a fortress. If that could be done without 
Trier being a fortress is a question, in the answer of which 
we must consider also the not altogether military factor, of 
what impression this would have on the inhabitants of the 
left bank of the Rhine, Jiilich having been already razed. 

The invasion of the Rhine Province on the left bank 
does not at all give an assurance of possessing the country, 
as long as the Prussian army has not been beaten and as 
long as one of the three great Rhine fortresses has not been 
taken. 

The French main army cannot operate directly against 
Coblenz through the Ardennes and the Eifel Mountains, for 
such an advance would expose its flank, after leaving the 
central Maas, to the force assembled at Coblenz. To invest 
Coblenz on the banks of three streams requires very large 
means. It is one of the peculiarities of this place that the 
fall of one of the independent forts would close to us the 
Rhine crossing there, but that the opponent himself can 
use that crossing only after he has taken all the forts, in- 
cluding Ehrenbreitstein. 

Even then the further operations will lead not only 
through the difficult terrain of the Wester Forest, but also 
into the direct sphere of action of our large concentration 
of troops on the Main. 

Of far greater importance than Coblenz to a French 
attack is Cologne, considering its relation to the Rhine 
Province and its highways and railroads. Five marches 
would bring the French army from Liittich to the gates of 
the Rhenish capital. In such a direct advance all of its 
communications would remain protected. 

Arrived at Cologne, it will have to be decided whether 
to attack that place on the left bank, or to invest it on the 
right bank, or whether to cross the stream in the face of 
the lower Rhine Army, to beat that army, and to start the 
investment after that and protect it by the main force of the 
army. 

The possession of Wesel would, for a French army, be 
of far less importance than that of Cologne and Coblenz. 



Preparations for War 

In order to secure communications in some measure, the 
French army could march on the left bank of the Maas down 
to Roermond and Venlo, and in doing so, of course, would 
keep as far as possible from the Main army. But in order 
to reach Wesel, the Rhine would have to be crossed at 
Xanten, and an advance by the lower Rhine Army would 
bring about a situation, the disadvantages of which a French 
army could avoid only by a decisive victory. The entire 
operation is possible only by a complete change of the base 
of operations, by landings on a large scale on the coast of 
the North Sea, by cooperation of Denmark and combina- 
tion of a doubtful nature. 

What we have stated above ought to be sufficient to 
show the great importance of Cologne for defending the 
Rhine. The foremost requirement to be made of this place 
is that it should not go to pieces at the first forcible attack ; 
that means it should be impregnable, for a formal siege 
requires that it be invested on two sides and protected to 
the right and left on both banks of the river against the 
two neighboring fortresses — requirements which are hard 
to attain as long as the lower Rhine Army is on the Rhine. 

The operation, probably easiest of execution, might 
be that the French invest Cologne by a strong corps on the 
left bank, gain at Diisseldorf or at Ruhrort a Rhine crossing 
by surprise or by force, and then attack the lower Rhine 
Army. 

If, however, the latter army accepts the battle 7iot with 
its rear to the Eastern provinces, not with its front to the 
west, but to the north, its left wing touching the Rhine val- 
ley, its right flank the mountains, then even the loss of the 
battle cannot prevent its retreating behind the sectors of 
the Sieg or the Lahn, its joining the Main Army and 
with it advancing to a renewed offensive, in which case 
Cologne and Coblenz would furnish material support 
whether the one or the other bank of the Rhine is used. 

The extraordinary strength of our theater of war on the 
Rhine cannot be misjudged. It could be endangered only, 
if we should take the offensive on the left bank prematurely 
and with insufficient forces. 

—89— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

In June, 1863, General v. Moltke worked out a memorial, basing 
his views on a war inaugurated by Napoleon III to capture the left 
bank of the Rhine. After an exhaustive contemplation of the proba- 
ble attitude of all interested European Powers, the General gives com- 
parisons of the French and Prussian forces as well as of their con- 
centrations, and finally discusses necessary measures in case the 
French should be in superior numbers in the start. 

MEMORIAL NO. 5 

Berlin, June 1863. 

If in the near future the political situation of Europe 
invites Emperor Napoleon III to a new operation towards 
the exterior, or if interior conditions in France compel him 
to do so, the left bank of the Rhine will, before all, form 
that terrain which can be immediately reached, taken pos- 
session of, and maintained. The landing of an actual fight- 
ing force on the Baltic coast deserves no serious considera- 
tion. 

It required the fleets of the two largest maritime powers 
to transport only 64,000 men, almost without cavalry and 
entirely without means of transportation, from one side of 
Black Sea to the other. Preparations for and actual em- 
barkation required 14 days; debarkation, not at all enter- 
fered with by the enemy, 10 days. A similar expedition, 
five times the distance and not made against an isolated ex- 
tremity but against the heart of Russia, or against Prussia 
with its network of railways, promises certain defeat. 

The sympathetic war against Russia, for the restoration 
of Poland, is merely the war against Prussia for the capture 
of the Rhine, which with all its difficulties at least promises 
a certain object and practical results. This long desired an- 
nexation, which in the course of events also makes the cap- 
ture of Belgium necessary, touches the vital conditions or 
existence of all states in such a degree that it becomes of the 
utmost importance to France to cease the war against the 
immediate participants, before the rest of the world can 
take a hand. 

The fact of the two powers adjoining each other di- 
rectly appears to make this possible, at a time when in the 
largest countries of both hemispheres threatens a war of 

—90— 



Preparations for War 

principles or of nationalities, or where the war is already 
in progress. 

It is true that at the present moment Russia stands on 
its western frontier ready for war and with large fighting 
forces; but, harassed by an interior crisis and in war 
against Poland, it will hardly feel inclined, nor be able to 
send an army against French encroachments on the Rhine. 
Under ordinary conditions, when its army is scattered in 
the large expansion of the country from the Vistula to the 
Volga, a Russian army, on account of the slowness of mobili- 
zation, concentration and transportation cannot in time 
arrive from such a distance before the end of the first cam- 
paign. 

Austria's military forces also are chained down to 
many points. The Magyar and Slavonic races are not yet 
satisfied with the union ; Austria has to continuously watch 
Russia in the Orient concerning the steadily progressing 
decay of the Ottoman Empire ; it has to guard in Italy its en- 
dangered possessions, to regain what it has lost. 

In the new Italy, France may see an ally who will draw 
Austria's power in a very large degree to itself and away 
from the Rhine. But this new friend can easily do too much, 
can do what Catholic France dare not countenance. There- 
fore he will have to be watched. 

The Tuilieries may count on Denmark, and possibly 
also on Sweden, to make a diversion, which, eventually sup- 
ported by a French oversea expedition on a small scale, may 
contain a part of the fighting forces in Northern Germany. 
But to do this, England's acquiescence is necessary. If the 
latter should declare against French aggression, its veto in 
the Rhine question will not have an indirect but an immedi- 
ate effect, not by augmenting the German fighting means 
on the Rhine, but by holding back those of the French. At 
the present time England is France's ally; still nothing 
would try this alliance harder than an invasion of Belgium, 
a threatening of the coast of the North Sea, or a threaten- 
inor of Antwerp. The Emnire will have to have a 
regard in respect to England in so many and so very impor- 
tant matters, that it may be presupposed with great cer- 

—91— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

tainty that it will, in an attack on the Rhine, respect the 
neutraliUj of Belgium for the sake of England. 

In this case France is still opposed by the entire German 
Confederation, the defensive resistance power of which will 
occupy the entire offensive power of France, and the main 
point will be to confine the battle into limited spaces. At 
the present time, in addition to Prussia, Bavaria, Hesse, 
Oldenburg and the Netherlands occupy territory on the 
left bank of the Rhine. Prussia can in no way be elimi- 
nated, it stands with all its power for the support of the 
Rhine Province. Should the remainder of the Confederation 
States be recompensed elsewhere, the material for that 
recompense could be found only in the Prussian territory on 
the right bank of the Rhine. From it the Rhine will have to be 
captured, it will have to defray the costs of recompense, the 
war is directed before all against Prussia, and in that Prus- 
sia must be isolated, if at all possible. 

It is of course true that a French army can invade the 
Prussian Rhine Province without entering territory not 
belonging to Prussia. Still, the frontier from Sierck to 
Saargemiind is buit 32 (English) miles long. An operation 
based on Metz leads for 120 (English) miles parallel to the 
Rhine front across the Mosel and the mountains along it 
to Cologne. Saarlouis would at the same time have to be 
attacked, Luxemburg and Mayence observed, Coblenz in- 
vested and detachments would have to be made against 
Wesel in order to invest Cologne. Without capturing this 
center of the province, the possession of the latter would 
never be secure. It will hardly be possible to involve the 
Prussian fighting forces in a decisive battle against their 
will and before completion of this concentration on the left 
bank of the Rhine, because they, being in firm possession of 
all crossings from Wesel to Mayence, can draw back in any 
desired direction. On the Rhine, of course, a longer halt 
would ensue, which appears dangerous, politically consid- 
ered. But if the entire Prussian fighting force is once con- 
centrated there, then an offensive advance via Coblenz or 
Mayence or on the right bank of the Mosel will cut off all 
communications of the French army with France and force 

—92— 



i 



Preparations for War 

that army to reconstruct them, with a changed front, 
through the defiles of that stream. 

But France needs a broader base for an attack on 
Prussia, and must extend its base, if Belgium remains 
out of the question in consideration of politics, to Southern 
Germany for military reasons. 

The defense of the entire western frontier of Ger- 
many requires three armies to be placed into position on the 
lower, central and upper Rhine. The strength of the Con- 
federation fighting force not only allows this division, but 
requires it as well as the expansion of the stretch to be 
protected. With due regard to the issue of orders, subsis- 
tence and to mobility, we cannot, without disadvantage, 
make the separate armies stronger than from 150,000 to 
200,000 men and the stream from Schliegen to Cleves is 320 
(English) miles long. 

Of these three armies the central one would have to be 
the strongest. It forms Germany's offensive force, which 
flanks the French advance across the lower as well as the 
upper Rhine and which transfers the war into hostile ter- 
ritory. 

But the dispositions of the enormous fighting means 
of the Confederation is dependent upon collective Confed- 
erate acts, for which not only national strategic thoughts, 
but also manifold local requirements and special interests 
would be the basis. It is easily understood that based on 
actual conditions that the States of the Vllth and Vlllth 
Confederation Corps require a special and strong army 
for the direct protection of their own domain, and if for 
this they demand that parts of their contingents support 
them, they are justified, in so far as that can be done — but 
these States would labor under a delusion if, for instance, 
they should demand that the IXth and the Xth Confedera- 
tion Corps should join the army of the upper Rhine. The 
Prussian position covers all the States of these corps and the 
nearest interests of these States is to do their share in the 
maintaining of that position, the Xth Corps to be on the 
lower Rhine, the IXth Corps to be on the central Rhine. 

—93— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Even the Saxon Division, should the French troops 
suddenly spread through the open door of Strassburg over 
Southern Germany could not arrive in time for the defense 
of the Black Forest. It would work on the same lines as 
the Prussian or the Austrian corps. 

The Hessian troops undoubtedly will not leave their 
endangered land in order to go to Rastatt or to Ulm, and the 
transportation of the contingents of the Xth Corps from 
north to south would cross the general movement of the 
masses from east to west, which would ruin any projected 
concentration of the armies on the Rhine. 

A direct help in Southwestern Germany can be fur- 
nished only by Austria. The relation of Austria to Germany 
is far too important to the former to let us believe that it 
would not reinforce the upper Rhine Army with all available 
forces and as quickly as possible. It is of course true that 
Austria's position as a European power is very complicated. 
Experience has shown that it cannot at all times have an 
army disposable in Germany. Even in less unfavorable 
political situations than in 1859, and not counting what it 
has to protect in the East and in its interior, it must guard 
its own and German interests in Italy, Tyrol and Switzer- 
land. The occupation of the latter by France touches Aus- 
tria as directly as would an invasion of Suabia. 

The extension of the territory alone makes it difficult 
for Austrian help to become effective on the Rhine and in 
the Black Forest, and this help may be possible only on 
the Iller or on the Danube even with the best and most 
patriotic intentions. 

The fact is there is an absence of a great power in 
Southern Germany directly joining the Rhine, which, as 
is the case in Northern Prussia, would be compelled to an 
immediate holding of the most advanced frontier for its 
vital interests. 

At the first movement of a French attack the contin- 
gents of Southwestern Germany would hardly be sufficient 
to protect Baden and Wiirttemberg and may possibly not be 
able to offer any resistance except at Ulm. 

—94— 



J 



Preparations for War 

In these conditions the empire might see the possibility 
of separation, which would localize the battle with Prussia. 
However, this very unnatural union, so much in opposition 
to actual interests, or even only neutrality, finds little en- 
couragement in the sentiment of the princes or the people 
of Southern Germany. They would have to be forced into 
a renewal of the Rhine Confederation by armed demonstra- 
tion and France would in any case have to send a special 
army to Southern Germany. 

If we may presuppose Belgium's neutrality, then the 
French fighting forces will have to concentrate between Metz 
and Strassburg for an attack on the Rhine territory, and 
the main operations would have to be made on the Main, 
against the center of gravity of the defense, against the 
Prussian army concentrated there. This direction goes 
around the strong line of fortresses on the lower Rhine in 
the very start, touches the domains of the smaller states, 
separates Prussia from Southern Germany and threatens 
the former's communications between the western and eas- 
tern halves of the Monarchy. It leads to the quick deci- 
sion, on the shortest road which France needs. 

But in order to reach the Main, the Rhine will first 
have to be crossed. A direct advance through the Bavarian 
Palatinate and the Hesse-Darmstadt against Franfurt is 
threatened in the very start in the left flank from the Mosel 
and must be protected on that side by a special army detach- 
ment. 

After Landau and Germersheim are invested, the prin- 
cipal crossing is at Mannheim as indicated by its road con- 
nections, which is beyond the interference of the important 
point — Mayence. 

From there the right flank of the operation also will 
have to be secured against all that may be disposable from 
the Vlllth and Vllth Confederation Corps. 

Furthermore, it is possible that already at Mannheim 
resistance from the Prussian Army of the Main may be 
encountered, which might increase the diflficulties of cross- 
ing there or farther down stream. 

—95— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

It is necessary therefore to have a special army, start- 
ing from Strassburg, to throw back from the Rhine the con- 
tingents of Southwestern Germany and by advancing down 
stream on the right bank open the crossings for the main 
army. 

Consequently it is no arbitrary assumption, but one 
based on necessity, to say that France will have to put three 
separate armies into the field. The strength of each one 
of them is governed by the objects already discussed. 

The left auxiliary army, starting from Metz and Thion- 
ville, can in the start have the Prussian Vlllth Army 
Corps in its front, and if it advances quickly the latter 
corps may not be fully concentrated. A strength of 45,000 
men assures it the necessary superiority, at least at the 
start. 

The army from Strassburg also will find the contin- 
gents from Baden, Hesse, Wiirtemberg and Bavaria con- 
centrated, as its offensive, should the army be of ordinary 
strength, may extend as far as Ulm. Still, Rastatt will 
have to be invested and an advance made towards the Neckar 
in such strength that below the point where the latter flows 
into the Rhine the defender will have to evacuate the bank 
of the Rhine. 

Finally, the army from Strassburg would probably 
find Bavarian or possibly Austrian forces at Ulm and should 
not be weaker than these, even on the defensive. 

All these military, and, later on, political tasks, could 
hardly be solved with less than 90,000 men. 

The French main army then would be composed of the 
remainder of the French offensive forces. 

At the present time France is engaged outside of its own 
territory with : 

40,000 men in Mexico 

1,900 men in Cochin China 
16,200 men in Rome 



Total 58,100 men. 

To these detachments Algeria has contributed 17,466 
men and there remain in Algeria only 37,542 men, the num- 

—96— 



Preparations for War 

ber of which cannot be decreased on account of conditions 
existing there. Regiments may be taken from there, it is 
true, but they will have to be replaced by others. 

Accordingly, 100,000 men should be deducted from 
France's entire active force. 

Not counting 111,600 men for depots nor new recruits, 
France can now put into the field : 

23 infantry divisions 230,000 men 

15 cavalry divisions 32,000 men; 

Artillery reserve 24,000 men 

A total of 286,000 men 

Were Emperor Napoleon compelled, in order to re- 
main master of the situation in Italy, to keep an observa- 
tion army in readiness at Lyons, he would hardly be in the 
situation to commence a war against Germany with any hope 
of success. Only were King Victor Immanuel to give a 
guaranty for the wordly possessions of the Pope and be sat- 
isfied with taking Venice, the above stated strength would 
be available, and then of course the Austrian fighting force 
would be drawn from the Rhine. 

The fortresses situated on the northeastern French 
frontier require about 152,000 men for garrisons. Longwy 
and New Breisach, lying on the first line, have to be occu- 
pied with 44,500 men. For this the conscription and oc- 
cupation troops of the Second and Third Corps Districts are 
insufl[icient. It is true that troops may be called up from 
districts farther in rear, but war garrisons like those of 
Strassburg, Metz and Diedenhofen would undoubtedly al- 
ways require a nucleus of line troops. 

If we however assume, so as not to underestimate 
France's offensive power, that for this and for the Vosges 
between Paris and Lyon, as well as for the protection of the 
coast and the Belgian frontier, 34,000 men would be suffi- 
cient, then there would finally be about 250,000 men dis- 
posable for active operations in the field, and we would have 
to estimate the strength of the different French armies as 
follows : 



-97— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

1st Army of Metz 45,000 men 

2d Army of Strassburg 90,000 men 

3d Army of Weissenburg and 

Bitsch, at most 115,000 men 

Emperor Napoleon was enabled to bring his armies into 
the wars in the Orient and in Italy into the field in a sur- 
prisingly short time, but there were not over 150,000 men 
then, and the regular army furnished the men, horses and 
materials for these armies. It will be different if the en- 
tire French army has to be mobilized at one and the same 
time, and the most careful researches lead to the belief that 
France can do this no quicker than can Prussia, 

The intention of France to proceed to war will make 
itself manifest in its purchasing many horses, which it 
can do in its own country only partly, in spite of the ma- 
terially increased breeding of horses and the Algerian re- 
mounts. 

For a comparative estimate of time required we should 
count only that day as the first, on which France issues 
orders for the joining of the men on furlough and reserves. 
This order cannot be kept secret and it can be assumed that 
it will immediately be wired to Frankfurt, Berlin and 
Vienna. That day consequently should also be counted the 
first for the mobilization of the German Confederation 
forces. 

In order to have the troops ready in their garrisons 
to allow the transportation to their concentration points 
to proceed without interruption, it will require, as with us, 
14 days. 

For simultaneous concentration on both sides of the 
Vosges between Strassburg and Metz the 3d and 2d Corps 
will be ordered to march; the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th 
Corps would go by rail. 

The troops in garrisons in the south and west of France 
have to pass either through Lyons or Paris. There is a 
double track-railroad from Lyons to the area of concentra- 
tion, from Paris three may be used with the addition of a 
few marches. 

—98— 



Preparations for War 

With these communications it will be possible to con- 
centrate all disposable French fighting forces along the 
Rhine-Bavaria-Baden frontier quicker than can be done 
on the Prussian side, having but three trunk railroads from 
east to west (two of them single track) . 

There will be assembled for the French main army 
and the army of Strassburg : 

In three weeks 112,000 men 

In four weeks (or to be more 

accurate in 26 days) 205,000 men 

In addition, France has at its immediate disposal in 
the camp at Chalons a corps of 23,000 men which is but 
eight marches from the frontier. If we calculate three days' 
preparation, three days of rest, and two marches toward 
Prussian terrain, if 12,000 reserves are sent by rail to follow 
the corps to Diedenhofen, if the corps is reinforced by 
10,000 men from Metz, Luneville, or nearby garrisons, then 
it may be possible that 45,000 men can be at Trier on the 
16th day to interfere with the mobilization of the 17th Di- 
vision and to prevent the bringing up of war garrisons for 
Luxemburg and Saarlouis. 

This utilization of the nearest ready fighting means 
would only then be resultless, if at the stated time the Vlllth 
Prussian Army Corps were already concentrated on the 
Mosel. 

Furthermore, preparations might be made in secret to 
bring the 23,000 men in camp at Chalons in about four days 
to Forbach immediately after orders therefor are received; 
from there they would probably, without encountering re- 
sistance, appear in seven to eight forced marches through 
the Palatinate on the 12th day in front of Mayence, to try 
to execute a blow against that place. But Mayence, as a 
fortress, is in an excellent condition for defense; all that 
remains to be done is to provide it with a garrison of in- 
fantry and especially of artillery. If we are at all alert it 
will not be difficult to do this, using Prussian or Darmstadt 
detachments. For a permanent support of this and other 
similar undertakings, as well as for the opening of the cam- 

—99— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

paign on the Rhine, the necessary fighting forces, as already 
shown, are not so readily at hand. 

If we now take a glance at the defensive means of Ger- 
many, we see that the eight Confederation corps are equal 
to the French offensive force, and that by the junction of 
other Prussian or Austrian corps we will have a decided 
superiority, as soon as the masses are at our disposal on 
the frontier. 

We must not lose sight of the fact that, considering 
the enemy will take the initiative and also considering the 
extensive railroad net, the entire hostile fighting force can 
be concentrated on the northern frontier of France against 
Belgium and Germany quicker than can our forces on the 
Rhine. That frontier and the Rhine converge from the 
100 [English] miles long line between Lille and Wesel to- 
ward the southeast and finally join on the Lauter. 

Consequently danger of an immediate contact is smaller 
on the lower Rhine and the possibility of an uninterrupted 
concentration there more secure, than on the upper Rhine. 

Therefore we see in advance that the necessary forces 
to defeat a hostile advance through Belgium are easier to 
concentrate than would be the case against an advance from 
Alsace. 

For the assembly of the Prussian main forces, three 
different fields of concentration come into main considera- 
tion. 

1. TJie Bavarian Palatinate. In addition to the 
main army there the Vlllth Prussian Army Corps would 
have to be placed on the Mosel, the Vllth and Vlllth Con- 
federation Corps on the Murg. The distance between Lux- 
emburg and Rastatt is more than 80 [English] miles, and 
one main army and two auxiliary armies (in direct com- 
munication with the main army) will be sufficient. 

This first position of the German arms in the face of 
their restless neighbor should receive the preference, theo- 
retically, to any other; it more than any other covers all 
Confederation lands against the west, has an absolute offen- 
sive character, and leads most surely to a retorsion of the 

—100— 



Preparations for War 

hostile attack. But it presupposes Belgium's neutrality; at 
least were that not to be presupposed, all those fighting 
means would drop away which are required for the defense 
of the lower Rhine. It further presupposes a single leader- 
ship, and one which is forceful enough and not allow itself 
to be confused or hindered in the pursuit of the general 
object by particular and special interest — requirements 
hard to meet in practice considering the division of Ger- 
many into states and position of its two great Powers ex- 
tending beyond the frontier of the Confederation. And not 
at all counting these considerations, the very unequal con- 
dition of readiness for war of the different contingents, of 
the great distance, in spite of the generally favorable con- 
verging of the trunk lines of the German railways towards 
the central Rhine, will hardly allow a concentration in the 
Palatinate, which is unprotected by a larger natural ob- 
stacle and so near the French frontier. We have seen that 
after four weeks already 200,000 French can advance to 
that point. 

This shows that we must enter the Palatinate in the 
course of the operation but must not designate it as the 
rendezvous of separately arriving corps. 

2. More easy of access and next in offensive effect 
appears to be a concentration of the main force behind the 
protecting sector of the Mosel. It would be possible, by rail 
transportation to- Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence, in addi- 
tion to marches, to concentrate within 33 days on the Mosel : 

1 Prussian army corps at Trier and beyond, 
4 Prussian army corps at Wittlich, 
1 Prussian army corps at Coblenz, 

a total of 200,000 men. This position covers the Prussian 
possessions directly, is protected from envelopments on the 
right by Luxemburg, on the left by the Rhine, has a strong 
obstacle in its front, and the most assured retreat to the 
Rhine fortresses. 

The distance from Luxemburg to Basel is 160 [English] 
miles and consequently it becomes necessary to have two 
independent main armies, that is, in addition to the one 

—101— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

on the Mosel another one on the upper Rhine. If Austria 
is in the situation to send its three Confederation corps to 
the latter and to the Rhine, then both armies will co-operate, 
at least in the offensive. And even in the defensive each 
and any attack movement of the French against the one 
or the other would have one of them on their flank. 

But unfortunately it cannot be denied that the oppon- 
ent can appear on the Mosel or on the upper Rhine several 
days earlier, i.e., in the start with superior forces, before 
the concentration there is completed. 

This position consequently would be the correct and 
executable one, if the neutrality of Belgium were assured 
and if the first concentration were prepared in advance by 
corps mobilized before then. 

3. More secure and more certain of execution in any 
event finally is a concentration of the main forces on the 
Main, because this field of concentration is directly reached 
by rail from all parts of Germany, is more distant from the 
French frontier, and protected by the powerful Rhine line. 
Of course in this case we cannot protect at the first riioment 
with the means at hand the German territory on the left 
bank of the Rhine against hostile invasion. — The concentra- 
tion on the Main is a necessary make-shift in the face of 
the initiative left to France by the separation of Germany, 
and the defensive line, 280 [Enghsh] miles, from Wesel to 
Basel requires the placing of three separate armies, namely : 
One on the lower Rhine, which, however, if Belgium re- 
mains neutral and if time allows, can immediately advance 
to the Mosel, one on the Main and one on the upper Rhine. 

Prussia has the military power and has enough general 
German as well as special Prussian interests to furnish the 
preponderant part of two of these armies, which the Con- 
federation States can join in accordance with their geo- 
graphical situation. It will furnish these two armies even 
should it be confined entirely to its own resources. 

The Rhine with its fortresses will always remain the 
defensive front of Prussia against France. This line is so 
exceedingly strong, as to not at all require the total fight- 

—102— 



Preparations for War 

ing forces of the Monarchy tox holding it and the larger 
part of the forces will remain available for an offensive 
which can be made from the center or from one of the 
wings. 

The right wing is secured against France by distance 
mainly. Its envelopment, 200 (English) miles, across the 
lower course of the Schelde, Maas and the Rhine and past 
Antwerp through Belgium and Holland is impossible in con- 
sideration of military and political reasons. 

It is true that the left wing is advantageously sup- 
ported by Mayence, still for reasons which have already 
been explained, it needs a strong army for the offensive as 
well as for a permanent defensive. 

In assigning positions to the contingents of the central 
and minor States of Germany, we cannot leave their terri- 
torial interests out of sight. Each one of them will demand 
to have its domain secured. Prussia's position on the Rhine 
secures this protection to the north. Giving political riv- 
alries first consideration, we can adopt other systems in 
time of peace, but in case of war with France the pressure 
of the situation will force the Xth and Xlth Confederation 
Corps to join the Prussian defense. Even the Saxon Divi- 
sion, if it actually joined the South German army at Ras- 
tatt, would certainly not retreat on Ulm but on Wiirzburg, 
and would consequently enter the sphere of operations of 
the Army of the Main. 

The defense of Southern Germany will in the start be 
the task of the Vllth and the Vlllth Confederation Corps 
and the Illd Austrian Corps. 

We have mentioned above that Austria will have to 
protect not only its own interests but also German territory 
by a strong deployment of forces in Italy, the Tyrol, and 
Switzerland. The distance alone shows that it is improb- 
able that the corps, which Austria designates for a German 
theater of war, can be disposable in the start at the upper 
Rhine. If they will be, after the course of about three 
weeks, in position there or in Voralberg, or in Tyrol, or in 
lower Austria, depends on the very much complicated Euro- 

—103— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

pean position of the Empire. Consequently we must con- 
sider the possibility that the Austrian contingent cannot 
appear at the start on the upper Rhine for the defense of 
Southern Germany. 

If in the time mentioned (3 weeks) 100,000 French- 
men can deploy via Strassburg, then of course the most 
obvious reasons force Southern Germany to at once con- 
centrate all of its own forces. 

A local defense of the Rhine can have no possible suc- 
cess and to concentrate the Vllth and the Vlllth Confed- 
eration Corps, even if immediately behind the Black Forest, 
would mean to leave Baden at least entirely defenseless. 
Having an extent of 300 [English] miles and directly join- 
ing France, and with a depth of but two or three marches, 
this frontier territory can be protected only by a flank posi- 
tion in the Rhine valley, and Rastatt is the only place for 
that. 

! Wiirtemberg also cannot be held .at the start against 
superior hostile forces, and both of these states can be 
liberated again only by the help of Austria or Prussia. In 
accordance as to whether this help arrives quicker and 
stronger from the north or from the east, the retreat will 
have to be made on either the Iller or the Main. Thus it is 
probable that in that case only the latter direction is the 
proper one for all troops which Bavaria places in the field 
for the protection of the Palatinate, and also for the Baden 
contingent. 

Concentrated on the Murg the Baden contingent covers 
at least its lower Rhine district ; there it forms the advance 
guard of the Main army which is then only but five marches 
distant, and through which army alone it can be supported 
in time. 

It is of undoubted interest to Prussia, the political con- 
ditions of which are more simple than those of Austria, to 
meet a French attack against Germany with its entire 
forces. 

Even if we can expect no gratitude from Russia on 
account of our attitude during Poland's insurrection, that 

—104— 



Preparations for War 

power is chained down too much by interior conditions to 
prevent or interfere with the utilization on the Rhine of 
our army corps in the east of the Monarchy. We can with- 
out fear trust the cadre and garrison battalions of the dis- 
tricts close by to maintain order in the Grand-Duchy of 
Posen. 

It seems improbable that Denmark, even if Sweden 
helps it, will take the offensive against Germany. If France 
would bring about such a diversion it has to support it by 
troops which we would not have to fight on the Rhine in 
that case. A Prussian and the Xth Confederation Corps 
will probably be sufficient to meet this threatening danger 
and to guard the coasts. 

The mobilization of the army and the transportation 
of four army corps to the Rhine will take the first four 
weeks. Thereafter we may be able to see how many of 
the others will have to be held back, how many can follow 
up and into which direction they are to be started. 

We may in general designate Cologne and Mayence as 
the first concentration direction in any war with France, 
consequently we can regulate the transportation in advance. 
Our railroad net does not lead across the Rhine in toto; 
there are now only two single-track lines to Aix-la-Chapelle 
and a similar one to Trier, the latter in addition passing 
immediately along the French frontier. Consequently an 
interruption has to occur on the Rhine and marching re- 
sorted to for any further concentration farther west. On 
the other hand, railroads and steamers connect the two ter- 
minals, Cologne and Mayence, which allows, according to 
necessity, of sending troop transports from one to the other 
wing. 

To the Rhine and to the Main the present railroad net 
forms three independent trunk lines from east to west and 
one like it from north to south. 

The concentration will be effected in the shortest pos- 
sible time if 

The Vllth Army Corps concentrates by inarching, 
The Vlth Army Corps is sent via Bamberg, 

—105— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



The IVth Army Corps is sent via Cassel, 
The Vth Army Corps is sent via Hanover, 
The Vllth Army Corps is sent via Wetzlar. 

The last four corps (exclusive of a part of the Land- 
wehr cavalry) will reach with their rear detachments the 
terminals of the transport by the 27th day. 

To where these terminals should be transferred, how 
far the transport trains should go, whether the troops ar- 
riving at Cologne should be immediately sent farther up 
stream or those arriving at Mayence and Frankfurt down 
stream, can be regulated, considering connections anl facil- 
ities along the river, according to conditions then existing. 

Should the neutrality of Belgium be still doubtful, then 
we could place, after the end of the first four weeks: — 

The Vth and Vllth Army Corps at Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle ; 
The Vlllth Army Corps at Coblenz and Trier; 
The IVth and Vlth Army Corps at Frankfurt and Mayence, 
respectively. 

If we can ascertain by that time that the Belgian terri- 
tory will not be touched, the Vth Army Corps can immedi- 
ately be sent via Cologne to Coblenz and the Vllth via Wetz- 
lar also to Coblenz or to Frankfurt. 

Thus, in the same space of time, there would be as- 
sembled either : — 

The Vlllth, Vllth and Vth Army Corps on the Mosel between 

Trier and Coblenz, 
The Vlth and IVth Army Corps on the Main between Mayence 

and Frankfurt; 

Or, if we may expect but an auxiliary army on the 
Mosel, and the main hostile force in the Palatinate and 
Southern Germany: — 

The Vlllth and Vth Army Corps on the Mosel between Trier 

and Coblenz, 
The Vlth, IVth and Vllth Army Corps on the Main, between 

Frankfurt, Mayence and Darmstadt. 

Then there would be, for bringing up the corps from 
the eastern provinces, in any case two (the northern) rail- 
roads clear and within five days one corps, the Hid, could 
be brought to Cologne, Coblenz or Mayence, followed by 
the lid Corps. 

—106— 



Preparations for War 
Within five weeks we can have concentrated: 

On the Mosel On the Main 

Either 140,000 and 70,000] 

or 105,000 and 105,000 \ a total of 210,000 men. 

or 35,000 and 175,000 J 

If by that time at least the Vllth and the Vlllth Con- 
federation Corps have reached the upper Rhine and the 
IXth Confederation Corps the Main, and if by that time 
the French masses have not yet crossed the frontier, then 
we could take the position mentioned under (1) above: 

200,000 men in the Palatinate, 
35,000 men on the Mosel, 
80,000 men on the Murg. 

But there is little hope of being able to do that, considering 
what we have already said of the enemy's preparedness. 

On the other hand, the question arises for Prussia: 
Is it more advantageous and more correct to concentrate 
the larger number of Prussian corps on the Mosel or on the 
Main? 

If our own main force can be in position at the proper 
time and strong enough on the Mosel and occupy the Saar 
line, then we will defend at the same time our entire terri- 
tory, abandon not a single foot of it to the enemy, secure 
the inhabitants on the left bank of the Rhine against hostile 
invasion, and will not have to commence at the very start 
with a retreat. If we are strong enough our offensive from 
the Mosel will protect the Rhine Palatinate and indirectly 
even the upper Rhine. These advantages are self-evident; 
the question only is, can the concentration be made? 

A comparison of rail transportation in France and 
Germany shows: 

During the first stages of the war, we cannot oppose a 
suitable detachment ready for operation to the French 
corps assembled in Chalons, which is 35,000 men strong, 
inclusive of reserve, and which can reach Trier on the 
fourteenth day. 

In order to secure the mobilization of the 16th Division 
it would have to be started before the outbreak of war ; or^ 

—107— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

a permanent maneuver camp must be prepared by us on 
the Mosel; or, Trier must be made a fortress of the 1st 
class. 

On the twenty-first day 160,000 men can be assembled 
at those points on the French northeastern frontier from 
which the advance is to be made. (That the French would 
commence their main operations earlier than on that day 
and with less forces is not probable, considering the lack 
of artillery necessary for the mobilization of a larger army.), 
But if they start only on the twenty-second day from the 
line Diedenhofen — Bitsch, they can, after investing Saar- 
louis with about 10,000 men, be ready without doubt on the 
twenty-eighth day to cross the Mosel from Trier to Trar- 
bach with 150,000 men. 

We have seen above that by that day the Vlllth, Vllth 
and Vth Corps can be concentrated at Wittlich. These three 
corps number together about 100,000 men. 

It is true that the transports of the Vlth Army Corps 
on the Saxony — Bavaria line, which unfortunately is not 
very reliable, can be ordered to proceed at once via Mayence 
down the Rhine to Coblenz. As the direct march from 
Bingen via Simmern is then hardly safe, and as the facilities 
of all steamers and of the railroads along the Rhine will be 
fully taken up by transporting the Vth Army Corps from 
Cologne to Coblenz, the timely arrival of the corps at Witt- 
lich is somewhat doubtful and even if it arrives in time it 
would not make our force there equal to the French, 

In addition, as shown above, a part of the French fight- 
ing force coming from Chalons can have occupied Trier 
several days before and can have started towards Wittlich. 

Therefore the first assembly of our fighting force there 
cannot be ordered with certainty. For that, security of the 
upper Mosel is necessary, and there is not time for that. 
Here also the strategic importance of Trier plainly appears. 

Considering the conditions as stated and the railroads 
now existing, the first concentration of our main force can 
be effected with absolute certainty on the Main only, should 
the outbreak of war find our army still on a peace footing. 

—108— 



Preparations for War 

If in that case the French intend to advance with 150,- 
000 men towards the Mosel, an invasion of the Rhine Pro- 
vince would ensue, as we have already stated, but by no 
means a permanent occupation of the same. On the other 
hand, the army designated to undertake the task must not be 
weaker than 45,000 men, if after all unavoidable detach- 
ments, it is to be equal to our Vlllth Army Corps, which 
gradually assembles. 

, This will leave the French 115,000 men, which, con- 
centrated in front of the Forbach — Lauterburg line and 
crossing the frontier on the 22d day, cannot appear before 
the 29th day in front of Mayence and Frankfurt and that 
with 100,000 men at most, even if they do not encounter 
any resistance in the Palatinate or when crossing the Rhine. 
We have seen that by that time the Vlth, IVth and Vllth 
Army Corps, also 100,000 men strong, will be concentrated 
on the Main ; and in addition a part of the Hid Army Corps 
will have arrived there and we can also count on the arrival 
of the Hesse-Nassau contingents. 

The French, who will also have to secure themselves 
against Mayence, would then have to force a crossing of the 
Main against probable superior forces. Through a junc- 
tion of the Vth with the Vlllth Army Corps there would 
be, at the same time, considerably superior forces opposed 
to the French auxiliary army in the Rhine Province. 

It is therefore very probable that the French will com- 
mence their main operations only when all their fighting 
forces, 250,000 men, are disposable, that is, on the 26th day, 
at which time Prussia can have but 176,000 men concen- 
trated on its western frontier. 

As the French cannot encounter serious resistance in 
either the Rhine Province or in the Palatinate, they would 
reach with their auxiliary army Trier, and with a strong 
advance guard (after having invested Landau and Ger- 
mersheim) Mannheim on the 26th day, would try to secure 
the Rhine crossings there and in that vicinity, and, follow- 
ing with the main body in the same direction, reach the 
Main with about 180,000 men on the 32d day. 

—109— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Although on the 32d day the Illd Corps will have joined 
the Vlth, IVth and Vllth there, the total strength, inclusive 
of the Hesse-Nassau contingents, will be only 150,000 men. 

Of course in the meantime the transport of the Vth 
Army Corps would have been continued via Cologne to and 
on the Rhine and thereby we could oppose the French at- 
tack on the Main in equal force ; still in that case the Vlllth 
Army Corps would remain without any support and our 
Rhine Province would remain in the hands of the enemy. 

In order to meet this primary superiority of the French, 
the Main army has three different options. It can : 

(a) Take the offensive via Mayence to the left bank of the 
Rhine to interfere v^^ith the enemy's advance, or 

(b) await that advance on the defensive behind the Main, or 
finally 

(c) conduct an active defense behind the Rhine line from May- 
ence to Mannheim. 

The offensive procedure is the most desirable one, it 
is the more audacious operation, although the most pre- 
carious one. 

(a) The fortifications of Mayence favor the deploying 
as well as the retreat of large masses of troops, which later, 
in an unfavorable outcome, can also be directed toward 
Coblenz. 

With a full strength of 140,000 men we could take up 
this operation hardly before the 33d day. But we know that 
the French will be ready with larger forces already on the 
26th day and that they can have invested Mayence on the 
left bank on the 33d day. Therefore we must start earlier, 
about the 28th day, and consequently weaker, with 100,000 
men, in which case the first contact would take place very 
close to Mayence. It is possible that this contact will come 
unexpectedly to the French, that we will meet with our 
whole force only one of their columns and will gain a suc- 
cess at the very start. For, considering the enormous num- 
bers, the opponent will probably advance on the five exist- 
ing roads, which are 52 [English] miles from each other at 
the frontier. These roads converge towards Mayence in 
such manner that about opposite Alzey it would require but 

—110— 



Preparations for War 

one march to assemble all columns, and we might possibly 
have to fight with double our number, which would not be 
offset even if we could count by that time on the co-operation 
of the Vth and Vlllth Army Corps coming from the Mosel. 

Even if at this time the French have crossed the Rhine 
at Strassburg with 90,000 men, they would meet us in the 
Palatinate with about equal numbers. Should a stronger 
detachment towards the Black Forest suffice to secure the 
right flank of the Strassburg Army against the South Ger- 
man contingents, then at about the time when we are en- 
gaged in the Palatinate, that army could have reached the 
Neckar and we would hardly have any other choice than to 
either return to behind the Main or to base ourselves on the 
Mosel only. 

In that case it would most decidedly be best for us to 
take the offensive through the Palatinate, if the rest of 
Germany is willing and ready for a forceful and offensive 
conduct of the war, if the IXth Confederation Corps were 
joined with the Prussian corps on the Main, if the Vllth and 
Vlllth Confederation Corps, supported by Austrian corps, 
would attack the Strassburg Army or hold it. But if we 
could presuppose such a deployment of the German fight- 
ing forces and such a combined action, the French attack 
would hardly be made. 

(b). If, on the other hand, we remain on a strict 
defensive behind the Main, then the French, provided they 
start on the 27th day and advance through the Palatinate 
across the undefended Rhine, could, after leaving 20,000 
men in front of Landau and Germersheim, reach Darmstadt 
with 180,000 men on the 33d day. 

According to reconnaissances so far made it is true 
that our Main Army of 150,000 men will find a favorable 
defensive position behind the Nidda, between Hochst and 
Bonames. In attacking its front the enemy would be con- 
fined, in a very disadvantageous manner, to the limited 
terrain between that creek and the Main. Enveloping our 
left wing via Hanau and Aschaffenburg would endanger 
all French communications, must be protected against May- 

—111— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

ence, and requires more than one day's march to reach 
our roads of retreat across the Taunus. 

But the danger in the defensive lies in the enemy's 
throwing back our right wing, forcing us into the direction 
of Cassel and cutting our communications with the lower 
Rhine, on which stream we intend to base all our operations, 
even towards the east, should the French desire to pass our 
position that way. 

Mayence being 12 [English] miles distant, no longer 
directly protects this right wing, and a mere observation of 
the Main as far as Mayence would not at all suffice, as that 
stream, unimportant in itself, can easily be bridged, and 
is even fordable at places. To this must be added, that on 
account of the densely wooded terrain to the s6uth, the 
exact intention of the enemy can be preceived only at the 
last moment. 

Therefore the position behind the Nidda cannot be 
occupied in the very start and held under all eventualities. 
After the enemy will have driven back all our observation 
detachments sent across the Main, the corps would first 
have to be concentrated in bivouacs, about around Hofheim, 
so that they could take a position with the right as well as 
with the left wing on Hochst. In this the left flank should be 
covered by a detached division which, through local defense 
of Frankfurt, gains the necessary time for the army to go 
into position behind the Nidda or on the Main below the 
mouth of the Nidda. 

Should there be no good defensive position between 
Hochst and Mayence, then one must be sought farther in 
rear and in immediate connection with that place, that is 
at Erbenheim, in order that above all else the right wing 
and the connection through the Taunus with the Rhine will 
remain secure. 

Nevertheless, a hostile superiority of 30,000 or 40,000 
men will be felt in any position. It would be offset after 
five days by the arrival of one Prussian corps (probably the 
lid) which would be disposable even if we were compelled 
to leave two corps in the eastern Provinces against Den- 

—112— 



Pi'eparations for War 

mark or Poland. Finally, by the 38th day, the Saxon Divi- 
sion would probably complete the IXth Confederation Corps 
on the Main, for the purpose of which the railroad would 
become available on the 28th day. Then the superiority 
would be on our side, and it is self-evident how important 
it is to delay the French advance, even if for but a few 
days. This, it is plain, can be done only if we are able to 
dispute the Rhine crossing with the enemy. 

(c). If the Vlth Army Corps is transported at once 
to Darmstadt and partly beyond it, the most important 
points between Mayence and Mannheim on the right bank 
of the Rhine can be occupied on the 28th day, that is, on the 
arrival of the French, and if any French detachments have 
already arrived that far they can be driven back ; thereafter 
the IVth and Vllth Army Corps can be concentrated about 
Bensheim in a central position of readiness, from where 
they can reach threatened points between Mannheim and 
Oppenheim in one day's march. On this stretch then a 
Rhine crossing could hardly be forced in the face of 100,000 
men, because during the execution of the crossing the enemy 
could not bring his superiority of numbers into play. 

If the opponent declines to take the shortest route to 
the Main and should try a crossing above Mannheim, it 
would be doubtful if he could throw a bridge there consid- 
ering the proximity of Germersheim and the presence of 
the Baden contingents which we would support. In case 
of success he would still have to force the Neckar line, from 
which line our retreat to behind, the Main would not at all 
appear to be endangered. 

The French at the present time own at Strassburg a 
crossing over the Rhine which the Main army, on account 
of its distant situation from there, cannot dispute with 
them. If they intend to take that route with their entire 
force, then to cover that distance, the necessity of moving 
two such important masses in the narrow Rhine valley on 
at most two roads, the siege of Rastatt and Germersheim, 
and the crossing of the Neckar would take so much time as 
to make it impossible for them to reach the Main before the 

—113— 



k 



Moltke's Correspondence l 

38th day, at which time our reinforcements would have 
arrived and we would have become the stronger party. 

As a matter of fact the French have the numerical 
superiority only in the first phases of the campaign and, 
in order to bring them into play, are compelled to attack the 
Prussian army on the Main in the shortest possible time, 
that is, on the most direct route. For this they will require 
an army which, advancing on the right bank of the Rhine, 
opens the crossings on that stream to their main army. 
This means that the French army will have to be separated 
into two parts, the main army advancing through the Pal- 
atinate, and the second army, which, however, must also 
be strong, operating from Strassburg down stream. This 
of course complicates our task more and more. 

We have to make a defense of not only our front on 
the Rhine, but also of the flank on the Neckar. This is not 
so serious as it looks, because we will be in a position be- 
tween the two separated main forces of the enemy. We can 
defend the Rhine with smaller forces and the Neckar with 
our main forces. As the danger increases so also increases 
the prospect of a decisive victory. 

If the Strassburg army has been compelled to weaken 
itself materially in front of Rastatt and the South German 
contingents, then we will oppose it on the Neckar with su- 
perior forces. If then the Wiirttembergers and Bavarians 
are able to take the offensive on their part, it will hardly 
be possible for the army of the French right wing to avoid 
a complete defeat. 

Still we must not shut our eyes to the danger threaten- 
ing us should, during our advance south, the French main 
army succeed in crossing the Rhine below Mannheim. In 
that case we would be cut off from the lower Main and from 
the Rhine Province, and would have to lay our base on the 
eastern provinces. 

It is true that in the closest connection with the Vllth 
and Vlllth Confederation Corps, we would, after having 
driven the French right wing back across the Rhine, be 
fully equal to the center of the French army after it has 

_114_ 



Preparations for War 

advanced, but in that case entirely new conditions will 
obtain. 

Which of the three operations here discussed will be the 
correct one for the Main army, cannot be definitely decided 
on in advance, for that depends on conditions obtaining 
after concentration has been completed. 



When in August, 1866, during the peace negotiations between 
Prussia and Austria, the attitude of France seemed to indicate an 
interference of France in those negotiations, General v. Moltke ad- 
dressed a memorial to the Minister-President Count v. Bismarck, 
in which he discussed the military measures to be taken in case of 
a war with France. 



MEMORIAL NO. 6 
To THE Minister-President, Count v. Bismarck- 

SCHOENHAUSEN 

Berlin, 8 August, 1866. 

Your Excellency will allow me to hand you the en- 
closed short exposition concerning our military attitude 
against France at this time, and I desire to remark that 
according to our calculations France cannot concentrate 
an army of operation of 250,000 men between Metz and 
Strassburg earlier than in 26 days. 

MEMORIAL 

It is of manifest importance to arrive at a definite set- 
tlement with Austria as soon as practicable in order to have 
a free hand against the east and the west, if our neighbors 
should try to rob us of the fruits of our victory. In the nego- 
tiations at Prague, consequently, minor points are of no 
importance ; the main point should be to again have at our 
disposal the troops now in Bohemia and in Moravia. 

The first probability might be that France may demand 
from us cession of terrain, which would be in opposition 
to the task now set Prussia to unite all of Germany and to 



—115- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

protect it, a task, for the solution of which we have just 
taken the first and most important step. 

Should France make such a demand, the naturally 
resulting war would be a popular one within the entire 
Gerijian territory, outside of Austria. It cannot be at all 
doubtful that an alliance against France would be formed 
with the South German States against the surrender of the 
whole or of even the greater part of the territory occupied 
by us south of the Main. In such a case not only a con- 
federation with the North German States, but also with 
the states composing the entire territoify of Germany would 
ensue^and would receive new life. Considering, their pres- 
ent state of readiness for war and their present location, 
the South German contingents could be concentrated at 
Mannheim within from 8 to 10 days numbering some 
80,000 men. By the same time there could be concentrated 
around Mayence our Main army (by marching) and the 
lid Reserve Corps, dependent on whether the latter re- 
mains at Nuremburg or is at once started on the march 
to Wtirzburg, by rail or by marching — a force of 90,000 
men. 

In no case could France concentrate in so short a time 
an offensive army which would be strong enough to cross 
the Rhine at any point in the face of these first positions; 
and when peace has been established with Austria, the ques- 
tion would only be as to the time in which the French army, 
equal to our own, can be concentrated in the west. 

Conditions for a war of the French Empire against 
victorious Prussia and the united German people at this 
very instant appear so little favorable, that it undoubtedly 
will not be engaged in, unless an understanding has already 
been arrived at with Austria for the continuation of the 
war, which of course would make all peace negotiations of 
no use. 

Therefore it is necessary to look at this probability from 
a military standpoint. 

As, in accordance with treaty stipulations, Italy cannot 
come to peace terms without our sanction, Austria would 

—116— 



Preparations for War ' 

have. to send at least the largest part of its South Army to 
the other side of the Alps, and this appears to have been 
done already. Consequently there could be only some 150,000 
men opposed to us on the Danube, a force which is in part 
badly demoralized by the battle of June and July of the 
present year. 

Still, I do not believe that we can afford, in a simul- 
taneous war with France, to continue the offensive war 
against Vienna, as that offensive, provided it is not to 
come to a standstill on the Danube, would require all our 
forces. Of course, should the Austrians advance beyond 
the Danube, we could concentrate 160,000 to 180,000 men 
on the Thays within eight days and presumably win an- 
other battle with that force. However, it is not at all prob- 
able that they will do that, they will far rather remain on 
\the defensive behind that stream until French cooperation 
becomes effective. The armistice agreed on is for four weeks 
and that space of time is sufficient for the French prepara- 
tions and even if our preparations are completed before then, 
we need time to transport our armies from the Danube to 
the Rhine. 

Should Austria raise serious difficulties in the confer- 
ence at Prague, it will indicate an understanding with 
France, and consequently our military forces in Bohemia 
should not be reinforced, but should at once be transported 
to the Rhine. 

Four army corps, about 120,000 men, will be sufficient 
to successfully carry on, from the vicinity of Prague, a de- 
fensive based on Dresden, which is fortified. 

By the 9th of September there can have arrived at 
Mayence and Mannheim a total strength of 150,000 men — 
two army corps by rail via Oderberg — Berlin — Cologne, 
one army corps by rail from Dresden — Leipzig — Cassel 
and the Elbe army, presupposing a union with South Ger- 
many, on the two roads from Eger — Wiirzburg — Frankfurt 
on the Main and Pilsen — Nuremberg — Stuttgart — Bruchsal, 
provided a start is made on August 22 ; the strength of the 
North German forces there will then be increased to a 
total of 240,000 men. 

—117— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

We would have to count off 15,000 troops of the line for 
Mayence, the exclusive possession of which place must be 
secured in the treaties with the South German States, and 
further about that many more troops of the field army for 
Saarlouis, Coblenz, Cologne, Wesel and Luxemburg. 

This will leave more than 200,000 men, and counting 
in the South German contingents we will have an army of 
operation of nearly 300,000 men. 

But in arriving at these results we must take cogni- 
zance of the following assumptions : 

(a) That Prussia alone exercises the right of garrison- 
ing Mayence, in order to have that place absolutely secure 
against any and all French undertakings. 

(b) That the governments of Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, 
Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt place their railroads and ma- 
terials at our disposal for the transportation of the Elbe 
army. 

(c) That the Bavarian troops at once take a position 
somewhere along the Wiirttemberg frontier, to be in a 
position to reach the Rhine by marching within ten days. 
We cannot count on the contingents of the remaining South 
German States reaching there within that time, if they are 
now at their respective stations. 

In treaties with the South German States these three 
points should not be lost sight of. 

It is not probable that France will make its attack 
through Belgium. By doing so it would come into conflict 
with England and would have to weaken its forces materi- 
ally by occupying Belgium and Antwerp. 

An invasion of Southern Germany would not directly 
lead to the desired object, because it would leave Prussia 
unendangered and would always have the German armies 
on its flank. 

Without doubt, the French attacking army would, ad- 
vancing between Luxemburg and Rastatt, directly proceed 
to that country the possession of which it strives to gain. 
Our Rhine fortresses, which naturally should be placed in 
a state of preparedness, are consequently not in immediate 

—118— 



Preparations for War 

danger, and we would be justified in concentrating the en- 
tire fighting force, which Germany can assemble against 
France, between the Main and the Neckar. Insofar as there 
is no time for concentrating that army in the Palatinate, 
the attack may be awaited behind the Rhine, for the mere 
possession by the French of the left bank of the Rhine does 
not secure them possession of the land. They will not be 
able to overcome the necessity of crossing the stream in the 
face of the defender, and have to weaken their army by the 
investment of Luxemburg and Saarlouis, by observation 
against Coblenz, Mayence, Germersheim, Landau and Ras- 
tatt. 

Therefore, it can be said in general, that the war 
against Austria, considering its present weakness, and 
against France will have to be conducted in a defensive man- 
ner, but should not be avoided, considering the large object 
to be gained thereby. Even if the outcome should not be 
entirely successful, Germany would for all time to come be 
assembled around Prussia, while the voluntary cession of 
even the smallest part of German territory would make the 
future leadership of Prussia impossible. 

If we are successful in concluding peace with Austria 
within the next few days, France would surely object to 
all conditions of the treaty ; it could choose no more favora- 
ble time for war than the present. In that case it would be 
material to quickly consolidate North Germany in order 
to oppose in sufl!icient force dangers coming from the west 
and the east. 



-119- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The following work — without date — presupposes the possibility of 
utilizing the territory of Luxemburg and — differing from former mem- 
orials, which in the main were based on a defensive attitude of Prus- 
sia — treats of an advance of the North German fighting forces on 
France. 

MEMORIAL NO. 7. 



A. Advance Against the Line Metz — Diedenhofen 
Prior concentration of : 

The 1st Army at Luxemburg, Sierck; 

The 2d Army at Rehlingen, Saarlouis; 

The 4th Army at Sulzbach, Saarbrucken, Volklingen, utiliz- 
ing the Nahe and the Bexbach railroads; 

The 3d Army to secure against Strassburg or act as a left 
flank army following via Saargemiind — Morchingen. 



1st 
Army 



f Luxemburg 

i 

[ Sierck 
r Rehlingen 



2d 
Army 



Saarlouis 



4th 
Army 



1st Day 



f Busendorf, 
I Felsburg, 

I Tromborn, 
LHargarten, 

[ Ham below 
i Varsberg, 

"i Ludweiler, 
I St. Avoid, 
[Merlenbach, 



2d Day 

f Kattenhofen, 
I 

-I 
I 
L Konigsmachern 

f Dalstein, 
I Busendorf, 

I Brittendorf, 
L Eblingen, 

f Bolchen, 
I 

-,' Hallingen, 
I Fullingen, 
L Buschborn, 



3d Day 

f in front of 
I Thionville 

Remingen, 

L Metzervisse 

r Betsdorf, 
I Homburg, 

I Vigy, 

|_ Brittendorf, 

f St. Barbe, 



Bolchen, 

Flanville, 

[ Courcelles. 



Uh Day. Eight corps (250,000 men) one to two miles 
from the Mosel. One division in front of Diedenhofen, one 
corps against Metz. 

First Army south of Bussy across the Mosel, to sup- 
port the attack in the front. 

Eight corps, on a front of 12 [English] miles, two 
echelons deep. 

Start: First line early in the morning, second line in 
the afternoon. 



-120- 



Preparations for War 






SPh^ o 



o •" 

o > 

■I I 



f3 


> 


01 






S 



M 



O 



Si) 



AM 



r-H O (U C 

0) c3 3 :3 



§1 

^ o 




OJ 


0) 

be 


^^ 


^ 


03 


:0 C3 


3^ 




C 


PQCQ 


pq<l 


S 


fe 



;? 

o 

p^ 

o 
o 

> 
<1 



Si 






a 


>.2 


0) - 




tz 

lomb 

urce] 


rzel 

lling 

Icher 




^ o o 


3:3 O 




Soo 


MC^pq 



M 



01 T3 
^ 01 



o 



fl^ ^ > s 

' — I (11 . Tl 



.2 «!-:s 



foM 







pq 



Si 


« ^ 


s 


C3.22 ^ 


C) 


5n '-' 01 








T3 N CO 




0) -|J ^^ 


"-H 


■li; oj c3 




:5^Q 




' -V- ' 




>> 




s 



'Z w 






—121- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The political situation after 1866, and the task of the fortress of 
Luxemburg in the year 1867, had brought about a change in the mili- 
tary relations of Northern Germany towards France. Details of this 
are contained in the following two letters. 

NO. 8 



To THE Minister of War, General of Infantry v. Roon 

Berlin, 15 May, 1867. 

If we abandon our military position in Luxemburg the 
question arises, should some other point near the French 
frontier be fortified to protect the Rhine Province. 

The most natural procedure would be to enlarge Saar- 
louis, which lies at about the center of the line only thirty- 
two [English] miles long, from Luxemburg to the Ba- 
varian Palatinate. A large fortified place with a strong 
garrison would of course have a general influence on this 
entire stretch of frontier. Saarlouis cannot be trans- 
formed, except by material enlargement, into a fortress 
which will be able to withstand a formal attack consid- 
ering present-day fire effect. 

Not counting the fact that the terrain, especially on 
the right bank of the Saar, is unfavorable to a more extend- 
ed fortification, we have but lately learned the difficul- 
ties any fortress in the immediate vicinity of the frontier 
causes us. Such a fortress must be fully prepared and gar- 
risoned in time of peace. The first may be gone pecuniarily, 
but not the latter, for, as a matter of policy, the Landwehr 
is designated to garrison the fortresses, and it cannot be 
assembled in time of peace. 

Consequently there would only remain to throw troops 
of the field army into a fortress and that is field troops of 
our peace organization — considering that we are opposed by 
an enemy who is fully prepared and stationed so close to 
us. The enlarged Saarlouis would require the entire infan- 
try of the 16th Division to be secure against a sudden attack. 

In any case, under present strained conditions, the en- 
largement of the place could hardly be finished at the time 

—122— 



Preparations for War 

when required. Although one element of the state of 
"strained conditions," i.e. Luxemburg, is now eliminated, 
the main disturbing factor remains, the demand of France 
for supremacy in Europe (which of course is not justified 
at all) ; that means, forcing Prussia to relinquish the posi- 
tion which it has gained in Germany. In spite of all its 
preparatory arming, France, still without an ally, would 
hardly be in the situation to conduct war against Germany. 
It is probable that France will wait for its new armament 
which may be completed by next year. 

Even if by that time the reorganization of the French 
army should be completed and if consequently 300 battal- 
ions can take the field in future 1000 men strong instead of 
700 men strong, the North German army would be numeri- 
cally superior. After organizing a field army, a third of 
which in any case would be composed of raw levies, France 
would have exhausted its reserves, and replenishment and 
new formations could be effected only by recruitment or by 
volunteers, while our Prussian Landwehr forms a nucleus 
from which even the army of operations can be reinforced. 
In the French artillery the number of guns will have been 
increased to 1014, but not the number of trained artillery- 
men, while Prussia can this year put 1240 guns into the 
field. 

Consequently, next year the means for a successful 
war against France will be available in North Germany 
without counting on South Germany, and the main point 
will only be to concentrate these means at the proper time 
and correct place. 

Therefore I see more security for us in hastening the 
extension of our railroads than there would be in construc- 
tion of any fortifications. 

With existing railroad connections we can transport to 
the Rhine by the 30th day after orders are issued for mobili- 
zation : 

3 army corps by marching, 

4 army corps by rail, a total of 

7 army corps. 

—123— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The remaining six army corps can be transported only 
after that day, and the march into position of the army can- 
not be effected in less than six weeks. 

But it is doubtful if the 200,000 men, first assembled, 
will be sufficient to carry the offensive into France which 
would better than anything else protect our Rhine Province. 

In order to augment the North German railroad net, 
we do not need the construction of railroads for strategical 
purposes, but only the completion of such lines as are al- 
ready projected by the requirements of commerce and com- 
munication. 

In order to open new trunk lines for military transpor- 
tation to the Rhine, the following lines will have to be com- 
pleted : 

1. The Borssum — Halberstadt line. 

2. The continuation of the Halle — Nordhausen railroad from 
Heiligenstadt, be that directly via Witzenhausen, via Miinden, or 
even Gottingen. 

3. The Fulda — Hanau railroad. 

Should, in case of the last named road, the terrain dif- 
ficulties be so great that its construction, by using all pos- 
sible means, could not be completed within a year — which is 
of course a matter to be decided by professional men — 
then, 

4. A second track would have to be laid on the railroad from 
Bebra to Guntershausen. 

In the first three cases the question is of a construction 
of about 80 [English] miles, which will give us 5 indepen- 
dent lines, an advantage worth millions to us in case of war, 
for then we would be able to complete the concentration of 
the army within four weeks. 

If hastening the work means additional cost, the sums 
so expended ought to be considered as mere loans. 

If the state should be required to advance a few mil- 
lions for hastening the completion of the projected lines, 
it would be entirely justified by the political situation. 

It is hardly necessary to mention that in addition to 
the above named, practical but short lines, the connection 
between Trier and Cologne and the construction of a sec- 

—124— 



Preparations for War 

ond track on the railroad on the left bank of the Rhine will 
always remain desirable from a military standpoint. Still, 
I consider communication from the center to the west of the 
Monarchy under existing political conditions the most im- 
portant, and respectfully leave it to the excellent judgment 
of Your Excellency, if this matter cannot be facilitated by 
communicating with the Minister of Finance and Com- 
merce. 



NO. 9 

To THE Minister of War, General of Infantry v. Roon 

Berlin, 6 July, 1867. 

I respectfully return to Your Excellency the inclos- 
ures to the correspondence of the 1st of this month.* 

Concerning the enlargement of Saarlouis, I have al- 
ready, under date of 15 May, this year, expressed my opin- 
ions of the necessity of keeping this place, which is on the 
immediate frontier, in a continuous state of readiness, and 
that all of the battalions of the 16th Division, which would 
have to be thrown into the fortress at the first sign of dan- 
ger, would be sufficient as a garrison. 

If we were compelled to conduct the war defensively 
on the Rhine, the operation of relieving this division, be- 
sieged by the enemy in Saarlouis, would be a very difficult 
one. 

If we are able, as it is hoped, to offensively invade 
France, we need no fortress in order to debouch across the 
Saar. 

Streams like the Rhine and the Vistula of course can 
be crossed in the face of the enemy only on fortified bridges. 



* This correspondence contained information that the General 
Department of the War Ministry had sketched out a tentative plan 
for the enlargement of the fortress of Saarlouis. The inclosures 
mentioned above contained extracts from that plan with explanatory 
notes. 

—125— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Still the Saar and the opposite bank of it can be passed eas- 
ier at any other point than via the rocky slope at Saarlouis 
or the single road at Ober-Felsberg. 

I also do not think very much of the place as a depot 
for an offensive advance. A good railroad net in our rear, 
which of course has first to be prepared here on the Rhine, 
and which must be prepared, secures the transportation of 
all necessities, even if the depots are in the Rhine fortresses. 
I again call attention to the fact that, according to my view, 
all means which are available for the defense of the country 
should be utilized first and foremost for construction of 
railroads which are strategically the most important. 

According to the projected work, Saarlouis of to-day 
would form a part of the fortified camp to be provisionally 
constructed by next year, for the establishment of which 
there is no need. 

Fortified camps have a great disadvantage in so far 
as there is no actual guaranty that an army will be in them, 
that they are weak in the absence of the army, especially 
if, as is the case here, there is no existing central fortifica- 
tion. 

They also cannot assure actual rest to troops within 
their limits. The troops would nightly be alarmed by some 
battery or other going into position in a fold in the terrain 
and firing at long range. Only if the camp is situated on 
a large river or delta, like the Alsen Sound, an army detach- 
ment can, by crossing to the other bank, find the protection 
and rest necessary for its reorganization or for a more ex- 
tended stay. 

So far, in the annals of war, the history of fortified 
camps is in most cases connected with their capitulation, 
and I would recommend the construction of such a camp 
least of all at Saarlouis, where, for instance, the range of 
the forts on the Felix Hill reaches to beyond French terri- 
tory. 

Concerning the projected smaller forts which are in- 
tended to prevent the enemy from using our railroads, I 
believe that these forts will certainly accomplish no more 

—126— 



Preparations for War 

in that connection than will arrangements made in ad- 
vance than blowing them up at suitable points. The de- 
struction of a viaduct like that at Saarbriicken or Gorlitz 
interrupts the continuity of a line for the entire course of 
a campaign and I doubt if a fort of smaller dimensions will 
hold out for that length of time. 

It is of course true that these forts would be useful, 
could they prevent the enemy from destroying valuable 
structures. 

Should the French utilize, for instance, their fighting 
forces which are first ready to invade the country on the 
left bank of the Rhine, then they would undoubtedly destroy 
the crossing at Saarlouis if forced to fall back, which would 
be very much against our interests. Still, then also the 
tunnels of the Nahe railroad would have to be protected in 
similar manner, for should they be destroyed, we could not 
use that road for a long time to come. However, it is de- 
pendent on the locality in each case whether or not it will 
be possible to take any structure under fire in such manner 
as to prevent the enemy from destroying it. 

Consequently, I do not believe that there will be any 
material advantage in the projected forts. 



The continuous preparations for war by France since the spring 
of 1867 — even after the Luxemburg question was settled — caused the 
Minister-President Count v. Bismarck to call on the Chief of Staff of 
the army in the beginning of September, for a written opinion: 

NO. 10 



To the Minister-President, Count v. Bismarck-Schoen- 
hausen, Berlin : 

Creisau at Schweidnitz, 

6 September, 1867. 

In reply to Your Excellency's letter of the 2d instant, 
I have the honor to submit the following: 

—127— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

According to my opinion France is arming and prepar- 
ing for war under the auspices of its War Ministry since last 
spring, partly — 

1. in order to rectify prior neglects in its military organi- 
zation; 

2. in order to bring the French defensive forces to a higher 
plane corresponding to new conditions, especially in order to 
facilitate quicker mobilization, and finally, partly 

3. under the supposition that the apparently vacillating poli- 
cies of the Emperor may bring about a sudden outbreak of v^rar. 

In each one of the many measures taken by the French 
for readiness for war, we can trace one of these three mo- 
tives as either a basis or an auxiliary reason for them. 

As the development of the French forces, mentioned 
under (2), cannot yet have been reached, considering the 
material shortcomings and long standing neglects, meas- 
ures for preparedness for war will continue probably even if 
French politics should be of an entirely peaceful aspect. 

What weight we will have to give different reports 
received concerning this matter, will depend mainly on 
whether they can be explained as being based on the one 
or the other motive, or if they are to be brought into con- 
nection with an imminent political question. 

In general, there is no doubt whatever but what France 
is hostile towards us and will remain so for the present; 
all measures taken by it consequently will have the char- 
acter of ill will and preparation for war. Whether or 
not there is any reason in the present political situation 
to await an actual development of the crisis, is beyond my 
judgment; Your Excellency is in a better situation to know 
all about that. 

The separate exterior symptons, which have apppeared 
lately, and which may be of military importance, are: 

(a) The purchase of horses in Hungary, commenced since the 
settlement of the Luxemburg question, and still continuing, the horses 
being sent via Nabresina (northw^est of Trieste on the railroad to 
Vienna) and the Mont Cenis route to France. This measure seems to 
indicate an intention to improve, not the quantity but the quality of 
the French military horses. In the spring, unsuitable horses pur- 
chased in a hurry were sold — 131 head in the 9th Dragoons alone — 
and 10,000 head loaned out to farmers. According to a report in our 
hands, dated the end of July, of the Horse Artillery Regiment of the 
Guards, that regiment was from ten to thirty horses per batery be- 
low its peace strength. 

--128— 



Preparations for War 

(b) The reported purchase of grain and beef cattle in Italy; the 
purchase in England of woolen blankets and other articles neces- 
sary for a winter's campaign; the reported — not yet confirmed — 
placing of orders in Vienna for maps of the German theater of war, 
especially of the rivers. 

(c) The reported intention of moving the regiments from the 
camp at Chalons to the northeastern districts of Dunkirchen and as 
far as Strassburg — the unusual keeping up of the divisions and bri- 
gades of these troops — and the reported new formation of a division 
in Paris. The latter two reports are denied by official organs (news- 
papers) and it is said lately that the intended change of station of 
troops would not be made, because it has made the French people 
too uneasy. Should it actually be made, there would be forty-eight 
battalions of field troops more in the terrain situated east and north 
of the line Calais — Paris — Basel than were there last year. The con- 
sequent decrease in the number of troops in the remaining provinces 
of France would, however, amount to but fifteen battalions, which may 
be explained by the return of the troops from Mexico and Rome. 

(d) Under certain conditions also the proposed measures to be 
taken in the French navy are a strange symptom. Whether and to 
what extent the French navy is to play a role in a war against 
Prussia, is hard to determine in advance. It is a fact that the French 
navy is superior to ours, even if no additional steps are taken to in- 
crease it; still a report of such a contemplated increase might easily 
excite the mistrust of other maritime powers, though they would 
keep aloof in the conflict. Consequently it is a question whether the- 
naval preparations on the part of France are connected more with 
an Oriental than with a German question. 

(e) The completion of new formations in the infantry, artillery 
and train troops possibly may be regarded less in a military sense' 
than judged as motives mentioned in (1) and (2) above. 

(f) Under the same category would be classed the fortification 
work started in the spring and lately resumed. Those at Belfort I 
specially hold as entirely irrelevant to us, and they probably would 
play no role at all in a war between France and Germany. 

I will also remark as follows : 

We cannot deny that French army matters have, since 
the spring, taken a great step ahead in most directions. 

The effective strength of trained men has been in- 
creased by 70,000 men through the addition of two years' 
conscripts, the number of horses available now may suffice 
to mobilize the army in about the same time as can the Prus- 
sian army, — the field artillery has been increased by 34 
batteries. But two very important results have not yet 
been attained: on the other hand, according to numerous 
reports confirming each other, the number of completed 
chassepot rifles is less than 50,000 (only the larger part of 
the infantry of the Guards and the 16 infantry regiments 
up to this time in the camp at Chalons can be supplied with 

—129— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

them so far) , and in the second place the number of trained, 
but not the number of available men, has been increased, 
because no new recruitment has so far been started. 

The increased recruitment expected heretofore (in 
June) of about 160,000 men has not yet been effected, and 
by the Decree of the 7th of August only the usual contingent 
of about 100,000 men has been called to the colors at the 
regular September recruitment and that under keeping to 
the old custom of allowing conscripts to purchase their 
freedom from service, etc. 

Consequently, according to our conception, France will 
at the present time not be able to oppose against Prussia a 
stronger army than the above mentioned field army of at 
most 300,000 men. 

As it now appears that Emperor Napoleon did not suc- 
ceed in forming in Salzburg the desired Austria — South 
German alliance, the above military considerations do not 
lead to the belief that France can undertake a campaign 
this fall, which at the present time it is not strong enough 
to carry on without an ally. 

Another deciding factor might be — what measures date 
from the time before the convention at Salzburg, and what 
after that convention, and therefore started in consequence 
of that convention. The Moniteur de VArmee reports that 
the Decree of August 24 dismissed the present oldest active 
class (1862) to the reserve, and in addition that by the De- 
cree of August 31, after the usual autumn maneuvers the 
semi-annual furloughing of officers, non-commissioned offi- 
cers and soldiers will be more numerous than heretofore. 
Although these measures are no absolute indication of peace, 
but in the main have for their object making room for the 
training of younger men, they do not absolutely indicate 
hostile intentions. Should in the meantime Your Excellency 
have reasons to suspect contrivances of France in the matter 
of new political dissensions in the near future, the above 
points contained in from (a) to (d) would be entitled to 
careful consideration. 



—130— 



Preparations for War 
NO. 11 



To THE Minister-President, Count v. Bismarck- 

SCHOENHAUSEN, BERLIN I 

Creisau, 9 September, 1867. 

In continuation of my letter of the 6th instant (No. 10) 
I have the honor to report that from the publications of 
the Moniteur de I'armee it has been ascertained: 

1. The increase of troops in the northeastern garri- 
sons in France does not, as stated in that letter as possible, 
amount to forty-five, but to twenty-eight battalions. The 
earlier assumption that the troops of the camp at Chalons 
would remain in the northeast has been confirmed, it is true, 
but in their place troops have been transferred from the 
northeast to the south and west. 

2. The same number of the Moniteur declares expressly 
that the troops up to novi^ at Chalons would become part of 
the territorial command in their garrisons. In the same 
sense this number of the Moniteur brings a "Denial of the 
Constitution" against keeping these troops as a part of the 
active divisions. 

3. The rumor of the reinforcement of the Army of 
Paris by a division reduces itself, according to the same 
number of the Moniteur, to the fact that in place of the 
1st Division, to be disorganized (the regiments of that divi- 
sion to go to the west and south), a new division under the 
same numerical designation is to be formed under the com- 
mand of General Douay. 

4. The late reports of contemplated movements of the 
navy, especially at Toulon, are now explained to be con- 
nected with an intended inspection on a large scale. 



—131- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

To serve as a basis in a discussion with the Assistant Chief of 
the General Staff concerning the positions and the first operations 
of the army in a campaign against France, General v. Moltke made 
the following notes: 

NO. 12 

Berlin, 16 November, 1867. 

In the event of difficulties with France next spring, it 
is probable that Austria's and Denmark's attitude will be 
doubtful, to say the least, and that therefore it will be neces- 
sary to leave parts of our fighting forces opposed to them. 

As in such a case the Xllth Army Corps could hardly 
be utilized in Saxony or Silesia, the Vlth Army Corps would 
have to concentrate at Neisse, the 1st Army Corps trans- 
ported via Bamberg and Frankfurt to Hansdorf to march 
from there to Gorlitz, and a strong division of the IXth 
Army Corps would have to proceed by rail via Hamburg, 
Berlin and Kottbus also to Gdrlitz, making a total of 80,000 
men, which, reinforced by Landwehr, would have to unite 
along the mountains according to the nature of the opera- 
tions taken later on by Austria ; but they would have to oc- 
cupy Dresden in any case. The rest of the IXth Army 
Corps concentrates in the fortified camp at Duppel. 

In this movement all the lines leading west will remain 
untouched, and we can send there ten army corps, a total 
of more than 300,000. 

The advance guard marching on France will be formed 
by the 5th Division, which can be at Saarbriicken on the 
17th day, and the 16th Division, which concentrates about 
the same time the other side of Trier. 

Both divisions will have to cover the march of the army 
in the Rhine Palatinate and also the march of the Vllth 
Army Corps, as well as to secure the railroad as far as 
possible. 

By the twenty-fifth day the 6th Division and the IVth 
Army Corps will arrive at Neunkirchen, the former via 
Kreuznach, the latter via Kaiserslautern ; the Vllth Army 
Corps will arrive at Wittlich, and parts of these three or- 
ganizations may arrive at those places even before then, 

—132— 



Preparations for War 

which will enable the advance guards, supported by them and 
by the terrain, to hold their position in front and will pre- 
vent the necessity of their having to retreat via Neunkirchen 
and Wittlich. 

In case these movements could not be made, then of 
course transportation on the Nahe and the Bexbach rail- 
roads would have to be commenced earlier. 

At the stated time the 15th Division is assembled at 
Morbach, the lid and the Xlth Corps are echeloned between 
Alzey and Mayence, and the Vth and the Xllth Corps at 
Mannheim (the latter probably a little later?). 

On the whole, on the twenty-fifth day, there will be at 
our disposal eight army corps, about 250,000 men, between 
the Saar and the Rhine, which can be concentrated in the 
center in three marches, to the front or to one of the flanks 
in seven marches. 

At our disposal then in home garrisons are the Guard 
Corps and the Xth Army Corps, some 65,000 men, which 
can be transported to Dresden or via Bingen and Mayence 
after the twenty-fifth day, to allow us to utilize 150,000 men 
against Austria and 250,000 men against France. 

If by that time it were ascertained that no large force 
would be required against Austria, then the army against 
France could be reinforced by the thirty-second day to over 
300,000 men, without leaving Silesia and Saxony unguarded. 

Fighting forces against France: 

1st Army: Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps, 

2d Army: Hid, IVth and finally Guard Corps, 

3d Army: lid, Xlth, and finally Xth Army Corps, 

4th Army: Vth and Xllth Army Corps. 

DEFENSIVE 

If we should be unable to complete our preparations 
ahead of the French, then we must expect the enemy's offen- 
sive operations to begin by the twenty-fifth day. 

Smaller detachments of the enemy, which may advance 
on the left bank of the Mosel, will offensively advance 
against the 16th, 13th, and 14th Divisions or against parts 
of these. 

—133— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Should 50,000 French or more march against Coblenz 
— Cologne, which is not probable, then the above mentioned 
divisions will unite with the 15th behind the Mosel to guard 
the crossings. An offensive executed by the center of the 
army via Saarbriicken and Saarlouis will compel the enemy 
to immediately evacuate the country on the left bank of the 
Rhine. 

Should the French main force advance from Metz — 
Nancy against Mayence — Mannheim, we will learn that 
fact through the resistance which the Hid Army Corps will 
have to make at Saarbriicken and Neunkirchen. 

Then it will be a question whether or not we will be 
able to make a front halfway on our advance, at Homburg, 
about the thirtieth or the thirty-second day, with the Illd, 
IVth and the Xlth and lid Corps (about 125,000 men), the 
latter continuing the march. 

A position prepared in advance behind the upper Blies 
and at so important a railroad appears to be favored by the 
terrain. 

It will undoubtedly be the enemy's endeavor to combine 
his attack at that point from the west with one from the 
south, the latter executed probably by the fighting forces 
assembled at Strassburg. To meet that, it is necessary to 
leave the Vth and the Xllth Corps in march on Landau, in 
order to hold, by an offensive from there, the Strassburg 
Corps or to draw near to the main army via Piermasens, 
should that army march on Bitsch. 

Should our left wing be threatened by such a move it 
would at the most result in a retreat on Coblenz, which is 
not an unfavorable direction at all. On the other hand, and 
being strategically of more disadvantage, the left wing of 
the French main force is endangered by the Vllth and Vlllth 
Army Corps, should we succeed to bring these up by the day 
of the decision. 

Leaving nothing but observation detachments on the 
Mosel, these two corps should be started in the general di- 
rection of Birkenfeld, St. Wendel or Tholey. But as their 
actual arrival at a certain point cannot be counted on as to 
day and hour, the battlefield cannot be designated definitely 

—134— 



Preparations for War 

in advance. Still an apt and competent leader will be 
able to regulate the march of the two corps with that of 
the main army — by having the former make longer, the 
latter shorter marchas — so as to insure the union of both 
on the day of the decision, should that be farther to the rear 
of the Lauter or Alsenz, where then in addition to the lid 
and Xlth Corps, possibly also the Guard Corps and the Xth 
Army Corps might be disposable on the thirty-fourth or the 
thirty-sixth day. 

It remains to be decided later, whether we will make a 
stand on the twenty-fifth day with the Illd and IVth Corps, 
65,000 men, at Neunkirchen or Homburg, or accept battle 
about the thirtieth day with the Illd, IVth, Vllth, Vlllth, 
Ild and Xlth Corps, 200,000 men, opposite Kaiserslautern, 
or wait until the thirty-fourth day for the Guard Corps and 
the Xth Corps, presupposing of course that the Strassburg 
Army is held in check by the Vth and the Xllth Corps. 

OFFENSIVE 

If we are able to bring our army into position oppo- 
site the French army in time so that the latter has not been 
able to drive back the Hid and IVth Army Corps behind the 
line Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken by the thirty-third day, 
then by that day the Xlth and lid Army Corps, coming from 
Alzey, will have approached to behind that line, and the 
Guard Corps or the Xth Corps, continuing their travel on 
the Nahe and Bexbach railroad, have reached there, a total 
of 150,000 men. 

The Vllth and Vlllth Corps will have marched to the 
vicinity of St. Wendel and Tholey. 

The advance guards will be advanced to the Saar. 

The Vth and Xllth Corps are concentrated at Landau. 
Their attitude depends on that of the hostile fighting forces 
assembled. at Strassburg. They have to cover towards the 
south the advance of the main army westward, to protect 
the railroad connections and to finally draw near the main 
army. 

The offensive of the main army will be directed on its 
object, the French offensive, which at that time we may as- 

—135— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

sume to be close in our front. Even should that not be the 
case, we are certain to meet it if we advance in the direction 
Nancy — Pont-a-Mousson, which threatens France the most, 
and which line can be reached within seven marches. 

In that advance the strictest concentration is necessary. 

The Second Army is assigned to the Saarbriicken — St. 
Avoid — Han on the Nied roads; the Third Army the Saar- 
gemiind — Piittlingen — Baronweiler road. 

On the whole only the artillery will march on these 
roads, the cavalry and at least a part of the infantry will 
use parallel roads, consequently short marches and bivouacs. 

The marching depth of the corps must be regulated so 
that it will not be more than eight [English] miles. 

The advance guards, accompanied by as much cavalry 
as the terrain demands, will be half a march in front. 

The leading corps of each army starts at daybreak, 
the second corps after dinner, the third corps follows at 
the proper time the next morning. 

The opponent cannot advance in close concentration. 
Considering the nature of French troop leading it is not 
probable, though possible, that the French army will await 
us in a prepared position and thus have all its fighting 
forces in hand. 

If the advance guards encounter resistance which they 
cannot overcome, main bodies in rear support the advance 
guard. Two corps of each army are concentrated each even- 
ing, the third, if necessary, can be brought up by a night 
march, or will arrive behind the front the next morning as 
a reserve. 

The First Army marches via Kreuzwald to Fiillingen, 
one division as right flank guard via Bolchen to Contchen on 
the Nied towards Metz. 

On the first day after crossing the frontier the leading 
elements of the three armies will be twelve [English] miles 
apart, on the third day but eight [English] miles, on the 
line Fiillingen — Baronweiler. The depth of the column, 
with flank bivouacs and short marches, would be con- 
fined to eight [English] miles (measures for subsistence to 
be taken in accordance therewith) . Thus we could deploy 

—136— 



Preparations for War 

any day 250,000 men for battle, not only to the front, but 
also towards the flank, should the French army advance to 
the attack from either the Nied or the Seille. 

The latter operation would have t*he Fourth Army in 
the flank and would, in case of a lost battle, merely force us 
to retire on the Rhine line. 

A concentration behind the Seille has the advantage 
for the French main army of being in the very start in con- 
nection with the Strassburg army. But a rapid advance 
on our part via Saarbriicken and Finstingen will lead us to 
the inner line of operations between the two armies. Should 
these armies already be united at Saarburg, then, bringing 
up our Fourth Army, and having a good base, the battle 
would lead in the direction which would, in case of victory 
on our part, drive the French army away from Paris. 

More dangerous would be the first operation, which, 
in case of reverse, would cut all our communications. It is 
true that then also conditions would be precarious for the 
enemy, but not so much as on our side, considering the 
proximity of two fortresses and the Mosel sector. 

Still, this presupposes that the French, in accordance 
with a strictly defensive plan of war, have concentrated 
their main force between Diedenhofen and Metz, which 
would mean all absence of connection with the part of the 
forces which are compelled to leave the railroad in the Rhine 
valley at Strassburg to avoid great loss of time. Thereby 
these forces would run into danger, as we can easily rein- 
force our Fourth Army from the concentration at Homburg. 

If after the end of from four to five weeks, we should 
still be without information as to the position of the French 
main force, a reconnaissance in force sent out by the First 
Army via Kedingen towards Reichersberg and one by the 
Third Army towards the Seille would be the means to de- 
cide if we would have to seek the opponent there. In that 
case of course our advance would have to be made towards 
the Nied or up the Saar. 

Finally, we must consider the possibility that the 
French will defensively hold the weaker part of the course 
of the Mosel between Lunevillfe and Metz. 

—137— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

In that case one division of the First Army would hold 
the Nied crossings east of Metz, the Army itself take a po- 
sition at Peltre against Metz, and one corps of the Third 
Army would have to proceed to Chateau-Salins, to protect 
the left flank. 

The remainder of the army, more than 200,000 men, 
would proceed towards Cheminot and Nomeny, would drive 
off the outpost position of the enemy on the Seille and direct 
the attack towards Pont-a-Mousson. 

The probability will be that we will meet the French 
army between the Blies and the Seille, and our measures 
should principally be based on that supposition. 

In any case the Fourth Army should be so much rein- 
forced that the westward advance will not be disturbed from 
the south. This can easily be done, as the larger the Strass- 
burg Army is, the smaller will be the French main army. 

Should the operation be conducted from Strassburg on 
the right bank of the Rhine, that would not change anything 
herein ; the separation of the French forces would be more 
complete, the danger of our offensive advance less. The 
Fourth Army would cross the Rhine at Germersheim. 



The measures to be taken in case of an offensive advance of the 
French before completion of their mobilization are discussed by Gen- 
eral V. Moltke in the following : 

NO. 13 

Berlin, 21 March, 1868. 

It cannot be seen in advance if the French will wait for 
the regular mobilization of their fighting forces, or if they 
will advance to the attack with what they now have at their 
disposal. 

We, on our part, can hold to but one method of placing 
our army in readiness, which must be in accordance with 
both eventualities. 

Our plans for this were worked out last November, and 
we now have only to examine the latest tables of mobiliza- 

—138— 



Preparations for War 

tion, to see the addition (Hansu — Hersfeld) to the railroad 
net might hasten a concentration on the Rhine. 

Then we should examine, in what relation this method, 
to be designated as the permanent one, stands to a strate- 
gical attack made by France. 

Taking the case of a strategical attack, 70,000 French 
could reach the Rhine line on the 20th day, their leading 
elements probably a few days earlier ; that is, at a time when 
the Rhine fortresses are not completely supplied, before the 
Landwehr garrisons have arrived and when consequently 
active fighting troops of the line would be required there. 

It cannot be assumed that the French will go as far as 
the Wesel, even if they should ignore Luxemburg's neutral- 
ity. The disadvantages would all be on their side. 

Thiere are six battalions of the 14th Division in Cologne. 
The three in Aix-la-Chappele and Jiilich could wait until 
completion of their mobilization; their communication, at 
least via Diisseldorf , would not be endangered ; the three in 
Coblenz should for the present be left there. 

We cannot reckon with certainty on the four battal- 
ions of the 16th Division in Saarlouis; they can neither at 
once be drawn off nor relieved by Landwehr. 

At the start we would have to renounce holding the 
terrain on the left of the Rhine under the stated assumptions. 
Consequently we could bring back at once their supplies by 
steamer and rail. I do not believe that this procedure would 
cause a less unfavorable impression than if they were to 
retreat fighting. 

Five battalions and five squadrons in Trier form an 
advanced detachment, which, especially if reinforced by half 
a battery from Coblenz by steamer — may calmly await the 
enemy's advance. Their reinforcements will arrive on the 
8th day. The road to Coblenz offers a series of positions, 
in which a fight can be broken off without danger, and the 
river can easily be crossed at Bernkastel. 

More difficult is the retreat for the battalion in Saar- 
briicken, but that will be protected by five squadrons. It is 
desirable that this battalion should withdraw along the 
Nahe railroad, then via Simmern. 

—139— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

I am of the opinion that we should not blow up the 
works on the railroad, as we have good chances to again be 
on the Saar in fourteen days. That the enemy may destroy 
the works is possible and probable, but not certain, and then 
it would make no difference had we done it or the enemy. 

Conditions will have to decide whether we will destroy 
an embankment (but not a viaduct or tunnel) which delays 
the enemy some days, draws his attention, but can be re- 
constructed within a few days. 

By the 20th day there will have arrived at Mayence the 
largest part of the Xlth, IVth and Vth Corps. It is possi- 
ble that the transportation of the Hid Corps from Cologne 
cannot be continued up the Rhine. 

But in any case there probably will be so many fighting 
forces on the right bank of the Rhine from Cologne to May- 
ence by the 20th day, that 70,000 French cannot attempt to 
cross the stream. 

Then we would have to take the offensive as early as 
possible from Cologne, Coblenz, Mayence and finally also 
from Mannheim. The French railroad will undoubtedly 
be taken up with the transport of peace cadres up to the 
10th day. Thereafter the reinforcing detachments, more 
than 100,000 men, will have to be brought up after comple- 
tion of clothing, equipment and organization, as well as the 
mobile National Guard for the frontier fortresses. 

Reaction would then set in. 



Shortly thereafter General v. Moltke sketched out his views as 
to the marching into position of the German fighting forces and the 
probable first movements, in the following memorial : * 

NO. 14 

Berlin, in April 1868. 
If war should happen this year, we may count with 
certainty on the fact that it will be only with France alone. 



*0n the cover of this there is a note in the handwriting of the 
general as follows: — "final, and governed by present conditions, 
sketch of a plan of onerations. 20-5 v. M." 

—140— 



V Preparations for War 

Incomplete equipments, armament, etc., the disinclination 
of Hungary, and the attitude of Russia, preclude Austria's 
participation. Consequently we will be able to utilize nearly 
all of our forces against the one enemy. 

Still, it is advisable to leave the Vlth Corps at home at 
the start, or at least to move it last to relieve the Xllth 
Corps, which cannot be left in its present station. Finally, 
it is necessary to leave a strong force to protect the prov- 
inces and the coast, especially the North Sea coast, as 
France will hardly leave an arm like its fleet unused. 
; In less than three years we can build no fortification 
for niaritime protection, an active defense will have to do 
its best. ;; 

;. Accordingly the Vlth and IXth Corps cannot be counted 
aii, they will fprm only the last echelon. ' ^ ' 

■)..'■ This leayes eleven army corps, 360,000 men, and these 
will form a force which is equal to the French force, even if 
the latter does not direct itself against separate attacking 
points. V 

We will gain a material superiority as; soon as the 
South Germans join us, even if they do so With only from 
40,000 to 60,000 men. ; 

Equality or superiority will be attainedionly if we are 
able too concentrate our forces opposite tile French at the 
proper time. '^ 

T^his concentration will take place within two time 
limits, which are determined by the capacities of the avail- 
able railroads. 

First period, from the first mobilization day to the 
22nd day: — 

Army Men 

1st 60,000 Vllth Army Corps by marching " ] Coblenze and 
Vlllth Army Corps by marching and !■ beyond on the 
using auxiliary line via Call J Mosel 

2d 60,000 1 Mayence and 

Hid Army Corps, R. R. Hanover , ^^y°^4 ^" ^^^ 

[Vth Army Corps, R.R. Halle-Marburg j p^J^iJf^" 

^ a a ma e 

3d 70,000 lid Army Corps, R.R. Halle-Fulda ] 

Xth Army Corps, R.R. Paderborn- \ Mayence 
Wetzlar j 

—141— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



4th 90,000 Hessian Division in Darmstadt 

One Bavarian Brig:ade in Landau 

Vth Army Corps, R.R. Leipzig- 1 

Wiirzburg } Mannheim 

Xlth Army Corps, (21st Division 
marching) J 

Wiirtemberg Division, rail and ! Ofu+te-art 

marching I ^i'""BarT; 

Baden Division, rail and marching J-Rastatt 
Total 280,000 men. 

The First Army concentrates towards Wittlich. It will 
try to see if it can support its advance guard at Trier. 
Should a superior French army advance through Luxem- 
burg, it will give way, probably at Bernkastel, to the right 
bank of the Mosel, keeping possession of the crossings. If 
it has no enemy in its front, it will draw near the Second 
Army with which it will keep in connection and march 
abreast of. In a battle in the Palatinate it would be of de- 
cisive importance for the First Army to appear at the right 
time on the enemy's left flank. 

The detachment of the 16th Division at Saarbriicken 
will not be ordered back, but will be immediately reinforced 
from Mayence via the Nahe railroad by the 5th Division, 
to keep us informed what parts of the enemy advance on 
the Palatinate. 

If after that conditions permit, the Illd and IVth Army 
Corps will continue their journey without interruption on 
the Nahe and Bexbach railroad, and the Second Army will 
assemble on the line Homburg — Zweibriicken. 

The Third Army follows immediately by marching in 
reserve. 

Conditions obtaining at place and time will govern 
whether we will accept battle, even before the arrival of the 
second transport echelon between the Blies and the Rhine, 
with the 

Second and Third Army 130,000 men 

later supported by the First Army 60,000 men 

that is, with 190,000 men 

—142— 



Preparations for War 

Should the French army have already invaded the 
Palatinate in force when our army corps reach the Rhine 
then of course the two railroads diverging there could not be 
used for transporting the entire Second Army. 

Both armies would then await the arrival of reinforce- 
ments in a strong defensive position in front of Mayence, 
for instance, with their right wing on the Donnersberg. 
Accordingly the First Army should be sent through the 
Hunsriick. 

Concerning the destruction of the Nahe railroad the de- 
tachment at Saarbriicken will receive direct orders from 
general headquarters. 

The Fourth Army is designated to receive or support 
the South Germans. Southern Germany will best be pro- 
tected by an offensive with all forces far into France. 

If by the 22d day a French army has not yet crossed 
the upper Rhine, the Fourth Army concentrates on the line 
Neustadt — Landau (the contigents from Baden via Maxau, 
those from Wiirttemberg via Germersheim) and follows 
the forward movement of our main army as a left echelon. 

Even if, as is probable, a French army is concentrated 
at Strassburg, it will not dare, considering the deployment 
of our large forces in the Palatinate, to cross the line below 
Strassburg. (An incursion through the Breisgau with an 
auxiliary army would be of no effect on the campaign and 
would merely weaken the French fighting force.) The 
Strassburg Army can operate only against the left flank of 
our offensive advance. But we stand on the inner line of 
operation between the Strassburg Army and the enemy's 
main line, which latter, if it desires to make full use of the 
railroad net, can concentrate only on the other side of the 
Vosges, about on the line Diedenhofen — Nancy. Therefore 
we have the choice, if the advance of the Strassburg Army 
offers the opportunity of a short, quick, offensive advance 
on the left bank of the Rhine and upstream, to give to the 
Fourth Army a decided superiority by reinforcing it from 
the Third Army ; against the west we would confine ourselves 
in the meantime to the defensive. 



-143— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

If on the other hand, the French have been enabled to 
cross the upper Rhine before we complete our concentration, 
the Vth and Xlth Corps would march up the Rhine on the 
right bank, would receive the Wurttembergers and Baden- 
ers in Bruchsal and Rastatt, advance on the enemy's com- 
munications, and compel him to turn about. We should 
not be afraid of this partition of our fighting forces and we 
can carry out the offensive with our main force towards 
the west after the arrival of the second transport echelons, 
because the enemy has also divided his forces and abandoned 
all connections between them. 

The fact that the South German contingents do not 
directly join the Fourth Army but operate independently, 
based on Ulm, for the defense of the Black Forest, must not 
be lost sight of and in that case we would allow them to do 
so and, leaving but an observation detachment on the Neckar, 
open the offensive on France with all four armies. The 
capture of Southern Germany can have no effect on us, be- 
fore we have had a battle which will call back the French 
for the defense of their own territory. During the time 
the French march from Strassburg to Ulm we march from 
Mayence to Nancy. There we will endanger the communi- 
cations even of the French South Army, while we on our 
part will have our Rhineland in our immediate rear. 

Only the loss of the South German fortresses would 
be a material disadvantage. 

Second Period — to the 30th day. 

Immediately following the above mentioned corps there 
would have to be transported : 

The Guard Corps via Hanover — Cologne; 

The Xllth Corps via Corbetha — Fulda; 

(the 22d Division joins the Xlth Corps by marching). 

Should, after three weeks, conditions be such as to 
show that the 18th Division is a sufficient force in Schles- 
wig, and should a Landwehr garrison suffice for Dresden, 
then within this period the following could be brought to 
the Rhine: 

The 17th Division via Kreiensen — Wetzlar, 
The 1st Army Corps via Cassel. 

—144— 



Preparations for War 

After three weeks the Bavarian corps also would have 
to be concentrated in the vicinity of Wiirzburg — Nordlingen. 

In case the French have invaded Southern Gemany, the 
Bavarian corps would co-operate with the Fourth Army, 
provided it could not immediately join that army via : — 

Stuttgart-Bruchsal ; ^ Heidelberg ; 

Heilbronn ; \ r)„„^„tadt 

Aschaffenburg; 3 Uarmstaat. 

The 07^der of battle* would then be about as follows: — 

First Army, Vllth and Vlllth Corps 60,000 men; 

Second Army, Hid, IVth and Guard Corps 110,000 men; 

Third Army, lid, Xth, Xllth and 1st Corps 125,000 men; 

Fourth Army, Vth, Xlth, each one Baden, 1 Wiirttemburg 

Div., 2 Bavarian corps 140,000 men. 

A total of 430,000 men. 

The Third Army forms the reserve for the other three. 

A second army reserve would have to be formed of the 
17th Division and eventually the Vlth Corps, which would 
bring the fighting force to a numerical strength of 480,000 
men, and which reserve would have to secure the communi- 
cations to the rear of the greatly extended line of operations. 

Concerning the Bavarians specially, Nordlingen — ^Wiirz- 
burg is to be recommended as a point of concentration for 
them, "because the concentration will first have to be ef- 
fected in their own territory, and because the Bavarian 
government will willingly accede to these views," the Bavar- 
ian territory being thereby directly protected. 

In case of a French invasion there will of course be an 
inclination to throw the 1st Corps to Ulm, and that corps 
will then draw on itself the French fighting forces, and that 
in a direction very dangerous to us. But if the contingents 



*As shown by a marginal notation, General v. Moltke assumed 
as Army Commanders, Chiefs of General Staff and Quartermaster 
Generals of these armies as follows: — 
First Army — Grand Duke of Mecklenburg or General v. Herwarth; 

Schlotheim. Vieth. 
Second Army — Prince Frederic Charles; 

Stiilpnagel. Strantz. 
Third Army — v. Steinmetz; 

Wittlich. Stiehle. 
Fourth Army — Crown Prince; 

Blumenthal. Stosch. 

—145— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

from Baden and Wiirttemberg have joined our Fourth 
Army, the Bavarian corps can find support nowheres. 

For the event, that we can advance on the left bank 
of the Rhine with all our forces, the Bavarian corps would 
have to be drawn up directly via Maxau, Germersheim and 
Ludwigshafen. 

If, however, there is no necessity for the entire Fourth 
Army to advance towards Strassburg, a position of the 
Bavarian corps at Vendenheim against Strassburg might 
be sufficient to secure to us, after the forcible capture of the 
barrier-forts, the important Mannheim — Weissemburg — 
Vendenheim — Nancy R. R. 

We might possibly also charge the Bavarians with an 
investment of Strassburg. 



On May 13, 1868, a conference took place in Berlin between Gen- 
eral von Moltke and the military plenipotentiaries of Bavaria and 
Wiirttemburg concerning the combined employment of the North and 
South German fighting forces in case of a war with France. The 
subject matter of his views expressed in that conference General v. 
Moltke submitted to the Chancellor, Count v. Bismarck, as follows: 

NO. 15 



Berlin, 13 May, 1868. 

Theoretically speaking, and considering the existing 
offensive and defensive alliance with Southern Germany, 
nothing will be necessary except for the South German con- 
tingents to be ready at the proper time and in full number 
to carry out the orders which His Majesty, the King of 
Prussia, will issue in his capacity as commander-in-chief in 
accordance with the situation of war with France. Prac- 
tically, however, the matter is different. 

An offensive and defensive alliance is always an in- 
complete form of mutual help, and has just so much value, as 
each party of the alliance is able to give help. In this rela- 
tion conditions of proportion are by no means equal. 

—146— 



Preparations for War 

The North furnishes an army, the South furnishes con- 
tingents ; we have a war lord, the South but a confederation 
commander-in-chief ; the South with the best intentions can 
but furnish us a coalition. 

The difference between a Union army and a coalition 
is well shown by the campaign of 1866. 

Austria had a defensive and offensive alliance with 
Southern Germany. It demanded no less than that the 
South German contingents should unite with the Austrian 
army in Bohemia. With a superiority of 90,000 men there 
was a hope to attain the main object of the war. But in this 
plan the South Germans were expected to leave their terri- 
tory defenseless against an invasion and it is easily under- 
stood that they declined to do so. 

The same thing occurred in a less degree with Bavaria. 
Bavaria had a defensive and offensive alliance with the 
South German States and had the supreme command. Its 
field marshal demanded what was entirely correct from a 
military standpoint, i.e., that the VlHth Confederation 
Corps join the Vllth Confederation Corps. But Nassau, 
Frankfurt and Darmstadt demanded protection, and an ad- 
vance was made west around the Vosges Mountains, where 
a junction to the front was impossible. 

And vice versa: Assuming that the Rhine land and 
Westphalia had been a Sovereign Grand-Duchy, would it 
have been possible, even with the existence of a defensive 
and offensive alliance, for it to send its entire force out of 
the country and to Bohemia, where the decision was to be 
found? 

All special considerations may be disregarded in a 
Union, in a Confederation they have to be taken into ac- 
count. Consequently the question is not to demand from 
the South Germans what is militarily correct for the at- 
tainment of the war objective, but to demand what they can 
and will perform with due regard to their own security. And 
that may be arrived at by discussion. 

An immediate offense in superior force, which threatens 
the enemy in his own country, which holds his fighting force 
there, secures indirectly the ivhole of Germany. All states 

—147— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

will willingly participate in that offense. But for such an 
offense political initiative is required and a readiness for 
war which cannot be found now in Southern Germany. 

Consequently also the first defensive protection of South 
Germany has to be considered. 

We believe the lower as well as the upper Rhine is best 
protected by an army on the central Rhine. The South 
German States need a firm guaranty that we will be there 
in time and in great strength, in order to come to a decision 
as to their measures, and that guaranty I can give. 

There are two ways for a defense: ^., 

1. The direct, for which the South German States can 
concentrate within their frontier, in order to hold the Rhine 
Valley or the Black Forest from about Rottweil, or to at 
least hold the Iller in protecting Ulm. We do not consider 
this way the correct one, but we cannot object thereto. That 
in this way a direct participation by North German troops 
is. excluded, is the result of long distance as well as of the 
guarding of the independence of the South German States. 
This then leaves but — 

2. The indirect defense, which bases itself on the North 
German fighting force on the Neckar and Main, advances 
on the flank and on the communications of the invasion 
made by the enemy and forces an immediate retreat of the 
same. Two Prussian army corps, 66,000 men, would be 
expressly assigned to form, with a combination Wiirttem- 
berg — Baden corps and two Bavarian corps, a left wing 
army of 140,000 men. This army would operate up the 
Neckar or up the Rhine, dependent on whether the enemy 
has already advanced, and on the left bank of the Rhine in 
case the advance is only threatened. It can be reinforced 
as necessary, if the enemy uses larger forces in his under- 
taking against Southern Germany, as in that case he will 
weaken his forces in our front by just so much. If he 
should renounce such a precarious expedition, as seems prob- 
able under the conditions, then the left wing army would at 
once conform to the movements of the main army and join 
it. 



-148— 



Preparations for War 

Of course all this presupposes that the South German 
contingents are at hand at the proper time. 

Considering the existing readiness for war of our neigh- 
bors we must insist that on the 21st day, after orders have 
been issued in Berlin for the mobilization of the North 
German Army, the South German contingents are ready for 
march and transportation in larger detachments within their 
territorial frontiers, that the rolling stock of the respective 
railroads is in readiness and that each State has taken proper 
steps for the erection of depots to subsist its troops and has 
the means of transport supplies. 

Concerning now specially the different points of con- 
centration, we would have to come to an agreement with the 
separate States, with due regard to local conditions, and 
special interests, as to the following : 

The Baden division assembles the troops garrisoned in 
the southern part of the Grand Duchy under protection of 
Rastatt, the ones in the northern part will join after they 
become disengaged through the advance of the left wing 
army. The Wiirttemberg division has only to draw up the 
regiments becoming disposable by cutting the Ulm garrison 
in half, to be concentrated at Stuttgart — Ludwigsburg. 

We would counsel for Bavaria a formation of two army 
corps, of which the 1st Corps assembles at Nordlingen, the 
lid at Wiirzburg. The troops in the Palatinate would form 
into a strong brigade at Landau, which in case of need re- 
tires on Germersheim. 

Of course in this distribution of the South German 
fighting forces not the strategic advance of these but the 
first position of readiriess made necessary by existing con- 
ditions, is meant. The actual junction, considering the lim- 
ited time, may have to be made possibly during the course 
of operations against the enemy. 

If a French army should have already crossed the Black 
Forest on the 21st day, the Prussian corps of the left wing 
army would advance in the direction Heilbronn — Ludwigs- 
burg — Stuttgart, would receive the Wiirttemberg division, 
and draw up the lid Bavarian Corps from Wiirzburg. Thus 
Ulm and the 1st Bavarian Corps would secure the Bavarian 

—149— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

territory against the invasion of the hostile leading ele- 
ments. The left wing army must under all circumstances 
be made numerically superior to and must immediately at- 
tack the hostile main force in Southern Germany in a di- 
rection endangering all of that force's communications. 

When, on the other hand, the enemy who has advanced 
across the Rhine (as a matter of fact, he cannot do other- 
wise) turns down the Rhine against our strong fighting 
force concentrated on the Neckar, then the Wiirttemberg 
division would immediately have to join, fully utilizing the 
railroads, the left wing army going via Bruchsal, and the 
lid Bavarian Corps also, going via Darmstadt and Heidel- 
berg, as well as the 1st Bavarian Corps, via Stuttgart. 

If the decision to proceed to war has been arrived at 
in proper time it at least will not be impossible to assemble 
the left wing in the Palatinate even before the enemy crosses 
the upper Rhine, in order to thus protect, in connection 
with our main force, this valuable part of German ground 
and to give, through an offensive on the left bank of the 
Rhine, the best security to the south. This means that the 
entire South German contingents, utilizing the already men- 
tioned railroads via Maxau, Germersheim- and Ludwig- 
shafen, should join with the Prussian Corps, at the start, 
in the vicinity of Landau. 



Based on his discussions with the representatives of the South 
German Armies, General von Moltke composed, in 1868, the following 
sketch of a plan, which he revised and supplemented in January and 



March 1869; 



NO. 16 



A. First Concentration of the Army in a War 
With France Alone 

In a war which we conduct against France alone, we 
are in the fortunate situastion of being able to concentrate 
our entire fighting forces in the Bavarian Palatinate, uti- 
lizing six trunk lines. 



-150— 



Preparations for War 

If the French desire to utilize their entire railroad net, 
they will be compelled to concentrate around Metz and 
Strassburg in two groups separated by the Vosges, between 
which we will be in the very start on the inner line of 
operations. 

It would not be justifiable to leave a part of our field 
army for direct defense on the lower Rhine. That is pro- 
tected by Belgium's neutrality and, if this should not be 
respected, by the distance of the French frontier from ours. 
In the Palatinate we will be as close to Aix-la-Chapelle and 
Cologne as are the French to Diedenhofen and Mezieres. 
Our operation on the left bank of the Rhine across the Mosel 
takes the French operation against the Rhine in rear and 
compels the French to make front to the south with all their 
communications toward the flank. 

It would be just as little justifiable were the South 
Germans to try and directly defend the upper Rhine, or even 
only the Black Forest. In connection with the North Ger- 
man fighting forces and supported by them, an advance from 
the Palatinate on the left bank and up-stream will be of 
the utmost effect, even should the enemy have already 
crossed the stream. 

But the most assured protection to the strong lower, 
as well as to the weaker upper Rhine would be given by 
a decisive offensive with superior fighting forces into France, 
and it requires but a timely concentration of the means at 
hand to take that offensive. 

Four armies would have to be formed : 

MEN 

First (right wing) Army around Wittlich, Vlllth 

and Vllth Army Corps 60,000 

Second (main) Army at Neunkirchen — Homburg 

Hid, IVth, Xth and Guard Corps- 130,000 

Third (left wing) Army — at Landau, — Vth and 

Xlth Army Corps 1 60,000 

with the latter two South German army |- 

corps later !___ J 80,000 

Fourth (reserve) Army in front of Mayence, the 
combined IXth Corps (18th Hessian, Inf. ] 

Div.) and Xllth Army Corps |- 60,000 

And eventually the 1st, lid and Vlth Corps J 100,000 

We can count on 300,000 Prussian combatants for the 
offensive, and under favorable conditions on 500,000. 

—151— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

First Army 
Vlllth Army Corps. 

The Vlllth and Vllth Army Corps are to be assembled 
in the shortest possible time in the vicinity of Wittlich — 
Bernkastel-on-the-Mosel. 

To protect this concentration the garrison of Trier 
forms the advance guard and should be reinforced imme- 
diately by at least one battery from Coblenz by rail, by 
steamer or by forced marches. The detachment must hold 
positions as near Trier, Schweich or Wittlich as possible. 

The battalion of the 69th Regiment joins the garrison 
in Saarbriicken. It falls back in the direction of St. Wendel, 
but only when forced to do so, and tries to protect the rail- 
road as long as possible, the destruction of which is to occur 
only when directly ordered by superior headquarters. 

In order to affect the concentration of the remaining 
troops of the army corps, it appears best to direct the 29th 
Regiment, the remainder of the 3d Battalion Foot Artillery, 
and the Jager battalion (to be brought up from Wetzlar by 
rail to Boppard) to the vicinity of Bernkastel by the road 
via Castellaun. 

The 60th, 67th and 72d Regiments will be transported 
on the 10th and 11th day to Andernach and Coblenz 
and with the mounted battalion of the artillery regiment 
and the pioneer battalion march by the road via Kaiseresch 
to Wittlich. 

It will be advisable to have the 33d Regiment, which 
will complete its organization on the 16th day, brought by 
steamer to Andernach and let it follow on the same road. 

The 8th Cuirassier Regiment and the 7th Hussar Regi- 
ment can march via Adenau and in addition the 1st Bat- 
talion of the Artillery Regiment. 

The 28th Regiment and the 2d Battalion of the Artillery 
are to be sent via Priim and from there according to cir- 
cumstances to Trier or Wittlich. Only in case (which is 
very improbable) that this march will be endangered from 
Luxemburg, the troops in Aix-la-Chapelle and Jiilich will 
first have to be drawn back to the Rhine. 

—152— 



Preparations for War 

Thus, the concentration of the entire corps, except the 
33d Regiment, in the district Trier — Wittlich — Gonzerath 
can be completed by the evening of the 16th day of the mobil- 
ization. 

To be able to assemble it on the left as well as on the 
right bank, it is advisable to throw a boat bridge at Bern- 
kastel even before the arrival of the ponton train. 

On the 14th already the advance guard can be reinforced 
by three battalions, four squadrons, and several batteries. 

Vllth Army Corps. 

According to the travel and march tables sketched out 
for the Vllth Army Corps, it will use the railroad lines 
Buende — Rhine — Unna — Cologne — Diiren — Call and the 
14th Infantry Division the line via Viersen to Eupen. 

Only the pioneer troops will start by marching from 
Deutz. 

Considering that the road from Call to Wittlich will be 
taxed to its full capacity, it is advisable to establish an aux- 
iliary depot and a line of communications headquarters in 
Stadtkyll. 

In this manner the troops of the corps, exclusive of 
their trains, will be concentrated in the vicinity of Wittlich 
on the evening of the 17th mobilization day. 

The entire corps with all of its columns and trains 
will be ready and able to take up operations in Wittlich 
on the 20th day, at Trier on the 21st day. 

This means that the First Army, after the close of 
the 17th day, can enter a battle at Wittlich, or march off in 
any ordered direction, with 50 battalions, 32 squadrons and 
30 batteries — a total of 60,000 men. 

The advance guard in Trier will probably have to be 
reinforced earlier than that, according to circumstances. 

Headquarters of the First Army will have to regulate 
the station of the troops arriving successively at Wittlich, 
and the Supply Department will have to take proper steps 
in advance for their subsistence in crowded cantonments, 
which presumably will be for but a very short time. 

—153— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

SECOND ARMY 

Illd, IVth, Xth and Guard Corps. 

On the arrival of the troop trains we will learn from 
the weak detachment at Saarbriicken (2 battalions, 4 squad- 
rons of the Vlllth A. C.) to what extent and in what 
direction the Nahe and the Ludwig railroad can be used in 
the Palatinate. 

On these lines, of which the latter is protected in the 
very start by a Bavarian brigade at Landau, the first de- 
tachments of the Illd and IVth Army Corps will arrive 
early on the 12th day. These then detrain as far to the front 
as circumstances will allow, in order to first support the 
detachment of the Vlllth Corps, then to relieve it and to 
protect the railroads; they will also eventually move more 
to the rear in order to drive off weaker hostile detachments 
which may already have invaded the country. 

The two above mentioned corps will have their full 
quota of troops on the 15th day and will take a position in 
front of the line Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken (about near 
Bildstock and St. Ingbert), behind which position the Xth 
and the Guard Corps will debark by the 19th day at Neun- 
kirchen and at Homburg. 

In the afternoon of the 19th day after mobilization then, 
the troops of the entire Army, but without trains, will be 
concentrated ; about 104 battalions, 107 squadrons, and 60 
batteries — about 130,000 combatants. 

It is not probable that by that time a stronger French 
army will have crossed the frontier. Should this be the 
case, then the Second Army will have to fall back in the 
direction of Kaiserslautern on the Reserve Army, in which 
case the railroads in rear of Neunkirchen and Homburg 
should be but temporarily interrupted. 

If on the other hand the Second Army holds the posi- 
tion on the frontier, its headquarters can order a reconnais- 
sance of four cavalry divisions, supported by infantry, 
against the Mosel district Thionville — Nancy to gain in- 
formation concerning the enemy. 

—154— 



Preparations for War 

THIRD ARMY 

Vth, Xlth Corps, 1st, and lid Bavarian Corps, 
Wilrttemherg and Baden Division. 

By the arrival of the two infantry Divisions of the 
Vth Army Corps, the Bavarian position at Landau will be 
reinforced between the 13th to the 15th mobilization day. 
By noon of the 18th mobilization day the troops of the Vth 
Army Corps will have arrived, and also, by marching and 
partly by rail, the larger part of the Xlth Army Corps, 
about 44 battalions, 40 squadrons, 26 batteries, a total of 
about 55,000 Prussian combatants, which will iind a strong 
position behind the Kling creek, 

(Bridge at Maxau to be kept intact and protected. 
Rastatt to -be occupied by the 34th Regiment ; supplies, rein- 
forcements, etc., to be sent there. A Prussian engineer 
officer to be sent to Rastatt.) 

The arrival of the South Germans has been promised 
by that day, which would augment the Third Army to a 
strength of about 150,000 men. 

Here also army headquarters will order a reconnais- 
sance by the cavalry in the direction of Strassburg. 

FOURTH (RESERVE) ARMY 

Combined IXth Corps, Saxon Xllth Corps and even- 
tually 1st and lid Corps. 

By the twentieth mobilization day there can be as- 
sembled in an extremely favorable battle position at Marn- 
heim on the road to Kaiserlautern : 

The 18th and the Hessian Division (concentrated at 
Worms) combined as the IXth Army Corps, and the Xllth 
Army Corps, in the start 60,000 men, which will immedi- 
ately be followed by reserve artillery and by the cavalry. 

Had the Second Army been forced to retreat, we would 
accept the decisive battle at Mannheim with about 160,000 
men (six complete army corps) . 

The Vth and Xlth Army Corps undoubtedly can also 
be brought up in time from the Third Army, and that with- 
in three marches. 

—155— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Furthermore, the corps of the First Army concentrated 
on the sixteenth and seventeenth days at Witthch (in so far 
as they do not have important fighting forces in their front, 
which, however,would then also be absent from the French 
fighting forces) can be started in the direction of Lauter- 
ecken to the enemy's left flank and rear. 

Presupposing timely arrival, on the twentieth day 
300,000 men (nine complete corps, even if the Vllth cannot 
come up) can be engaged together, and this fighting force 
can be materially strengthened in the next succeeding days ; 
if at all possible the 1st, lid and the Vlth Army Corps 
should also be brought up. 

If the Second Army has maintained its position, then 
the Fourth (Reserve) Army can have reached the former^s 
immediate rear by the evening of the twenty-first day. 

All army corps will be completely supplied with their 
trains only by "the twenty-third or twenty-fourth day, still 
the offensive can commence on the twenty-second. 

Should it be found that the hostile main force turns 
through Luxemburg or finally through Belgium against the 
lower Rhine, then in a movement against the north the 
First Army would form the advance guard behind the Mosel, 
the Second Army the left, the Fourth the right wing, and 
the Third Army would, according to conditions, advance 
offensively against Strassburg or against Metz. 

Consequently the proposed concentration makes it pos- 
sible to accept a defensive battle in front of the Rhine on 
the twentieth day after commencement of mobilization and 
with probably superior numbers, and to advance offensively 
in a westerly direction across the frontier on the twenty- 
second day with 300,000 men. Whether or not the 1st, lid 
and Vlth Corps, still in rear, can also be drawn up to the 
Rhine can be ascertained then. Possibly it will always 
be necessary to send one division from one of these corps 
to relieve the Xllth Corps in Dresden. 



-156— 



Preparations for War 

COAST DEFENSE 

For active defense of our coast four Landwehr divi- 
sions will be organized and that at the same time as the 
above discussed main concentration of the army. 

1st District. — Emden — Bremerhaven; in addition to 
8,000 men local garrisons, the 3d Landvi^ehr Division — 10,800 
men — at Bremen. 

2d District. — Hamburg — Wismar; in addition to local 
garrison (17,750 men), the mobile 17th Infantry Division 
— 15,000 men — at Hamburg. 

As a reserve for both, the mobile Guard Landwehr 
Division, 15,000 men, in Hanover, 

Thus we can concentrate about 40,000 men for defense 
of the North Sea coast. 

3d District. — Stralsund — Colberg; in addition to local 
garrisons, the 2d Landwehr Division, 10,400 men, at Stettin. 

Mh District. — Danzig — Memel ; in addition to local gar- 
risons, the 1st Landwehr Division, 10,400 men, at Elbing. 

A total of about 60,000 men. 

Should a French landing expedition be intended, it 
undoubtedly will occur in the North Sea and probably in 
the very first stages of hostilities. If the French fighting 
forces are attacked in their own country, the French will 
hardly undertake such an operation. 

The coast divisions (the mobile ones first) would then 
be available to guard the lines of communications to the rear. 

Should Denmark participate in the war, then it may 
become necessary to bring up the 17th Infantry Division to 
support the 18th in the Duchies. 

Should* the French occupy Belgium they must utilize 
at least 120,000 men for that purpose, in order to occupy 
Brussels and to besiege, invest or at least observe the Bel- 
gian army assembled in Antwerp. 

But as this procedure cannot be tolerated by either 
England or Prussia, France will be forced to at once place 
all of its fighting forces on a war footing. In addition to 



*Here commences the addition to the memorial composed on the 
10th of March, 1869. 

—157— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Rome and Algiers it would have to observe the western fron- 
tier and the north coast. After garrisoning the fortresses 
of Paris and Lyons, it would have about 180,000 men to 
carry out its offensive. 

It surely cannot be their intention to await develop- 
ment of events retaining this large force in a passive at- 
titude; on the whole, the entire matter might only be the 
start of a war against Germany, and, of course, in a direc- 
tion which is the least dangerous to us. 

Should the French main force be concentrated in the 
vicinity of Metz — Strassburg, the two armies would in two 
separate theaters of war, 160 to 200 [English] miles dis- 
tant, and without possibility of mutual support. 

Should the Hollanders join a French alhance, this rein- 
forcement would be offset by an English landing in Ant- 
werp. 

The French North Army would be contained in Belgium 
and could not undertake anything serious against our line 
of fortresses on the Rhine. We would assemble in the Rhine 
Palatinate all disposable forces against the South Army, 
would take the offensive with a superiority of 100,000 men, 
would frustrate a march by the enemy via Luxemburg 
to Aix-la-Chapelle to join the North Army, would force the 
South Army back on Paris, and would at the same time 
force the evacuation of Belgium. 

If the French enter Belgium at all, they can do so only 
by concentrating their main force on the line Lille — Mezi- 
eres and advancing through Belgium across the Maas. 

That would mean that they will reach our frontier from 
ten to fourteen days later than they could from the line 
Metz — Strassburg; that they have no hope of receiving 
support in Southern Germany; and that they will have to 
weaken their army by at least 80,000 men by investing 
Antwerp. They could then reach our Rhine front with 
hardly more than 200,000 men. 

According to my view, we could meet such a procedure 
more effectively if we advance against the French from the 
Mosel than were we to appear from the Rhine fortresses in 
the front. We could compel the French to make front 

—158— 



Preparations for War 

towards the south, which would leave all their communica- 
tions on the flank. 

The distance from Maubeuge to Cologne is larger than 
that from Homburg to Cologne. Supposing that mobili- 
zation starts at the same time on both sides, we would 
arrive in good time from the Palatinate, still we could do 
that quicker from Coblenz and Mayence on a shorter road. 

If we desired to advance on Paris with our main force 
from the Palatinate, not paying any attention to the in- 
vasion of the French main force, then we would reach the 
vicinity on the other side of the Argonne Forest, as we 
would find no resistance, at about the same time that the 
French would reach our frontier at Aix-la-Chapelle. We 
are 120 [English] miles, the French 320 [English] miles 
from the opponent's capital. 

Still a mere advance on fortified Paris would of course 
not bring matters to a decision, and we might better oper- 
ate from the line Luxemburg — Pont-a-Mousson, converg- 
ing along the Mosel in the direction of Sedan. From there 
we will at one and the same time threaten Paris and com- 
pel the French army to return from Belgium, to make front 
against us and accept our battle, without which the war 
cannot be ended. 

That operation would bring the conditions between 
both sides to a crisis. We conduct the operation in a hos- 
tile country, but that country might also be in a state of 
insurrection at the same time; we have no railroad behind 
us and weaken ourselves at Thionvilie, Metz and Verdun. 
The result of the loss of, the battle could not be calculated, 
still in the battle we will be the stronger, as the French 
will have to leave a part of their forces opposed to the Bel- 
gium army, or will, should they march off, draw the Bel- 
gians after them. 

We would gain the same advantage with less danger 
if we advance from the line Luxemburg — Trier — Coblenz 
converging on Liittich, in which case of course we would 
have to march through the Eifel, Ardennes and Hohe Venn. 

In order to reach the line Coblenz — Luxemburg for our 
first position no material changes are necessary in the meas- 

—159— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

ures already sketched out for the concentration in the 
Palatinate; all that is required would be to stop the troop 
transports at Coblenz and diverge them from Mayence to 
Bingen and Coblenz. 

The Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps would be concen- 
trated on the 15th day of mobilization at Stadtkyll __60,000 men 

The Second Army can reach the vicinity of Luxemburg 
— Trier, in 3 marches, even if the route of trans- 
port is not changed, consequently by the 18th to 
the 21st day 130,000 men 

The Xlth and Xllth Corps, as well as the 18th In- 
fantry Division, can be concentrated at Coblenz 
by the 18th day 73,000 men 

The Vth Corps and the Darmstadt Division, via Bingen, 

at Zell-on-the-Mosel by the 20th day 45,000 men 

In about 4 to 5 marches, that is by the 26th day, and 

by converging marches, an army of a total of 308,000 men 

The distance from Lille — Maubeuge to Liittich could 
be covered by ten average marches. If we assume that the 
French will complete mobilization and march into position 
by the 15th day, they cannot interfere with this advance. 

B. — First Concentration of the Army in a War 
Against France and Austria 

In case Austria takes part in a war with France against 
Prussia, we could not bring to bear a superiority in num- 
bers towards either side by a division of our forces. 

Consequently the question of first importance is: 
against which enemy will carry out a defensive at the start 
with weak forces, in order to take the offensive against 
the other with as strong a force as possible. 

Undoubtedly the Rhine with its fortresses gives us a 
better defensive line against France than we have against 
Austria. We can count with certainty on the fact that this 
defensive line, supported by 100,000 men, will hold out from 
six to eight weeks, but we would have Southern Germany, 
if not against us, certainly not with us. The French would 
go around our Rhine front via Worms, and operate through 
Franconia against Berlin, and only an offensive in strong 
force from the Palatinate can prevent them from doing so. 
To this is to be added that the Austrians probably will not 

—160— 



Preparations for War 

accept a battle in Bohemia nor in Moravia, but will await 
the effects of a French invasion in a fortified camp at Olmiitz 
or behind the Danube, which might then easily bring our 
offensive to a standstill. 

Austria — at the present time having but 100 men per 
battalion — will hardly be ready as soon as we will if we 
commence mobilization early for an unavoidable war, and 
we may have a free hand from six to eight weeks. 

France not only is our most dangerous enemy, but also 
the one most ready. If we invade French territory, French 
pride will not wait for Austria, we will be attacked at 
once. If we have superior numbers we may hope to gain a 
victory in the very first few days. Such a victory will prob- 
ably cause a change in the French dynasty. As we desire 
nothing from France, we may be able to conclude an early 
peace with the new reigning power. 

Should Austria in the meantime have actually occupied 
Silesia, Brandenburg and the capital, if our weak defensive 
army — without having been beaten — had given away, noth- 
ing definite would have happened to our disadvantage. 

Add to this, in the west we cannot expect foreign sup- 
port and have to be strong here in consequence, while in 
the east Russia would presumably give us more or less ac- 
tive support. If we advance against Vienna, it is true that 
Russia has no active interests in helping us ; but it is differ- 
ent if the Austrians threaten Berlin. 

For these reasons I would suggest concentrating ten 
army corps for an immediate offensive in the Palatinate, 
and placing three army corps in position against Austria, 
which, reinforced by the 1st and 2d Landwehr Divisions, 
would be of a strength of about 120,000 men. The defense 
of the little endangered Baltic coast will in that case have 
to be abandoned. 

Should Austria intend to turn its entire force against 
us, Russia would be left completely free to carry out its 
probable intentions in the Orient ; Austria can hardly leave 
the Wallachia — Moldavia frontier entirely without troops. 

An advance into Silesia is seriously endangered, should 
a Russian observation army — concentrated, say, at Czensto- 

—161— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

chau (on the Warsaw — Kattowitz R. R.) — commence oper- 
ations. Such an observation army presumably will be as- 
sembled in consideration of conditions in the Kingdom of 
Poland, and the Austrians will be compelled to have an 
army opposite it at Olmiitz. 

Only troops not required for this army will be avail- 
able for an advance from Prague directly on Berlin. This 
is the most dangerous direction for us. 

We on our part would have to decide in the first place 
whether to base our weak defensive army on the Oder or 
on the Elbe. The former direction facilitates connection of 
the fighting forces from Silesia with those which must be 
started to Dresden — Gorlitz to relieve the Xllth Corps. 
A retreat behind the Oder brings us closer to Russian sup- 
port and leads finally to the large fortresses on the Vistula 
and to Danzig, which, situated on the sea, is more suited 
than any other of our war depots to receive and protect 
an entire army for a longer time. 

Still in spite of these large advantages we must con- 
sider that the Russian support is not at all assured, and 
that it is a dangerous practice to directly join a stronger 
ally. By doing so the Prussian defensive army would lose 
its independence and must coordinate its movements to the 
intentions of its ally. 

To this is to be added that the probable advance of the 
enemy directly on Berlin can be flanked closer and more 
effectively from the Elbe than from the Oder. 

In a retreat on Torgau we remain in connection with 
our main forces on the Rhine and finally find a receiving 
place in the enlarged Madgeburg, which, actively defended 
by an as yet unbeaten army of 100,000 men, would be diffi- 
cult to attack. 

I would therefore prefer the latter direction, if it can 
be done. 

Should the force designated for the defense of the 
eastern half of the Monarchy be assembled at one point, 
that point ought to be Gorlitz, on account of its location and 
railroad connections, from which we can meet the advance 

—162— 



Preparations for War 

of the enemy in Silesia as well as we can in the Lausitz or 
in Saxony. 

Consequently there remains to be considered — 

1st. That we cannot possibly leave Silesia at the very 
start without troops and abandon it altogether; 

2d. that it is not advisable to draw the Xllth Army 
Corps to the Rhine, if it cannot be replaced in Dresden 
by at least one infantry division ; 

3d. that even if fully concentrated we should accept a 
decision only under the most favorable conditions, as very 
probably we may be compelled to retreat. 

Consequently, a partition of forces appears to me abso- 
lutely necessary. 

Finally, with our forces combined we can appear only 
in Silesia or in Brandenburg and the Austrians can advance 
in both directions ; they can do so in the first direction with 
a secondary army, the concentration of which I presume to 
be at Olmiitz — which at the same time would serve as an 
observation army against Russia and might therefore be 
easily stopped from a further advance, so that but a weaker 
detachment may possibly be sufficient to guard Breslau; 
but in the latter direction the Austrians will advance with 
their main force via Dresden directly on Berlin. 

I believe the Vlth Army Corps will have to concentrate 
at Neisse — Frankenstein, threatening via Glatz the hostile 
main railroad at Wildenschwerdt. A detachment in the 
fortified camp at Cosel, eventually supported by Landsturm, 
will serve for observation of at least upper Silesia. Com- 
pelled by superior numbers, the corps will fall back on 
Liegnitz, taking the hostile advance on Breslau in the flank. 
The movement via Gorlitz is protected by the "Riesenge- 
birge" (the chain of mountains between Silesia and Bo- 
hemia) and facilitated by the railroads. 

The lid and 1st Army Corps would in general have to 
be drawn up to Dresden, with exception of the 1st Division, 
which should be posted in Gorlitz to keep up the connection 
with Silesia. The two Landwehr divisions would join the 
concentration at Dresden. 

—163— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

An advance on Dresden is difficult for the Austrians 
and offers us a presumably fortunate offensive. Should we 
be compelled to retreat, we can do so either on the one or 
the other bank of the Elbe and at Riesa, and in any event at 
Torgau, we cut loose from the pursuit. 

It is not probable that the Austrians would advance be- 
yond Dresden on the left bank of the Elbe; to reach Berlin 
they would have to cross the stream between our fortresses 
and in the face of our defensive army. 

There are but two through routes on the right bank, 
the highways via Herzberg and, via Liibben, which run 
about parallel at an average distance of six miles from each 
other. The first has the advantage of running along the 
railroad, but it runs so close to the Elbe that we can reach 
it via Torgau and even via Wittenberg in one march. The 
enemy can hardly pass and pay no attention to our army 
there, which in any case is some 60,000 men strong. To at- 
tack that army behind the covering Elbe, is difficult. Even 
the complete investment of the bridgehead at Torgau and 
of the fortress of Wittenberg would not give entire security 
against the army's advance. With that obstacle behind it, 
advancing straight against the enemy's line of operation, 
against one (necessarily very deep) or several (in that case 
two marches distant) columns of the enemy, we would not 
have to be afraid of a decisive battle, as in case of misfor- 
tune the river precludes pursuit — the bridges being open 
to us and closed to the enemy — and as the connection with 
Madgeburg can not be endangered. 

But in order to guard Berlin as much as possible against 
danger, at least against hostile detachments, one detach- 
ment would have to directly retire on the capital in addition 
to the flank defense which is so important according to my 
views. That detachment would be composed of the 1st 
Division at Gorlitz, and it has to remain fully oriented as to 
the enemy's advance. It is not so easy for an enemy to 
march with weak forces into a city of some half a million in- 
habitants, as long as there is nucleus of armed force around 
which armed resistance could rally. 

—164— 



Preparations for War . 

We still have to consider the position or attitude the 
South German States will take in the supposed war situation, 
and what we can demand of them. 

As always with mere coalitions, which are not always 
exactly what is desirable from a military standpoint, noth- 
ing is done but what is thought to be advantageous to both 
parties to the coalition. It would be entirely useless to stipu- 
late anything else in advance, because it is never carried out. 
We can not expect of the Bavarians that they will send their 
entire fighting force to the Rhine Palatinate and abandon 
Munich to an Austrian invasion. We cannot even demand 
that they join us behind the Iron Mountains (Erzgebirge). 

An army in the Rhine Palatinate would protect the 
Rhine as far as Basle more effectively than it could protect 
the Bavarian eastern frontier by a concentration around 
Dresden, seeing that Salzburg is twice the distance, and be- 
fore all because we, even if united with Bavaria, would 
hardly be strong enough for an offensive through which 
such a flank position gains its value. 

The Bavarians have a vital interest in seeing their 
Rhine Palatinate protected and they will not object to the 
brigade, now there, joining our fighting forces at Landau. 
According to my view the Bavarian main army should con- 
centrate on the lower Inn. 

Passau offers a strong defensive position, the Danube 
and the Isar secure the retreat on Regensburg, and also se- 
cures Ingolstadt against superior forces. But the Bavarians, 
in consideration of direct protection to Munich, may prefer 
a concentration at Altotting — Tittmoning,* although they 
will always have to fall back to one side on Ingolstadt if 
opposed by a stronger army. 

Both concentrations are acceptable to us. They seri- 
ously threaten Austria's capital and its connection through 
Moravia. The Austrians cannot do without an observation 
army against the Bavarians and, in order to make that enemy 
of no danger in rear, that army must be strong, thereby 



* Allotting is east of Munich near the Inn; Tittmoning is on the 
Salzach, southeast of Altotting; consequently a concentration between 
the Inn and the Salzach would result. 

—165— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

weakening the main army some other place. Austria can- 
not at one and the same time observe the Russians and 
otfensively advance in Silesia, in the Lausitz, or against the 
Bavarians. It will be weak in one of these places and there 
we must take the offensive and disengage the endangered 
auxiliary army. 

However, we could not approve a concentration of the 
Bavarian forces say in a fortified camp at Ingolstadt, to re- 
main inactive there. 

Not only Baden but also Wtirttemberg are threatened 
sooner and more directly by France than by Austria. Their 
contingents would have to be sent to the Rhine Palatinate 
as has already been agreed on. 

There would be then disposable there, inclusive of a 
Bavarian brigade: 

North Germans 310,000 men 

South Germans 40,000 men 

350,000 men 

French active army . 336,000 men 

Deduct: in Algiers 35,000 men 

in Rome 5,000 men 40,000 men 

296,000 men 

From this total should be deducted the necessary line 
troops for the fortresses Strassburg, Metz, Thionville, 
Lille, etc., and for Paris and Lyons, at least if we get ahead 
of the French offensive. Even if there is no necessity, con- 
sidering conditions in Spain, for placing an observation 
corps near the Pyrenees, we will have hardly more than 
250,000 men in the first line opposed to us. 

The French Reserve Army, 93,000 men, has still to be 
organized. 

Of our immediately available Landwehr divisions we 
can utilize at least 35,000 men against the west. 

Consequently : 

350,000 men against 295,000 men 
35,000 men against 93,000 men 
and reserves 

A total of 

385,000 men against 343,000 men. 

—166— 



i 



Preparations for War 



The Bavarians surely would put forward their best efforts for 
the protection of their own country. 

Under such conditions their strength might be estimated 
as 50,000 men 

Opposed to Austria there would be (Prussians) 110,000 men 



a total of 160,000 men, 

but these would be in separate groups without direct mutual 
support. There is no doubt but what the Austrians can ad- 
vance with superior numbers against any of these groups, 
but it is just as certain that these groups will fall back and 
that Austria's offensive operations will be materially hin- 
dered by the other groups. 

As soon as we are able to have a part of our fighting 
forces available against the French, we will assure our- 
selves, as well as to the Bavarians, the greatest help, by 
bringing up the available troops to the Danube via Stutt- 
gart and Wiirzburg. 



NO. 17 

To Colonel Veith and Lieutenant Colonel Count 
Wartensleben* 

Berlin, 1 December, 1868. 

It should be considered, whether it would be advisable 
to transport the available artillery ahead of the reserve 
cavalry. 

With the Second Army, which is more or less on out- 
post, numerous artillery would be an impediment in case of a 
necessary retreat. Strong cavalry would be a great help. 

On the other hand, the artillery is of more value than 
the cavalry in the strong position at Mannheim. 

As a matter of fact a large cavalry reconnaissance 
can be dispensed with up to the 28th day, because we will 
be ready for operations only front the 30th to the 36th 
day. 



*Chiefs of Sections, Great General Staff. 

—167— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

I leave it to you whether or not changes can be made in 
the march and travel tables, in order to make the Second 
Army ready for operations as early as possible, even at the 
cost of the Reserve Army. 

In any case it appears advisable to me to complete the 
full equipment of the Vth Corps ahead of the Xllth Corps. 
If a front has to be made against the south, the latter corps 
will in any case have to be relieved first. 



In the winter of 1868-69, General v. Moltke again worked out a 
memorial, in which he fully discussed the first position of the army 
in a war against France and against Austria at one and the same 
time, and also in a war with the former alone. This work, published 
in part in the General Staff Account of the War of 1870-71, has 
Moltke's own notation: "Applies also to 1870." During 1869 and 1870 
this work was revised several times, the last time in July 1870. 

NO. 18 
First Position of the Army 

If the political situation brings about a war of France 
against Prussia, then the attitude of Austria will be either 
decidedly hostile or at least very doubtful. 

Should we oppose one half of our army to each of these 
two powers, we would be superior to neither. Therefore 
the first thing to be considered is : against which enemy 
will we in the start assume the defensive with minor forces, 
in order to advance offensively as strong as possible against 
the other? 

The Rhine with its fortresses undoubtedly affords us a 
defensive line against France, which we have not against 
Austria — a line which 100,000 men can hold from four to 
six weeks against any and all superior numbers. 

But in a defensive attitude against that side we would 
hardly have South Germany with us, if we do not have it 
against us. The French would go around our Rhine front 
via Worms to operate through Franconia against Berlin, 
while our main force, even after successful operations, 
would come to a stand possibly in front of Olmiitz or on the 

—168— 



Preparations for War 

Danube. It would not at all be impossible for the Austrians 
to decline to accept a decision in Bohemia or Moravia, and 
await behind their defensive lines the success of their allies. 
In financial straits, with weak peace cadres, Austria re- 
quires in any case a longer time to complete its mobilization, 
and it is very probable that we will have a free hand against 
France for some six to eight weeks, if we take the initiative. 

Neither Austria nor France is strong enough to carry 
on a war without allies against Northern Germany. As 
soon as Austria commences its mobilization, we ought to 
immediately declare war against France. We should not be 
kept from doing this by the fact of being the aggressor, for 
we may be sure that Austria will not mobilize, before an un- 
derstanding has been arrived at between both powers as to 
an advance, for which France merely gives its ally time to 
prepare. 

If we invade French territory, then French sentiment 
will not wait for Austria. France is not only the most 
dangerous but the most ready enemy, and we will be cer- 
tain to encounter this enemy very soon. The size of the 
armies, their limited space for concentration and the diffi- 
culties of subsistence and supply, indicate a quick decision 
as far as both sides are concerned, and we may say with 
certainty, that in the first few weeks a contact will be had, 
which, in case of being to our advantage, would cause Aus- 
tria to return its half -drawn sword to the scabbard. 

Had the Austrians completed their armament and con- 
centration while we were seeking a rapid decision on the 
other side of the Rhine, had they occupied Silesia and a part 
of the provinces of Brandenburg and Prussia, then surely 
nothing definite would have been lost, as long as our fort- 
resses there hold their own and as long as the defensive 
army there retreats unbeaten. It is probable that after the 
first unsuccessful battle a change in the dynasty will occur 
in France, and as we do not desire to take anything away 
from France we may soon be able to come to terms with 
the new government or new monarchy. 

Considering all these reasons, I suggest that we desig- 
nate ten army 'corps for an offensive against France, and 

—169— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

three army corps for a defensive against Austria. For the 
reinforcement of the latter and for the active defense of the 
coast, a mobile Landwehr division should be formed, and the 
17th Division should be kept back for observation against 
Denmark — that division to be replaced in the IXth Army 
Corps by the Hessian Division. 

It is self-evident that all forces should be employed 
against France if we have to fight against it alone for a 
longer time. 

1. — Defense Against Austria 

It is hard to state in advance with what numerical su- 
periority Austria can take the field against us, but it is 
certain that that country's superiority will develop only 
with the progress of its mobilization and armament. 

In 1866 Austria put 340,000 men in the field, which took 
it four months. There is no reason to assume that at the 
present time it could arm and mobilize more quickly or in 
stronger force. 

Interior conditions of the Empire will hardly allow the 
provinces to be stripped of all troops; considerations in re- 
spect to other countries, especially Russia, and possibly also 
Bavaria, will compel Austria to place troops also on other 
frontiers besides the Prussian frontier. It is not to be as- 
sumed that Austria will leave a free hand to Russia in the 
Danube Principalities nor in Galicia in order to employ all 
its forces against us. If Russia, not counting the Caucasian 
Army, places in the field 

8 inf. divisions at Bender; 
12 inf. div. and 2 cav. div. at Wolocysk; 
2 inf. divisions against Brody, 

it can still concentrate 18 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry 
divisions in a comparatively short time around Czenstochau, 
which would threaten the rear of any advance through 
Silesia. 

It seems probable that Austria will be forced to con- 
centrate an observation army possibly at Olmiitz and event- 
ually on the lower Inn, and then only the remainder of its 
fighting forces, exclusive of many garrisons, could be utilized 
against us. 

—170— 



J 



Preparations for War 

Even if Russia does not actually interfere at the be- 
ginning of the campaign, all Austrian operations in Silesia 
are endangered from the Russian side in the degree in which 
they advance. 

Consequently all considerations make it apparent that 
the Austrians will march from Bohemia directly on Berlin, 
and by the right bank of the Elbe, as otherwise they would 
have to re-cross that stream between our fortresses and 
in the face of our defense. 

Therefore we must take our measures primarily against 
such an operation. 

With due regard to the most rapid and combined as- 
sembly of all of the North German army corps it is advis- 
able to designate the 1st and lid for the defensive against 
Austria and to reinforce them by the 1st and 3d mobile 
Landwehr divisions to 83,600 men. Under the pressure of 
the moment the active defense of the Baltic sea coast must 
be left to the forces now stationed for defense on the North 
Sea, and this can be done, because there is little probability 
of an expedition in the North Sea. 

Furthermore, there would remain disposable for defense 
in Silesia the Vlth Army Corps with a strength of 30,000 
men and adding to it the above 82,600 men would give a 
total of 113,600 men. 

To assemble that force at one point, for instance at 
Gorlitz, is not allowable. 

On the one hand it would not be justifiable were we to 
take all the troops from Silesia, and on the other hand we 
could not draw off the Xllth Army Corps from Dresden be- 
fore it is relieved, and that by at least one Prussian division. 

The Silesian Army Corps can best be concentrated on 
the line Nisse — Frankenstein to guard the frontier and to 
threaten, via Glatz, the enemy's main railroad at Wilden- 
schwerdt. 

Should the enemy enter Silesia at all, he would do so 
with that part of his army, the concentration of which I pre- 
suppose to be at Olmiitz, which must at the same time serve 
for observation against the Russians, and the operations of 
which consequently can be made more diflficult by having to 

—171^ 



Moltke's Correspondence 

detach minor forces. Presumably that corps would not be 
strong enough to oppose an enemy's advance on Breslau, 
but it would flank such an advance by retiring via Schweid- 
nitz. 

However, if the Austrians advance with their combined 
forces against the Lausitz, then the bringing up of the Vlth 
Corps to Gorlitz will be protected against Bohemia by the 
mountains and hastened by using two railroads. 

It is also to be presumed that the main power of our 
defensive army will be too weak to directly oppose the en- 
emy. Retiring on Berlin, it would draw the enemy after it 
to that place, which is just his objective, or the decision 
would have to be accepted in the open field this side of the 
capital. 

Better success is promised by a flank position, which 
can be based on the Oder or on the Elbe, or both at one and 
the same time. For the former, we would take a position 
at Gorlitz, which facilitates connection with the Vlth Corps 
and in which we would be closer to Russian support. But 
this support is only a conditional one, and it will always re- 
main a matter of grave doubt whether or not to join a 
stronger ally directly, and that means to place ourselves 
under his orders. But as a matter of fact the Elbe flanks 
a hostile advance on Berlin, and effectively so, because on 
that stream our defensive army could remain in connection 
with our main forces on the Rhine and finds, until it can 
be reinforced from there, a sure rallying point in the en- 
larged Madgeburg. The Elbe with its fortresses, affords 
to an offensively conducted flank defense great advantages 
which will be acceptable when opposed to a superior enemy. 
Each and every advance from any bridge-head compels 
the enemy to make front and to fight with all of his com- 
munications on one flank. In case of reverses, we find 
complete security behind the stream, and a pursuit would 
take the enemy away from Berlin. 

That the enemy can get ahead of us in that direction 
would not scare us ; the advantages of the situation will ap- 
pear only when the enemy undertakes to pass us. Of course 
in such a procedure Berlin will have to be guarded by a de- 

—172— 



Preparations for War 

tachment on the road thereto against incursions by flying 
columns. The enemy also must weaken himself by sieges 
the farther he advances ; at least on the right bank, at Dres- 
den, Torgau and Wittenberg and by a careful guarding of 
his line of communications. Thus he may easily lose his 
numerical superiority before he reaches the capital, when 
then correct "leadership will succeed in uniting all forces and 
chance a decision, having a line of retreat open to Madge- 
burg. 

As the flank operation becomes more effective the far- 
ther upstream it commences, Dresden would be the proper 
point for the concentration of the: 

1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Infantry Divisions; 
1st and 3d Landwehr Divisions; 
2d Cavalry Division. 

On the other hand, the 1st Cavalry Division would have to 
be brought to Gorlitz to facilitate its reaching the Vlth 
Corps. 

If shortly before breaking out of hostilities our main 
forces move from Dresden to the strong position at Stolpen 
(25 km. east of Dresden) , in which operation they would re- 
main protected on the right flank by the impassable Sand- 
stone Mountains, and if at the same time the Gorlitz de- 
tachment is called up to Bautzen, then the possiblity exists 
at the very start of attacking, with all disposable forces, the 
enemy deploying from the Lausitz Mountains. In any 
case we would draw him on our force and into the direction 
of Dresden. All the rest falls into the province of opera- 
tions, which we can touch here only in so far as they demand 
the first position of the fighting forces. 

Concerning now the South German States, we must not 
expect in this nor in any other coalition anything except 
what is to the immediate interest of all parties. 

In a war against France alone the direct joining of the 
Bavarian army to the North German fighting force on the 
central Rhine gives the best protection against a French in- 
vasion into Bavarian territory, and if correct military views 
in Munich have the upper hand, this requirement will be 

—173— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

complied with. We cannot require this, however, when 
Bavaria has to defend its own frontier against Austria. 

We may assume that in that case Bavaria would un- 
doubtedly be able to concentrate 60,000 men on the lower Inn. 
Such a position would assure us the help which we have to 
expect of Bavaria. Being in rear of the hostile concentra- 
tion in Bohemia and Moravia it threatens Vienna in such a 
degree that Austria cannot help but send a force at least 
equally strong against it. Against such a force the Bavarian 
army would hardly be able to permanently protect Munich, 
but it could contain that force "until a general decision had 
been reached at Ingolstadt. However, we can not allow the 
Bavarians to take a waiting position in the start at Ingol- 
stadt ; we must demand that they exchange shots at the very 
beginning with Austria. 

Wiirtemberg and Baden are directly threatened by 
France as well as by Austria, and we can expect them to 
join our offensive. 

If we succeed in bringing about an early decision in 
France, then, even if the Austrians have made progress in 
the meantime in Silesia or Brandenburg, the direction of 
our operations would be against them through Wiirttem- 
berg and Bavaria. 

Consequently it is of main importance to take the field 
against France quickly and in superior numbers. 

2. Offensive Against France 

Less complicated than for the defensive against Austria 
is the plan of operations for the offensive against France. 
It consists mainly in seeking out the enemy's main force 
and to attack it where found. 

The only difficulty lies in executing this simple plan 
with very large masses. 

In its mobile stage the French active 

amy numbers 336,000 men 

deduct for Algiers 35,000 | 



and for Rome 5,000 5 



40,000 men 



Which leaves available 296,000 men. 

—174— 



Preparations for War 

But as soon as we get ahead of the French offensive, a 
part of these troops will be absolutely necessary for gar- 
risoning Strassburg, Metz, Thionville, Lyons and Paris, 
50,000 men at the lowest estimate. 

If after that, conditions do not require an observation 
corps to be placed at the Pyrenees or on the Channel, we still 
would at the start, meet hardly more than 260,000 men in 
the field. 

The ten North German corps number 330,000 men. 

Of course there are still 93,000 reserves in France. 
The simplest manner to utilize them would be to increase 
the battalions of 800 men up to 1000 men, and this would 
bring the French army in the field to about the same 
strength as that of the North German army. But it ap- 
pears that that is not the intention, but that a special reserve 
army is to be formed, and this pre-supposes new forma- 
tions, and is an additional reason for us to advance quickly. 

We have a reserve of 26,000 men in the already or- 
ganized Guard and 3d Landwehr Divisions, which pre- 
sumably follow in the course of the campaign. 

If we can count with some certainty on 30,000 men of 
the Baden and Wiirtemberg Division, then the proportion, 
at the opening of hostilities, of our forces to the hostile 
fighting forces, will be as 360,000 to 250,000, and later on 
386,000 to 343,000 men.* 

It is self-evident how important it is to fully utilize the 
superiority which we have in the start, and in the North 
German forces alone. 

This superiority will be materially increased at the de- 
cisive point, if the French engage in expeditions against 
the North Sea coast or into Southern Germany. To meet 
the former we have sufficient means without weakening the 
field army, and the latter expedition cannot be dangerous 
to us for the present. 



*Addition in 1870: — "How conditions are now in July, 1870, we 
are justified in assuming that all South German forces will join us, 
that is 60,000 men. In that case we would oppose the 250,000 French 
with 400,000 men and would still have three army corps in reserve." 

—175— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The main point is to concentrate our actual superiority 
in such a manner as to enable us to bring it to account at 
the decisive moment and in that the first question is : where 
may we expect to meet the enemy. 

The neutrality of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland 
confine the theater of war to the area between Luxemburg 
and Basle. Should France disregard this neutrality and 
advance through Belgium against the Prussian Rhine, then 
it would have to weaken itself by 80,000 to 100,000 men in 
Brussels and in front of the Belgian army assembled in 
Antwerp, not counting probable difficulties with England. 
A further advance across the Maas could be more effec- 
tively opposed from the direction of the Mosel, than from 
the Rhine. Our Rhine front is so strong that it requires 
no immediate support, and in addition, the distance from 
Brussels to Cologne is greater than from Mayence, Trier 
or Kaiserslautern to Brussels. Our advance from the 
south forces the enemy to make front and to fight with his 
communications in the flank — which are already threatened 
by Belgium. An original concentration of our fighting 
forces south of the Mosel would consequently enable us to 
meet the danger of this invasion on the left bank of the 
Rhine, as well as to get ahead of it by an offensive on 
French ground. Not counting political difficulties with 
England, the violation of Belgium's neutrality offers too 
little hope of success to be probable. 

France would encounter no less difficulties should it 
attempt to carry out operations through Switzerland to join 
hands with Austria. Capturing and holding this mountain- 
ous country would occupy more than 100,000 men for a 
long time. In addition a direct joint operation of both 
allied armies would be of no interest to each one separ- 
ately; they will have to pursue entirely different objects on 
separate theaters of war in order to finally gain their com- 
bined object — the defeat of the Prussian power. 

We are therefore justified in assuming that the French 
will effect their first concentration on the line Metz — Strass- 
burg in order to advance against the Main, going around 
our strong Rhine front, to separate North and South Ger- 

—176— 



Preparations for War 

many, to reach an understanding with the latter and, based 
on that, to advance against the Elbe. 

This also will mean a concentration south of the Mosel 
and of all disposable North and South German fighting 
forces in the Bavarian Palatinate as the most suitable 
means to oppose such plans. 

Expectation of easy success might easily induce the 
French to advance with a part of their fighting force from 
Strassburg against Southern Germany. But an operation 
upstream on the flank of this march would prevent any and 
all further advance across the Black Forest and would 
compel the opponent to first gain elbow room against the 
north. If the Baden — Wiirtemberg Corps has joined the 
left wing, then we are in the situation to reinforce it from the 
Palatinate to such an extent that a decision may be sought 
in the vicinity of Rastatt, and should the outcome be for- 
tunate for us, the enemy's retreat would result in anni- 
hilation. To attain that object we can without fear make 
detachm.ents from our main force, as the enemy in front 
will have to be weakened by just as much as he has made 
detachments from his main army for operations on the upper 
Rhine. 

Should the South German governments prefer a direct 
defense of their domain by a position behind the Black 
Forest or at Ulm, then we would be relieved of the neces- 
sity of supporting them. We can leave them to their own 
devices, as the march of a French army, extending via 
Stuttgart and Munich, will become effective on our strategic 
flank only, after the important operations against the 
weakened enemy in our front have fallen. 

If the French desire to fully utilize their railroad sys- 
tem for quick concentration of all their fighting forces, they 
will be compelled to detrain in two main groups, at Strass- 
burg and at Metz, separated by the Vosges Mountains. If 
the presumably smaller group at the first point is not as- 
signed against South Germany, then it can join the main 
force on the upper Mosel only by marching. 

In the Palatinate we stand on the inner line of opera- 
tions between both hostile groups. We can turn against 

—177— . 



Moltke's Correspondence 

the one or the other and, provided we are strong enough, 
against both at the same time. The concentration of all our 
forces in the Palatinate protects the lower as well as the 
upper Rhine and allows an offensive into the enemy's country 
which, provided it is made at the correct time, will probably 
get ahead of the French advancing upon German ground. 

The only question remains, if we, without running 
danger of being interfered with in our first concentration, 
can transfer the points of concentration across the Rhine 
into the Palatinate and to the immediate French frontier, 
and this question, according to my opinions, should be 
answered affirmatively. 

Our mobilization is prepared down to the very last 
detail. There are six trunk lines available for transport- 
ing troops to the vicinity between the Mosel and the Rhine. 
The time tables, showing day and hour of starting and 
arrival of each troop unit, are prepared. On the 12th day 
the first detachments can detrain close to the French fron- 
tier; and on the 15th day the fighting troops of two army 
corps will be assembled there. On the 20th day the number 
of our fighting forces will be 300,000 men and on the 2Uh 
day the armies will have their full complements.* 



*The notes concerning tne position in readiness of the fightingr 
forces in this memorial have been changed by the marginal note "For 
1870." It states: for the 12th day, read "10th": for the 15th, "13th"; 
for the 20th, "18th", and for the 24th, "20th" with "nearly all trains." 

These changes apparently are based on the following marginal 
notes in the handwriting of General v. Moltke: 

"According to the preparations for 1870: 

SECOND ARMY 

BNS. SQDS. bat's. 

on the 10th mobilization day 8 — — 

up to incl. the 12th mobilization day 30 14 8 

up to incl. the 15th mobilization day 64 75 27 

up to incl. the 17th mobilization day 104 84 48 

up to incl. the 19th mobilization day 104 108 60 

inclusive of the 1st section of trains and columns of all four army 

corps. 
In the vicinity of Landau there will be concentrated — of the 
Third Army: 
the Xlth A. C. not later than the 13th day of mobilization, 
the Vth A.C. not later than the 18th day of mobilization, 
inclusive of the first section of the trains; 

—178— 



J 



Preparations for War 

We have no reason at all to suppose that the concen- 
tration of the French army to a mobile footing, for which 
so far they have had no experience, can be made more 
quickly. Since. Napoleon Bonaparte's time France has 
known only partial mobilization, in which the part of the 
army taking the field was completed from the part remain- 
ing at home. 

Considering the numerous garrisons and camps in the 
northeastern part of the country, France can of course, on 
account of the excellent railroad system and plentiful roll- 
ing stock, assemble an army of 150,000 men at the frontier in 
a very short time. Such a procedure for a quick initiative 
would correspond with the national character and has been 
discussed in military circles. Assuming such an impro- 
vised army, which would be well supplied with cavalry and 
artillery, were concentrated on the 5th day at Metz and on 
the 8th day crossed the frontier at Saarlouis ; we still could 
start our railroad transportation in time and detrain our 
main force on the Rhine by that time. To that line the in- 
vader would have to cover six marches and would come 
to a standstill there on the 14th day opposite equally strong 
forces. Being in possession of the stream crossings, a few 
days later we would take the offensive in doubly superior 
numbers. 

The disadvantages and dangers of such a procedure 
on the part of France are so apparent that France would 
hardly decide on it, and in any case it will be unable of ex- 
ecution should we ourselves take the initiative. 

DAY OF 

of the Fourth Army: mobilization 

25th Div. will reach Gollheim on the 13th 

18th Div. with the troops the same line on the 15th 

so that the IXth Corps, able to commence operations by the ad- 
dition of the trains, etc., of the 25th Div., can after 1 day 

of rest, reach Homburg on the 19th 

the Xllth A. C. (with the 1st sec. of trains, etc.) detrains 

at Mayence by the 16th 

and can be echeloned from Homburg to Kaiserslautern by 

the 19th 

of the First Army : 

the Vllth A. C. can reach Saarburg — Zerf — Trier 18th 

and the Vlllth A. C. can be echeloned from west of Saar- 
louis to Hermeskeil. 
The 1st sections of trains are present with both corps." 

—179— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

If this shows the correctness of concentrating in the 
Palatinate, objection still may be raised against a concen- 
tration of all disposable fighting forces there and on the 
Mosel, based on an apparent exposure of our Rhine front. 
We have already indicated that that is protected by Bel- 
gium's neutrality and, should that be violated, by distance, 
by its own strength, and by operations. 

A fighting force like the one we place in the field 
against France, can of course operate only if divided into 
several armies. The strength of each of these armies 
should depend on special tasks and the assignment of the 
separate army corps to the armies should be made with due 
regard to having all in readiness in the shortest time. 

Without interfering greatly with the latter point, the 
following organization ought not to be changed : 

1st Army — Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps — as 

right wing around Wittlich 60,000 men 

2d Army— Hid, IVth, Xth and Guard Corps— 

in the center at Neunkirchen — Homburg __ 131,000 men 

3d Army — Vth, Xlth, Baden-Wiirtemberg 
Corps and eventually a Bavarian brig, as 

left w^ing at Landau and Rastatt 99,000 men 

or, should the two Bavarian Corps join __ 130,000 men 

4th, a Reserve, consisting of the combined IXth 

and Xllth Army Corps in front of Mayence 63,000 men 

Total 353,000 men 

or, under above assumption 384,000 men 

Of course, should we be engaged with France alone, 
then the 1st, lid, and finally the Vlth Corps, 100,000 men, 
can also be drawn up. However, these corps can arrive 
only later on, as the railroads will be fully occupied up to 
the 20th day. On the other hand, the two Bavarian corps 
could immediately join the Third Army, which would bring 
the strength of that army up to 130,000 men and the whole 
force, after three weeks, would be increased to 484,000 
men. 

First Army 



To secure the concentration of the Vllth and Vlllth 
Corps on the upper Mosel, it will be correct to not draw 
back the troops garrisoned there, but to leave them as an 

—180— 



i 



Preparations for War 

advance guard at Trier and Saarbriicken and to reinforce 
them. 

The position of the latter place will of course be occu- 
pied for the present by the troops there and the two bat- 
talions and four squadrons in Saarlouis, which will be suffi- 
cient for mere observation and protection of the railroads 
against minor raids by the enemy. Orders will be issued 
by higher authority for successive destruction of the rail- 
road and that for that purpose a railroad detachment will 
be attached to the detachment there. If at all Dossible. the 
detachment will not retire beyond Neunkirchen, and will 
either be reinforced or relieved on the twelfth day by 
strong detachments of the Hid Army Corps. Thereupon 
it will return to its corps. 

On the other hand, the garrison at Trier — four battal- 
ions, four squadrons and one battery (which latter is to be 
immediately sent from Coblenz) — forms a body of troops 
which is not so directly threatened by the enemy and, very 
favorably supported by the terrain, must hold itself at Trier, 
Schweich or a least at Wittlich. On the fourteenth day de- 
tachments will arrive there for permanent support, by the 
sixteenth the entire Vlllth Corps (exclusive of the 33d Regi- 
ment) will reach there, and by the seventeenth the Vllth 
Corps (exclusive of trains) and then 50 battalions, 32 squad- 
rons, 30 batteries will be ready for battle and able to start 
on the twentieth day entirely mobile in any desired direction. 

Second Army 

The troops at Saarbriicken and eventually at Neun- 
kirchen will keep us informed how far the Palatinate rail- 
roads may be used with security. On these roads the first 
detachments of the Hid and IVth Army Corps will arrive 
by the twelfth day. After both corps have their full comple- 
ment of troops by the fifteenth day, they will take position 
near the frontier (near Bildstock and St. Ingbert), behind 
which the Xth and the Guard Corps will detrain, and thus 
104 battalions, 108 squadrons, 60 batteries will be assembled 
around Homburg by the nineteenth day.. 



-181- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Third Army 

The position of the Bavarian brigade at Landau will 
be reinforced on the fifteenth or sixteenth day by the ar- 
rival of the infantry divisions of the Vth Corps. By the 
eighteenth the largest part of the Xlth Corps — mainly by 
marching — will be assembled and there will be in a strong 
position behind the Kling creek 50 battalions, 40 squadrons, 
30 batteries of Prussian combatants alone, which will be 
able to extend help to the Baden — Wiirttemberg Corps be- 
tween Rastatt and Karlsruhe, if the French should have 
crossed the upper Rhine, or, should this not be the case, that 
corps will be closed in on the Xlth Corps. 

Should a French army have already crossed the Rhine 
and be marching on Stuttgart, the Third Army will concen- 
trate on the line Pforzheim — Calw in two marches, and the 
Reserve Army would then form the left wing echelon of the 
offensive towards the west. 

The Reserve 

Of the Reserve the IXth Corps (formed by the 18th 
Division and the Hessian Division to be assembled at Kirch- 
heimbolanden) and the Xllth Corps — 52 battalions, 40 
squadrons, 31 batteries — will be assembled on the other side 
of Mayence by the twentieth day. At present it seems im- 
probable that the French will have attacked our farthest 
advanced Second Army with superior numbers prior to that 
day. 

If France concentrates its entire force against that 
army, if the Second Army has to fall back on the Reserve 
Army, then we would be in a good situation after the twen- 
tieth day to accept battle with 200,000 men in an exceed- 
ingly favorable position at Mannheim. Should that be the 
case, the French could not start any other large operation 
against the upper Rhine or the lower Mosel, and it would 
be entirely correct to reinforce our main force with the 
Third Army, and to direct the First Army across the Nahe 
to the flank and rear of the hostile advance. With only 
moderately good leadership 300,000 men would be concen- 
trated for the decision. 

—182— 



Preparations for War 

If, on the other hand, the Second Army holds its 
ground on the frontier, as we may assume with some prob- 
ability will be the case, reinforcements will reach it in 
time from the reserve, while the First and Third Army 
secure the flanks, and thus the offensive might be taken into 
the enemy's country at once. 

Should we still be in ignorance by then as to the point 
of assembly of the main forces of the enemy, there are four 
cavalry divisions of seventy-six squadrons each at hand, 
which, supported by infantry, should furnish us the desired 
information. 

3. Coast Defense 

For the defense of our coasts and for simultaneous 
observation of Denmark, four divisions are detailed, be- 
sides the garrisons of the fortified places, especially that of 
Sonderburg, viz. : 

one Guard Landwehr division, 
two Landwehr divisions, 
the 17th Infantry Division. 

There are local garrisons of about 8,000 men on the 
stretch of coast from Emden to Bremerhaven and the 2d 
Landwehr Division, a total of 10,800 men, should be sta- 
tioned at Bremen for active support. 

To protect the Elbe and the coast of Schleswig-Holstein, 
as well as the stretch from Hamburg to Liibeck, there are 
assigned as local garrisons 17,750 men, and furthermore 
the mobile 17th Infantry Division, 15,000 men, which latter 
should be concentrated around Hamburg. 

The Guard Landwher Division, 11,000 men, should be 
stationed as a general reserve at Hanover, in consideration 
of the existing railroad net. 

The 1st Landwehr Division remains disposable for 
defense of the less endangered Baltic Sea coast of Pomerania 
and Prussia. 

It appears justifiable to draw off the 17th Infantry 
Division from Schleswig, as it can quickly be returned by 
rail in case of need, and especially because it seems im- 
probable that Denmark will decide at the start of the cam- 
paign to be hostile. 

—183— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

A French landing, if at all intended, will undoubtedly be 
made in the very first stages of the war. As soon as we 
have entered French ground such far-reaching expeditions 
will logically have to be abandoned. 

Furthermore, the French fleet will hardly undertake 
an invasion of the Baltic Sea. The route around Skagen 
could hardly be kept concealed and we would have ample 
time to follow it with our fighting forces via the railroads. 

Far more probable appears a debarkation on the North 
Sea coast or at some Jutland port, in order to at least gain 
a land base for such a hazardous undertaking, and in order 
to finally unite with the Danish reinforcements. 

After what has been stated above, we could very soon 
oppose to such an expedition 40,000 men of our field troops, 
reinforcement for which does not need to bother us, because 
there will be sufficient troops left in the country which up 
to then could not be transported to the theater of war, and 
which are not absolutely required at the frontier on ac- 
count of the weakness of the French main army. 

In the further course of the campaign presumably the 
two above mentioned Landwehr divisions can be spared 
and be put at the disposal of the army, or they can be used 
for guarding the line of communications. 



Concerning the presumable strength of the French army, General 
von Moltke made the following notes, which bear no date, but may be 
assumed to have been made during the winter of 1869-1870. 

NO. 19 



If the entire cadres of the French army are filled to 
their war strength there would be — 

370 battalions 259,000 men 

62 cavalry regiments 31,000 men 

164 batteries 25,000 men 

Engineers 8,000 men 

Combatants proper 323,000 men. 

—184— 



Preparations for War 

This total does not include 12,000 men of artillery trains 
and baggage trains nor 65,000 reserves required at the de- 
pots which in time of peace are guarded by cadres only. 
These numbers are offset by our own train and recruit bat- 
talions. 

If we deduct only 10,000 troops of the line for Algiers, 
and 15,000 only for Paris, Lyons, Strassburg and Metz — 
the National Guards taking over the service of all other 
places — it will leave an army of operations of hardly 300,000 
men. 

There is no reason to suppose that the mobilization of 
the French army will be completed any sooner than that of 
the Prussian. On the other hand, the more complete French 
railroad net will enable France to have the largest part of 
all their available fighting forces at the initial concentra- 
tion points near our frontier at a time when we reach the 
Rhine with but a part of our fighting force. 

If the French desire to fully utilize their railroads, 
they will have to detrain one part of their fighting force 
east, the other (main) part west of the Vosges mountains. 

If the Army Detachment concentrated in the Rhine 
valley is to gain a political or military objective, it must be 
at least 50,000 strong. This will leave 250,000 men at most 
opposite the line Luxemburg — Weissenburg. 

We are justified in assuming that these concentrations 
can be completed after the course of three weeks. 



For the information of the Chiefs of Sections of the Great Gen- 
eral Staff General von Moltke composed the following memorandum in 
the spring of 1870, in \vhich he explained his views as to the execution 
of the advance of the army against the Mosel line. Note than in the 
attached march table cognizance is taken of only the North German 
fighting forces. 

NO. 20 



Berlin, 6 May, 1870. 

The operation against France will consist simply in our 
advancing, closed up as much as possible, a few marches into 

—185— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

French territory until we meet the French army, then to 
give battle. 

The general direction of this advance is Paris, because 
in that direction we are most certain to find our objective 
— the hostile army. 

On the direct road from the Palatinate to Paris is 
Metz. This place will be turned by the left and will be 
observed only. 

The next strategic advance, if a battle does not ensue 
sooner, is the line of the Mosel, Luneville — Pont-a-Mousson. 

In this advance, the Second Army will be in the first 
line, the Fourth in the second, and the flanks will be cov- 
ered by the First and Third Armies. Our initiative will lay 
down the law to the opponent. 

On the line Luneville — Pont-a-Mousson, we have two 
railroads in our rear; there, if not sooner, a decisive battle 
must ensue and beyond this we can arrange no details. 

Not counting the resistance which we may encounter 
sooner, this advance of 60 [English] miles finds its main 
difficulty in the limited area in which large masses have to 
advance. If the French advance to meet us in correspond- 
ing strength, that difficulty will be common to both sides. 
It is different if they await us assembled or advance to 
meet us deployed for battle. 

To enable us to deploy for battle we need a whole day, 
which the advance guard must secure to the army. We can 
learn where we are likely to meet the enemy only through 
the advance guard. Therefore it must be strong, and es- 
pecially so in cavalry. 

The advance guard will be formed of the 5th Infantry 
Division and one cavalry corps. For the latter there are 
76 squadrons of the 3d, 4th and 10th and the Guard Cavalry 
Divisions available under a commander to be specially se- 
lected. The 6th Division follows as support. 

Differing from seeking a decision in battle, the cavalry 
is not to be kept closed up, but it will advance in differ- 
ent directions by divisions and these latter will send out 
detachments until the main concentration point of the en- 
emy has been ascertained. The infantry division can sup- 

—186— 



Preparations for War 

port these smaller detachments, using wagons, but on the 
whole it will remain in close order so as to afford a rallying 
point in strong positions to the cavalry. 

The cavalry can advance several marches ahead of the 
infantry; its strength secures its return. 

The larger infantry detachments must avoid each and 
every movement to the rear. It is advisable to make all as- 
semblies toivards the front. The 5th Division is protected 
by the cavalry from the danger of encountering a concen- 
trated hostile force; in connection with that division, it 
can hold out against a hostile corps for 24 hours. It must 
precede the army by a whole march. 

It is true that the Second Army will be concentrated on 
the 19th day at the frontier (Bildstock — St. Ingbert), but 
it will have no train as yet. In addition the Fourth Army 
will have to be drawn up. The first echelons arriving of 
the latter can be started successively in the direction of 
Zweibriicken, but the last will require four days to close 
up, and the complete concentration behind the Second Army 
may take until the 24th day. 

It does not appear advisable to cross the frontier sooner 
than we are ready to accept battle. 

Under existing conditions it will be necessary for Royal 
Headquarters to regulate the marches of all corps and di- 
visions. 

It will be possible to make the march as far as the 
Mosel with the Second and Fourth Army in three main 
columns and in two echelons on a breadth and depth of 
one march, so that the assembly of 150,000 men towards 
the center and even towards a wing of the first line can be 
made in one march. 

All corps will be immediately followed by their trains ; 
the latter will halt (parking alongside the roads) only 
when the advance guard reports the proximity of the enemy. 

The length of a march should be 10 [English] miles; 
the start to be made early every morning. 

The IVth and Xth Corps will have independent advance 
guards. 

—187— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

As the cavalry divisions of the Second Army are in 
front, the marching depth of the infantry divisions of that 
army will be six hours. Therefore the Fourth Army will 
come in contact at noon with the trains of the Second Army, 
which should not prevent it going into bivouac, even if, 
when necessary, the march is to be continued in the after- 
noon. 

According to the political situation it is not probable 
that the First Army will encounter resistance in its ad- 
vance to join the right wing of the Second Army. 

On the other hand, it is very possible that the Third 
Army will have to be reinforced by the Fourth Army at the 
start. If this is done in a large measure, the residue of the 
Fourth Army will follow the advance of the First and Sec- 
ond Army. 

Should the French have concentrated their main force 
opposite our front, the Third Army will join the general 
advance against the Mosel, but sight must not be lost of 
the possibility that we may have to front towards the south. 

Concerning the concentration of all or at least the larger 
part of our fighting forces, that matter will be governed 
each day by general orders. 



— ]i 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 




















•an 


31UO0 o:; 


saiuuB jamo aq^ 


! 




MOIIB o^ 'XnuE 


J^M* 


joj Xbp 


q.S3J 'JO 


'ubssnoH-B-:juod; 




puE AouB^j — aiiiAaunq; saqoEaj Auiay 


puooag 


aqx 1 












■d 














ca 
















01 
01 


.S 
"3 




"o t^ 








■^p 


p 








2 

C4H 


E 


g 


X 

c 
o 

CI 


t/3 
3 

01 
C3 


p 

0) 


•5g 


II 

X-i- 


01 

tic 
e 


0) 
X 

C8 

03 


II 


C 

'-4J 






1 


O 


o 


o 
2 


X 


O 


o 


5g 


O 3 


tS 


tn 


sl 


E 




■o 




























-M 


a; 




























(U 


g 




























C 

a 
a ■ 
o 
o 

s 

5 


01 

C 
o 

c 


p 


2 
> 


0) 
M 
C 


•f -S 


a 

X 


P 

.2 
'p 

g 

C3' 


£ 

X 


CM 

C 
T3 
P 
01 


p 

_p 

3 


_p 

"S 
"o! 








C4 


"3 




O 


O 3 


o 


ffj 


"o 


3 


^^ 


3 








a 


fe 


w 


S 


«w_ 


fo 


m 


03 


oa 


O 


t-3 








bi 






X 




P 














•<* 




HI 

g 


2 
> 




o 

01 

0; 


p 

_o 

'p 

t 

cs 


p 
(« 

X 

o 


X 

1 

X 


3 


'5 














ri 


-4-S 





••= ca 




o 


C9 


S 














fol W 


fc 


pl K 


w 


02 


w 


— 


^- 
















•c 














h 




« 




2 
"o 


2 


X 




3 
g 


o 


If 

3 


a 

5 






o> 


_0) 

"3 

1 




N 




<D 


<; 


J 


c 


CS 


t 

X 


X 
g 


X 

"5 

^p 






01 

bj; 


X 








^j 


-M 


o 


4^ 


ci: 


o 


o 






p 


3 








m 


m 


&< 


CO 


Vj 


p: 


K 


N 0- 


1 




03 


- 






^ 


ji 


















1 








o 


















be 


o 


hA 




N 




3 


t^ 














_b£ 


3 


X 


3 
X 




e^ 






















X 

ea 


X 








W 01 


Bi C 
















OJ 

03 


^ 












^ 




t. 






















^ 


,;<: 


u 


he 


01 


"o 




X 


U-i 




1 


t 








c; 


o 




h 


3 




3 


^ 




p 


p 








o 


o 


'2 

3 


3 


bl 


h 






0> 




0) 


OJ 




N 








X 




£ 






N 














2 
K 




E 

o 


W 


'5 


01 
3 


p 

CIS 


X 

O 




■h 


.2 bo 

0) Sh 
^1 






< 




1 
















tt 




























P 




























































e 






















3 


























<!H 


OJ 

p >H 










i 














H^ 










> 


> 




























£ 


(5 


























p. 


X 


5 




P. 

o 


p 

o 
O 


■ B 

o 
O 


p 

o 
O 


a 
o 
O 


p. 

u 
o 
O 

>. 
g 

< 


tr, 

& 
O 

O 


a 
o 
O 






w 




c 


>> 

g 


0. 

o 

o 


>> 

S 


>> 


>. 


g 


g 

< 


g 


>> 

g 




o 








"S 


X. 


^ 


X 


X 


g 


X 


^ 

< 


< 
X 






> 


cs 




X 










X 












Co 


6 


> 


>< 


X 


X 


> 


> 


> 


>< 






Xuiav 


lUOO 


as 1 


XuuY 


Aun\ 


XllLI^- 




















q^r 


>Od 


^ 


SJl,^ 


P 


nqj. 





—189. 



CHAPTER II 



Operations from July 1 8 to September 2; 1870 

Translations as follows: 

Nos. 21 to 93, by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, Field Artillery. 
Nos. 94 to 248, by Mr. Harry Bell. 



No. 21 

Autograph pencil note by General von Moltke on a report of Ma- 
jor Count von Waldersee* dated July 12, 1870. 

Not dated {apparently ivritten between July 13-15, 1870). 

The transports appear to be intended for the transportation of 
troops coming from Algiers, and possibly from Civita Vecchia. The 
armoured vessels mentioned cannot have a landing in view, but are 
more likely to bombard our sea ports. 

It is not therefore necessary to call out the Landwehr for coast 
defense, but instead to arm the coast batteries. 

Kiel only is now well fortified. 



No. 22 

To Colonel v. WiTZENDORFF.f 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin, July 16, 1870. 

With reference to the telegram, regarding a possible destruction 
of railroads, which Your Honor should have received this night, I wish 
to state that it is still the intention to concentrate the army on the 
French frontier in order to take the offensive, and we therefore need 
the railroads ourselves. 

It is only if the French advance without mobilizing that they 
can get a start on us. It is asserted that this is their intention, in 
which case the destruction ordered must not be delayed. 

In case of such a strategical surprise the main thing is to delay 
the advance of the enemy from the border towards the Rhine, until 
we have sufficient forces concentrated to advance ourselves. Here- 



*Major Count von Waldersee, Aide-de-camp to his Majesty the 
King of Prussia and attached to the Prussian embassy in Paris had 
reported activity in French naval ports. 

tChief of Staff, Vlllth Corps. 

—190— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

after no destruction will be undertaken, which cannot be promptly re- 
stored; but we should proceed to a series of repeated small interrup- 
tions only if superior hostile forces force us to evacuate Sarrebruck. 
This at first will be on the line Sarrebruck — Neunkirchen, and also if 
possible in rear of Sarreguemines. 

The commanding General of the Xth Army Corps, General of In- 
fantry V. Voigts-Rhetz, had asked from the war ministry for authority 
to take preparatory measures for the employment of the Landstrum 
on the threatened coasts of his districts. The Minister of War for- 
warded this request to General von Moltke for remarks, stating that 
as far as he was concerned he was opposed to such a step. General 
V. Moltke answered this communication as follows: 



No. 23 

To THE War Department. 

Berlin, July 18, 1870. 

I have the honor to reply that as far as I am concerned the atten- 
tion of General Voigts-Rhetz should be invited to the prospective nom- 
ination of Governor-General, who vdll attend to all necessary matters. 

If it becomes indispensable to protect the coasts before the or- 
ganization of important forces, which are to be provided for this 
purpose, the General commanding must use nearest available forces, 
even if they are not yet mobilized. 

I no longer consider the calling out of the Landstrum as advisa- 
ble. It would be of no advantage and would only give pretext for agi- 
tations. 



The War Department had asked the following questions of the 
Chief of the General Staff: "Must the Austrian front be regarded as 
threatened; or may a part of the garrison troops which were assigned 
to this front according to the plan of occupation be withdrawn for ser- 
vice on the L of C ? Can the 23d Infantry be used for the field army ? " 
General von Moltke answered: 



No. 24 

To THE War Department. 

Berlin, July 18, 1870. 

The Austrian front is up to the present time not threatened. My 
honest opinion is to avoid in the frontier provinces all measures likely 
to lead to demonstrations. 

For this reason it is also intended to echelon the Vlth Army Corps 
now in lower Silesia along the railway lines. 

The part employment of garrison troops elsewhere, and the as- 
signment of the 23d Infantry to the field army are for this reason 
considered for the present inadvisable. 



—191— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 25 

Note by General von Moltke. 

Berlin; July 18, 1870. 

The Wurtemberg troops will have completed their mobilization 
by the 26th of this month. They march off successively behind the 
Baden troops, to Vi^hose help they vvrill send two cavalry regiments 
to Rastatt. They request a Prussian General as division commander; 
a Prussian General-Staff officer; General von Prittwitz as Governeur 
for Ulm; and for a consolidation with a Prussian Division into a 
corps. 

The Bavarians by the 25th of the month have a division ready for 
the field at Landau, although not completely mobilized; not until the 
22d, mobilization day (7 August) will their two corps be complete 
on the Haardt. 

The trains will not be complete until 27th day. (12 August.) They 
ask for direct orders from his Majesty; these previously have been 
sent through Major von Fryberg to the Bavarian Minister of War, v. 
Pranckh; but hereafter they will be sent direct to the Commanders 
of the two corps, (v der Tann and von Hartmann.) 



No. 26 

To Lt. General von Frankenberg.* 
Cologne. 

Berlin, July 18, 1870. 

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, that it has come to 
my knowledge, that a few commanders have taken the question of 
the destruction of various railroad lines, in a manner absolutely con- 
trary to existing conditions. 

I believe it my duty to remark that the continued use of the 
railroads is absolutely necessary for the safe and quick concentration 
of the army. Unjustified destruction of particular tracks is for this 
reason inadvisable and dangerous. 

Should an invasion by important hostile forces make a partial 
destruction necessary, it should consist only in the removal of rails, 
etc. Generally speaking, it must be possible to easily repair the 
railroads in order to assist the offensive which Prussia has in view. 

No commander of troops or commandant of a fort is authorized 
to destroy bridges or other works without directions from superior 
authority. Only if the enemy approaches a fortified place with con- 
siderable forces within a day's march, is the commander authorized 
within the limits of his command, to proceed with destructions abso- 
lutely necessary for the defense. 



* Commandant of Cologne. 



-192— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

No. 27 

To Major von Grolman.* 
Munich. 

Berlin, July 18, 1870. 

In reply to your Honor's telegram of today, I beg you to advise 
Major General Freiherr von Pranckh, as follows: 

I. It is assumed that the holding of Landau and Germersheim as 
also of the bridge of Maxau will be done at first by Royal Bavarian 
troops. The protection of the Palatinate, as well as all German ter- 
ritory is the common task of the German armies, whose early arri- 
val is hoped for. But so far as it can be estimated at present, the 
detail of troops from Bavaria most directly interested will unfortun- 
ately not arrive until after Prussian troops coming from the province 
Posen. 

II. The two Bavarian army corps will be put under direct orders 
of his Royal Highness, the Crown Prince of Prussia. 

III. Xo order as to whether our infantry will leave in helmets or 
in caps has yet been issued. The first headgear mentioned is more 
probable, however, according to my opinion the Royal Bavarian infan- 
try are not in any way bound to a like procedure. 

rV. According to the intentions of his Majesty, the King, which 
are known to me, nobody should be sent to G.H.Q. whose presence is 
not necessary for official reasons. 

It would be therefore ad\nsable to attach Major General Count 
Bothmer to the Army Headquarters of his Royal Highness, the Crown 
Prince of Prussia. 



No. 28 

To Lt. Colonel von LESzczYNSKi.f 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin, July 18, 1870, evening. 

A number of ships of small draught equipped with one gun have 
been sent from Toulon to Strassburg. They might be intended to 
damage or destroy the permanent crossings over the Rhine. 

Your Honor has already designated a place in the river not far 
from Rastatt, where a dam could be erected, covered by artillery fire. 
If this has not already been done, it is now time to do it. 

I have issued orders that a Xavy officer leave tomorrow morning 
for Rastatt, to assist in this work; from there he will go to Ger- 
mersheim for the same purpose. t Please advise the commander of 
Rastatt. 

I have just received a report from Speyer via Munich, that not a 
single Frenchman can be seen on the frontier. It, however, states: 
"Bridge by Maxau about to be destroyed." I presume that this is 
an error, as a Baden battalion is stationed beyond the bridge near 



^Prussian military attache in Munich and attached to the General 
Staff of the army. 

tChief of Staff of the Baden Division. 

tThe Royal Bavarian War Department, and the Commandant at 
Germersheim were notified accordingly. 



—193 



Moltke's Correspondence 



Hagenbach, and it would never be advisable to intercept so important 
a communication. 

The Emperor will leave Paris in a few days. 20,000 men from 
Algiers are expected on Friday at Toulon. Count Waldersee* is of 
the opinion that decisive operations are hardly to be expected before 
the 24th. 

On July 18, 1870 General von Moltke received the following Cjabi- 
net orders: 

Berlin, July 18, 1870. 

I send you enclosed a copy of my order, which was forwarded to- 
day to the Minister of War, directing that effective the 5th day of 
mobilization, my orders as to the movements and operations of the 
Army of the Confederation of the North and its separate detachments 
shall be transmitted to the proper commanders through the Chief of 
the General Staff of the Army. You will at all times keep the Min- 
ister of War informed as to all measures taken by you. 

(Signed) Wilhelm. 



No. 29 



To Colonel von Witzendorff, 

COBLENZ. 



Berlin, July 19, 1870. 



According to a report from Count Waldersee no severe hostilities 
are to be expected from the French before the 24th of this month. 
To complete the time and march tables of the Vlllth Army Corps, 
which have already been sent to your General Staff I remark, you 
are advised that the Vllth Army Corps will be transported by rail 
between the 9th to the 11th mobilization day to Call, Stolberg, Aachen, 
thence by marching towards the territory of Trier, where the heads 
of columns should arrive on the 16th, and the tails of columns on the 
18th mobilization day. The marches marked in pencil on the time 
and march tables of the two army corps, have been arranged to agree 
with one another. 

The Illd and then the Xth Army Corps will be brought up by the 
line Coin, Coblenz, Bingen, Neunkirchen and will detrain at the latter 
place. 



On the 10th mobilization day 
On the 11th mobilization day 
On the 12th mobilization day 
On the 13th mobilization day 
On the 14th mobilization day 
On the 15th mobilization day 
On the 16th mobilization day 



with 8 Battalions Squadrons Batteries 

with 11 Battalions 4 

with 2 Battalions 9i 4 

with 2 Battalions 51 4 

with 2 Battalions 151 

with 6 Battalions 8 3 

with 9 Battalions 2J 4 



*See Document No. 21. 



—194— 



i 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 30 

Berlin, July 19, 1870. 

If the French intend to await the arrival of their reserves, before 
they start operations, they virould not have declared war today. 

It is therefore probable, that they will cross the border tomor- 
row, on our 5th mobilization day. 

As their forces are without reserves, it is possible that they will 
abandon completely any idea of inyasion of South Germany (they are 
now advised as to the sentiment of these states) and will invade the 
Palatinate on the front Saarbruecken — Bitsch. 

They can reach a position near Marnheim on the 10th mobiliza- 
tion day, and attack on the 11th mobilization day. 

On that date we can concentrate only about half of the Illd, IVth 
and Xlth Corps and the 25th Division, say about 60,000 men with in- 
sufficient artillery. 

For this reason we cannot for the present take Marnheim as 
assembly point for the army; it is more probable that the French if 
they advance in a determined manner, will arrive before Maince on 
the 12th day. 

There would be there assembled on the following day: 

The Hid, IVth and IXth Army Corps— 100,000 men. 

On the same date at Germersheim, Xlth Army Corps, the Baden 
Division, and a part of the Wurtemberg Division — 50,000 men. If the 
French do not debouch from Strassburg on the right bank of the 
Rhine the Xlth corps would be directed towards Maince. 

On the 17th mobilization day with 9 Battalions li Squadrons 5 Batteries 
On the 18th mobilization daywith _ Battalions 4^ 5 

On the 19th mobilization daywith 1 Battalion __ 3 

On the 20th mobilization daywith 3 Battalions 
On the 21st mobilization daywith 1 Battalion __ 2 

Should the border be crossed earlier by considerable French forces 
during the concentration, the detraining will be effected at a point 
situated farther to the rear. 

Your Honor will readily see from the above mentioned facts, how 
it is of extreme importance, that the command of the detachment of 
Saarbruecken be entrusted only to a cool and intelligent officer. 

I will further state that two fortress Pioneer companies of the 
Hid Army Corps should arrive in the forenoon of the 9th mobilization 
day at Neunkirchen, and two of the IVth Army Corps at Homburg. 
These organizations are to assist in detraining operations and are 
placed at the disposition of Captains Mantey and von Huene of the 
General Staff who have been sent to the places mentioned. The de- 
tachment at Saarbruecken will keep in liaison with the above named 
officers, and will protect their operations by cavalry patrol.* 



*At the same time information was sent to Colonel von Hertz- 
berg, Chief of Staff of the Vllth Corps, that the Vlllth Corps would 
assemble by marching in the vicinity of Saarlouis, and that its last 
elements should arrive there on the 19th mobilization day. 



-1»9— 



Moltke's Correspondence 
No. 31 

If we receive intelligence within the next few days, that the 
French troops are marching off from their peace stations waiting only 
for their men on furlough, but not for their reserves, it will indicate 
an intention on their part of surprising us strategically. 

The interference which would then result in mobilizing a part 
of the 16th Division cannot be a goal which could justify such a 
measure. The garrisons at Trier, and Saarbruecken would have to 
withdraw their depots toward Coblenz; the District H. Q. Staffs would 
have to evacuate their depots and call out the men of the Landwehr. 
Such a hostile measure will have no influence over the mobilization of 
our army and over the transport of the corps to the Rhine, but it will 
influence its strategical deployment. 

We could just as little prevent an incipient invasion of the terri- 
tory on the left bank of the Rhine, as the French can prevent the 
garrison of Saarlouis marching against Metz on the first mobilization 
day. 

In the very start we will have an army of weak, but numerous 
battalions, filled very completely with officer and non-commissioned 
officers, fully equipped with cavalry and artillery and with a strength 
of presumably 130,000 to 150,000 combatants. 

If our mobilization takes place immediately, the 8th day would be 
considered as the one on which this army by using all railroads can 
be brought to the frontier; from there on, 7 to 8 marches will be needed 
to reach the Rhine. 

If the French are in a position in the course of these 8 days to 
clothe, arm and transport their reserves, which are without doubt or- 
dered out at the same time as order for the departure of the active 
toops, their first deployment might take place near the left bank of 
the Rhine instead of on the line Metz — Strassburg. 

All this shows how important the occupation of Landau would be 
for us in the presumed case and the carrying out of numerous inter- 
ruption on the Nahe Railroad as well as on the Ludwigsbahn. This 
brings up the question of the need of utilizing the last days before 
arrival of the French reinforcements, to deliver the first battle. 

We need for that five army corps, which must be available on 
the 16th mobilization day at the latest. 



No. 32 

Start of operations on July 25 

Only a part of the troops at Belfort and Colmar can be brought 
to Strassburg. 

1st Corps, and Douay's Division about 35,000 men. 

25th Drusenheim. 

26th Rhine crossing. 

27th Oos. ' 

28th Fight with Baden troops. 

29th Ettlingen. 

In Germersheim will be the Xlth Corps 30,000 men 

On the 27th ready for action, 

28th Karlsruhe. 

—196— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

29th Ettlingen, to cover the debouch- 
ment of the Baden troops 

from the mountains 15,000 men. 

Wurtemberg troops coming from Dur- 

lach 20,000 men. 



65,000 men. 

French XI Corps V Corps Baden and Wur- 

temherg troops 

25. Hagenau, Birschweiler. 

26. Sulz, Selz. Landau Maxau. (Blow up 

27. Winden, Maxau. bridge.) 

28. Landau, Germersheim. 

If the 5th Corps (Failly) be brought up from Bitsch. 

25. Bitsch. 

26. Pirmasens. 

27. Annweiler. 

28. Landau. 

85,000 Germans against 55,000 French. 
Everything will be surer if the operations do not commence un- 
til the 26th. 



No. 33 

On the 13th mobilization day, July 28: 

Hid Corps: between Bingen and Mainz. 

Advance Guard: Kreuznach. 
IVth Corps: 

Advance Guard: Duerkheim. 
IXth Corps, 18th Division: Maince. 

25th Division: Worms. 
Xlth Corps: Near Landau. 

On the 14th mobilization day, July 29th, there can be concentrated 
near Alzey: 

Hid and IVth Corps 65,000 men. 

Near Neustadt or Duerkheim: 

IVth and Xlth Corps 60,000 men. 

Or if necessary: 

Behind Maince: the Hid Corps and the 18th 

Division 50,000 men. 

Near Germersheim: 25th Division 15,000 men. 

Near Worms: IVth Corps 30,000 men. 

Near Mannheim: Xlth Corps 30,000 men. 

Near Rastatt, Speyer; Baden and Wurtem- 
berg troops 30,000 men. 

On the 18th mobilization day, August 2, possibly: 
Second Army and Reserve: 

Hid Corps: Kreuznach. 

IXth Corps: Alzey. 
Xth and Xllth Corps: Mainz. 
Guard Corps: Mainz.. 

IVth Corps: Gruenstadt. , 

—197— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



In all beyond Mainz 180,000 men. 

Vth and Xlth Corps: Landau, Germersheim 60,000 men, 

Baden and Wurtemberg troops at Mazau .• 30,000 men. 

Total 270,000 men. 

Vlllth Corps on the Nahe 30,000 men. 

Vllth Corps approaching Total 300,000 men. 



No. 34 

Without counting Bavarians. 
Vllth Corps en route. 
Eleven North German and one South German 

army corps, consisting of 380,000 men. 

In complete readiness for action, will be on the farther side of 
the Rhine in 21 days (July 16 to August 5). 

We can meet a hostile attack with sufficient forces: 
(a) On the upper Rhine after July 29: 

(1) On the right bank, 

Xlth Corps, Baden and Wurtemberg 

troops 55,000 Infantry. 

against 45,000 Infantry, 

(2) On the left bank, 

Xlth and Vth Corps, and a part of the 

Baden and Wurtemberg troops 62,000 Infantry, 

(b) In the Palatinate beyond Mainz after August 1: 
Hid, IVth, Xlth, Guard, IXth and 

Xllth Corps 140,000 Infantry, 

And if the Vlllth and Vth Corps 

join 200,000 Infantry, 

against 136,000 Infantry, 

(c) On the Mosel, towards Wittlich on August 1: 

Vllth Corps 26,000 Infantry. 

And eventualy the Vlllth Corps 50,000 Infantry, 

Consequently, if the French advance by Saarbruecken and on the 
left bank of the upper Rhine, the Vlllth army corps must be directed 
from Kirchbach where it can arrive on August 2 to Kreuznach, in or- 
der to obtain a desirable numerical superiority. If on the contrary 
the French advance on the right bank of the river, the Vllth and 
Vlllth Corps could continue their march toward Saarlouis, etc. 

All the above mentioned corps will be provided by the evening of 
August 3, with the first echelon of their trains, and will conse- 
quently be ready to commence operations. 

The corps, which were so equipped prior to this date, can for 
this reason continue their march forward as a first line. 



No. 35 

The French may commence their offensive on July 25: 

In the Palatinate. 
It seems, that the 3d Corps, Bazainfe — 26,000 Infantry, is already 
brought up toward Bolchen in line with the 2d Corps, Frossard — 
19,500 Infantry. 

—198— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The 4th Corps, Ladmirault, can then only march either against 
Trier, or in second line towards the Palatinate. 





First line__. 






65,000 Infantry. 




3d Corps 2d Corps 


5 th Corps 


25. 


South of Saarlouis Saarbrucken 


Saargemund 


26. 


Sulzbach Blieskastel 


Zweibruecken 


27. 


St. Wendel Landstuhl 


Primasens 


28. 


Kusel Kaiserslautern 


Heltersberg 


29. 


Wolfstein Winnweiler 


Frankenstein 


30. 


West of Doners- East of Donersburg 
burg 


Gruenstadt 



Six inarches without rest days; also the arrival of the second 
line must be awaited. 

6th Corps, Canrohierls, 19,500 

Guard Corps, Bourbaki, 13,000 

— 32,500 Infantry. 



Total 97,500 Infantry. 

(Ladmirault 20,000 men, will be contained by the Vllth Army 
Corps.) The attack on a position in the vicinity of Ailzey or Marn- 
heim can for this reason not take place before August 1. 

By that time we can dispose of the Second 

Army 130,000 men. 

two reserve corps 60,000 men. 



190,000 men. 

And if the French advance march takes place on the right river 
bank, the Vth army corps can also be brought up in three 
marches 30,000 men. 



220,000 men. 
Deduct s for Cavalry and Artillery 44,000 men. 



176,000 Infantry. 

The French start operations on July 25. 

Only with great difficulty can the division of Douay at Comar 
and Belfort be brought up to Strassburg to reenforce the 1st Corps, 
McMahon, and thereby bring it up to 36,000 Infantry. 

25 July, Drusenheim. 

26 July, Rhine crossing. 

27 July, Cos. 

28 July, Fight with Badea troops. 

Our Xlth Corps will be at Germersheim ready for action after 
the 27th 30,000 men. 

27. a Germersheim. 

28. Karlsruhe. 



-199- 



i 



Moltke's Correspondence 



29. At Ettlingen, with Wurtemberg troops 20,000 men to secure 
the debouchment of the Baden troops from the mountains 

15,000 meB. 



65,000 men. 



Deduct for Cavalry and Artillery about 13,000 men. 

52,000 men Infantry. 
Or on the left bank of the Rhine. 

French 

25 July: Hagenau, Bischweiler XI Corps V Corps Baden and 

Wurtemberg 
troops 

26 July: Sulz Selz. Maxau (blow 

up bridge) 

27 July:Winden Maxau. Landau Germers- Germers- 

heim heim 

Position behind the Klingbach 

28 July: Battle. 36,000 men against (95,000 men, deduct Cavalry 
and Artillery 20,000 men) 75,000 Infantry. 

If the 5th Corps, Failly be brought up from Saargemuend. 

25. Bitsch 

26. Pirmasens. * 

27. Annweiler. 

28. Landau. 

In this case there will be 55,000 French against 75,000 Germans; 
this case is not probable, as the army in the Palatinate is already too 
weak. 



The 5th Rhine Dragoon regiment should be advanced to the vi- 
cinity of Kaiserslautern, for the observation of the frontier between 
the detachment at Saarbruecken, and a Royal Bavarian brigade sta- 
tioned at Speyer, and also for the protection of the railroad line Lud- 
wigshafen — Homburg. For this purpose the following order was 
issued: 

No. 36 

To THE Rhone Dragoon Regiment. 
■ Mainz. 

To the 5th Rhine Dragoon regiment, Mainz.* . 

The regiment will reach Alzey on the 22d, Winnweiler and vicinity 
on the 23d, Kaiserslautern on the 24th of this month, it will observe 
the Bavarian — French frontier, connecting on the right with the 7th 
Rhine Ulan regiment (now at Saarbruecken) and on the left with 
the Royal Bavarian brigade (now at Speyer) which is under command 
of Major General Maillinger. 



*To the governor of Mainz for information and transmission; 
copy to CG Xlth Corps at Cassel; for information of the 21st Divi- 
sion at Francfort. 

—200— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

Maintain liaison to both flanks, and especially protect the railroad 
Ludwigshafen — Homburg against attempts at interruptions by weak 
hostile detachments. Captain v. Huene of the General Staff is in 
command of the above mentioned railroad line. 

Two fortress Pioneer companies from Ludwigshafen should ar- 
rive with him at Homburg on the forenoon of July 24, 

Important reports should always be telegraphed directly to me, 
and to the governor at Mainz. 

Should the regiment be pushed back by superior forces, it will 
retire on Mainz. 

Captain v. Huene is in charge of railway destructions. 

Only if the officer is not to be present, may slight destructions 
through removing of rails and switches be undertaken, and wherever 
possible this will be done under the supervision of a technical man. 

Major General Maillinger and the Commander of the 7th Rhine 
Ulan regiment has been informed of the mission of the regiment. 



No. 37 

To Lt, Colonel von Pestel. 
Saarbruecken.* 

Berlin, July 20, 1870, 8:00 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Try with a small detachment sent from Saarbruecken, to destroy 
thoroughly the railroad Saargemund — Hagenau. Ask the railroad 
administration for technical assistance. 



No. 38 

To the 1st Hanseatic Infantry Regiment No. 75. 
Bremen. 

Berlin, July 20-21, 1870, midnight. 
Telegram. 

Two companies will be sent immediately and if possible by rail 
from Brelin to Geestemuende on account of the nearness of hostile 
ships.f 



No. 39 

To THE Governor of Mainz. 

Berlin, July 21, 1870. 

Referring to your telegram of yesterday, I have the honor to 
advise the Royal government that it is urgently desirable to build 
quickly a permanent floating bridge, instead of the flying bridge at 

*Commander of the 7th Rhine Ulan regiment; at the same time 
in command of frontier guard at Saarbruecken. 

fThe corps headquarters of the IX army corps and the war min- 
istry were also notified. 

—201— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



Petersau. The material of the bridge at Worms is not available for 
this purpose, as it is in our interest to maintain this bridge intact as 
long as possible. 

In view of the important facilities, which the river navigation 
offers, it will be very easy for the Royal government to establish a 
new floating bridge, utilizing if necessary the assistance of civil engi- 
neers and mechanics. 

The point of cost is insignificant. 



No. 40 

To THE Commanding General, Third Army. 
Berlin. 

Berlin, July 21, 1870. 

I have the honor to advise the Royal Army Headquarters as to 
the positions, etc., of the troops under its command, as follows: 

The Royal Prussian Vth and Xlth Army Corps are in process of 
mobilization, and will be moved in accordance with the time and 
march tables which have been transmitted to their respective com- 
manders. 

The Vth Army Corps will be brought to Landau by rail via Leip- 
zig — Hof — Mainz and detrains there from the 12th to the 18th 
mobilization day inclusive. 

The Xlth Army Corps will reach the line Germersheim — Landau, 
partly by rail via Fulda — Aschaffenburg — 'Mainz and partly on foot, 
between the 10th and 13th mobilization days inclusive. The greater 
part of the troops of this corps will be assembled by the evening of the 
10th mobilization day. Only the 5th Rhine Dragoon regiment arrives 
at Maince today, and marches from there on the 22d of this month 
to Alzey, on the 23d to the vicinity of Winnweiler, on the 24th to 
Kaiserslautern. It will take over in the first instance the observation 
of the hostile frontier between a detachment of the Vlllth Army 
Corps, stationed at Saarbruecken, and a Royal Bavarian brigade, sta- 
tioned at Speyer under command of Major General Maillinger. 

As far as known here, the last mentioned has a battalion, at Win- 
den (railway center between Landau and Weissenburg), supported 
by a Baden Squadron and a pioneer company at Maxau. 

The position of the almost mobilized Baden Division was on the 
evening of the 18th July as follows: 

Headquarters, Karlsruhe. 

lid battalion, 2d Grenadier regiment, and one squadron 1st Dra- 
goon regiment at Hagenbach Bavarian Palatine, south of the Maxau 
bridge) : patrols on the Lauterbach. 

One squadron at Winden (see above), patrols at Weissenburg. 

One company at Maxau. 

3d Dragoon Regiment observes the Rhine from Maxau to Stein- 
mauern (mouth of the Murg). 

2d Dragoon Regiment observes the Rhine from Steinmauem to 
Lichtenau. 

Besides the 34th Pomerenian Fusilier regiment and a Prussian 
Mining company, the 2d and 3d Baden Infantry brigades (12 bat- 
talions) including fortress artillery and pioneers, are at Rastatt. 

Kehl is occupied with 1« companies of the 3d regiment, 40 artil- 
lerymen, a few pioneers and. 20 horses. 

—202— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

Troops not mentioned are stationed in northern garrisons. 

At Heidelberg is a reserve hospital of 300 beds. 

Arrangements, to block the passage of the Rhine by Steinmau- 
ern have been made; 19 large boats and 70 launches are ready to be 
sunk. 

The Wuertemberg Division is completely mobilized and is ready 
to be transported on the evening of the 26th of this month. Their 
destination is Karlsruhe. Ten squadrons are ready to move today 
and are temporarily at the disposition of the Baden Division. 

As to the Royal Bavarian Army Corps, the following mentioned 
troops are ready for action at Germersheim and Speyer: 

On the 1st of August, the 2d, 3d and 4th Division. 

On the 2d of August, the 1st Division. 

On the 3d of August, the reserve cavalry of both corps. 

On the 7th of August, the reserve artillery of the lid Corps. 

The Bavarian Army Corps will not be equipped with all their 
trains until the evening of August 8th. 



No. 41 

To THE Commanding General, the Royal Wurtemberg Divi- 
sion. 
Stuttgart. 

Berlin, July 21, 1870, 11:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Place temporarily at the disposition of the Baden Division all 
the cavalry which is ready to march, and place these in movement at 
once, and if possible by rail.* 

Lt. General v. Beyer, Commanding the Baden Division, inquired 
by telegraph if he could leave Mannheim unoccupied. According to 
his report French troops had been seen near Stollhofen. The enemy 
was examining the course of the river. General von Moltke answered : 

No. 42 

To Lt. General von Beyer. 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin, July 21, 1870, 9:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

As Hagenbach, Landau and Speyer are occupied, there is no ob- 
jection of withdrawing the battalions at Mannheim. The consolida- 
tion of the Baden Division around Rastatt is desirable. 



On the necessity of detraining the Second Army in rear of the 
Rhine, General von Moltke expressed himself as follows: 



*The Baden Division was informed by telegraph of this order. 



—203— 



i 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 43 

Report for His Majesty the King. 

Berlin, July 22, 1870. 

The French had not crossed the frontier up to yesterday; but they 
may do so at any moment. 

If today, our 7th mobilization day, they take the offensive, with 
142,000 men, which they have assembled, they may on the 13th mobili- 
zation day by a resolute advance reach the vicinity of Kirchheimbol- 
anden. 

At most the French may reach on our 15th mobilization day the 
Rhine, where they will meet: 

the Hid, IVth and IVth Corps__100,000 men near Mainz 

the Xlth Corps, the Baden Divi- 
sion and a part of the Wurtemberg 
Division, about 50,000 men near Worms 

the Vlllth Corps 20,000 men near Kreuznach 

Total 170,000 men 

so that the hostile movement even in the most favorable case for them 
will come to a standstill. 

After the 17th mobilization day we will be reenforced by: The 
Guard and Xth Corps near Mainz and the Vth and Xllth Corps near 
Worms. 

August 1. On this day we may debouch with: 

near Kreuznach - 30,000 men 

from Mainz 130,000 men 

from Worms 90,000 men 

Total, less Bavarians 250,000 men 

The Vllth Corps remains available for use against the enemy's 
communications. 

It is possible that the French may delay their invasion. 52,000 
men are being concentrated behind the Corps already completely mo- 
bilized; 70,000 reserves will join the depots on July 23, and the troops 
on the 28th. It is however neither certain, nor probable, that the 
French will wait this long. 

We can meet the French even if they do not commence their 
march before the 9th mobilization day (July 24) by Kirchheimbolan- 
den or in advance thereof only with the Illd and IVth Corps; 60,000 
men. We would have to fight a retreating action. 

I have the honor to propose now as a conclusion, "that the Second 
Army detrains on the Rhine." 

This will not preclude sending two Divisions after the 12th mo- 
bilization as advance guard beyond Mainz, and according to circum- 
stances of moving the Second Army forward by marching. 

No changes are necessary in railroad and march tables for the 
present. 



—204— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

No. 44 

To THE Administration of the Hessian Ludwigs Railroad. 
Mainz. 

Berlin, July 22, 1870, 9:00 AM. 
Telegram. 

It is important from a military point of view to go ahead with 
the construction of the railway line Armsheim — Alzey. It is for 
this reason desirable that you continue this work vigorously. If nec- 
essary the viaduct may temporarily be provided with a wooden struc- 
ture instead of a stone arch, about which I must be informed. Please 
answer. 



No. 45 
To THE C. G. 1st Army Corps. 

KOENIGSBERG i. Pr. 

Berlin, July 22, 1870. 

'■■'■ I most respectfully request the Royal Corps H. Q. while continu- 
ing the transportation arrangements already provided for, to arrange 
for extending in the general direction of Dresden, the movements of 
fractions of the Army Corps which are to detrain at Hansdorf and 
Goerlitz. The troops which are to detrain at Dresden will similarly 
continue their movement as far as Riesa. 

The Army Corps will thereby be in position to continue its move- 
ment by rail as soon as the lines which lead west are free. 

The necessary orders will be sent at the proper time and it is 
desirable that I be advised as soon as possible as to the march tables 
of the units of the Army Corps from Hansdorf, Goerlitz and Dresden. 
A copy of these orders above mentioned, has been sent confidentially to 
the Royal Saxonian War Minister. The commander of the army corps 
should enter into communication with the above mentioned authority 
concerning the billeting of troops which will pass through Saxon ter- 
ritory.* 



No. 46 

To THE Headquarters of the VIth Army Corps. 
Breslau. 

Berlin, July 22, 1870. 

I enclose herewith for the Royal Corps Headquarters, two copies 
of the instruction tablesf for the garrison troops of the VIth Army 
Corps for transmission. At the same time I desire respectfully to re- 
quest that you issue orders that the 11th Infantry Division be con- 
centrated by marching and be billeted widely east of and near Goer- 
litz; the 12th Infantry Division, the Corps Artillery and the trains be 
concentrated in the same manner near Breslau. The cavalry regi- 
ments will until further orders march with the Divisions to which 
they belong according to peace formation. 



*See No. 53 for modifications of this order. 
fNot found. 

—205— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The staff of the 2d Cavalry Division, M^hich is to be formed at 
Breslau. will remain for the present in Breslau with the Staff of the 
Army Corps. 



No. 47 

REGULATION FOR THE DETRAINING, BILLETING AND SE- 
CURITY OF THE TROOPS DURING THE CON- 
CENTRATION OF THE ARMY 

Berlin, July 22, 1870, evening. 

The decision of His Majesty the King, that the concentration of 
the army will take place in the first instance on the Rhine, seem to 
require the following special instructions: 

I. By line A (Hid Army Corps, followed by the Xth Army Corps), 
Bingen is designated as the detraining railhead. The Hid Army 
Corps will send an advance guard beyond Kreuznach and will be bil- 
leted east of the line Bingen — Kreuznach. As soon as the Xth Army 
Corps arrives, the Illd Army Corps will move towards Mainz. - 

II. On line C (the IVth army corps, followed by the Guard 
Corps) Mannheim is designated as the detraining railhead. The IVth 
Army Corps will sent an advance guard beyond Dirkheim, which will 
Iceep in liaison with the advance guard of the Illd Army Corps by 
means of the 5th Dragoon regiment stationed at Kaiserslautern. The 
main body of the IVth Army Corps will be billeted around Mann- 
heim. The Army Corps will then be ready to march off, either on 
Marnheim or on Mainz by either the right or left bank of the 
Rhine. It will be in position to support the Xlth Army Corps and 
the Bavarians by Landau — Germersheim, or else the Baden and Wur- 
temburg troops near Rastadt. As to whether the Guard Corps shall 
also detrain near Mannheim or better be near Darmstadt, this is a 
question the solution of which will depend on future circumstances. 

III. The Grand Ducal Hessian (25th) Division (belong to the 
mobilized IXth Army Corps) must not be advanced beyond Worms. 

IV. The rest of the IXth Army Corps (18th Infantry Division, 
Corps Artillery and trains), and the Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps 
which detrain at Mosbach or Castel will be billeted near Mainz. 

V. Headquarters of the Second Army is charged with regulating 
the billeting and L. of C, of the two reserve corps, the IXth and 
Xllth about Mainz. 



No. 48 

To THE Headquarters of the First, Second and Third Armies. 
Berlin. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

His Majesty the King directs that all staffs and commands, pre- 
scribed by Tables of Organization, or the order of battle will im- 
mediately commence to function. They will not control directly the 
troops until after these have left the rail lines. 



—206— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 49 

To ALL Headquarters Staffs. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

His Majesty the King orders that telegraphic reports be as brief 
as clearness permits. All unnecessary words in the address, titles, 
signatures, etc., are particularly to be avoided. 

Avoid the use of cipher telegrams as much as possible; they easily 
result in misunderstandings, and if they are used too often, they 
may lead to the discovery of the cipher. In all cases the original 
cipher telegrams are to be completely destroyed after they have been 
deciphered. 



No. 50 

To THE Staff of the Second Army. 
Berlin. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

His Majesty the King directs that the Royal H. Q. be informed as 
follows : 

The intelligence which has been received concerning the mobili- 
zation and concentration of the Imperial French army, indicates that 
it is possible that within a few days important hostile forces will cross 
the frontier between Trier and the Rhine. 

Therefore His Majesty has decided, that the Hid and Xth Army 
Corps which are to be transported by the Line Cologne — Coblenz — 
Bingen will commence to detrain at the last place. They will be bil- 
leted at first in the direction of Kreuznach and Maince, under protec- 
tion of an advance guard posted the first mentioned of these two 
towns. 

In the same manner should the IVth and Guard Corps be trans- 
ported by rail only as far as Mannheim via Frankfort M.; the ad- 
vance guard of the IVth Army Corps will be posted towards Durk- 
heim. The 5th Rhine Dragoons who are at Kaiserslautern will tem- 
porarily maintain liaison between the advance guards of the Illd and 
IVth Army Corps but they should however be relieved as soon as pos- 
sible by another cavalry regiment from the Second Army. The main 
body of the IVth Army Corps will be billeted along around Mannheim. 
Furthermore His Majesty places the Second Army in charge of regu- 
lating billeting in the vicinity of Maince and of L. of C. affairs for 
the IXth and Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps. 

The Headquarters, Second Army, will be transported on the eve- 
ning of July 26th from here by rail to Mainz. 

Report if a change becomes necessary as to this billeting as- 
signment. The IXth and Xllth Army Corps have been directed to 
send a general staff officer and an intendance official as soon as possi- 
ble in advance to Mainz. 

The direct observation of the hostile frontier is now assured: 

(a) from Trier to Saarbruecken through detachments of the 
Vlllth Army Corps, now in process of concentration in the direction 
of Saarlouis. 

(b) from Saarbruecken to the Rhine through Royal Bavarian 
troops (H. Q. Speyer, Major General Maillinger). 

On the 24th of this month the 5th Rhine Dragoons will arrive at 
Kaiserslautern, as mentioned above, to assure liaison with the ob- 

' —207— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



servation detachments of the Vlllth Corps. The Royal Bavarian 
troops can thus close in towards their left. 

Finally on the right bank of the Rhine is the Grand Ducal Baden 
Division, reinforced by 10 Royal Wurtemberg squadrons now south 
of Karlsruhe and completely mobilized. The Royal Prussian Xlth 
Army Corps is in motion by rail and march towards Landau — Ger- 
mersheim. 

The enclosure herewith which is to be kept very secret and is not 
to be copied is intended to give you a general idea as to the movements 
of the army within the next few days. 

Enclosure 
General idea as to the initial movements of the entire army. 

First Army 

Vllth Corps— 13th Division; 24th-27th July, to Call by rail; 31st 
July-lst August, to Trier by road. 14th Division; 24th-26th July, to 
Aachen and Stolberg by rail; lst-2d August, to Trier by road. 

Vlllth Corps — To march generally on the right bank of the 
Moselle (the troops coming from the north crossing at Berncastel), 
and to be echeloned between Saarlouis and Hermeskeil on the 2d Au- 
gust, or to be assembled in the neighborhood of Kirchberg between the 
28th and 31st July. 

Second Army 

Illd Corps; 25th-28th July, to Bingen by rail. 

Xth Corps; 29th July-5th August, to Bingen. 

IV Corps; 26th to 29th July, to Mannheim. 

Guard Corps; 30th July-5th August, to Darmstadt or Mannheim. 

Third Army 

Xlth Corps; 25th-27th July to Germersheim and Landau. 

Vth Corps; 27th July-3d August, to Landau. 

Bavarians: — 1st Corps at Speyer; lid Corps at Germersheim; 
both to be completely mobilized by the 3d August, and ready to move 
by the 9th. 

Wurtembergers ; 27th-28th July, concentrated at Carlsruhe; 10 
squadrons moved there yesterday (22d July). 

Badeners; the Baden Division is now north of Rastatt. 

Reserves 

IXth Corps; of this Corps, the 25th Division moves to Worms on 
the 26th July, 18th Division, 28th July — 2d August, to Mainz. 
Xllth Corps; 27th July-2d August, to Mainz. 

Corps in the Eastern Districts of the Monarchy 

1st Corps; 27th July-5th August, to move westward as far as 
Berlin. 

lid Corps; 26th-31st July, to Berlin. 

Vlth Corps; to move chiefly by marching after the 25th and 26th 
July. The 11th Division at Goerlitz; 12th Division at Breslau. 



—208— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

17th Infantry Division and Landwehr Divisions 

17th Division; 26th-28th July, to Hamburg. 

Guard Landwehr Division; 28th July-3d August, to Hanover. 

2d Landwehr Division; 29th July-lst August, at Bremen. 

1st Landwehr Division To be echeloned along the railways 

until the 5th August, viz., at Schnei- 

2d Landwehr Division demuehl, Magdeburg, Stettin, Glogau, 

Posen and Tilsit. 

The garrisons of the fortresses will be on a war footing as fol- 
lows: 

Saarlouis (is now fully garrisoned as per v/ar establishment). • 
Mainz — on 28th July. 
Cologne — on 1st August. 
Coblenz — on 30th July. 

and the menaced coast-fortresses on the 29th and 30th July. 



NB. — On all transportation lines times have been calculated to 
include the first line ammunition columns and trains. 



No. 51 
To THE Headquarters of the First Army. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

In compliance with his Majesty's orders, I send the Royal H. Q. 
staff a very secret, and not to be copied, synopsis of the movements 
of the army, which are to take place in the near future. 

At the same time I also inform the H. Q. staff that it will be 
transported from here on the afternoon of July 26th by rail to 
Coblenz. 

Finally I respectfully request that you send to my office as soon 
as possible as march table showing the Headquarters of the corps 
commanders and the commander of the Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps. 



No. 52 

To the Headquarters of the Third Army. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

In compliance with his Majesty's orders, I send the Royal H. Q. 
staff a very secret and not to be copied synopsis of the movements of 
the army, which are to take place in the near future. Please note that 
the Headquarters of the Second Army has been directed to relieve as 
soon as possible the 5th Rhine Dragoon regiment at Kaiserslautern 
by another cavalry regiment. The first mentioned regiment is there- 
upon to be returned to the control of its own Division. 



-209— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The Headquarters of the Third Army will be transported on 
the afternoon of the 28th by rail to Mannheim. 

A report if it becomes necessary to change the location of the 
headquarters. 



No. 53 

To THE Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps. 

KOENIGSBERG i. Pr. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

' His Majesty the King orders that the 1st Army Corps shall be 
transported — changing our earlier order — by rail to Berlin, and shall 
be billeted in this vicinity until the rail lines toward the west are 
free. I respectfully request the Corps Headquarters, in reply to your 
telegram of the 22d of this month, to get in connection at Berlin with 
the Royal General government for the districts of the Illd and IVth 
Army Corps areas in regard to billeting the army corps. 



No. 54 

To the Headquarters of the IVth Army Corps. 
Schleswig. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

His Majesty the King directs that the IXth Army Corps report 
temporarily to the Second Army in regard to billeting areas near 
Mainz and the regulation of the lines of communication. I respect- 
fully advise you that the Grand Ducal Hessian (25th) Division has 
received orders direct from here to move on the 25th of this month 
to Gernsheim, on the 26th of this month to Worms, and to billet at 
the latter place and vicinity. I request you in consequence to get in' 
communication with the Royal Headquarters staff of the Second Army 
(up to the 26th evening here, from the 28th noon at Mainz), as to the 
above mentioned points, and to send in advance as soon as possible 
General Staff Officer, and an Intendance official to the last mentioned 
place. 



No. 55 

To THE Headquarters of the Guard, IIId, IVth, Vth, VIIth, 
VIIIth, IXth, Xth, and XIth Army Corps. 

Berlin, July 23, 1870. 

In regard to march and rail routes of supply trains, the Royal 
Corps H. Q. is requested to note the following: 

I. All auxiliary trains that can arrive by marching before August 
6 in line with the points designated as the principal depots of the army 
corps, are by August 5 to be started off as soon as they are organ- 
ized. 

II. Where this cannot be done, the auxiliary trains will be for- 
warded by rail. It should be considered that transportation will not 

—210— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

be available before August the 1st. It is even possible that rail trans- 
portation will not be available before August 4th or 5th. 

III. In consideration of the above, the Royal Corps Headquar- 
ters will please report quickly to this office, when and by which route 
the auxiliary trains will be started off, or else when and where they 
will be organized and ready for rail transportation. 

IV. All auxiliary trains must be loaded, regardless as to whether 
they proceed by marching or by rail. 



No. 56 

To THE Headquarters of the IVth Army Corps, 
Magdeburg. 

Berlin, July 2U, 1870, 10:00 AM: 
Telegram. 

The first echelons of the IVth Army Corps will be detrained at 
Mannheim and will be billeted there. Orders to this effect have been 
given to the railroads. Advise the troops. 



No. 57 

To THE Grand Ducal Hessian G. H. Q., and to the Prussian 
Pioneer Headquarters at Mannheim. 

Berlin, July 2k, 1870, 10:00 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Preserve under all circumstances the railroad bridge over the 
Rhine. Destruction absolutely inadmissible. 



Lieut. Colonel Wright, commanding the 5th Rhine Dragoons, had 
telegraphed: "Kaiserslautern, 7, 24, 1870; 10:20 A.M. Dragoon regi- 
ment arrived. If your Excellency does not answer in three hours, 
leave today for Landstuhl. Tomorrow to Homburg, possibly Blies- 
kastel. Will be in daily telegraphic connection with Saarbrueck and 
Homburg " General von Moltke answered: 

No. 58 

To Lt. Colonel Wright. 
Kaiserslautern. 

Berlin, July 2U, 1870, 1 :15 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Keep moving, but keep in liaison to your left. 



—211— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 59 

To Lt. Colonel von Pestel, 
Saarbruecken. 

Berlin, July 2U, 1870, U:00 P.M. 
Telegram. 

In our own country, structures of great importance will not be 
destroyed. If your retreat becomes necessary, carry one minor, but 
repeated interruptions on both railroads. 



No. 60 

To Lieutenant Colonel von Pestel. 
Saarbruecken. 

Berlin, July 25, 1870, 10:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

The numbers of the regiments, of prisoners, of killed and of de- 
serters are to be telegraphed immediately to this office. (14) Report 
railway destruction carried out on the 24th, also the name of the 
technical engineer who participated therein. 



No. 61 

To Vice-Admiral Jachmann. 
Wilhelmshaven. 

Berlin, July 25, 1870, 9:^5 P.M. 
Telegram. 

The embassy in London telegraphs: 

"Dover, July 25, 1870. 
The French fleet, consisting of ten iron vessels has just passed 
the straits going east." 



Lt. General von GersdorfF, commanding the 22d Division reported 
on the morning of July 25th, that he had arrived at Landau and in 
view of intelligence just received by him as to a hostile advance soon 
to be made on Pirmasens, to be intended to concentrate all Prussian 
troops already arrived northwest of Landau. 

General von Moltke answered immediately: 



No. 62 

To Lt. General von Gersdorff. 

Berlin, July 26, 1870, morning. 
Telegram,. 

Your telegram of this morning received. I approve your inten- 
tion, and invite your attention towards Annweiler. 

—212— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The Baden and Wurtemberg Divisions at Carlsruhe have been 
instructed from this office, to rally on the Third Army, if a hostile 
advance takes place only on the left bank of the Rhine. 

Until the arrival of General Werder and later of the headquar- 
ters of the Third Army, the senior general is in command. The IVth 
Army Corps near Mannheim will later be able to support you. 

Advise General Bose* and General Bothmerf as to this message. 



No. 63 

To THE Headquarters of the Grand Ducal Baden and Royal 
wurtemberg divisions. 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin, July 26, 1870, morning. 
Telegram.t 

It is improbable that 60,000 men advance on Weissenburg from 
Bitsch, Strassburg, Colmar, Belfort. 

If important forces advance towards the Lauter, without it ap- 
pearing that a crossing of the Rhine is to be effected simultaneously 
or earlier, the Baden Division with the Wurtembergers will join im- 
mediately with the Third Army by Maxau or Germersheim. 

See that the bridges at Maxan are safely guarded. 

The Xlth Corps detrains on the 25th in Germersheim; the Vth 
Corps on the 27th at Landau; the Bavarians should be on August 3d 
at Speyer and Germersheim. If the French rather advance on the 
right bank, the Baden and Wurtemberg Divisions be supported in 
time near Ettlingen. 

Acknowledge receipt by telegraph. 



Lt. Colonel von Pestel reported on July 24th, 1:45 P.M., that he 
had made the viaduct between Saargemuend and Blieskastel impassa- 
ble, and that destructions would continue. (See No. 37.) General von 
Moltke answered: 

No. 64 

To Lt. Colonel von Pestel. 
Saarbruecken. 

Berlin, July 26, 1870, 7:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

The mission assigned you from here is considered as accom- 
plished. 



* Commanding General of the Xlth Army Corps. 
fCommanding General of the Royal Bavarian 4th Division. 
JA copy of this telegram was sent to the Third Army at Berlin. 



—213— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



Lt. Colonel Wright received the following answer to an inquiry- 
concerning his future actions. 

No. 65 

To Lt. Colonel Wright. 
HOMBURG I. P. 

Berlin, July 26, 1870, 7:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Observe and keep in liaison on both flanks until you are relieved. 



On July 27, 3:12 P.M., Lt. Colonel von Leszczynski inquired from 
Carlsruhe, if he should carry out the dam across the Rhine, near Al- 
trip, south of Mannheim. 

General von Moltke answered: 

No. 66 

To Lt. Colonel von Leszczynski. 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin, July 27, 1870, 7:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

I approve the preparation for obstructing the river near Altripp. 
While reserving the right to carry out this project, the water com- 
munications between Mainz and Germersheim are important for us. 
See that the obstruction prepared according to my orders, at the last 
mentioned town* will not prevent the possible destruction of the 
Maxau bridges. 



No. 67 

To all Headquarters. 

Berlin, July 27, 1870. 

His Majesty the King directs that there be submitted every ten 
days to G. H. Q., commencing August 1, situation reports on mobil- 
ized troops. 

These returns will show by Army Corps and Cavalry Divisions, 
the situation of troops on the first, eleventh and twenty-first of each 
month. 

Casualty lists are to be submitted within 24 hours after every 
engagement. The regimental numbers, etc., of prisoners captured will 
also be immediately reported to this office. 

Generals and Staff Officers will be reported by name. 

*See No. 28. 



-214— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 68 

To ALL Army and Corps Headquarters. 

Berlin, July 28, 1870. 
Telegram. 

The military authorities, the Intendance and the contractors 
cannot figure on transportation during great troop movements. They 
are to be positively informed not to push the railroad administration 
in this matter. Arrangements made for train movements and num- 
ber of cars in trains must be strictly complied with. 

Send here, up to the 31st instant inclusive, all pressing requests 
on the Intendance, giving quantities, and untraining and detraining 
stations. 



No. 69 
To THE VIIIth Army Corps. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin, July 28, 1870, 12:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Direst your troops to wire me all information concerning the 
enemy, especially engagements; as far as possible give the numbers 
of the hostile regiments. 



No. 70 

To THE Lt. General von Stosch. 
Mainz. 

Berlin, July 28, 1870, P.M. 
Telegram. 

It is desirable that subsistance supplies be pushed forward; at 
first up to the line Kreuznach — Alzey — Worms. A large depot at 
Alzey; depots at Gaubickelheim and Monsheim. Bakeries at Neunkir- 
chen, Homburg and Saarlouis. To assist the bakers call on the pio- 
neers of Captain Mantey in Bingerbrueck and Captain Huene in Mann- 
heim. But do not interfere with the great troop movements. The 
1st Corps will arrive by lines A and C; the Vlth Corps by lines E 
and D commencing on the 3d of August; the lid Corps not yet decided. 
Details by letter.* 



No. 71 

Memorandum. 

Berlin, 28 July, 1870. 

By the 30th of this month there will be equipped and ready for 
operations : 

First Army 

VII Corps, marching on Trier, with main body within two days' 
march of this point. 



*See No. 77. 

—215- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

VIII Corps, inarching on Saarlouis, with main body near the 
heights near Morbach (two miles * south of Berncastel). 

3d Cavalry Division, in part watching the frontier and in part 
in march on Corps liaison. 

Second Army and Reserves 

III Corps (less Corps artillery), east of the line Bingen; Kreuz- 
nach. 

IV Corps, astride the high road Mannheim; Durkheim. 

IX Corps (less Corps artillery), between Mainz and Wornis. 
5th and 6th Cavalry Division (less regiment with X Corps), in 

the vicinity of the III and IV Corps. 

The Guard, X and XII Corps along four railroad lines in the 
area Bingen; Mainz; Mannheim. 

In order to secure sufficient room for the last mentioned corps, 
and to improve the supply arrangements, it is desirable that the III 
and IV Corps move their main body to the line Alsenz; Gollheim; 
Grunstadt, with advance guards securing the line Lauterechen; Kais- 
erslautern. While advancing Cavalry Divisions should be formed 
to be pushed still further towards the frontier. Headquarters of the 
Second Army^Alzey. 

On the other hand by holding back the Second Army the First 
Army must halt on the line Trier; Wadern in order not to isolate 
it by pushing it forward to the frontier, where up to the present 
time only some advance troops and the 3d Cavalry Division are in 
observation. 

In the dispositions which have hitherto been directed for the 
Third Army changes as to time should not be allowed. 

Finally it is necessary to clear up the situation, since the French 
army has already crossed the frontier today with important forces. 

Especially does this apply to the center where the Second Army 
and the Reserves are. These Headquarters can assemble on the 
line Alsenz; Gollheim; Grunstadt, in one line; but not before August 
5th, even with extraordinary marches; so that by that date there 
will be the following troops 

The Guard Corps 29000 infantry 

III Corps 25000 infantry 

IV Corps 25000 infantry 

X Corps 25000 infantry 

IX Corps 23000 infantry 

XII Corps 29000 infantry 

I Corps 25000 infantry 

i VI Corps 13000 infantry 

Total 194000 infantry 

in a good position, able to debouch from high ground on the heads 
of the enemy's columns. Lastly there may be found on this line: 

3d Corps, Bazaine 36000 infantry 

2d Corps, Frossard 27000 infantry 

5th Corps, Failly 27000 infantry 

Guard Corps, Bourbaki 18000 infantry 

Reserves, Canrobert 25000 infantry 

Total 133000 infantry 

*These are German miles. A German mile is equal to about 
7500 yards or U English miles. — C.H.L. 

—216— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

On the flanks the enemy may assemble: 

Right Flank: 
1st Corps MacMahon, 44000 infantry against which the Third 
army has today 

XI Corps 25000 infantry 

i V Corps 13000 infantry 

Baden Division 12000 infantry 

Wurtemberg Division 15000 infantry 

One Bavarian Division 12000 infantry 

Total 77000 infantry 

to oppose them. These troops will be reenforced by August 5th by: 

i V Corps 12000 infantry 

3 Bavarian Divisions 36000 infantry 

Total 48000 infantry 

As noted above 77000 infantry 

Total for Illd Army 125000 infantry 

On the left flank the enemy has available: 

4th Corps, Ladmirault, 27000 infantry against which the First 
Army has 50000 infantry. 

Therefore on August 5th: 

First Army Second Army Third Army 

50,000 infantry 194,000 infantry 125,000 infantry 

against against against 

27,000 infantry 133,000 infantry 44,000 infantry 



No. 72 

Telegram. 

To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin, 29 July, 1870, 3:00 P.M. 

His Majesty directs that the First Army main body shall not 
pass the line Saarburg; Wadern. Hold Trier against enemy attacks. 



No. 73 

Telegram,. 

To Prince Frederick Charles. 
Mainz. 

Berlin, 29 July, 1870, 3:00 P.M. 

His Majesty directs that the Second Army push forward its 
cantonments to the line Alsenz; Gollheim; Grunstadt. Advance 



—217— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



guards should be formed from the 5th and 5th Cavalry Divisions 
still further forward. 



No. 74 

To THE Commanding General. 
First Army. 

Berlin, 29 July, 1870. 

His Majesty, the King, leaves here at 6:00 P.M. the 31st in- 
stant passing through 

Magdeburg at 8:30 P.M., July 31st 

Fraunschweig 3:00 A.M., August 1st 

Hanover 6:00 A.M., August 1st 

Hamm 3:00 P.M., August 1st 

Cologne 10:30 P.M., August 1st 

Coblenz 3:00 A.M., August 2d 

for Mainz, where GHQ will be after 7:00 A.M., August 2d. 

Wire information to above mentioned stations. 

From the enclosed report it can be seen what is known as to the 
strength, formation and positions of the hostile army. 

At the same time I advise you that in compliance with cipher 
GHQ telegram* of this date, the Second Army has been ordered 
to advance their cantonments to the line Alsenz; Gollheim; Grun- 
stadt, and that the 1st and Vlth Corps are soon to be brought by 
rail to South of Mainz to the area Bingen ; Mainz ; Mannheim by 
August 5th. 

The Commanding General, Second Army moves his Headquarters 
in the morning to Alzey. 

(Enclosure to Above.) 

REPORT: Trustworthy information on the Formation and Po- 
sition of the French Army for the Period July 27 to July 29. 
1st Corps, MacMahon; Chief of Staff, General Colson. 
2 Divisions at Strassburg 

2 Divisions near Strassburg in bivouac along the railroad 
to Brumath. 
The 1st Corps should have 19 batteries, consisting of 12 Divi- 
sion batteries, 1 horse battery belonging to the Cavalry Division, 
and four 12-pounder and two 4-pounder batteries of the Corps artil- 
lery. 

Strassburg is fully armed; although machine guns are still to 
be mounted on field carriages. 

2d Corps, Frossard; Chief of Staff, General Saget. 
Headquarters at St. Avoid. 

Bataille's Division is opposite our outposts near Forbach. 
Near Morsbach several points have been fortified. 
3d Corps, Bazaine; Chief of Staff, General Manique. 
The advance of this corps on the 22d instant from Metz to 
Bolchen has been confirmed. 

The 3d Division (Lebrun) is to be commanded by Lorencez. 

*See No. 72. 

—218— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

4th Corps, Ladmirault; Chief of Staff, General Deiant de Mart- 
hille. 

This corps is to be assembled near Diedenhofen. 

The advance guard near Sierck is to consist of the 20th Rifle 
Battalion; the 13th and 33d Infantry; and the 11th Chasseurs 
(mounted). 

Two divisions of this corps are to be commanded by Generals 
Eissey and Payol. 

5th Corps, de Failly; Chief of Staff, General Besson. 

Headquarters at Bitsch. 

This corps is to have four divisions. Nothing further known. 

6th Corps, Canrobert; Chief of Staff, General Henry. 

To assemble near Chalons. 

Nothing further known as to its mobilization. 

7th Corps, Donay; Chief of Staff, General Benson. 

Headquarters; at Belfort. 

Reported as still in progress of mobilization. 

But news received that it is to consist of three cavalry and one 
infantry divisions. The commanders of the cavalry divisions are 
to be Generals Barail, de Bonnemains and de Forton. 

Guard Corps, Beurbaki; Chief of Staff, General d'Auvergne. 

Stationed near Nancy. 

The Emperor Napoleon left yesterday to join his army. His 
headquarters are at Nancy. 

The Army in Alsace and Lorraine is designated as "the Army 
of the Rhine." 

There is also talk of other corps, among which are probably 
that of General Count Palikao for the expeditionary forces to be 
sent by sea, and it is understood Reserve Corps are being formed 
at Chalons. 

Contact between the advance troops of both sides has been 
quickly obtained since July 27th. As to an offensive by the French, 
no evidence thereof has yet been reported. 

A telegram received today (July 29th) from Florence reports 
the embarkation at Civita Vecchia of French troops for France. 
They consisted of : 

Infantry Brigade, Guilheim 
6th Rifie Battalion 
35th and 42d Infantry 
2 squadrons, 7th Chasseurs, mounted 
2 batteries, 14th Artillery 
1 Engineer company 

All under command of Major Dumont. 



No. 75 

To THE Commanding General, Second Army. 
Alzey. 

Berlin, 29th July, 1870. 

(Note: First three paragraphs, same as No. 74 omitted. — C.H.L.) 

At the same time I advise you that in compliance with cipher 
GHQ telegram* of this date, the First Army main body has been 

*See Ne. 73. 

—219— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



pushed forward to the line Saarburg; Wadern which is not to be 
crossed. 

The 1st and Vlth Corps are soon to be brought by rail to south 
of Mainz to the area Bingen; Mainz; Mannheim by August 5th, and 
for this reason it is desirable that the IXth and Xllth Corps should 
move their cantonments. 

GHQ understands that changes in plans which may delay the 
Third Army are at present not allowed. 



No. 76 

To THE Commanding General, Third Army. 
Speyer. 

Berlin, 29th July, 1870. 

(Note: First three paragraphs, same as No. 74, omitted. — C.H.L.) 

Your excellency is further advised that His Majesty has ordered, 
that the First Army main body is for the present not to cross the line 
Saarburg; Wadern; that the Hid and IVth Corps are to advance 
their cantonments to the line Alsenz; GoUheim; Grumstadt, and that 
also the 1st and Vlth Corps are to be brought by the four rail lines 
A, B, C and D to the area south of Mainz by August 5th. Early on 
the 19th mobilization day (August 3d) a considerable number of supply 
trains will have arrived near Mosbach and Castel, which should be 
loaded at once, in order to free the railroad stations and allow the 
railroad cars to be quickly sent back. 



No. 78 

Telegram. 

To General of Infantry, v. Goeben. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin, 30 July, 1870, 2:00 P.M, 

Small detachments at Saarbruecken must not be sacrificed. Sup- 
port by the Second Army not yet possible; the detachment at Wadern 
should not occupy Sulzbach or Neunkirchen. Destruction of rail- 
roads no longer forbidden. 



No. 79 

Telegram. 

To Lieut. General v. Pestel. 
Saarbrucken. 

Berlin, 30 July, 1870, 7:50 P.M. 

In view of the great superiority of the enemy the infantry 
should be withdrawn as early as possible from Sulzbach; Bildstock. 

—220— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The cavalry should maintain touch with the enemy. Acknowledge 
receipt of this order. 



No. 80 

Telegram. 

To Prince Frederick Charles. 
Alzey. 

Berlin, 30 July, 1870, 2:15 P.M. 

His Majesty directs that the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions shall 
be sent without delay to reconnoitre towards the frontier about Saar- 
brucken; Bitsch. 

The IXth and Xllth Corps until further notice are entirely under 
the orders of your Royal Highness, and are hereby so advised. 

The IXth Corps will at once move up to the line of the Hid and 
IVth Corps; the other Corps will close up immediately . 



No. 81 

Telegram. 

To Lieut. General v. Blumenthal. 
Speyer. 

Berlin, SO July, 1870, A.M. 

Second Army assembled forward on Alzey; IV Corps near Grun- 
stadt. 

Telegram from Colonel Gottberg of yesterday evening received. 

It appears that the junction of the French 5th and 1st Corps 
on the lower Lauter is intended. 

Information has been received from Zweibrucken that yesterday, 
evening strong detachments were about Breidenback; Bitsch. 

I believe it desirable that the Wurttembergers and Badeners 
be brought to the left bank of the Rhine, as long as the Maxau bridge 
can be used. 

No danger is to be feared for the right bank as soon as the 
Third Army proceeds with its offensive in the direction of Hagenau; 
Bischweiler. 

Directions for this will be given by His Majesty; the decision 
will be communicated without delay. 

No orders yet, but advise His Royal Highness the Crown Prince 
on matters to be considered. 

Answer soon. 



—221— 



Moltke's Correspondence 
No. 82 

Telegram. 

To THE Commanding General, Third Army. 
Speyer. 

Berlin, 30 July, 1870, 7:30 P.M. 

His Majesty is of the opinion that as soon as the Baden and 
Wurtemberg Division has joined on the left bank of the Rhine, the 
Third Army should advance in a southerly direction, to seek and 
attack the enemy. 

A bridge fight south of Lauterburg will be thus avoided, all 
South Germany will be effectively protected. 



No. 83 

Telegram. 

To THE Commanding General, Third Army. 
Speyer. 

Berlin, 31 July, 1870, 12:20 P.M. 

When do you expect the Third Army will be ready for opera- 
tions? 

Note: General v. Blumenthal replied to the foregoing, that the 
Third Army would be ready to advance on August 3d. 



No. 84 

Telegram. 

To the Commanding Generals, First and Third Armies. 
Coblenz and Speyer. 

Berlin, 31 July, 1870, 10:30 A.M. 

Hid, IVth and IXth Corps will be on August 3d in front of 
Alzey; the Guard, Xth and Xllth Corps closed up in rear; the 5th 
and 6th Cavalry Divisions, with one Division each from the Hid 
and IVth Corps, today move forward and are authorized to reach 
the frontier on August 3d. 

(The following is in the telegram to the Third Army only:) 
Posts in Saarbrucken are still held. 



—222- 



No. 88 



Left Wing— Third Army 

jXIth Corps 
|& Baden Div. 
42000 



Aug. 2 

March to 

on 
Aug. 3 

Aug. 4 

Aug. 5 

Aug. 6 

Aug. 7 

Aug. 8 



Germersheim 
& Karlsluhe 



Langendankel 
& Maxau 



Selz 

Hagenau 

Pfaffenhosen 

Lutzelstein 

Finstingen 



IVth Corps 
& Wurttemberg Div. 
42000 



84000 

Laudau & 
Germersheim 

Weissenburg 



Sulz 

Reiehshofen 

Ingweiler 

Puberg 

Saarunion 



Note:— GHQ was enroute to Mainz.— C.H.L. 

To face page 222. 



lid Bav. 
Corps 



list Bav. 
Corps 



Germersheim 
Landau 

Annweiler 
Pirmasens 
Neu-Hornbach 
Rohrbach 



57000 
Speyer 



Elmstein 

Weldfichbach 

Zweibrucken 



Reinheim, E. 

of Saargemund 
according to 
circumstances 



PROPOSED MARCH TABLE 

(No date, but about end of July, 1870.) 

Second Army and Reserves 

IVth Corps llXth Corps lllld Corps IXth Corps 



Mannheim 
Durkheim 

Frankenstein 

Kaiserslautern 

Bruchmuhlbach 

Blieskastel 

Saargemund 



Gollheim 
Minnweiler 

Wolfstein 

Kusel 

Ottweiler 

Sulzbach 

Saarbrucken 



130000 
Alzey 



Lauterecken 
Baumholder 
St. W«ndel 
Landsweiler 
Volklingen 



Kreuznach 
Sobernheim 

Oberstein 

Turkiomuhle 

Tholey 

Lebach 

Saarlouis 



1st Corps 



Kaiserslautern 



Vlth Corps 



Landau or Mussbach 



Vlllth Corps 



First Army — Right Wing 
Vllth Corps 



can reach 
Saarlouis , Rehlingen 



Rehlingen 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 85 

Telegram. 

To THE Commanding General, First Army. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin, 31 July, 1870. 

His Majesty directs that the First Army be assembled on the 
line Wadern; Losheim. Observation to be continued towards the 
Saar. 



No. 86 

Telegram. 

To Lieut. General v. Stosch. 
Mainz. 

Berlin, 31 July, 1870, 2:00 P.M. 

Depots at Birkenfeld, Kusel and Kaiserlautern desirable. Ad- 
vance in immediate prospect. 



No. 87 

To THE Commanding General, Second Army. 
Alzey. 

Magdeburg RR. Station, 31 July, 1870. 

Kaiserslautern and Birkenfeld will be cleared by early morning 
August 2d. Line commissions have been advised. Illd, Xth and 
Guard Corps should inform the High Command. 



No. 88. 
(See Proposed March Table) 



No. 89 

To the Commanding General, Second Army. 
Alzey. 

GHQ, Mainz, 2 August, 1870. 

By Royal order, the 1st Corps cantonments and movements will 
be supervised by GHQ. Of the 1st Corps, five battalions will be 
available at Birkenfeld from August 3d; the remainder of the 1st 

—223— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Infantry Division, and three regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division 
of the 1st Corps, will quickly follow in in one column. 

The remaining half of the 1st Corps detrains at the rate of 18 
trains a day at Kaiserslantern commencing August 4th. 



No. 90 

To THE Commanding General, Third Army. 
Speyer. 

GHQ, Mainz, 2 August, 1870. 

By Royal order the Vlth Corps cantonments and movements 
will be supervised by GHQ. 

The Vlth Corps, less the Cavalry regiment, attached by the 2d 
Cavalry Division order of battle, will detrain at the rate of 12 
trains a day at Landau commencing early on August 4th. 



No. 91 

To THE Commanding General, Second Army. 
Alzey. 

GHQ, Mainz, 2 August, 1870, 11 :00 A.M. 

With reference to telegrams sent yesterday from Royal GHQ, 
His Majesty the King has proposed, and orders as follows: 

In view of the fact that the enemy up to today has not advanced 
with any strong forces, the IVth Corps main body will advance to 
Landstuhl, but will not proceed beyond this point. 

Should there develop today a determined hostile advance in the 
area between Saarbrucken and Saargemund, the Illd Corps will not 
advance tomorrow on Baumholder, and the IV Corps main body will 
remain at Kaiserslautern. Further detraining at Birkenfeld and 
Kaiserslautern appears secure. With reference to Birkenfeld the 
presence of the First Army at Wadern for the moment secures this 
point. An earlier advance of the two above mentioned corps, is un- 
desirable until the remainder of the Second Army is distant about 
a half day's march. 

For arranging the further advance of the Army, GHQ needs 
to know as to the progress of the advance ordered for the IXth, 
Guard, Xllth and Xth Corps. 

Concerning the difficulty of furnishing supplies full orders will 
be given, and I will undertake with this in mind to write to Lieut. 
General v. Stosch. 

The present advance of three complete supply trains to Birken- 
feld necessary for the coming detraining of the three ammunition 
trains (1st Train Column) of the Illd Corps already at Bingen 
cannot result in alack of ammunition in the last mentioned Corps, 
as the IXth and Xllth Corps have their ammunition trains with 
them. 

—224— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

In addition, as Royal GHQ has apparently advised, His Ma- 
jesty the King has assigned effective tomorrow afternoon Line A, 
and the following morning Line C, to the 1st Corps for its concen- 
tration, lines previously assigned to the Second Army. In conse- 
quence the necessary steps will be taken to assure the above men- 
tioned corps joining the right wing. The 1st Cavalry Division is 
by Royal order, effective today, assigned to the First Army. 



No. 92 

Telegraim. 

To THE Commanding General, Second Army. 
Alzey. 

GHQ, Mainz, 2 August, 1870, 9:00 P.M. 

The Third Army is concentrated today in bivouac north of the 
Kling — Bach. According to information from Zweibrucken the en- 
emy crossed the frontier this afternoon at Saargemund. Telegraphic 
news leads us to suppose that our posts in Saarbruecken have been 
withdrawn. 

(Note: — The foregoing information was also sent to the Third 
Army.) 

Early deployment of the Second Army necessary. 



No. 93 

To THE Royal Minister of War. 
Munich. 

GHQ, Mainz, 2 August, 1870. 

To provide for the previously determined advance of the German 
troops without weakening the field armies by leaving behind them 
line of communication detachments, it becomes necessary to provide 
special troops for the lines of communications. These can at first 
take over fortresses not in danger uncovered as the army advances. 

It is also recommended that the Third Army Line of Communi- 
cations .Command attach trustworthy people with local parties. 

In this regard the favorable consideration of the War Minister 
is hereby requested, that the Royal Headquarters of the Third Army 
from now on enter into direct communication with the War Minis- 
ter on matters of supply. The Prussians will furnish eight bat- 
talions and four squadrons for the line of communications. 



—225- 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 94 
To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz. 

LOSHEIM. 

Hq. Mayence, 3 August, 1870, 11:00 AM. 
Telegram.. 

Dilatory advance of the French justifies assumption that the 
Second Army can be concentrated on the 6th instant in front of the 
forest zone at Kaiserslautern. 

If rapid advance of enemy cannot be prevented, concentration of 
Second Army takes place behind the Lauter. 

Combined action of both armies in the battle intended; First 
Army from St. Wendel and Baumholder. 

His Majesty orders that First Army concentrates on the 4th 
against Tholey. Tomorrow Third Army crosses frontier at Weis- 
senburg. General offensive intended. 



No. 95 

To H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles. 
Alzey. 

Hq. Mayence, 3 August, 1870, 11:00 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Dilatory advance of the French justifies assumption that the 
Second Army can be concentrated on the 6th instant in front of the 
forest zone at Kaiserslautern. 

First Army will be drawn to Tholey tomorrow. Combination of 
both armies in the battle. 

If rapid advance of the enemy cannot be prevented, concentration 
of Second Army takes place behind the Lauter. First Army to Baum- 
holder. 

Third Army crosses frontier tomorrow at Weissenburg. General 
offensive intended. 



No. 96 

To Headquarters First Army. 
Losheim. 

Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, noon. 
Telegram. 

By orders of the King 1st Cavalry Division attached to First 
Army. Will reach Birkenfeld from noon the 5th to incl. 8th of August, 
Hq. probably 7 August. 



—226— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 97 

To Headquarters Third Army. 
Speyer. 

Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, noon. 
Telegram. 

By order of the King 2d Cavalry Division attached to Third Army. 
Headquarters will reach Castel on the Rhine August 4, the regi- 
ments of the Vlth Corps there also from the 3d to 6th August, the 
regiments of the 1st and lid Corps reach Bingen on the 5th and the 
7th or 8th August respectively. 



By noon August 3, only indefinite information had been received 
at Royal Headquarters of the battle at Saarbriicken the day before. 
This caused the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to ask the 
following: 



No. 98 

To Commanding Officer. 
Saarlouis. 

Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, noon. 
Telegratn. 

What happened yesterday at Saarbriicken ? We have only 
rumors, but no official report. 

(Same to Hq. Vlllth A. C.) 

Only at 5:15 P.M. a telegram was received in Mayence, sent from 
Lebach at 11 :20 A.M. and from Saarlouis at 2 :28 P.M., from General v. 
Goeben containing more definite information of the battle at Saar- 
briicken, which caused General v. Moltke to issue the following orders: 



No. 99 

To Headquarters VIIIth Army Corps. 
Lebach (via Saarlouis) . 

Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, 7 ihS P.M. 
Telegratn. 

Possession of Saarbriicken at present time of no importance to 
us. First Army has orders to assemble at Tholey. VIIIth Corps will 
move guiding its march accordingly. 



—227— 



Moltke's Correspondence 
No. 100 

To Headquarters Second Army. 

WiNNWEILER. 

Hq. Mayence, U August 1870, 12:00 noon. 

I have the honor to inform headquarters Second Army that the 
orders of the instant brought by Lieutenant General v. Stosch to 
these headquarters and containing intended movements are in accord- 
ance with the King's intentions. 

For the purpose of orientation for the next few days I will 

The First Army is concentrating to-day in the triangle Tholey — 
Lebach — Ottweiler (hq. Tholey, connection via St. Wendel) and will 
remain there for the present. It has not yet been decided whether 
the 1st Army Corps will be permanently attached to that army or 
kept at the disposition of the King. Consequently it might be ad- 
visable to send the troops of that corps to the vicinity of Tiirkismuhle 
— Tholey — St. Wendel and to keep headquarters of the First Army 
permanently informed of the location of headquarters of 1st Army 
Corps. 

The Third Army takes the offensive today, for the present in 
southerly direction. After it has advanced to Hagenau and if it has 
not met strong hostile forces, it will turn against the Saar at Saarge- 
mund, proper — protecting its left wing. 

If that is the case, it is the intention to have the Vlth Army Corps, 
now detraining at Landau, march to Pirmasens as connecting link be- 
tween the Second and Third Army. 

Still, the Third Army will hardly reach the upper Saar before 
August 9th, and it is therefore not necessary for the Second Array to 
reach the Saar with its main forces before that day. 

The enclosed sketch shows what is known here so far of the posi- 
tion and strength of the hostile army. The advance of the Third Army 
will bring certain information concerning the whereabouts of the 
corps MacMahon and Failly. The intentions of the enemy appear 
to be a strict defensive on the Saar for the present. Considering 
these points and in so far as hostile forces do not cross the Saax today, 
it is left to H.R.H.'s discretion whether or not the leading elements 
of the llld and iVth Army Corps very soon advance to the line Ott- 
weiler— Neunkirchen — Homburg, but if they do they must halt there 
and await the arrival of the rear echelons, in order to get as soon as 
possible across the terrain which greatly interferes with the deploy- 
ment of larger forces. 

Finally, I will state that the King has to-day ordered the bringing 
up of the lid Army Corps, and that it will detrain probably on the 
9th or 10th of August in Neunkirchen and Homburg with both infan- 
try divisions. 

The 3d Landwehr Division, placed at the disposal of the Second 
Army for guarding the line of communications, which has been sent 
from here for the present toward Homburg (to arrive there on the 
7th or 8th August), can be detrained in toto or in part at points far- 
ther in the rear, at your discretion, and doing this would relieve two 
companies sent from here to-day by steamer to Bingen and Worms. 

On the 9th instant a ferry service will be ready at Rosengarten 
— Worms to allow loaded wagons coming from Darmstadt to be fer- 
ried there and sent on to Alzey. 



-228— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

In the matter of assuring subsistence, after today several trains 
will be at the disposal of the proper authorities on Lines A and B. 
Complete control of projected lines will be given to the a,uthorities 
of the lines of communications of the Second Army only after com- 
pletion of transport of the lid Army Corps, that is at about the 11th 
instant (when that corps reaches the terminus). It will also have 
control of Line B by the 10th instant. 

Here follows a sketch of the area between Metz and Strassburg, 
showing French forces as follows: — 

Bourbaki's Corps (Guard) at Metz; Bazaine's (3d Corps) at 
Bolchen; Ladmirault's (4th Corps) west and east of Busendorf (lar- 
ger part west, smaller east) ; Frossard's (2d Corps) between For- 
bach and Saarbriicken; one division or brigade of the 2d Corps west 
of Saargemiind; Failly's (5th Corps) south of Bitsch; MacMahon's 
(1st Corps) south of Hagenau; with one brigade from either 1st or 
7th Corps advanced to the immediate, north of Strassburg. 

Notes to this sketch: 

There are no further reports of the 6th Corps, except that the 
47th Regiment is supposed to have still been at Chalons on the 29th 
July. 

It is said that the attempt to embark an expeditionary corps has 
been given up (latest reports). 

It is also questionable whether the 1st Corps has not already 
marched via Zabern. 

There is no information at hand concerning the 7th Corps re- 
ported as concentrating upon the upper Rhine. 



No. 101 

To Lieutenant General v. Blumenthal. 
Landau. 

Hq. Mayercce, U August 1870, 12:00 noon. 

In reply to your communication of 5 P.M. yesterday, I have the 
honor to inform you that the intentions stated therein are entirely in 
accord with our views and intentions. 

Full freedom is left the Third Army in the execution of its task. A 
direct combined movement with the Second Army is at present im- 
possible, if for no other reason than the difficult Haardt Mountains. 
To bring the operation of both armies into consonance can be done 
only from these headquarters with due regard to the measures taken 
by the enemy. 

It would be very desirable if H. R. H. could encounter the Corps 
of MacMahon, or Failly, as soon as possible. At Hagenau, if not 
prior to reaching there, it must be ascertained if those parts of the 
French army have also been drawn up to the line St. Avoid — Saarge- 
miind. A further advance southward would in that case be but a 
thrust into the air and necessitate a change of direction to the upper 
Saar. 

The Second Army will to-day reach the following points: 

Illd Corps, Baumholder — Kusel; advance guard towards St. 
Wendel; 

IVth Corps, Landstuhl; advance guard towards Homburg; 

5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions advanced to near the frontier. 

—229— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



Both corps will have to halt for the present until the remaining 
ones close up. These latter reach today: 

Xth Corps, Meisenheim; 

IXth Corps Winneweiler ; (Hq. of Prince Frederick Charles); 

Guard Corps, Otterberg — Kaiserslautern; 

Xllth Corps, Gollheim. 

The First Army today stands in the triangle Tholey — Lebach 
— Ottweiler. 

By the 7th of August presumably the Second and First Army 
will come into direct connection on the line Ottweiler — Zweibriicken. 

The hostile army, the position of which as far as known here 
will be shown by enclosed sketch (see Note No. 100), is remaining 
in a passive attitude. 

It is true that day before yesterday our detachment in Saar- 
briicken was dislodged by three of Frossard's divisions, but the rail- 
road depot in St. Johann is today still unoccupied by the enemy. This 
seems to show that the intention is to take a defensive position in 
force behind the Saar, after interrupting the railroads, the construc- 
tion of fortifications, etc. 

In that case the frontal attack of the Second Army will be ma- 
terially supported by an advance of the Third Army, which, in order 
to use as many roads as practicable, should be made in as much breadth 
as the proximity of the enemy allows. 

It has not yet been decided whether to attach the Vlth Corps 
to the one or the other of the armies; for the present it will be at 
the disposal of the Third Army. That corps, in the advance west- 
ward, may effect a very desirable connection between the Third and 
Second Army on the road to Pirmasens and would prevent a possible 
advance of the enemy from Bitsch between the two armies. 

The object to be sought is the simultaneous action of all three 
armies in the decisive battle, and these headquarters will try to regu- 
late all movements with this idea in view. 

The Baden as well as the Wiirttemberg divisions have signified 
their desire to be attached to a Prussian division and have no inten- 
tion to form a corps by themselves. H. R. H. will use his discretion 
in arranging this matter. 

When the Vth Army Corps no longer requires the railroad trans- 
portation facilities, the troops of the line of communications (8 bat- 
talions, 4 squadrons) placed at the disposal of the Third Army, will 
reach Landau on the 9th of August, and the further movements of 
whether troops (by rail or otherwise) is left to H. R. H.'s discretion, 
with the remark that on the whole, after the 9th instant. Line D and 
Line E are entirely at the disposal of the authorities of the lines of 
communications of the Third Army. 



No. 102 



To General of Infantry v. SteinmetZo 
Tholey. 

Hq. Mayence, U August 1870, 12:00 noon. 
Telegram. 

Your position (Tholey — Lebach — Ottweiler) approved; remain 
there until further orders. 



—230- 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 103 

To Headquarters, First Army. 
Tholey. 

Hq. Mayence, i August 1870, 12:00 noon. 

In explanation of my telegram of today, I inform you as follows: 

The Third Army commences the offensive today in the direction 
of Hagenau, and then against the upper Saar. The Second Army 
remains on the march towards the line Neunkirchen — Homburg. The 
First Army will receive further orders to either support the latter or 
to advance against the left flank of the hostile army. We have no in- 
tention of crossing the Saar before the 9th instant, behind which the 
enemy apparently intends remaining on the defensive. 

The 1st Army Corps, which is still detraining at Birkenfeld and 
Kaiserslautern, will be placed in position by the Second Army in such 
manner that it can be attached to either the First or the Second Army 
for further operations. Orders for this will be issued later. 

The enclosed sketch [see note to No. 100] shows the details of 
the hostile positions as far as known here. 

Line F is from now on entirely at the disposition of the authori- 
ties of the lines of communications of the First Army. 



At 8 P.M., August 4, the following telegram sent by General v. 
Steinmetz was received by the Chief of the General Staff at Royal 
headquarters : 

"Hq. St. Wercdel, ^ August 1870, 3:36 P.M. 

By orders of the King I marched today with the First Army to 
the vicinity of Tholey, but would rather have preferred to remain in 
the position at the Saar, because that forms an offensive flank for 
the advance of the Second Army, and the First Army could accom- 
plish more than in position at St. Wendel or even at Baumholder, 
where the First Army is but an elongation of the front of the Second 
Army. Consequently I do not understand the strategic thought in giv- 
ing up the position on the Saar, for which there is no reason in the 
general situation. Information concerning the matter would be very 
acceptable in order to correctly guide my further actions. Had the 
Crown Prince been at Weissenburg on the 6th, this fact and the ad- 
vance of the Second and Third Army toward Nancy or Luneville would 
have compelled the enemy, deployed on an extended line, to leave the 
Saar and would have offered opportunity to the First Army to success- 
fully interfere. I fear now that the French will see an advantage 
gained for them by our taking a new position." 



General v. Moltke replied the same evening : 

No. 104 

To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz. 
Tholey. 

Hq. Mayence, U August 1870, 8:^5 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Desired information concerning motives of King as to measures 
taken now en route by letter. The Crown Prince was already at 
Weisenburg on the 4th. 

—231— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

In the preceding telegram General .v. Moltke refers to 
the orders of 4 August, 12 :00 noon, see No. 103. In addi- 
tion, the request of General v. Steinmetz caused the follow- 
ing written explanations, which were sent at noon on the 
5th: 

No. 105 

To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz. 

T HOLEY. 

Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, 6:00 A.M. 

I thoroughly agree with Your Excellency as to the importance of 
your understanding and knowing correctly the motives on which are 
based the orders of the King to you. I therefore now have the honor 
to answer as follows to your inquiry of the 4th instant more in detail 
than could be done by wire. 

As already discussed in Berlin, I mean with Your Excellency in 
person, or in any case with your Chief of Staff and Chief Quartermas- 
ter, it is the task of the First Army, in addition to protecting the 
Rhine Province, to decisively intervene in the battle against the left 
flank of the enemy. 

This intervention, of course, cannot be executed independently, but 
must take place in conjunction with the Second Army. 

The point, where it may take place, is not only dependent on that 
army, but also on the movements of the enemy. 

The day when orders were issued for the concentration at Wa- 
dern, the Second Army was still so far in rear that contact on the 
other side of Kaiserslautern was probable, even certain. Therefore 
we had to be certain of the possibility of bringing up the First Army 
to Baumholder for the battle. 

Today it is still possible that contact will take place on the line 
Ottweiler — Homburg. At Tholey then the First Army would be in 
the correct position. 

Only w^ien the Second Army has approached the Saar will the 
time have arrived to send the First Army across that stream. 

A separate advance of the First Army against the enemy, who 
appears to be closely concentrated with all his forces, could lead 
only to defeat. 

The combined movements of all three armies can be ordered only 
by the King and in those orders the freedom of executing them will 
be left entirely in the hands of the different army headquarters and 
they can act according to the situation. 



In the meantime General v, Steinmetz had also sent 
a telegram to the King on this matter, as follows: 

"Hq. St. Wendel, 5 August 1870, 1:30 A.M. 

General Moltke has informed me that a general offensive is in- 
tended and in the same telegram has ordered the concentration of the 
First Army at Tholey by your command. Today he informs me that 
the First Army will remain until further orders in its position at 
Tholey — Ottweiler — Lebach. On the other hand the Second Army in- 

—232— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

forms me that it will occupy the line Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken on 
the sixth. By this the Second Army gets ahead of the First, and as 
I have not received any orders concerning a further advance, I have 
no base on which to act intelligently." 



This caused General v. Moltke to give further explana- 
tions of his views on which the orders were based, to the 
First and Second Army : 

No. 106 

To Headquarters, First Army. 
Tholey. 

Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, 12:30 P.M. 
Teleg7~atn. 

The road St. Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen will be cleared to- 
morrow by the First Army. 

The 1st Army Corps is definitely assigned to the First Army; 
goes by rail via Homburg and detrains at Neunkirchen. Letter en 
route. Headquarters of line of communications and field railroad de- 
tachment detrain in Birkenfeld commencing early tomorrow morning. 



No. 107 

To Headquarters, First Army. 
Tholey. 

Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, noon. 
Telegram. 

In reply to telegram to His Majesty, First Army headquarters 
is informed that even if the leading elements of the Second Army 
reach the line Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken on the 6th, the assembly of 
that army will be completed only on the 7th, and the troops, if at all 
possible after their exhausting march, should receive a welcome day 
of rest on the 8th. 

Considering this, it is entirely correct for the First Army to re- 
main in its present position today and tomorrow, and merely clear 
the St. Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen road, which is absolutely 
necessary for the movement of the Second Army. 

However, on the 7th, the First Army, to which the 1st Army 
Corps (Hq. Birkenfeld) is permanently assigned by orders of the 
King, must approach to the Saar, using the Lebach — Saarlouis and 
the Illingen — Volklingen roads without creating unnecessary atten- 
tion, so near that, crossing the Saar, between Saarlouis and Volk- 
lingen, it will be ready after the 8th to take the offensive against the 
hostile left flank, while the Second Army simultaneously advances 
to the front. 

His Majesty especially reserves to himself the right to order the 
execution of such operation, as the commencement and the direction 
of it are dependent on the conditions which will have arisen at that 
time with the Third Army. 



-233- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

No. 108 
To Headquarters, Secx)nd Army. 

Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, 12:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

The St. Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen road will be cleared by 
the First Army. 

Headquarters lines of communications and field railroad battalion 
detrain early tomorrow morning in Birkenfeld, the provision column 
of the Hid Army Corps, now behind, in the succeeding night. Ad- 
vance of strong cavalry across the Saargemiind — Bitsch railroad de- 
sirable. 

Prussian railroads to be kept intact. 



No. 109 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 
Kaiserslautern. 

Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, noon. 

His Majesty has ordered that the 1st Army Corps be permanently 
attached to the First Army, the Vllth to the Third and the lid to the 
Second Army. The latter will detrain between the 8th and 11th, proba- 
bly at Neunkirchen and Homburg. To facilitate the concentration 
of the 1st Army Corps it has also been ordered that the trains carry- 
ing this corps arriving from this afternoon on in Kaiserslautern, keep 
on through Homburg to Neunkirchen and detrain there. 

Headquarters of the First Army has received orders to imme- 
diately clear the St. Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen road and to 
echelon the army on the 7th on the Lebach — Saarlouis and the lUin- 
gen — Volklingen roads. The First Army will then be ready to sup- 
port, as originally planned, the operations of the Second Army, espec- 
cially by action against the hostile left flank. 

If further development of conditions do not require a different 
proceeding with the Third Army, the subsequent advance against 
the Saar from the intended position ordered by Royal headquarters 
will not be made before the 9th, and thus the larger part of the Sec- 
ond Army will have a day of rest on the 8th, which it stands in need 
of. 

His Majesty will probably transfer Royal headquarters from 
here to Homburg on the 8th instant. 



General von Steinmetz was not at all satisfied with the 
explanations furnished him by Royal headquarters and on 
August 6th he sent to General v. Moltke an additional let- 
ter stating his views as to the task of the First Army. This 
letter read : 

Hq. Hellenhausen, 6 August 1870. 

Your letter of the 5 August reached me at 2:30 A.M. today, 6 
August. 

—234— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

In reply I have the honor to state that I had no doubt at all con- 
cerning the task of the First Army as long as the Second Army 
endeavored to carry out its strategic march against the Saar; that 
task could only consist in facilitating the advance of the Second Army 
by drawing the hostile troops away from that army and onto the First 
Army* and when the Second Army could no longer advance without 
fighting, the First Army would have to effectively support the Second 
in any ensuing battle. With this idea was also conceived the recon- 
naissance on a large scale which was frustrated by orders from Royal 
headquarters for the First Army to march towards Tholey, and the 
position of the First Army behind the Saar — from Saarbriicken to 
Saarlouis — had been in consonance with my conception of the task; 
but now, drawing the First Army back to Tholey and possibly as far 
as Baumholder, leaves the enemy complete freedom of action behind 
the Saar and will increase the difficulties of advance for the Second 
Army. 

The enemy has utilized the opportunity to fortify himself in his 
position from Saarbriicken to Forbach and appears to desire us to 
attack him in that position. The question now is, if and how we should 
do that. 

At the present time the troops of the First and Second Army, lit- 
erally speaking, stand arm in arm; that is, should the Second Army 
continue its march, the two armies would become mixed, or the First 
Army will at least become very much confined in its freedom of opera- 
tion. Therefore, and especially as the advance of the Vllth and Vlth 
Army Corps needed regulation, I was not able to evacuate the St. 
Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen road, as the troops to be sent to 
the westward might already have reached villages occupied by other 
troops, which would have entailed a complete rearrangement of quar- 
ters westward and also southward, considering that room had also to 
be made for the 1st Army Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division placed 
under my command in the meantime. 

The First Army, which has had to make two marches so far from 
Tholey to the Saar, is now within one day's march of that stream and, 
if the First and Second Army should make a combined attack on the 
enemy behind the Saar, has the necessary freedom of movement and 
has also regained sufficient room for the deployment of its troops.f 

For the subsequent operations after the enemy has been driven 
away from the Saar, it becomes necessary for me to know what direc- 
tion of operation is to be given to the Second Army. I assume that 
this direction will be toward NancyJ so that the First Army will not 
be forced toward the fortresses along the Mosel. 

The main reason for my request to be furnished this information 
was to find out whether His Majesty intended to order this or some- 
thing else, and I hereby renew my request, as my measures must 
necessarily depend on His Majesty's intentions." 



*Marginal Note by Moltke: — "This would have meant defeat for 
the First Army." 

Marginal Note by General Moltke: — "In place of overlapping 
the enemy it would be itself overlapped should it advance from Saar- 
briicken — Volklingen on Bolchen." 

JMarginal Note by General Moltke: — "Plans of operations, when 
in immediate contact with the enemy, can not be given to hold good 
for any length of time in the future." 



—235— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 110 

To THE Royal Minister for War. 
Mayence. 

Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870. 

I have the honor to inform the Royal Minister for War that H. 
M. the King has ordered the formation of a combination corps of 
troops for special purposes in and at Kaiserslautern, which will be 
composed of the following organizations: 

1. The 3d Landwehr Division, so far attached to general head- 
quarters of the lines of communications of the Second Army, which 
accordingly will be detrained at Kaiserslautern. 

2. Infantry Regiments Nos. 19 and 81, stationed in and around 
Mayence, and the 7th Reserve Uhlan regiment, which will be started 
from here on the 8th of August by marching. 

3. The three reserve foot batteries now marching from Cassel 
to Mayence, which will be sent from here without a stop, by marching. 

In place of the 3d Landwehr Division, the headquarters of the 
lines of communications of the Second Army will receive the follow- 
ing troops, sent by rail to Mosbach, where they will detrain on and 
after the 10th instant. 

Landwehr Regiments Nos. 53 and 56, at present at Wesel, 
the Landwehr Regiments Nos. 16 and 55, at present at Minden, and 
the 5th Reserve Hussar Regiment, at present at Paderborn. 



There being no exact information concerning the vic- 
tory at Weissenburg on August 4, the following inquiry- 
was sent: 

No. Ill 

To Lieut. General v. Blumenthal, Weissenburg, or 
wherever found. 

Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 9:10 A.M. 
Telegram. 

So far His Majesty has not received the smallest detail concern- 
ing the battle at Weissenburg, nor any information concerning our 
losses, while the French papers already contain these details. This 
must be immediately attended to. 



Even before Royal Headquarters had information of 
the battle of Spicheren on August 6th, the following orders 
were issued, based on reports of General v. Rheinbaben, 
commanding the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions: 



—236— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 112 ' 

To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz. 

SULZBACH. 

Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 5:1,5 P.M. 
Telegram. 

The enemy appears to be retreating from the Saar. His Majesty 
leaves it to your discretion whether or not to cross the frontier. The 
Saar must be crossed below Saarbriicken as the Saarbriicken — St. 
Avoid road belongs to the Second Army. Send reports here until 10 
A.M., to Ludswigshafen until 1 P.M., to Kaiserslautern until 4 P.M., 
and after 6 P.M. to Homburg. 



No. 113 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 
Homburg. 

Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 5:^5 P.M. 
Telegram. 

First Army crosses below Saarbrucken tomorrow to pursue the 
enemy. Desirable that in addition to cavalry the infantry of the 
Second Army also keeps at the enemy's heels. Saarbriicken — St. 
Avoid road belongs to Second Army. Send reports tomorrow [as in 
112]. 



No. 114 



To Headquarters, Third Army, 

Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 5 :Jf5 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Enemy appears to leave the Saar. First and Second Army in 
pursuit. Send reports tomorrow [as in 112]. 



A telegram from General v. Goeben from Saarbriicken 
at 6:30 P.M. brought the first information of the victory at 
Spicheren to Royal Headquarters ; General v. Moltke imme- 
diately asked by wire: 

No. 115 

To General of Infantry, v, Goeben. 
Saarbrucken. 

Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 7 :U5 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Please report approximate strength of enemy, and numbers of 
hostile regiments. Have prisoners been taken? 

—237— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Concerning the victory at Worth, 6 August, the follow- 
ing telegram was sent: 

No. 116 

To Headquakters First Army, Through General Goeben. 
Saarbrucken. 

Hq. Mayence 7 August 1870, 3:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Third Army has gained new great victory on the 6th over Mac- 
Mahon and parts of Canrobert and Failly. Stand made there by the 
enemy as vi^ell as west of Saarbrucken makes it not improbable that 
strong hostile forces are still in readiness near the Saar. Recon- 
naissance by cavalry necessary. 

A copy of this telegram was also sent to Headquarters Second 
Army in Homburg, and a few hours later the following orders: 

No. 117 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 
Homburg. 

Hq. Mayence, 7 August 1870, 8:15 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Information only now received that after the victory of the 
Crown Prince yesterday at Worth, MacMahon retreated on Bitsch; 
may reach that place today; cavalry and left wing of Second Army 
may gain touch with him tomorrow possibly at Rohrbach. 






No. 118 
To Headquarters, Third Army. 

SULZ. 

Hq. Mayence, 8 August 1870, 3:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

So far but one telegram received from Sulz, the one dated 10:15 
P.M. Absence of most important information. Where was the battle ? 
In what direction did enemy retreat? 



No. 119 

To Lieut.-General v. Blumenthal. 
Sulz, 

Hq. Mayence, 7 August 1870, 9:30 A.M. 

Hearty congratulations on your brilliant success. 

Your first telegram of last night was not received here, therefore 
we learned but this morning that battle took place at Worth and enemy 
retreats on Bitsch. A telegram was at once sent to Second Army 
that MacMahon possibly could be reached tomorrow in the vicinity of 

—238— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

Rohrbach by cavalry and by the left wing: of the Second Army, in 
case he keeps the direction on Saargemiind which is still held by the 
French. „ , , . ^ 

There also was yesterday a very hot fight at Forbach against 
four divisions under Frossard, in which finally (at least the leading 
elements of) the 14th, 16th, 5th and parts of the 6th Divisions took 
part. The main body of the Second Army intends to take a position 
today on the line Saarbriicken — Neu-Hornbach; the First Army will 
halt with its main body on the line Forbach — Volklingen and wili pur- 
sue the enemy with cavalry only. 

Concerning intentions of hostile main force we have but rumors. 

The most correct measure undoubtedly would be a general offen- 
sive against our Second Army, which has not yet been able to con- 
centrate all of its corps, as all of its leading elements have continued 
on the march so far. Sti 1, the French would encounter a superiority 
and such a step seems not in consonance with their conduct as so far 
displayed. 

Should the French main army retreat on Metz, it goes far away 
from MacMahon, leaves him to your pursuit and exposed to an even- 
tual flank attack by the Second Army. 

Should MacMahon be received, should the two French armies 
join, this could hardly be made at any other place than in the vicinity 
of Saarburg, where we will arrive about the same time. 

It is of importance to us to learn wether MacMahon marches 
to the west or to the southwest. 

As far as we can see conditions now, it appears to me to be the 
most correct procedure for the First and Second Army to advance 
now not against the Mosel above Metz, but first southward to join 
your army, as the next measure to be taken by the French main force 
must be in the nature of reconnaissance. 

Concerning the parts of the enemy at Hagenau, possibly these 
are intended for garrisoning Strassburg, where at present there is 
hardly anything but garde mobile. You will have to leave back suffi- 
cient force to guard against them. It is very desirable to take Hage- 
nau in the first panic. The siege train will be mobilized today. Siege 
of Strassburg can now be seriously considered; an advance as far as 
Vendenheim would secure to us utilization of the Strassburg — Nancy 
railroad. What you will have to leave behind will be relieved even- 
tually by a Landwehr division reinforced by two line regiments and 
one cavalry regiment. 

We are about to start to Homburg. 



No. 120 



To Headquarters, First Army. 
Volklingen. 

Hq. Homburg, 7 August 1870, 10:15 P.M. 
Telegram. 

His Majesty orders that the First Army remain in position be- 
tween Saarbriicken and Volkingen tomorrow with the Vllth and 
Vlllth Army Corps, holding the heights of Spicheren against any 
attack. Orders for future advance can be given only after cavalry 
has gained definite information concerning enemy's whereabouts. Sec- 
ond Army also halts. 



—239- 



Moltke's Correspondence 
No. 121 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 
Blieskastel, 

Hq. Hamburg, 7 August 1870, 11 P.M. 

His Majesty fully approves the measures to be taken on the 8th 
as outlined in the letter brought to these headquarters by Major Gen- 
eral V. Stiehle. 

Information received from the Third Army states that the hostile 
army retreated in the utmost confusion after the battle of Worth. 
Artillery tried to go into position at Niederbronn but was captured 
by the Bavarians. Enemy retreated on road to Bitsch, pursued by 
the cavalry, vi^hich captured four additional guns. Dead and wounded 
mapk the line of retreat. Third Army reaches Niederbronn today. 
No parts of Failly's corps were present in the battle. As so far the 
cavalry divisions have not ascertained whether the enemy retreated 
from Forbach and Saargemiind on Metz or in a southernly direction, 
the First Army has received orders to remain in its position tomor- 
row and hold the heights of Spicheren. Thus the right flank of the 
Second Army is perfectly protected. 

The telegram sent by General v. Steinmetz [see No. 125] has 
been read to His Majesty. His Majesty is now considering the issue 
of a proclamation or general order to the French Nation. 



No. 122 

To Headquarters, First Army — Volklingen; Second Army — Blies- 
kastel; Third Army — Sulz, or wherever found. 

Hq. Homhurg, 8 August 1870. 
Telegram. 

His Majesty orders that all military reports, questions, and re- 
ports to army headquarters be addressed to me. 



No. 123 

To General v. Steinmetz, 

Volklingen, or where found. 

Hq. Hamburg, 8 August 1870. 
Telegram. 

As so far no report has been received as to whether the enemy 
has evacuated Bolchen and Busendorf, the First Army must remain 
tomorrow in the position ordered for today. The Second Army will 
reach the Saar tomorrow with its last corps. Acknowledge receipt 
of this by v^dre. 



—240- 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

No. 124 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 
St. Johann, or where found. 

Hq. Homhurg, 8 August 1870, 11 P.M. 
Telegram. 

Will your headquarters be in Johann tomorrow? What move- 
ments are ordered for tomorrow ? The Illd Corps can not detrain in 
Saarbriicken.* 



No. 125 

Pencil draft in v. Moltke's handwriting for a letter 
from H. M, the King to General of Infantry v. Steinmetz. 

[No date; apparently 8 August 1870.} 

Replying to telegram which you sent on the 7th instant to head- 
quarters, Second Army, I call your attention to the orders which 
originally assigned to the First Army the direction of Saarlouis. In 
order not to isolate that army, but to cause it to await the arrival of 
the Second Army in a flank position, the First Army was held, by 
order of the 29th July and 3d August on the line Warden — Saarburg; 
thereafter around Tholey and Lebach. By the First Army extending 
its cantonments beyond the last named line as far at Ottweiler, it 
came into the march zone of the right wing of the Second Army, 
and consequently, by orders of thfe 5th instant, it was confined for its 
further advance to the roads towards Volklingen and Saarlouis. In 
spite of this the army took the direction via Guichenbach and Fisch- 
bach towards Saarbriicken — Forbach, a further advance to which line 
would be flanked by the enemy forces still at Bolchen. 

We therefore have to disapprove your views as expressed in the 
telegram to the Second Army, and emphatically declare that the 
Sev;ond Army advanced entirely in accordance with our views, which 
fact we have communicated to General of Cavalry, Prince Frederick 
Charles. 



No. 126 

To THE General Government of the Coasts, 
Hanover. 

Hq. Hamburg, 9 August 1970, 9:10 A.M. 
Telegram. 

After 4 P.M. today Royal Headquarters will be in Saarbriicken.* 



*This latter is a reply to a question if the lid Corps could not be 
detrained in Saarbriicken instead of Neunkirchen. 

*A11 telegrams as to change of locations of headquarters were 
sent to all headquarters and general governments. 



—241— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

No. 127 

To Headquarters, First, Second, Third Army. 

Hq. Saarbrucken, 9 August 1870, 8:00 P.M. 

Reports received justify the assumption that the enemy has re- 
treated to behind the Mosel and eventually Seille. 

All three armies will follow these movements. 

The Third Army receives for this the Saarunion — Dieuze road 
and connections south. 

The Second Army: St. Avoid — Nomeny road and south. 

The First Army: Saarlouis — Bolchen — Tennschen road and south. 

To protect the march the cavalry should be sent further ahead 
than usual and supported by advance guards thrown far to the front 
to give the armies time for closing up when necessary. 

Any change in the above march direction will be ordered only 
by His Majesty in so far as may be justified by the enemy's position 
or movements. 

The 10th of August may be utilized by the First and Second Army 
to give a day of rest to the troops or to start them on the roads as- 
signed to them. 

As the left wing can reach the Saar only by the 12th, the corps 
of the right wing will have to shorten their marches accordingly. 



No. 128 

To Headquarters, Third Army, 
Merzweiler, or where found. 

Hq. Saarhi-ucken, 9 August 1870, 9:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

First and Second Army resume the advance on the Mosel on the 
10th; march direction of Third Army, right wing on Saarunion — 
Dieuze; cavalry ahead. 



No. 129 



To Headquarters, Baden Division. 

Brumath. (Same to Third Army) 

Hq. Saarhriicken, 10 August 1870, 10 :U5 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Please inform the commander of the troops in front of Strass- 
burg that His Majesty orders him to prevent any and all trains carry- 
ing troops and supplies from the south reaching Strassburg. Complete 
siee-.^ desirable; reinforcements for that are now en route.* 



^Assembled at Hagenau: 1 Landwehr Division (12 bns., 4 sqns., 
3 btrs.); 34th Fus. Reg., 30th Inf. Reg., 2d Res. Drag. Regt., 2 
Res. Batteries, 3d F. A. Regt. — a total of 18 battalions; 8 squadrons, 
5 batteries. 



—242— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 130 

To His Majesty, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. 
Hamburg. 

Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870, noon. 
Telegram. 

The 1st Landwehr Division should be transported within the next 
few days to the upper Rhine. You. should as soon as possible report 
location of the troops to the Executive Commission in Berlin, and the 
latter shauld also be directed to conform the travel to the schedules of 
the Line Commission. 

These headquarters should be continually kept informed as to the 
location of the divisions. 



No. 131 

To Major General Baron Schuler v. Senden. 
Kaiserslautern. * 

Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870, 3:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

3d Landwehr Division will be immediately started on the march 
to Saarlouis. Await further orders there. 



No. 132 

To Headquarters, First, Second, Third Army. 

Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870. 

To preserve order in the trains it is necessary for headquarters 
of the line of communications to confine itself to those lines which 
are assigned to each army, and to send to the rear, as far as prac- 
ticable, also by these lines, only trains carrying wounded and other 
things. All such trains must be reported as early as practicable 
to the Line Commission, and in any event the time of their starting. 

General Headquarters of lines of communications must at all 
times keep Superior Headquarters, the Line Commission, and the 
War Ministry informed of the location of their headquarters and must, 
in addition, direct all commanding officers of lines of communications 
to stop interfering with movements of trains. 

According to the regulations of the system of lines of communi- 
cations, which regulations must be strictly complied with, the Direc- 
tor of Railroads at Headquarters, Lines of Communications is the 
proper person to regulate railroad traffic. 

The following was added to the letter sent to Head- 
quarters, Second Army. 



*Commander of 3d Landwehr Division. 

—243— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

It will be necessary to organize a special Line Commission for 
the roads from Neunkirchen westward and the Quartermaster Gen- 
eral of the Second Army probably will have to supply the needs of 
the First and Third Army. 



No. 133 

To THE General Government of the Coast District. 
Hanover. 

Hq. Saarhriicken, 10 August 1870, 7 :U5 P.M. 
Telegram. 

After 5 P.M. tomorrow Royal Headquarters will be in St. Avoid. 



No. 134 



To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz. 
Supposed to be in Volklingen. 

Hq. Saarhriicken, 10 August 1870, 7:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

There are persistent rumors that Your Excellency has removed his 
headquarters today from Volklingen to Lauterbach.* 

So far no official report has been received here concerning this, 
nor of the movements of the First Army today, nor of probable 
changes in the position of the First Army intended for tomorrow; 
this information should be furnished without delay. 



No. 135 

To Headquarters, First Army. 
Lauterbach.* 

Hq. Saarhriicken, 10 August 1870, 8:30 P.M. 

The following reports have been received so far from head- 
quarters Second Armv: 

The Illd Army Corps (right wing) reaches Falkenburg tomor- 
row and sends out an advance guard for the support of the indepen- 
dent cavalry. 

The leading elements of the IXth Army Corps are at Beningen 
— Merlenbach. 

The main body of the Xth Army Corps reaches Hallimer, sending| 
an advance guard towards Gr. Tanchen — Landorf. 

The Guard Corps proceeds to Insmingen, its advance guard to-| 
ward Altdorf — Wirmingen — Morchingen. 



* Later a report was received that headquarters had been trans-' 
f erred there. 

—244— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The IVth Army Corps sends its leading elements as far as Hars- 
kirchen, its advance guard to the line Altweiler — Miinster — Mari- 
mont. 

The leading elements of the XII Army Corps will reach Metzin- 
gen— Dieblingen — Wustweiler. 

Headquarters of the Second Army will be in Piittlingen. 



No. 136 
To Headquarters, First and Second Army. 

Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870. 

To prevent misunderstandings it is hereby ordered that in addi- 
tion to the villages situated on the main highway from St. Avoid to 
Trittlingen, Falkenberg, Herlingen, Han-on-the-Nied, Nomeny, the 
Second Army will use for the purpose of requisitions only those places 
located within one [English] mile north of that road. 



No. 137 

To General of Infantry, v. Stein metz. 

To be looked for starting from Lauterbach. 

Hq. Saarbriicken, 11 August 1870, 6 A.M. 

Your Excellency's letter of yesterday*, I received at 10 P.M. 

The occupation of Buschborn by the 35th Regiment is not at all 
in accordance with orders of the King concerning the advance of the 
armies and must be changed without delay. 

I shall not fail to submit Your Excellency's desire concerning 
the trains to His Majesty, but must state my conviction, that it is 
entirely impossible to allow the trains to march otherwise than on 
the roads on which the respective corps are marching. How bad it 
is to deviate from that rule is shown by the confusion which occurred 
yesterday on the road to Forbach, where the trains of the Illd Army 
Corps marched in addition to those of the Vlllth, Vllth and 1st, and 
where the IXth Corps is to march today. 

Finally, I again call attention to the fact that the three main 
highroads assigned to the three armies are to be taken only until 
the cavalry sends in information as to the location of the hostile main 
force. Then the three armies must not only concentrate within them- 
selves, but will also have to draw close to each other and at the pres- 
ent time it cannot be said whether the First Army will pass Metz — 
which in any case is but to be observed — on the south or on the north. 
For the purpose of such observation a Landwehr division — already 
mobilized — will be brought up. 



'^In this letter General v. Steinmetz complained that parts of 
the Second Army were met on roads assigned to his army. He further 
requested authority in a further advance on Metz to concentrate 
the trains of the First Army at St. Avoid and to let them follow 
from there on the highway via Falkenburg. 



-245- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

No. 138 

To Headquarters First Army. 

To be looked for starting from Lauterbach. 

Hq. Saarbriicken, 11 August 1870, 10 A.M. 

H. M. the King has been in ignorance of the whereabouts of 
army headquarters and location of the corps of the First Army dur- 
ing the entire day yesterday until 10 P.M.; and today it is so far not 
known what movements are intended. H. M. the King consequently 
calls your attention to existing orders requiring daily reports to be 
submitted, so as to enable His Majesty to make proper dispositions 
of the corps at any moment, which is more and more necessary the 
closer the armies get to the enemy. 

Enclosed herewith is a synopsis of the reports received here from 
the Second Army which, in connection with the previously furnished 
sketch of the movements of the Second Army for today, will give First 
Army headquarters a base for its further movements. 

It has also been reported that trains of the First Army are on 
the road to Forbach. His Majesty orders that these trains be imme- 
diately taken off the road which was originally assigned for the trains 
of the Second Army. 

Finally concerning the request of the 8th instant for permanent 
assignment of railroad trains on the Rhine — Nahe railroad to bring 
up supplies to the First Army, His Majesty has decided that the 
First Army should first of all use the land transportation assigned it 
on the different routes and that support by railroad trains can only 
be had in case of absolute need. Proper requisition for rail trans- 
portation should in such case be submitted, stating actual amounts 
to be transported, to the Commandant line of communications, and 
to these headquarters only when ammunition is required. 

Enclosure 

Synopsis of reports from the Second Army up to the 
evening of August 10: 

1. Railroad bridges at Herny blown up. 

2. Small infantry detachments of MacMahon's Corps marching 
on Metz. 

3. This morning strong columns marching out of Metz towards 
Bolchen and Pange. 

4. Military trains coming from Chalons arrived in Metz night of 
9-lOth. 

5. Camp of two hostile brigades seen at Pange. 

6. Strong infantry and artillery columns are marching from 
Metz toward Courcelles, Mont and Pange. 

No reports have been received from the First Army. 

It can be assumed with a degree of certainty that a 
part of the French Army is going into camp on the French 
Nied. 



—246— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

No. 139 

To Major General v. Stiehle.* 

Hq. Saarhrilcken, 11 August 1870, 10:Jlt5 AM. 

Thanks for all your reports, the more so as we have not heard 
anything from the First Army. I cannot even tell you to what point 
the 1st, Vlllth and Vllth Corps are marching today. Proper steps 
have been taken to correct this matter. 

Position behind Nied undoubtedly only a position of observation, 
main army evidently behind the Mosel. Leave it to your judgment if 
the Illd Corps had not better halt to allow others to close up. 



No. 140 
To Headquarters, First, Second, Third Army. 

Hq. Saarhrilcken, 11 August 1870, 11 A.M. 

Cases again have arisen of absolutely unnecessary destruction of 
railroads by our troops, and it is consequently necessary to issue 
the strictest orders forbidding the destruction of railroads and tele- 
graphs between the advancing armies and the enemy and to hold 
all organizations and officers to the strictest account in this matter. 

It is also necessary in our interests to at once occupy all tele- 
graph and especially railroad stations in all towns reached by our 
troops, to prevent their destruction by the population or individuals 
and to secure possession of removable material. 



No. 141 
To Headquarters First and Second Army. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 11 August 1870, 7 P.M. 

It is not improbable that a considerable portion of the enemy is 
this side of Metz on the left bank of the French Nied. Closer connec- 
tion between First and Second Army consequently becomes neces- 
sary. 

H. M. the King has ordered the following: 

The Hid Army Corps at Falkenberg will be the supporting point 
for this junction of the armies. 

The First Army will march tomorrow in good time with two 
corps to the line Bolchen — Mohringen, with one corps to Buschborn. 

The Second Army will send the IXth Corps to Lubeln, west of St. 
Avoid, at which place the lid Army Corps, so far as it is available, 
will join. The Xth Army Corps will proceed (about via Lellingen) 
to the rear of the Illd Corps. The Guard, IVth and Xllth Corps are 
to be drawn up towards the left wing of the above sketched position 
in such manner that they can join that position if required, or con- 
tinue the march in the direction of Nancy. 



*Aide to His Majesty and Chief of the General Staff of the Sec- 
ond Army. 

—247— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The outposts of the First Army will in general be advanced to 
the German Nied. 

All army corps will leave the second section of their trains in 
their today's location, leaving the roads completely clear. 

Tomorrow's location of headquarters of both armies will be re- 
ported at once. 

Addition to letter for Second Army: Extract of above orders has 
been sent to headquarters Hid Army Corps in writing; and tele- 
graphic extract sent to headquarters IXth Army Corps. [See No. 
142.] 



No. 142 
To Headquarters IXth Army Corps. 

B'ORBACH. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 11 August 1870, 8 P.M. 
Telegram. 

His Majesty orders that the corps marches via St. Avoid to 
Lubeln early tomorrow. Second section of trains to be left there 
today, clearing roads. 



On the morning of 11 August, H. R. H. Prince Fred- 
erick Charles, Commander of the Second Army, sent the 
following letter to General v. Moltke, giving his views of 
the situation as then existing: 

Hq. Piittlingen, 11 August 1870, 9:^5 A.M. 
Your Excellency: 

I sent you a report from Saargemiind that the enemy appeared 
to have concentrated in dense masses behind the French Nied, this 
side of Metz. 

It appears as if this concentration of hostile masses will lead to 
a battle. It does not seem probable that the enemy will advance from 
his excellent position and attack us, although this would be more in 
consonance with the French character than their heretofore defensive 
attitude. The enemy has not succeeded very well in his defense; it is 
reasonable to assume that he may now try the offensive. Although 
it is not very probable that he will do so I shall prepare for that event 
in such manner as to prevent him from attacking my corps separ- 
ately before the Second Army is concentrated, in so far as to preclude 
the possibility of my being defeated. 

The march of my army today is known to you. At its conclusion 
I shall hold my leading elements and will execute a turn to the right 
with my army (Hid Corps the pivot) only on receipt of the King's 
orders. 

I would suggest that the First Army be informed of this and 
ordered to march in such manner that it keep touch with my Hid 
Corps — partly extending the front, if necessary, against the enemy, 
but that it especially endeavor to envelop the hostile left flank with 
strong forces. I would not utilize more troops against the hostile 

—248— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

front that what would appear necessary to hold him there — similar 
to the conduct of my army at Sadowa — and to prevent the enemy's 
piercing our center. I shall bring the main pressure to bear on the 
enemy's right flank, advancing toward there offensively and in strength 
and will have at least one corps follow as reserve in echelon to my 
enveloping movement. 

We still have provisions to last us for four or five days, thanks 
to the enormous supplies taken in Saargemiind and Forbach. Your 
Excellency, however, will do well to take the necessary steps to have 
supplies brought up tomorrow by rail to Falkenberg and also have the 
troops of the lid Army Corps, at least in part, transported by rail to 
that place or at least as far as St. Avoid, so as to be as strong as pos- 
sible in the battle. 



All my corps are good and will do their full duty. Everybody is 
eager to get at the enemy. The King can have full confidence in 
them in that respect. We must have to be prepared for enormous 
losses and for a two days' battle; although I do not entirely believe 
the latter to be the case, I shall prepare for it. We can go into posi- 
tion in daytime in the front of the enemy; the preparatory move- 
ments towards the flanks will have to be made at night on reconnoi- 
tered roads, no fires ought to be built and the battle should be started 
early — not later than 5 o'clock. God will be with us. 

In the evening the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Army replied: 



No. 143 

To H. R. H., Prince Frederick Charles. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 11 August 1870, 8 P.M. 

Your Royal Highness' letter of this forenoon was received by 
me at 6 P.M.; there was not sufficient time to send a reply with the 
messenger who carries instructions which have now become necessary. 
These instructions are based on the views of Your Highness, that 
a new mission of the army requires a forceful and sudden offensive, 
which is the only correct method, considering that our corps are di- 
vided in the area from Saarlouis to Zabern; however they only pro- 
vide the first measures to be taken in case of the probable attack 
against the Hid Army Corps. 

A full turn as far as Verny would not be necessary and would 
even be dangerous should, as is not improbable, the enemy's detach- 
ment retreat to behind the Nied and should his main force be south 
of Metz behind the Seille or Mosel. I hope that our plans are in con- 
sonance with your Royal Highness' intentions. By tomorrow after- 
noon we will have six corps assembled, two of them in reserve, and 
we can be ten corps strong by day after tomorrow.* Should this not 
become necessary, the IVth, Xllth and Guard Corps would not have 



*Remark by Prince Frederick Charles: that means including the 
corps which have covered a day's march and which are not fresh. 

—249— ""^"^^ 



Moltke's Correspondence 

to be called up, in order to allow us to continue the advance against 
the Mosel in as much breadth as possible.* 



As nothwithstanding our haste the messenger leaves only novsr, I 
hand him this letter to carry along, asking your Royal Highness to 
pardon the hurried writing. 



Early on the 12th a supplement to the orders of the 
evening of the 11th, was sent to Hq. Second Army: 

No. 144 

To Headquarters Second Army. 

PtJTTLINGEN. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 7 A.M. 

As up to this hour no reports have been received which make 
the direct calling up of the Xth Army Corps to the north of the IHd 
necessary, it is left to your discretion to send that corps farther west- 
ward if that can still be done. 



Presuming that Strassburg would be invested very 
soon, and supplementary to the orders of 10 August (No. 
129) the following two queries were sent: 

No. 145 

To THE War Ministry. 
Berlin. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870. 
Telegram. 

When and where will the siege train be mobilized and when ready 
to start? 

No. 146 

To Headquarters Baden Division. 
Hagenau. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 7:15 A.M. 
Telegram. 

What measures have you taken in obedience to my cipher tele- 
gram of the 10th instant? Wire answer.f 



*Note by Prince Frederick Charles: This view will undergo a 
change as soon as Moltke receives information today that Nancy is 
free of the enemy and that masses have again been seen marching 
from Metz toward the Nied. 

fHeadquarters replied, that two infantry brigades were placed 
on the north and west sides and cavalry on the south side for the 
purpose of investing Strassburg; and that one battalion was at Kehl. 



—250- 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 147 

To Lieut.-General v. Fransecky. 
Saarbruecken.* 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 11 :50 A.M. 
Telegram. 

When will the lid Army Corps be assembled with its troops at Saar- 
briicken? When will the last trains reach there ?t 



No. 148 
To Headquarters, First Army. 

BOLCHEN. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870. 

The First Army can now get its subsistence supplies until fur- 
ther orders from the railroad depots at Forbach, St. Avoid and Fal- 
kenberg, in so far as they are not procured by requisition or carried 
on the army's own transportation. But the wagons sent to the above 
mentioned points must keep off the main highway Falkenberg — For- 
bach as much as possible. 



No. 149 
To Headquarters First, Second and Third Army. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 1^:30 P.M. 

As far as can be seen from reports so far received, the enemy's 
main force is retreating through Metz across the Mosel. 

His Majesty the King orders: 

The First Army tomorrow the 13th instant advances against the 
French Nied, main body towards line Tennschen — Pange, and secures 
the railroad depot of Courcelles. Cavalry reconnoiters towards Metz 
and crosses the Mosel below there. Thus First Army covers right flank 
of Second Army. 

Second Army marches towards line Buchy — Chateau — Salins and 
sends outposts to the Seille; it will try, if possible, to secure the cross- 
ings at Pont-a-Mousson, Dieulouard, Marbache, etc. Cavalry recon- 
noiters to beyond the Mosel. 

Third Army continues advance towards the line Nancy — Luneville. 
Orders for its further utilization will be issued in the next few days. 

The trains can everywhere follow their army corps as far as the 
Mosel and Meurthe. 

After 5 P.M. tomorrow Royal Headquarters will be in Herlingen. 
Send reports here up to 2 P.M. 



* Commander of lid Army Corps. 

fReply: At present lid Army Corps in triangle Neunkirchen — 
Homburg — Saarbrucken, except larger part of trains and columns ; the 
latter still en route from Berlin to Saarbriicken and will be assem- 
bled in Homburg and Neunkirchen only by the 14th. 



—251- 



Moltke's Correspondence 
No. 150 

To THE General Government, Coast Districts. 
Hanover. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 5:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

After 5 P.M. tomorrow Royal Headquarters will be in Herlingen, 
west of Falkenberg. 



No. 151 

To Lieut.-General v. Kummer. 
Mayence. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 5:30 P.M. 
Telegram. 

All troops assigned to your command have been started to Saar- 
louis and vicinity, where they will arrive on the 15th and 16th. Writ- 
ten orders sent by me to Saarlouis. [See next number.] 



No. 152 

To Lieut.-General v. Kummer. 
Saarlouis. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 11 A.M. 

His Majesty the King has issued the following orders for the 
utilization of the detachment of troops under your command, who will 
be joined within the next few days, at Saarlouis, by the 3d Reserve 
Hussar Regiment and the 5th Reserve Uhlan Regiment — the brigade 
of Major General v. Stranz. 

It is the task of the 3d Reserve Division to hasten to Metz and 
prepare the siege of that fortress by temporary investment. Thion- 
ville is to be observed. In any event it must prevent operations from 
Metz against the communications of the armies continuing the ad- 
vance. Until arrival of the 3d Reserve Division at Metz, a detachment 
of the First Army* will remain in front of Metz and it will orient Your 



No. 153 

To Lieut.-General v. Fransecky. 
Saarbrucken. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 13 August 1870. 
Telegram. 

Transportation by rail via Neunkirchen or Homburg of troops and 
trains of the lid Corps cannot be tolerated. 



*That army was directed to leave a division there. 
Excellency as to conditions in and in front of that fortress. At the 
present time it is not known of what the hostile garrison is composed. 



—252- 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 154 

To General Governmenti of Coast Districts. 
Hanover. 

Hq. St. Avoid, 13 August 1870, 11:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Instructions have been issued to the Guard Landwehr Division that 
it must apply to the Line Commission in the matter of rail transport to 
Karlsruhe. 

It v^^ill receive its orders from Lieut. General v. Werder.* 
The division will be relieved in Hanover by Silesian Landwehr bat- 
talions. 



No. 155 

To Headquarters First and Second Army. 

Hq. Herlingen, 13 August 1870, 9 P.M. 

According to information so far received large hostile detach- 
ments have halted at Servigny and at Borny on this side of Metz. 

His Majesty orders that the First Army remain tomorrow, the 
14th August, in its position on the French Nied and observe by ad- 
vanced guards whether the enemy retreats or advances to attack. 

Should the latter be the case, the Hid Army Corps of the Second 
Army will be sent tomorrow to opposite Pagny, the IXth Corps to 
Buchy in the direction of the Mosel (Pont-a-Mousson), where they 
will, provided they start early, be ready at a distance of 41 [English] 
miles to interfere in a more serious battle in front of Metz. The road 
from Herlingen via Buchy to Pagny is to be kept clear of all trains. 

On the other hand, the First Army is in a situation to prevent 
any advance of the enemy southward by a flank attack. 

The remaining corps of the Second Army will continue the ad- 
vance against the stretch of the Mosel from Pont-a-Mousson to Mar- 
bache. The Xth Corps will take position in front of Pont-a-Mousson. 

The cavalry of both armies must be sent ahead as far as possible 
and must interrupt a possible retreat of the enemy on the Metz — 
Verdun road. 



No. 156 



To Lieut.-General v. Werder. 
Hagenau. 

Hq. Herlingen, IJf August 1870. 

By orders of the King I have the honor to inform Your Excel- 
lency that the following troops assigned to your command have been 
brought up, or will shortly arrive, and are now ready at your dis- 
posal: 

Fusilier Regiment 34 at Hagenau, for the present under the 
orders of Lieut. General v. Beyer; 



*v. Werder had been assigned to the command of the siege corps 
at Strassburg, and the Guard Landwehr Division was attached to that 
corps. 

—252— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Regiment No. 30 at Hagenau; 

2d Reserve Dragoon Regiment at Hagenau; 

Guard Landwehr Division at Karlsruhe; 

1st Landwehr Division at Karlsruhe; 

One Reserve battery F. A. Regiment No. 1 at Karlsruhe; 

Tw^o Reserve batteries F. A. Regiment No. 3 at Karlsruhe. 

The Grand Ducal Baden Division is already at Strassburg. The 
mobilization of the siege train, as well as of the required fortress 
artillery and fortress engineer companies is completed, and they will 
be brought by rail as close to Strassburg as possible. 

It is Your Excellency's task to capture this place as soon as pos- 
sible. 



No. 157 
To Headquarters First, Second and Third Army. 

Hq. Herlingeyi, lU August 1870. 

The order of march of the artillery and trains, of themselves 
very satisfactory, is greatly interfered with by the carelessness of 
hired and requisitioned subsistence vehicles. 

Therefore His Majesty orders that the following points be strictly 
observed: 

1. All vehicles on the march will keep on the right side of the 
road, and fully clear the left side. Vehicles or columns traveling at 
an increased rate and overtaking moving vehicles or columns going 
in the same direction will pass the latter on the right and close to 
them. 

2. Marching two vehicles abreast is allowed for batteries and am- 
munition columns, and that formation should be taken when the re- 
spective column of troops marches in readiness for battle, or when 
it can be ascertained by the commanding officers that no other col- 
umns travel on the same road in either direction. To march that 
way, of course the road must be broad enough to accommodate three 
vehicles abreast. 

3. Each column halting for any reason whatever or for feeding, 
must under all circumstances clear the road and park alongside of it. 
This especially applies to sutler vehicles, which must be at once 
driven off the road, taking care however not to illtreat the animals. 

4. All commanders of troops and all field gendarmes should again 
be directed to watch over the execution of the above orders and to 
punish all violators of same, or report them to their proper authori- 
ties. 



No. 158 

To THE Minister of War, General op Infantry v. Roon. 

Hq. Herlingen, H- August 1870. 

Referring to your letter of the 12th instant; I have the honor to 
inform Your Excellency that by orders of His Majesty the 1st Army 
Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division have been attached to the First 
Army, the lid, IXth and the Xllth Army Corps to the Second Army, 
the Vlth Army Corps and the 2d Cavalry Division to the Third Army. 

—254— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The Guard Landwehr Division has received orders also to pro- 
ceed to Strassburg to reinforce the troops there, and it has been 
started by rail to Karlsruhe. This division v(rill be replaced in Han- 
over by Landw^ehr Regiments Nos. 23, 63, 22 and 62 and these latter 
will for that purpose be called up from Cosel and Glatz and trans- 
ported by rail from Frankenstein. 



No. 159 
Draft of Operation Orders for the 15th of August.* 

Hq. Herlingen, H August 1870. 

The First Army marches off to the left tomorrow^, the 15th Au- 
gust, and takes position on the line Pommerieux — Arry, between 
Seille and Mosel, south of Metz. 

One division remains at Courcelles. It will take over the ob- 
servation of Metz, as long as only its proper garrison is assumed to 
be in and around that place; this division will be relieved as quickly 
as possible by the mobilized 3d Landwehr Division. 

For final support of the First Army, the right wing of the Second 
Army (IX and Xllth Army Corps), marching on Pont-a-Mousson, 
will be in readiness a miie away. 

Those parts of the 6th Cavalry Division which are still near 
Metz may be called back by the Second Army in the course of the 
forenoon. 

The Second Army will resume the march to the Mosel. It is 
advisable to give troops a day of rest in rotation as the river is 
crossed; still headquarters of the Second. Army must not fail to send 
cavalry, as strong as possible, and supported by infantry detach- 
ments as far as practicable, without delay towards the Metz — Verdun 
road. 

Depending on reports received from the First Army that Army 
can also, and on the shortest road, advance against that road. Cross- 
ings are to be at once reconnoitered below Pont-a-Mousson and pre- 
pared. 



No. 160 

DRAFT OF OPERATIONS 

No date, apparently 1^ August 1870. 

If reconnaissance show that large masses of troops are in front 
of and behind Metz — 



*These orders were not issued. It seems they were sketched out 
by V. Moltke in the expectation that by the evening of the 14th relia- 
ble information would be received that the largest part of the French 
army had arrived behind the Mosel. But as by 6 P.M. the situation 
as to the enemy had not yet been ascertained, and nothing was knoVn 
at Royal Headquarters of the battle taking place in the meantime, the 
orders given in No. 161 came into force. The main points of these 
orders, however, recur in the orders for the 16th [No. 168], of course 
with due regard to the events on the 14th. 

—255— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

First Army. — Line Courcelles — Orny — Pournoy. 

Xllth Corps as support takes its rest day in Buchy-Solgne. 

Total 120,000 men. 

As soon as lid Corps arrives 150,000 men. 

Xth Corps rests today. On the 15th August at Gorze with 3d 
Cavalry Division. 

16th August five corps behind the Madine, that is on the left 
bank of the Mosel towards Metz, also 150,000 men. 

Third Army on the march to Paris. 



No. 161 

To Headquarters, First, Second and Third Army, as 
well as to Headquarters Illd, IXth and Xllth Army Corps : 

Hq. Herlingen, H'th August 1870, 6:00 P.M. 

Observations by the First Army have not resulted in any defin- 
ite clearing up of the situation in front of Metz. Still we may assume 
that the largest part of the hostile army is still this side of Metz. 

Considering that after exhausting marches the armies need a 
day of rest, and because such a day of rest can be taken by a part 
of the army corps with security against possible offensive under- 
takings from Metz, His Majesty the King hereby orders: 

The leading elements of the Hid, IXth, and Xlth Army Corps 
remain in their place tomorrow; these corps will close up within 
themselves and cook meals. 

The First Army also remains with the 1st and Vllth Army Corps 
in its present position; the Vlllth Army Corps, except that part de- 
tached via Bolchen to Bazoncourt— Alben for purpose of closer con- 
nection with the right wing of the Second Army, should be closed up, 
which at the same time will facilitate the subsequent necessary left 
flank movement of the First Army. There is no objection to the 
cavalry, especially the 3d Cavalry Division, going farther to the front. 

To better clear up the situation in the meantime it is absolutely 
necessary to advance on the left bank of the Mosel with larger forces 
against the connecting roads of the enemy, Metz — Verdun. 

This task the Second Army will assign to all the cavalry now on 
the left bank of the Mosel and support that cavalry in the direction 
of Gorze and Thiaucourt by those corps which cross the Mosel first. 

For this purpose the Hid Army Corps must prepare tomorrow 
a crossing below Pont-a-Mousson. 

The lid Army Corps continues its march in the direction it now 
has. 



The battle of August 14th made special orders neces- 
sary early on the 15th : 



—256— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 162 

To Headquarters Second Army. 

PONT-A-MOUSSON. 

Hq. Herlingen, 15 August 1870, early. 
Telegram. 

1st and lid Corps have, throuorh heavy fig:hting, driven strong 
hostile forces into Metz. Parts of the 18th Division were also en- 
gaged. The IXth Corps will get close to the battle today. Disposi- 
tion as to the Illd Corps reserved. Pursuit important on the Metz — 
Verdun road. 



No. 163 

To Headquarters First Army. 
Varize. 

Hq. Herlingen, 15 August 1870, early. 
Telegram. 

His Majesty orders that the First Army today hold the terrain 
gained in yesterday's battle, as far as it is not within range of the 
fortress guns. The Vlllth Corps should at once be brought up to 
support the 1st and Vllth. The IXth Corps which already was en- 
gaged yesterday, will be dravioi close to the battlefield. The leading 
elements of the lid Corps will today reach Han on the Nied. His 
Majesty will proceed to Pange. 



No. 164 
To Headquarters IXth Army Corps. 

Hq. Herlinyen, 15 August 1870.* 

The IXth Army Corps will immediately advance with all forces 
to Peltre — Jury, to be ready for a hostile advance. His Majesty pro- 
ceeds to Pange. 



No. 165 
To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz, 

Near Flanville, 15th August 1870, 10:45 A.M. 

His Majesty having convinced himself that there are no parts of 
the enemy this side of Metz, the advance of the First Army is no 
longer required. The 1st and Vllth Corps have received orders direct 
from these headquarters to halt and to send ahead only cavalry for 
observation of the fortress and to protect the wounded. The Vlllth 
'Army Corps, in so far as it has already started on the march, should 
proceed to Orny, where it will receive orders direct. 



*This order was received at 5 P.M. at corps headquarters. 



-257— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 166 

To Headquarters VIIIth Army Corps. 

Near Flanville, 15th August 1870, 10:^5 A.M. 

His Majesty having convinced himself that there are no parts of 
the enemy this side of Metz, the advance of the VIIIth Army Corps 
is no longer necessary. Shojild the corps be now en route, the march 
should be directed to Orny, via Pange. 



No. 167 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 

Near Flanville, 15 August 1870, 11 A.M. 
Telegratn. 

French driven completely into Metz and now apparently in re- 
treat on Verdun. All three corps of the right wing (Hid, Xllth, IXth) 
are now at the complete disposal of Second Army Headquarters; the 
Xllth Corps is already on the march to Nomeny. 



No. 168 

To Headquarters First, Second and Third Army. 

Hq. Herlingen, 15 August 1870, 6:30 P.M. • 

As long as it has not been ascertained whether more than the 
regular garrison is in Metz, it will be necessary to leave one army 
corps of the First Army in the vicinity of Courcelles, which will very 
shortly be relieved by the corps under Lieutenant General v. Kum- 
mer coming up from Saarlouis. The other two corps of the First 
Army will take position tomorrow, the 16th, between the Seille and 
Mosel, about on the line Arry — Pommerieux. A crossing over the 
last named stream should be at once reconnoitered, provided that it 
has not already been done in that vicinity by the Illd Army Corps, 
in which case it will be kept intact for the use of the First Army. 

By telegram of 11 A.M. this date, the Second Army received 
free disposition of all its corps. An early report concerning its move- 
ments is expected, but in general the following is known: 

Conditions under which the 1st and Vllth Army Corps and parts 
of the 18th Division victoriously fought last evening preclude any 
pursuit. The fruits of the victory can be gathered only by a strong 
offensive by the Second Army against the roads from Metz as well as 
via Fresnes and Etain towards Verdun. It is left to Headquarters 
Second Army to conduct such an offensive with all available means 
at hand. Even if the Second Army gets for the time being ahead 
of the First Army, care will be exercised at these headquarters in 
arranging for a further advance westward, which steps cannot be 
foreseen at present and steps will also be taken to give the troops 

—258— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

all necessary rest. The leading elements of the Third Army today 
reached the line Nancy — Dombasle — Bayon; its cavalry is raiding 
towards Toul and south thereof. After 5 P.M. tomorrow Royal Head- 
quarters will be at Pont-a-Mousson ; send reports here until 1:00 
P.M. 



No. 169 

Unsealed Orders for the respective detachments of both 
Armies. 

Hq. Herlingen, 16 August 1870, 7:15 A.M. 

The IXth Army Corps shall today, if possible, cross on the bridge 
prepared by the Illd Army Corps in the vicinity of Arry, and in any 
case will approach close to the river. Therefore it is advisable that 
the First Army let that corps pass ahead, the bivouac of the Vlllth 
Corps should be changed accordingly. 



News of the battle at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour caused 
the following orders to be issued on the evening of the 16th 
of August: 

No. 170 

To Headquarters, First Army. 

POMMERIEUX. 

Hq. Pont-a-Mousson, 16 August 1870, 5:00 P.M. 

The enemy retreating from Metz has been attacked today at 
Rezonville by the IHd Army Corps, coming from Gorze. The Xth 
Corps is being brought up from the west. In order to force the 
enemy into a northerly direction away from Chalons and Paris, and 
because he appears to be in considerable force, His Majesty orders 
that the two disposable corps of the First Army cross the Mosel im- 
mediately after the troops of the IXth Corps. Until the troops have 
crossed, the trains of all three corps must remain on the right bank of 
that river. 

The subsequent direction of the Vlllth and Vllth Army Corps 
will be regulated by Army Headquarters with due regard to bringing 
them into touch with the enemy as soon as possible. 

These headquarters will issue the necessary orders for continu- 
ing the march of both armies westward. 



No. 171 
To Headquarters, Second Army. 

Hq. Pont-a-Mousson, 16 August, 8:00 P.M. 

Headquarters First Army has received orders to cross the troops 
of the Vlllth and Vllth Army Corps over the Mosel immediately be- 
hind the troops of the IXth Army Corps tomorrow, and send them 
by the shortest direction against the enemy. 

—259— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



Proper formation of the First and Second Army, in the sense of 
a subsequent advance westward, can be attended to later; at present 
the most important point is to force as large a part of the hostile 
army away from Chalons and Paris in a northerly direction and to 
pursue it to and into Luxemburg territory. 

The remainder of the Second Army may now halt and rest, and 
it will be sufficient if the crossings over the Mass are occupied by 
advanced leading elements. 



Before Headquarters Second Army had sufficient infor- 
mation concerning the seriousness of the battle at Vionville 
— Mars-la-Tour, Major General v. Stiehle wrote the follow- 
ing letter to the Chief of the Great General Staff, which be- 
fore the departure of Second Army Headquarters for the 
battlefield, he left in Pont-a-Mousson to be handed to Royal 
Headquarters on its arrival. 

"Hq. Pont-d-Mousson, 16 August 1870, 2:00 P.M. 

I leave behind me a copy of Army orders just issued for the per- 
usal of Your Excellency. 

The report of the Illd Corps at Vionville, dated 10 A.M., justifies 
the assumption that a strong detachment has been forced off and is 
retreating on Thionville; the Hid Corps has orders to pursue directly, 
advancing its left wing, to either force the retreating enemy into the 
fortress of Thionville or against the Belgian frontier. As such a 
possibility was foreseen, today's Army orders give the right wing 
of the Second Army (Xth, Hid, IXth Corps) a certain independence 
and leave dispositions of that wing in the hands of General v. Voigts- 
Rhetz, whenever His Royal Highness should not be present. 

I believe it is best to quietly leave the other four corps of the 
Second Army on the march towards the Maas from Bannoncourt to 
Commercy, to gain possession of the crossings there tomorrow. After 
that we undoubtedly will have to halt for several days in order not to 
emerge from the Argonne into the plain of Champagne with only 
some of our leading elements. 

As reports of the cavalry state that Toul is only weakly occupied 
and little prepared. General v. Alvensleben has received instructions 
as to the importance of undertaking a raid against that place to se- 
cure our railroad connections, — we must be satisfied in merely calling 
his attention to this fact, we cannot order anything in tl^ absence of 
definite information. 

Today and tomorrow we will get far ahead of the Third Army, 
an additional reason to halt on the Maas. 



Just received, 2 P.M. 

General v. Kraatz reports from Thiaucourt at 11:30 A.M. that 
the Hid Corps is fighting with strong forces at Rezonville. General 
V. Rheinbaben is there with .nine regiments of cavalry and four bat- 
teries. The 20th Division is marching to the sound of the guns; noti- 
fication is being sent to the 19th Division. We ride to the spot via 
Gorze. 

—260— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
General v. Moltke replied: 

No. 172 

To Major General v. Stiehle. 

Hq. Pont-d-Mousson, 16 August 1870, 8:00 P.M. 

According to our views the success of the campaign rests in 
driving northward the main hostile forces retreating from Metz. The 
more the Hid Army Corps has in its front, the greater the victory will 
be tomorrow, when the Xth, Hid, IXth, Vlllth Vllth Corps and 
finally the Xllth Corps will be disposable against the hostile force. 

Only when this main object is obtained will the First and Sec- 
ond Army be separated for a continuation of the march westward. The 
corps of the Second Army not now engaged may halt. 

A quick arrival on the Maas appears of minor importance, but 
the capture of Toul would be of great value. There is at present 
no necessity for the deployment of the three corps from the Second 
Army. 



The day before the battle of Gravelotte — St. Privat the 
following orders were issued : 

No. 173 

To Headquarters First Army. 
Coin-on-the-Seille. 

Hq. Pont-d-Mousson, 17 August 1870, 2:00 A.M. 

The Hid and Xth Corps held their positions yesterday. Never- 
theless support as early as possible, at daybreak, is urgently desirable. 

The corps of the Second Army, coming up, will have to cover 
larger distances than those of the First Army. Therefore it is neces- 
sary that the corps of the First Army start immediately, utilizing 
all available crossings (which probably has already been ordered). 

His Majesty will very shortly proceed to Gorze, where he expects 
to receive early reports. 



No. 174 
To Headquarters First and Second Army.* 

Hill south of Flavigny, 17 August 1870, 1:U5 P.M. 

The Second Army will fall in at 5 A.M. tomorrow the 18th and 
advance in echelons [the orders to First Army road read — advance in 
echelon from the left wing], between the Yron and Gorze creeks (in 
general, between Ville-sur-Yron and Rezonville). The Vlllth Army 
Corps will join this movement on the right wing of the Second Army. 
At the start the Vllth Army Corps will have the mission of protecting 



*Delivered by a general staff officer of Royal Headquarters. 

—261— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

the movements of the Second Army against possible operations from 
Metz. Further orders from the King will depend on the measures 
taken by the enemy. Send reports for the present to hill south of 
Flavigny. 



No. 175 



To General of Cavalry v. Manteuffel.* 

COURCELLES. 

Hq. Pont-d-Mousson, 17 August 1870, 10 P.M. 

In the very probable case of the French Army executing an attack 
in superior forces on the 1st Army Corps, after the corps of Fros- 
sard, Decaen (successor to Bazaine), Ladmirault and the Guarde Im- 
periale were defeated yesterday after a long and bloody battle by the 
Illd, Xth and parts of the Vlllth and IXth Army Corps at Vionville, 
it would be in entire accord with His Majesty's intentions, should 
Your Excellency, for the purpose of covering our communications, 
fall back in the direction of Remilly. 



Shortly before Royal Headquarters left Pont-a-Mous- 
son the following orders were issued early on August 18, 
1870: 

No. 176 

To Headquarters, First Ari/iy. 
Ars on the Mosel. 

Hq. Pont-d-Mousson, 18 August 1870, i:00 A.M. 

Nothing is changed in matters of command in the First Army. 
Direct orders from His Majesty may also today be expected to be 
received on the battlefield. 

The Vllth Army Corps will for the present assume a defensive 
attitude. Connection with the Vlllth Army Corps can be sought only 
towards the front. 

Should it be ascertained that the hostile army is retreating into 
Metz, our corps will execute a turn to the right. 

Direct support for the First Army, should that become neces- 
sary, will be given by the second line of the Second Army. 



During the battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat the follow- 
ing orders and directions were issued by Royal Headquar- 
ters to the different headquarters: 



^Commanding General 1st Army Corps. 
—262— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

No. 177 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 

Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 9:20 A.M. 

There is an unimportant skirmish on the right wing of the Vllth 
Army Corps. The troops visible on the hills towards Metz appear 
to be moving northward, possibly toward Briey. It does not appear 
that the First Army requires more extensive support than can be 
furnished by the Hid Corps from Vionville or St. Marcel. 



No. 178 

To Headquarters, Second Army. 

Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 10:30 A.M. 

Reports received justify assumption that the enemy intends to 
hold his position on plateau between Le Pont-du-Jour and Montigny- 
la-Grange. 

Four hostile battalions have advanced into the Bois des Geni- 
vaux. His Majesty considers ife advisable to start the Xllth and 
Guard Corps in direction of Batilly in order to reach the enemy at St. 
Marie-aux-Chenes, should he march toward Briey — and in case he 
should remain on the heights to attack him from direction of Aman- 
villers. This attack would have to be made in conjunction with the 
First Army attacking from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte, the 
IXth Corps attacking against the Bois des Genivaux and Verneville, 
and the left wing of the Second Army attacking from the north. 



No. 179 
To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz. 

Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 12:00 noon. 

The battle now being heard is but a partial engagement near 
Verneville and does not make a general attack of the First Army nec- 
essary. The First Army should not let strong bodies of troops be 
seen, and in any case only its artillery for purpose of preparing the 
subsequent attack. 



No. 180 
To Headquarters, Second Army. 

Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 1:45 P.M. 

The IXth Corps is now engaged in an artillery battle in front 
of the Bois Doseuillons. The actual general attack along the entire 
line will not be made sooner than important fighting forces can ad- 
vance from Amanvillers. 



—263- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The day after the battle (of Gravelotte-St. Privat) the 
following two orders were issued: 

No. 181 
To Headquarters of the First and Second Army. 

General Hq., Rezonville, 19 August 1870, 8 :i5 A.M. 

1. Burial of the dead and of dead horses will be carried out 
by the troops within their billet areas ; the southern road from Metz to 
Verdun forming the dividing line between the First and Second 
Army. The villages situated along this road are assigned to the First 
Army, including the lid Army Corps. This division of billet areas 
will hold good also for requisitions. 

2. *The Second Army is hereby directed to send one squadron to 
Pont-a-Mousson to Headquarters of Lines of Communications to be at 
the disposal of the C. O. thereof. 



No. 182 



To Headquarters of the First, Second and Third Army and 
to H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

On the hill in front Fort St. Quentin, 19 August 1870, 11 A.M. 

After the victorious events of the last few days it is necessary 
and permissible to give complete rest to the troops and to bring up 
replacements to fill up losses. It is in addition required that the 
armies will continue the march against Paris in one line in order to 
meet in sufficient strength new formations that may eventually as- 
semble at Chalons. Considering further that the French army, driven 
back on Metz, might make an attempt to fight its way through west- 
ward, it will be to the point to leave six army corps on the left bank 
of the Moselle, which can oppose such an attempt on the ridge that 
has been captured yesterday. One army corps and the Reserve Divi- 
sion will remain on the right bank of the Moselle which will fall back 
if necessary in case of a superior hostile attack. 

His Majesty designates for this investment the II, III, IX, and 
Xth Army Corps in addition to the First Army and 3d Reserve Div- 
ision.f 

His Majesty intrusts to H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles the 
command of all troops designated for the investment of the French 
main army and further directs that the Guard, IVth and Xllth Corps 
and the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions will be under the orders of 
the Crown Prince of Saxony so long until the original army organiza- 
tion can be readopted. The staff of H. R. H. the Crown Prince of 
Saxony will be organized in compliance herewith. 

The ridge designated for the defense will be fortified and, for 
the rest, cantonments in rear as far to the Orne, can be occupied. 



*Par. 2 to the Second Army only. 

fThe commanding general of this division, Lieut.-General von 
Kummer, received direct orders (see next number). 

—264— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The three corps, temporarily detached from the Second Army, 
will go into quarters on the other side of the Orne and the Yron. The 
Third Army will halt for the present on the Meuse. 

Headquarters of His Majesty remains for the present in Pont-a- 
Mousson, where one battalion of the lid Corps will be left. 



No. 183 

To Lieut-General von Kummer. 

General Hq., Pont-d-Mousson, 20 Augitst 1870. 

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that, since the French 
main army has been forced by the battle of 16 and 18 August to 
withdraw into the fortress of Metz, it became necessary to designate 
a larger body of troops to invest that place. 

H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles has assumed command of this 
investing army, and Your Excellency and your troops [see No. 182], 
will now be under direct orders of H. R. H., who has taken his head- 
quarters in Doncourt. 



No. 184 



General Hq,, Pont-d-Mousson, 20 August 1870. 

1. Corps headquarters of the mobilized troops in the coast dis- 
tricts, the 17th Division (exclusive of ponton train) and the 2d Land- 
wehr Division will be sent by rail to Neunkirchen and Homburg. 

Their place will be taken by Landwehr Regiments Nos. 10 and 
50 from Neisse to the Province Hanover, and it is left to the dis- 
cretion of the General Government of the Coast Districts to also 
draw up the 3d and 43d Landwehr Regiments from Konigsberg as 
well as the 45th Landwehr Regiment from Graudenz and Thorn to the 
North Sea coast. 

2. A detachment will be formed to invest Thionville, to con- 
sist of: 

Inf. Regt. No. 65 (two battalions from the Headquarters of 
Lines of Communications of the First Army, one battal- 
ion from Cologne). 

28th and 68th Landwehr Regiments from Cologne. 

One heavy reserve battery of the 7th Regiment from Cologne. 

4th Reserve Hussar Regiment (from Neisse, Glatz and Cosel). 

Headquarters of Lines of Communications of the First Army 
receives in their place the 17th Landwehr Regiment from Wesel.* 

3. The 3d Zieten Hussar Regiment will for the present be de- 
tached from the 6th Cavalry Division and placed under the orders of 
H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles. 



*The different Governments, to which the above mentioned troops 
pertained, received corresponding orders. 



-265- 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 185 

To Lieut-General von Werder. 

MuNDOLSHEiM (in front of Strassburg) (in answer to query 
from General v. Werder). 

General Hq., Pont-d-Mousson, 20 August 1870, 7:00 AM. 

Telegram. 

Bombardment of Strassburg from Kehl fully justified if capitu- 
lation can be reached by this means, which, however, cannot be de- 
termined here. 



No. 186 

To Major General v. Stiehle. 

General Hq., Pont-d-Mousson, 21 August 1870. 

Telegraphic orders have been sent to send 50 heavy twelve- 
pounders. Their arrival in front of Metz at Ars-on-the-Moselle will 
be reported by wire. 

I would call your attention to the fact that an eventual breaking 
through of the invested army in a northeasterly direction appears to 
us to be the least danger, while, on the other hand, its advance south- 
ward would cause us much trouble. Thereby the line Frossard — 
Strassburg would be pierced, which line receives an especial impor- 
tance in an advance on Chalons. Since the strength of the investing 
army has been brought to 71 army corps, a stubborn resistance should 
be made also on the right bank, at least in that direction. 



No. 187 
To Headquarters of the Army in Front op Metz. 

General Hq., Pont-d-Mousson, 21 August 1870. 

You will regulate all Lines of Communications matters for all 
troops around Metz, adhering as much as possible to existing com- 
munications. 

In this you will count in general only on the railroad to Cour- 
celles, while that via Nancy of the Third Army Detachment remains 
under direction of H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

It is necessary for that army detachment to organize a provisional 
Line of Communications Hq. in connection with General Hq. of 
the Army Line of Communications, in which, under present con- 
ditions, Colonel V. Bliicher and his staff may be available in assum- 
ing the above mentioned arrangement of Lines of Communications 
matters General Hq. of the L. of C. of the Second Army had probably 
best arrange for its headquarters at Remilly. 

Thereupon the Second Army, which will soon be reinforced by. 
four Saxon battalions, will have to detach to the newly organized 
Hq. of L. of C. of its L. of C. troops four battalions and two squad- 
rons, and these as much as possible to be taken from the troops 
in the first line. 



—266- 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

No. 188 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz, the First 
AND Third Army, as Well as to the Army Detachment of 
the Crown Prince of Saxony and Lieut.-General v. Werder. 

General Hq., Pont-a-Mousson, 21 August 1870. 

The French Government has ordered the mobilization of the mo- 
bile Guards (inc. the levies of 1869). 

These are to be concentrated in the main cities of their arron- 
dissements and their uniform is to consist of blue blouse with leather 
belt and a red cross on the sleeve, linen trousers and caps. 

Wherever such men are found, they will be treated as prisoners of 
war. 

You will instruct your subordinate headquarters and line of 
communication authorities accordingly. 



No. 189 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz, the First 
and Third Army and H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq., Pont-d-Mousson, 21 August 1870, 11:00 A.M. 

Since a large portion of the French Army has been beaten and 
invested in Metz by 71 army corps, the Army Detachment of the 
Crown Prince of Saxony and the Third Army will continue the march 
westward in such manner that the latter will remain on the left of the 
former and in general one day's march away in order to attack the 
enemy, wherever he makes a stand, in front and on his right and 
push him to the north of Paris. 

According to reports received here only hostile detachments are 
said to be in Verdun, probably retreating on Chalons, but that at 
the latter place portions of the Corps of MacMahon and Failly are 
assembling, as well as new formations and single regiments from 
Paris and the west and south of France. The Army Detachment 
under the Crown Prince of Saxony and the Third Army will con- 
centrate against that point on August 26th on the line Ste. Mene- 
hould — Vitry-le-Francois. 

The former will start on the 23d instant and will march to the 
line Ste. Menehould — 'Daucourt — Givry-en-Argonne, where its ad- 
vance guards must arrive on the 26th. Verdun to be captured by 
surprise, or to be turned on the south, leaving an observation detach- 
ment. 

The Third Army will starts so that it will reach with its advance 
guards the line St. Mard-sur-le-Mont — Vitry-le-Francois on the 26th. 

On the 23d General Headquarters proceeds to Commercy, where 
the IVth Army Corps has left one battalion as garrison. 



—267— 



Moltke's Correspondence 
No. 190 

To General Headquarters of the Coast Districts. 
Hanover. 

General Hq., Pont-a-Mousson, 22 August 1870. 

His Majesty the King has ordered the formation of two reserve 
army corps, one of them to be concentrated at Berlin, the other at 
Glogau. 

The Royal Government should issue orders as soon as possible — 
for organizing the former — for the rail transportation of the 1st, 
3d, 4th, 5th, 43d and 45th Landwehr Regiment and the 1st Reserve 
Ulan Regiment. 



No. 191 

To General Government of Posen. 

General Hq., Pont-a-Mousson, 22 August 1870. 

His Majesty the King has ordered the formation of two new 
reserve army corps at Berlin and Glogau. 

For organizing the latter, are designated: the 7th, 47th, 10th, 
50th, 84th and 85th Landwehr Regiments as well as the 1st Reserve 
Ulan Regiment, which has heretofore been placed at the disposition 
of the Royal Government, and, finally, the three reserve batteries 
of the Vth Army Corps. 

Home Headquarters of the IVth Army Corps will order the trans- 
portation of the 84th and 85th Landwehr Regiments. 

By leaving to the discretion of the Royal General Government all 
details, it is remarked that, until complete organization of the corps, 
the respective troop units are to be placed under orders of the immo- 
bile commands of the home headquarters of the Vth Army Corps. 



No. 192 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz, the First 
AND Third Army, and the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq., Pont-a-Mousson, 22 August 1870. 

His Majesty the King permits that, deviating from general 
regulations, all troop commanders are allowed to have medicinal 
carts follow the troops directly on the march when an engagement is 
expected. 



1 



No. 193 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front Metz, the First and 
Third Army, the Crown Prince of Saxony, and to Lieut.- 
General v. Werder. 

General Hq., Pont-a-Mousson, 22 August 1870. 

Formation of Volunteer Corps has been started in all Depart- 
ments. Their appellation is "franctireurs." 

—268— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

Uniform : 

Cap, blue, with narrow red band, 

Light civilian blouse. 

Red wool belt (ceinture) 

Linen trousers with white leggins, haversack. 

Armament: 

Carbine (a la tabatiere) , bayonet. 

According to information received, the task of these men is to 
take all dispersed soldiers by surprise and shoot them. 

But, as the franctireurs themselves are no soldiers, they are 
amenable — according to Paragraph 2 of the Proclamation, — to mili- 
tary law and death. 



No. 194 



To H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles. 

DONCOURT.* 

General Hq., Pont-d-Mousson, 22 August 1870. 

I have the honor to reply to Your Royal Highness, that so far 
it has not been possible to assign a number of general staff offi- 
cers from those still remaining at home to the field army, nor to 
still more weaken the working staff of these headquarters by detach- 
ing" Captain von Biilow. In order to meet the wishes of Your Royal 
Highness as much as possible. Major von Holleben will be detailed to 
the staff of the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

We are fully aware of the difficulties and bad features of the 
very important task that has fallen to your lot, but they may be 
of only short duration. Should the enemy succeed in breaking through, 
his attempt will probably be made in the direction of Nancy, then 
the war of investment will immediately turn into mobile war. As 
we may with assurance count on most energetic pursuit, in such 
a case, according to my opinion, the advance of the other two armies 
should proceed without interruption. 

If the French army in Metz is not able to fight its way through, 
it surely cannot hold out long there, in view of the impossibility of 
relief, and then Your Royal Highness would achieve, with its capitu- 
lation, one of the most important successes shown by military history. 



No. 195 



To THE General Government of the Coast Districts. 
Hanover. 

Hq., Pont-d-Mousson, 22 August 1870, 11:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Send messages for His Majesty to this place up to 10:00 A.M. 
tomorrow, thereafter to Commercy. 



* Answer to a private letter from the Prince, the contents of 
which can be gleaned from this answer. 



-269— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

No. 196 

To Lieutenant General von Blumenthal. 

LiGNY. 

General Hq., Commercy, 23 August 1870, 3:00 A.M. 

In reply to your letter of the 22d instant enclosing the march 
tables for the Third Army for the next succeeding days, I have the 
honor to state that it vi^ould correspond with His Majesty's inten- 
tions, if, in general, and on the 26th, the cavalry divisions w^ould 
remain in front of the army. According to reports w^e have here it 
is not impossible that the hostile army, assembled to Chalons, is 
about to march off. In that case it would be desirable to ascertain 
the correct march direction of the enemy through cavalry sent far 
out and also sent south of Chalons, and in which case these headquar- 
ters will reserve the right to change the marches to be made by the 
entire Third Army on the 26th. For the same reasons, and in order 
to secure more roads for further advance, it is left to your discre- 
tion, whether it is possible to send the Vlth Corps towards Join- 
ville as early as tomorrow, as it, if necessary, could then be dravni 
the day after tomorrow to St. Dizier. 



I 



No. 197 

To Headquarters, Army Detachment of H. R. H. the Crown 
Prince of Saxony. 
Jeandelize. 

General Hq., Commercy, 23 August 1870. 

I have the honor to inform you that these headquarters will be 
in-Bar-le-Duc tomorrow. Send messages to this place until 10 o'clock. 

You are also requested to submit the march tables of your detach- 
ment for the next few days as soon as possible. 



No. 198 

To Headquarters of the First Army. 
Ars-on-the-Moselle. 

General Hq., Commercy, 2Jf August 1870, 7 :00 A.M. 

His Majesty permits that, considering the great distance from 
your headquarters to headquarters of the First Army, that the two 
daily reports may be-omitted. However, these headquarters expect 
that, in so far as telegraphic communication exists, you will im- 
mediately report everything important. 



—270- 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 199 

To H. R. H., THE Crown Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq., Commercy, 2U August 1870, 7:00 A.M. 

According to a report received here, Emperor Napoleon is said 
to be in Reims with a portion of the fighting forces. On the other 
hand, a letter from a high ranking French officer in Metz, intercepted 
by the Second Army, indicates that Metz counts with certainty on 
relief by the troops concentrated at Chalons. This attaches an in- 
creased importance to the Reims — -Longuyon — Thionville railroad. 
Thorough interruption of that road at several points is desirable, 
as well as observation by the cavalry towards Reims. 



No. 200 
To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 

General Hq., Commercy, 2U August 1870, 7:00 A.M. 

According to a report received here. Emperor Napoleon is said 
to be in Reims with a portion of his fighting forces, while Metz is 
counting on relief from the troops concentrated at Chalons. This 
attaches increased importance to the Reims — Longuyon — Thionville 
railroad. The Crown Prince of Saxony has been directed to have 
thorough destruction of that road made in his zone, and it is left to 
your discretion to take similar steps. 

At the same time you are informed that a detachment consisting 
of: 

The 65th Infantry Regiment 

The 28th and 68th Landwehr Regiments 

One reserve battery from Cologne 

The 4th Reserve Hussar Regiment* 
will be concentrated in the next few days at Saarburgf under com- 
mand of Major General von Bothmer (heretofore commandant in 
Cologne). 

General von Bothmer has been directed to await orders from 
your headquarters in Saarburg. In so far as a mere observation of 
Thionville from there is considered sufficient, the above troops can 
be utilized in front of Metz, in which case, according to our views, 
reinforcement of the position on the right bank of the Moselle above 
Metz seems advisable. 



No. 201 

To ALL Armies and the Army Detachment Under H. R. H. the 
Crown Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq., Commercy, 2U August 1870. 

The case has arisen that French surgeons released from hospitals 
have been sent from the rear through another army directly towards 



*Major General von Bothmer and the 4th Reserve Hussar Regi- 
ment in Neisse received orders direct. 
fin the Rhine Province, near Trier. 

—271— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

the enemy. On this it is remarked that it is not permissible to ar- 
range for the return of surgeons, guaranteed them by the Geneva 
Convention, to their army, in such manner that thereby the secrecy 
of our movements is endangered. Consequently surgeons, etc., will 
be sent back by a detour, for instance, across neutral ground, or only 
after a phase of the operations has been completed. 



No. 202 



To Headquarters, Third Army. 

LiGNY. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, H August 1870. 

Replying to your letter of today, your headquarters is requested, 
to transmit to these headquarters and to the Army Detachment of 
the Crown Prince of Saxony the parole and counter-sign given out 
today by your headquarters. 

The above named detachment has been directed that the parole 
and counter-sign of the Third Army will be in force there also.* 



Reports received at General Headquarters up to the 
evening of August 24th, concerning the Army under Mac- 
Mahon, stated that that army was marching from Chalons 
towards Reims, but left doubt as to the purpose of that 
movement. Therefore General von Moltke decided to give 
to the further march of the German armies such a direction 
that a turn could be made against Reims, but at the same 
time adhering to the general direction on Paris without 
material loss of time. For this purpose he composed the 
following orders, which however were not issued on account 
of reports coming in during the night of August 24-25th: 

No. 203 

To Headquarters of the Army Detachment Under H. R. H. 
THE Crown Prince of Saxony, Monthairon, and Third Army 

AT LiGNY. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 2U August 1870, 7:00 AM. 

As it has been ascertained that Chalons also has been evacuated 
by the French, His Majesty the King desires that a day of rest be 
granted the troops at suitable points on the 26th or 27th. 



*In front of Paris, General Headquarters issued the parole and 
counter-sign in common for the Third Army and Army of the Meuse, 
and from and after November 24th, in consequence of the close touch, 
in which both armies found themselves, the same for all (i. e. also 
for the First and Second Army). 

—272— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The trains will be brought up, and provisions should be brought 
up in sufficient quantities so that barren portion of the Champagne 
can be traversed without delay. 

Advance guards must, on August 28th, be on the line Suippes 
— Chalons — Coole, or south thereof. 

For this advance, the left wing Army Detachment under H. R. 
H. the Crown Prince of Saxony, is assigned to the Laheycourt — Out- 
rieviere Ferme — Poix — Chalons road; and the Third Army, as right 
wing is assigned the Nettancourt — Possesse — Togny-aux-Boeufs road. 

The Army Detachment camps (quarters) and requisitions right 
of the two designated roads and in their vicinity (2 km) ; the Third 
Army on the left thereof. 

Conditions will decide thereafter if and in what force our fight- 
ing forces will execute a right turn against Reims, or continue the 
march against Paris in full force. 

The cavalry will reconnoiter far to the front, that of the right 
wing especially early tomorrow into the terrain toward the Bel- 
gian frontier, with early observation against Montmedy and Sedan, 
and thereafter reconnoiter towards Reims, Rethel and Mezieres, in 
which, if possible, the Reims — Laon railroad is to be interrupted. 



No. 204 
To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 2U August 1870, 8:00 AM. 
Telegram. 

Chalons evacuated by the enemy. We continue the advance, secur- 
ing our right wing. 



Reports received at General Headquarters during the 
night of August 24-25th confirmed anew the march of the 
French Army towards Reims and indicated the enemy's 
intention — heretofore believed improbable — to march along 
the Belgian frontier to the relief of Metz. But as there 
was no assurance as yet that this was an actual fact, Gen- 
eral Headquarters decided to- turn for the present more 
northwestward and to observe with more vigor conditions 
on the right flank. For this General von Moltke issued the 
following orders : 

No. 205 

To Headquarters of the Third Army, Alliancelles, and Army 
Detachment Under H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony. 
Fleury. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 25th August 1870, 11:00 A.M. 

All reports received here confirm that the enemy has evacuated 
Chalons and is marching on Reims. 

—273— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



His Majesty the King directs that the Army Detachment under 
H. R. H. The Crown Prince of Saxony and the Third Army follow 
this movement by continuing the march in a northwesterly direction. 

The former will start tomorrow with its Xllth Army Corps to- 
wards Vienne (advance guards Autry and Servon), with its Guard 
Corps towards Ste. Menehould (advance guards Vienne-la-Ville and 
towards Berzieux), with its IVth Army Corps towards Villers-en- 
Argonne (advance guard towards Dommartin). The cavalry will 
be sent far ahead to reconnoiter the front and right flank and will 
especially reach Vouziers and Buzancy. 

The Third Army proceeds tomorrow with its leading elements 
as far as the line Givry-en-Argonne — Chagny northeast of Vitry. 

The latter place will be observed. 

If very important information is not received, the armies will be 
granted a day of rest on the 27th. This may be used to bring up the 
trains and for regulating subsistence matters, so that no difficulties 
will be encountered in the subsequent crossing of the barren Cham- 
pagne. 

General Headquarters proceeds tomorrow to Ste. Menehould. 
Send reports here until 10:00 A.M. 



As the left wing of the IVth Army Corps came into very- 
close touch in its advance with the Bavarian lid Corps, which 
led to disputes as to the occupation of villages, General von 
Alvensleben, commanding the IVth Army Corps, asked the 
Chief of the General Staff for instruction direct, as the dis- 
tance to the Headquarters of the Crown Prince of Saxony 
was too great for speedy decision. 

General von Moltke sent his inquiry by the following 
indorsement to the lid Bavarian Corps: 

No. 206 

To THE Bavarian IId Army Corps. 
Charmont. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 25 August 1870. 

To the Royal Corps Headquarters requesting a line of march be 
left free to the IVth Royal Prussian Army Corps. 

That army corps vvdll niarch tomorrow to Villers-en-Argonne, 
and to avoid further collision, the Royal Bavarian II. Army, v/hich 
presumably will tomorrow continue the march to Givry en Argonne, 
will extend to the right not farther than the line Noyers — Sommeeille 
— Le Chatelier. 



-274- 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 207 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 

DONCOURT. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 25 August 1870, 7:10 A.M. 
Telegram. 

We have no reports from you since day before yesterday. Re- 
quest telegraphic report of anything new there. Desire written re- 
port in detail of your positions. 

General von Stiehle replied that telegraphic reports 
had been sent daily and that a mounted messenger was then 
enroute with a written report. 

Awaiting receipt of certain information as to the direc- 
tion of march of the Army of Chalons, General von Moltke 
utilized the time in sketching out the following march table 
for concentrating the Army of the Meuse, the two Bavarian 
Corps of the Third Army and two corps of the Army invest- 
ing Metz in the vicinity of Damvillers on the right bank of 
the Meuse, by which MacMahon's advance on Metz could be 
prevented. 



No. 208 

DRAFT 

General Hq., Bar le Due, 25 August 1870. 

If by evening the 25th information is received that the envelop- 
ment has started on the 23d and has progressed by that time to 
Vouziers, then : 

Corps 26th 27th 28th 29th 



. Marville 
Longuyon 



Seven army corps — 150,000 infantry.' 

The preceding draft was at the same time to serve as 
basis for the subsequent movements of the German armies. 
For as early as the evening of August 25, 1870 General 
Headquarters received further' reports — among others a 
telegram from London with the information taking from 
the Temps of the 23d of the sudden decision of MacMahon 



XII. 


Varennes 


Dun 


eventual retreat on 


Guard 


Dombasle 


Montfaucon 


Damvillers 


IV. 


Fleury 


west of Verdun 


Damvillers 


III. 


- 


Etain 


Damvillers 


IX. 




Landres 


Damvillers 


Bavarian 


Chaumont 


Nixeville 


Mangiennes 


ao 


do 


Dombasle 


Azannes 



—275— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

to hasten to the help of Bazaine — which indicated a prob- 
able advance of the French army on Vouziers. It is true 
that all doubts about this were not yet dispersed and es- 
pecially there were as yet no reports at hand from the Ger- 
man cavalry as to being in touch with the enemy, but the 
question was to act so as not to lose the right moment to get 
ahead of MacMahon's army. And thus, in the course of 
the night all initial orders were issued so as to be able to 
start off as early as possible on the 26th northward with 
the Army Detachment and the two Bavarian Corps — pre- 
supposing that the cavalry sent towards Vouziers and Buz- 
ancy would confirm the approach of the enemy toward Metz. 



No. 209 

To Headquarters Army Detachment Under H. R. H. the Crown 
Prince of Saxony. 
Fleury.* 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 25 August 1870, 11 :00 A.M. 

A report just received makes it appear not improbable that 
Marshal MacMahon has arrived at the decision to attempt the relief 
of the hostile main army in Metz. He v^^ould consequently have 
been on the march from Reims since the 23d instant; and in that 
case his leading elements might reach Vouziers today. 

In that case it becomes necessary to concentrate the Army 
Detachment under H. R. H., The Crown Prince of Saxony toward the 
right wing and probably in such manner that the Xllth Corps marches 
on Varennes while the Guard and IVth Corp^ approach the Varennes 
— Verdun road. The Bavarian 1st and lid Corps will eventually fol- 
low that movement. 

However, the start for this movement depends on the reports 
which H. R. H. The Crown Prince of Saxony may have by this 
time and for which we can not wait here.f 

The Guard and the IVth Corps have received orders from these 
Headquarters not to start the march ordered today for tomorrow 
morning, but to cook meals and await further orders for the march. 



^Headquarters of the Third Army received a copy of this with 
the note that the Bavarian 1st and lid Corps had received orders 
direct to halt; that the Vth, Vlth and Xlth Corps continue on the 
march as directed heretofore; that General Headquarters reserved 
the right to draw these corps subsequently up in the direction of Ste. 
Menehould. 

fLieut. -Colonel von Verdy of the general staff was sent to Fleury 
during the night to explain the views held at General Headquarters 
and consequent intentions. 



—276— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

No. 210 

To Headquarters of the Guard Corps, ThiauCourt, Headquar- 
ters OF the IVth Army Corps, Laheycourt, and Headquar- 
ters IsT'^ AND IId Army Corps. 
Charmont. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 25 August 1870, 11:00 P.M. 

The corps will not start the march as ordered for tomorrow, but 
will cook meals early and wait: 

Guard Corps and IVth Corps for orders from H. R. H., Crown 
Prince of Saxony; Bavarian 1st and lid Corps, for further orders to 
commence the march. 



Although on the morning of August 26th there was no 
confirmation of the supposed march of the French army on 
Metz, that fact appeared to be very probable. Therefore, 
in consultation between General Headquarters and Head- 
quarters of the Third Army in Bar-le-Duc it was left to the 
discretion of the latter whether to now start the march to 
the right with the Third Army, in so far as the following 
orders, issued in the meantime, would permit: 

No. 211 

To Headquarters of the IVth, Guard, and Bavarian 1st and 
IId Army Corps. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, , 2S August 1870, 12:00 noon. 

Reports received make it appear very probable that the army 
under Marshal MacMahon is concentrating at Vouziers. 

His Majesty directs that the Army Detachment under H. R. H., 
The Crown Prince of Saxony and the 1st and IId IBavarian Army 
Corps start immediately on the march in that direction. 

The Xllth Army Corps and the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions are 
already on the march. The Guard Corps marches towards Dombasle; 
one battalion of the Xllth Army Corps remain in Clermont as Gen- 
eral Headquarters guard. The IVth Army Corps marches to Fleury. 
The Bavarian 1st Army marches to Erize-la-Petite, the IId Bavarian 
Army Corps to Thiaucourt. 

The troops will start after finishing cooking, will carry provi- 
sions for three days, and will leave trains that are not immediately 
required behind under a sufficient guard. 

General Headquarters proceeds this afternoon to Clermont. 



*Headquarters 1st Bavarian Army Corps was also in Bar-le-Duc, 
and consequently received these orders verbally. 



—277- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The above orders were sent to Headquarters Army De- 
tachment, and Headquarters Third Army for their informa- 
tion ; Headquarters of the Army in front of Metz receiving 
a copy with the following addition : 

No. 212 
To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 26 August, 12:00 noon. 

It is our intention to send the Xllth Corps tomorrow, the 27th, 
from Verennes by way of Dun to behind the Meuse; on the 28th 
the Guard and the IVth Army Corps, followed by the two Bavarian 
army corps, will reach the vicinity of Damvillers. His Majesty di- 
rects that the investing army detach two army corps and send them 
so that they also will, without fail, reach the vicinity of Damvillers 
— Mangiennes, for which they will probably not have to start until 
the 27th. 

It is left to the discretion of your Headquarters to make all ar- 
rangements so that, even if the investment on the right bank of the 
Moselle has to be temporarily abandoned, the enemy's breaking through 
towards the west will be prevented. 

The 5th, 6th and 12th Cavalry Divisions, sent today towards 
Vouziers, should bring exhaustive and sure information of condi- 
tions there. 

Telegraphic connection with General Headquarters will be 
established today as far as Erize-la-Petite (Fork of Clermont — Bar- 
le-Duc and Clermont — St. Mihiel roads). 

From that point runs a relay line. 



The following orders were issued to the Corps under 
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, the leading elements of 
which reached, on August 26th, Homburg — Neunkirchen: 

No. 213 

To H. R. H. THE Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. 
Saarbrucken. 

General Hq., Bar-le-Duc, 28 August 1870, 10:00 A.M. 
Telegram. 

The corps will immediately start by echelons for Metz and will 
report for orders to General Steinmetz, Headquarters Jouy-aux-Ar- 
ches at Ars-on-the-Moselle. Acknowledge receipt of these orders by 
wire.* 



*Prince Frederick Charles and General von Steinmetz received 
copies of these orders. 



—278— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

To secure the railroad communications to the rear 
the commandant of the Field Railway Service received the 
following orders : 

No. 214 

To Director Weishaupt, Pont-A-Mousson or Nancy R. R. De- 
pot. 

Hq. Bar-le-Duc, 28 August 1870, 11:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Expectations for taking Toul increase. Vitry is ours. Construc- 
tion this side of Toul more and more important and should be has- 
tened. We proceed today to Clermont ; R. R. station Bar-le-Duc very 
large and in excellent shape. General Stosch will give full authori- 
zation for removal of interruptions in rear. 



General Headquarters proceeded to Clermont in the 
afternoon of 26 August. As in the meantime communica- 
tions had been established by wire between Headquarters 
of Prince Frederick Charles in Doncourt and General Head- 
quarters as far as Erize-la-Petite, General von Moltke was 
enabled to send in the evening the following orders by re- 
lay and wire: 

No. 215 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 
Doncourt. 

General Hq., Clermont, 26 August 1870, 7:00 P.M. 
Telegram. 

General Headquarters now in Clermont. Orders enroute by 
mounted messenger [see No. 212], Troop movements orders will not 
be started before Saturday noon (August 27th). By then we will 
probably have better information. Acknowledge receipt by wire. 



Finally, in the course of the evening reports were re- 
ceived from the cavalry of the Army Detachment, accord- 
ing to which hostile troops of all arms had reached Grandpre 
but had not yet reached the Meuse line. Thus, it became 
absolutely certain that MacMahon was marching on Metz. 
Therefore, by direction of His Majesty, General von Moltke 
issued verbal orders at 11:00 P.M. to Major General von 
Schlotheim, chief of staff of the Army Detachment, Head- 
quarters of which was also in Clermont, to continue the 

—279— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

march on Damvillers the next day, to take possession of 
the Meuse crossings at Dun and Stenay, and to have his 
cavahy attack the enemy's right flank. The following 
orders were issued in writing: 

No. 216 

To THE Bavarian I. Army Corps. 

General Hq., Clermont, 26 Augxist 1870, 11:00 P.M. 

His Majesty the King directs that the 1st Bavarian Corps march 
tomorrov^r to ISlixeville; start to be made after cooking meals and 
not before 11:00 A.M. The corps will protect itself against Verdun. 



No. 217 

To THE Bavarian II. Army Corps. 

General Hq., Clermont, 26 August 1870, 11 :00 P.M. 

His Majesty the King directs that the lid Bavarian Army Corps 
march tomorrow (Saturday) to Dombasle. 



No. 218 
To Headquarters of the Third Army 

General Hq., Clermont, 26 August 1870, 11 :00 P.M. 

The cavalry sent ahead in a northerly direction, has ascertained 
the presence of hostile troops of all arms near Grandpre. 

His Majesty has issued orders that the Xllth, IVth and Guard 
Corps continue the march in direction of Damvillers. The 1st Bavar- 
ian Army Corps proceeds tomorrow (Saturday) to Nixeville, the lid 
to Dombasle. 

The Prussian corps of the Third Army (including the Wiirt- 
temburg Division) are to continue the march in the direction of Ste. 
Menehould. The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions at Somme Py and 
Autry have orders to follow the enemy to Grandpre and Vouziers. 



No. 219 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 
Doncourt. 

General Hq., Clermont, 26th August, 11 :00 P.M. 
Telegram.* 

Hostile troops of all arms at Grandpre. 

According to written ordersf two corps of the army will start 
tomorrow (Saturday) for Damvillers and reach there on Sunday the 
28th. 



*By relay to Erize-la-Petite, from there by wire. Copy on Aug- 
ust 27th by mounted messenger. 
fNo. 212. 

—280— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

The remarkably slow advance of the French Army, 
which had not gotten by the evening of August 26th with 
its leading infantry elements to beyond Grandpre — Buz- 
ancy — Le Chesne, made it possible to reach the hostile 
fighting forces while they were still on the left bank of the 
Meuse and bring them to a stand. A concentration at Dam- 
villers could therefore be abandoned, and the advance of 
the German army corps could be continued in the direction 
of Vouziers, Buzancy and Beaumont. In this movement 
there was no necessity for participation of the portions of 
the army investing Metz. The orders issued, based on 
these views, were as follows : 

No. 220 
To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 

DONCOURT. 

General Hq., Clermont, 27 August 1870, 8:00 A.M. 
Telegratn. 

According to report just received a large portion of the hostile 
fighting forces was last evening still at Vouziers. Therefore the 
troop movements you were directed to make need not start until 
further orders from here. A relay line to be established as far as 
Etain ; steps will be taken for wire communication from there. An- 
swer by wire at once. 



No. 221 
To H. R. H. THE Crown Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq., Clermont, 27 August 1870, 8:00 A.M. 

Prince Frederick Charles establishes a relay line from Doncourt 
to Etain. Your H. R. H. will continue that line from there to these 
headquarters. 



No. 222 

To Headquarters Bavarian II. Army Corps. 

General Hq., Clermont, 27th August 1870, 8:00 A.M. 

The lid Bavarian Army Corps will send one infantry brigade 
jtoday to Clermont, which will remain there. 



—281— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

No. 223 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 
DoNCOURT. By Relay to Erize la Petite. 

General Hq., Clermont, 27 August 1870, 7:30 A.M. 
Telegram. 

As now sufficient fighting forces are concentrated here, no more 
detachments will be made by you. Acknowledge receipt by wire. 



No. 224 

To Headquarters Third Army. 

General Hq., Clermont, 27 August 1870, 7:30 AM. 
Telegram. 

If possible leading elements of the Prussian corps of the Third 
Army must reach Malmy and Laval on the 28th. Written orders en 
route [see No. 225.]. 



No. 225 

To Headquarters Army Detachment Under H. R. H. the 
Crown Prince of Saxony and Headquarters Third Army.* 

General Hq., Clermont, 27 August 1870, 7:30 A.M. 

According to reports received the main fighting forces under 
Marshal MacMahon are still at Vouziers ; strong cavalry has advanced 
as far as Beaumont and Buzancy. 

His Majesty the King directs that the Army Detachment under 
H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony and the Third Army continue 
the advance in that direction. 

This advance will be made by the Army Detachment and both 
Bavarian Army Corps according to attached march tables [see No. 
226], which had to be arranged in detail from considering the condi- 
tions here and has consequently been transmitted direct to both Ba- 
varian corps. 

The Third Army (Vth, Vlth, Xlth Corps and Wiirttemberg Di- 
vision) must reach with its leading elements on the 28th the line Mal- 
my — Laval, on the 29th the line Sechault — Somme Py and concen- 
trate closely. 

The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions (Autry and Monthois) will 
in the next few days receive their orders from headquarters of the 
Third Army, and also will report direct to these headquarters. 



*To former via staff officer, to Third Army via headquarters of 
the Vth Army Corps for transmission; in addition copy by mounted 
messenger to both Bavarian corps and to the lid "Bavarian Corps 
with additional note: "One battalion remains in Clermont." 



—282— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 
No. 226 

MARCH TABLES FOR AUGUST 28th and 29th, 1870. 

29th 
Grandpre 



Bavarian lid Corps 

Bavarian 1st Corps 

Guard Corps 

Xllth Corps remains a^ 

IVth borps 



28th 
Vienne* 

and in rear thereof 
Varennes and 

in rear thereof 
Bantheville 
Dun 
Montfaucon 



Grandpre 

Buzancy 

Nouart 

Bantheville 



No. 227 
OUTLINE OF MARCH FOR AUGUST 29th and 30. 

Without date, apparently sketched August 28th. 
29th 30th 

Xllth Corps Buzancy — Nouart Ballay 

Guard Corps by Rem- Themorgues, Champ- Longwy 

onville and Landres igneulles 

IVth Corps St. Julian Falaise 

1st Bavarian Corps Autry Savigny-sur-Aisne 

lid Bavarian Corps Servon — Sechault Savigny-sur-Aisne 

No. 228 
OUTLINE FOR AN ATTACK ON VOUZIERS 

G. Hq., Clermont, 28th August 1870. 

One to two army corps of the enemy vsrere still at Vouziers 
last evening. It is probable that the enemy's remaining fighting 
forces are at Le Chesne. 

In an attack on Vouziers our right flank must be secured against 
these forces. For that purpose are available: 

Xllth Corps Buzancy 

Guard Corps Themorgues 

IVth Corps Grandpre 

From there the latter, if necessary, moves on Briquenay (1 mile by 
road). If on the other hand considerations of flank protection permit, 
these three corps will support the attack on Vouziers each with one 
division on Ballay, Longwy and Falaise. 

For the direct attack on Vouziers are designated: 

Bavarian lid Corps — Termes on Falaise. 

Bavarian 1st Corps by Chatel — Autry on Chambre-aux-Loups. 

Vth Corps by Monthois on Chambre-aux-Loups. 

The course of the attack will show if it is desirable to also bring 
up the Xlth Corps for direct attack or to cut off enemy's retreat with 
our Vlth Corps. 

*Marginal note: "From Dombasle to Clermont the corps will 
take the road via Brabant-en-Argonne and Vraincourt." 



—283— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

Reports received at General Headquarters in Clermont 
up to 7:00 P.M., August 28th, justified the assumption that 
the enemy was marching northward and caused the follow- 
ing measures to be ordered : 

No. 229 

To Headquarters of the Third Army and Army Detachment 
Under H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq., Clermont, 28 August 1870, 7:00 P.M. 

The enemy evacuated Vouziers early this morning and is march- 
ing off northward. It remains uncertain whether he intends to con- 
centrate more towards Le Chesne or towards Rethel. 

His Majesty directs the continuation of the march as follows: 

The Xnth Corps marches tomorrow towards Nouart; one brigade 
remaining at Stenay. 

The Guard Corps marches toward Buzancy. 

The IVth Army Corps follows as far as Remonville. 

H. R. H. The Crown Prince of Saxony will reckon with the possi- 
bility of a hostile attack from the direction of Le Chesne and will have 
the terrain south of Nouart and Buzancy reconnoitered for that pos- 
sibility. 

The 1st Bavarian Army Corps proceeds to Champigneulles, the 
lid Corps to Grandpre, both corps will be in readiness there to support 
the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

The three Prussian corps of the Third Army (including the Wiirt- 
temberg Division) move in the direction of Vouziers and west thereof. 
One cavalry division of the Third Army will be sent in the direction of 
Reims. 

General Headquarters proceeds to Grandpre tomorrow. 

Reports to this point till 8:00 A.M. 
Addition to the Third Army: 

Direct orders have been sent from here to the Bavarian 1st Corps. 



No. 230 



To Headquarters Army Detachment Under H. R. H. the 
Crown Prince of Saxony. 
Malancourt. 

General Hq., Clermont, 28 August 1870, 7 :00 P.M. 

In reply to your letter of today* you are informed that headquar- 
ters of the Army in front of Metz received orders last evening to call 
back the Illd and lid Army Corps to Metz. Therefore you need not 
count on support from these army corps tomorrow. 



*That headquarters had requested information as to whether the 
lid Army Corps, detached from the Army in front of Metz and started 
from Damvillers would be under orders of the Crown Prince of Sax- 
ony and had at the same time expressed the wish that in place of the 
Guard Corps the IVth Army Corps, which was numerically stronger, 
be sent into the first line and the Guard Corps follow in second line. 

—284— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

As will be seen from today's orders, it has not been possible to 
exchange the IVth for the Guard Corps, but this matter will be kept 
in mind here. 



New reports were received at General Headquarters 
around 9:00 P.M., according to which the enemy had not 
marched off northward, but was doubtlessly continuing his 
march eastward. Orders, becoming necessary because of 
of this fact, were as follows : 

No. 231 

To Headquarters of the Third Army and Army Detachment 
Under H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq. Clermont, 28 August 1870, 11 :00 P.M. 

The appearance of strong hostile infantry at Nar near Buzancy 
indicates that the enemy will make an attempt to relieve Metz. It 
may be assumed that for this purpose one or two corps will take 
the Vouziers — Buzancy — Stenay road, while the rest of the army 
marches north via Beaumont. 

So as not to lead the enemy to an attack before we have assem- 
bled sufficient fighting forces, it is left to the discretion of H. R. H. 
the Crown Prince of Saxony to concentrate in time the Xllth, Guara. 
and IVth Corps at first in a defensive position about on the line Lan- 
dres — Ancreville. 

The line Dun — Stenay will be observed by the detached brig'ade. 

Both Bavarian army corps will start at 5:00 A.M. The 1st Corps 
which will receive orders from these headquarters direct, marches by 
Fleville to Sommerance, reaching there not later than 10:00 A.M. 
The lid Corps marches via Binarville, Chatel and Cornay to St. Juvin. 

The Vth Army Corps will march via Bouconville, Montcheutin and 
Senuc to Grandpre. 

These headquarters will issue further orders concerning the attack 
against the Vouziers — Buzancy — Stenay road. 

The remaining two corps of the Third Army are to be started so 
that they can be brought up for the decision in case of need. 

His Majesty will proceed at 9:00 A.M. to Varennes. 

Moltke's personal addition to orders for the Meuse 
Army Detachment : 

"This does not preclude an advance for the purpose of taking the 
Buzancy road against weaker hostile forces." 



No. 232 

To Headquarters Bavarian I. Army Corps. 

General Hq., Clermont, 28 August 1870, 11 :00 P.M. 

The Corps will start at 5:00 A.M. and march via Fleville on 
Sommerance, where it will go into position for the present in rear of 

—285— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



the left wing of the Army Detachment under H, R. H. the Crown 
Prince of Saxony at Landres. 

The lid Bavarian Corps will be drawn up via Cornay to St. Juvin 
while the Vth Prussian Corps debouches via Grandpre. 

At 9:00 A.M. His Majesty proceeded to Varennes. 

The Corps will establish a relay line from Varennes to Clermont 
and from Varennes to Grandpre. 



On the road from Clermont via Varennes to Grandpre, 
General von Moltke sent direct orders, changing previous 
orders in some details, during the course of August 29th, to 
the leading army corps of the Third Army.* 



No. 233 
To Headquarters 1st Bavarian Army Corps. 

Near Fleville-\ 29 August 1870, 11:30 A.M. 

As it is very probable that operations tomorrow will be proceed 
in a westerly direction, the 1st Division of the 1st Bavarian Corps may 
bivouac at St. Juvin and will send one battalion to Grandpre to these 
headquarters. 



No. 234 

To Headquarters IId Bavarian Army Corps. 

Near Fleville, 29 August 1870, 11 :30 A.M. 

The Bavarian lid Corps will bivouac on the left bank of the Aire 
at Cornay and Chevieres. 



No. 235 

To Headquarters V. Army Corps. 

General Hq., Grandpre, 29 August 1870, 12:30 Noon. 

The Vth Army Corps will halt at Grandpre and go into bivouac. 
The 9th Division has received direct orders from here to that effect. 



*The Vlth Army Corps, that started from Ste. Menehould towards 
Verennes, received orders enroute through Captain Zingler of the 
general staff of General Headquarters, to turn off towards Vienne- 
le-Chateau ; it went into bivouac there. 

fBetween Varennes and Grandpre. 



—286— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

Reports received up to the evening of August 29th in 
Grandpre from the cavalry, together with the personal re- 
ports of observations made by Lieutenant Colonels von 
Brandenstein and von Bronsart, of the general staff of Gen- 
eral Headquarters, clearly indicated that the enemy was 
moving in northeasterly direction towards the Meuse and 
that his main forces could be assumed to be between Le 
Chesne and Beaumont and that strong flank detachments 
were farther south. Papers captured from a French staff 
officer in Buzancy carrying orders for August 29th con- 
firmed the above assumption. Therefore His Majesty the 
King decided to attack the enemy the following day with 
both armies before he could reach the Meuse and to threat- 
en at the same time his communications leading westward. 



No. 236 

To Headquarters of the Third Army, Senuc, and Headquar- 
ters Army Detachment Under H. R. H. the Crown Prince 
OF Saxony. 
Bayonville. 

General Hq., Grandpre, 29 August 1870, 11:00 P.M. 

All reports received today coincide in the fact that the hostile 
army will be tomorrow forenoon with its main forces between Beau- 
mont and Le Chesne, or south of that line. 

His Majesty directs that the enemy be attacked. 

On the right, the Army Detachment under H. R. H. the Crown 
Prince of Saxony will advance at 10:00 A.M. across the line Beau- 
clair — Fosse in direction of Beaumont. It will use the roads east of 
the main Buzancy — Beaumont road. The Guard Corps, being in re- 
serve at the start, must evacuate that road by 8:00 A.M. 

The Third Army, starting early, marches with its right wing via 
Buzancy on Beaumont and is in readiness to support the attack of 
H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony w^ith two army corps, while the 
remaining corps will keep the direction on Le Chesne. 

One battalion of the Third Corps will hold Grandpre. 

His Majesty proceeds at 10:00 A.M. from here to Buzancy. 



The evening after the battle of Beaumont the follow- 
ing orders were issued : 



-287— 



Moltke's Correspondence 



No. 237 

To H. R. H. THE Crown Prince of Saxony, Beaumont, and H. 
R. H. THE Crown Prince of Prussia. 
At St. Pierremont. 

Hill or Sommauthe, 30 August 1870, 6:00 P.M. 

General Headquarters proceeds to Buzancy. Please report loca- 
tion of the corps as soon as that can be done. 



No. 238 

To Headquarters Third Army at St. Pierremont and H. R. H. 
THE Prince of Saxony. 
Beaumont. 

General Hq., Buzancy, 30 August 1870, 11 :00 P.M. 

Though no report has been received up to this hour as to where 
the engagements of the different corps ended, it is clear that the enemy 
has fallen back at all points or been defeated. 

Therefore the forward movement will be continued very early 
tomorrow, the enemy energetically attacked everywhere where he 
makes a stand this side of the Meuse, and pressed together in as small 
a space as possible between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier. 

The Army Detachment under H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Sax- 
ony will have the special task of preventing the hostile left wing from 
escaping eastward. For this it will be advisable that at least two 
corps advance along the right bank of the Meuse and attack any pro- 
bable position opposite Mouzon in flank and rear. 

Similarly, the Third Army must turn against the enemy's front 
and right flank. Artillery positions, as strong as possible, will be 
taken up on this side of the river in such manner that they will ha- 
rass the march and camps of hostile columns in the valley bottom of 
the right bank from Mouzon downstream. 

Should the enemy enter Belgian terrain, without being immediate- 
ly disarmed, he will immediately be followed into that country. 

At 8:30 A.M. His Majesty will proceed from here to Sommauthe. 

All orders issued by the difl'erent army headquarters will be 
sent here up to that hour. 

ADDITION 

For the Third Army: 

The IVth Corps, having driven, in conjunction with the Xllth 
Corps, the enemy on Mouzon, has its outposts on the north edge of the 
Bois de Givodeau [Bois Givedeau], the main body north of Beaumont. 
The Guard Corps is south of Beaumont, the Xllth Corps at Letanne and 
Pouilly (on the Meuse), holding both places. The IVth Corps has cap- 
tured 11 guns and 2000 prisoners, also two large ammunition parks 
and the camp of one division. 

To The Crown Prince of Saxony: 

In accordance with a report just received the corps are located 
as follows: 

—288— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

Vlth Army Corps at Vouziers. 

Xlth Army Corps and Wiirttemberg Division at Stonne. 
Vth Army Corps at La Besace. 
Bavarian 1st Corps probably at Raucourt. 
Bavarian lid Corps probably at Sommauthe with its leading- 
elements. 



No. 239 
To Headqharters Third Army at St. Pierremont. 

General Hq., Buzancy, 30 August 1870, 11:30 P.M. 

His Majesty has observed with displeasure that the lid Bavarian 
Corps which was to follow as reserve immediately in rear of the 1st 
Corps according to orders, was not in position in rear of that corps 
at i mile distance at Sommauthe, but was in march column after 
9:00 P.M. with its rear elements at Buzancy. Thus, the corps would 
have been entirely unable to offer support had that been required. 

In addition, the corps increased the difficulties of bringing up 
the trains of the rest of the corps, and it reached its bivouac by an 
unnecessary night march. 



Headquarters of the army in front of Metz was in- 
formed of the events of the past few days and as to fur- 
ther intentions and received corresponding orders : 

No. 240 

To Headquarters in Front of Metz. 
Malancourt. 

General Hq., Buzancy, 31 August 1870, 8:00 A.M. 

I have the honor to inform you as follows: 

After it had been ascertained in the past few days that the army 
under MacMahon was moving in the terrain between the Meuse and 
the Aisne, the Army Detachment under H. R. H. the Crown Prince of 
Saxony and the Third Army were sent to the front in the direction of 
the Beaumont — Le Chesne road. 

Yesterday strong hostile troops were encountered at Beaumont 
and Stonne. The Corps of Failly, at Beaumont was attacked by the 
IVth and Xllth Corps and driven past Mouzon with great loss (11 guns 
and 2000 prisoners, two large artillery parks, as ascertained last 
niglit). Mouzon was taken by the IVth Corps last evening. 

The hostile army corps at Stonne evaded complete annihilation 
by a timely retreat via Raucourt towards Sedan. Only its rear guard 
was attacked and defeated by the 1st Bavarian Corps in the afternoon. 

The advance will be continued today. 

At 5:00 A.M. the Xllth and the Guard Corps, which are in bivouac 
close to Beaumont, cross the Meuse at Letanne and Pouilly to the right 
bank and start for Douzy and Carignan — Sachy respectively. The IVth 
Corps follows them via Mouzon. 

—289— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The Third Army also proceeds via the Mezieres — Remilly stretch 
to eventually beyond the Meuse. 

The intention is to crowd the hostile army into as small a space 
as possible between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier and eventually 
throw it into Belgium, into which country our armies will follow un- 
less the French army is immediately disarmed. 

It is not impossible that single portions of the hostile army have 
turned eastward after yesterday's fights at Mouzon. It will be well 
for you to keep this in mind and keep closer investment of Metz. 



No. 241 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 
Malancourt. 

Sommaiithe* 31 August 1870, 11:00 A.M. 
Telegram. 

Enemy was driven yesterday from Beaumont to beyond Mouzon. 
Possible, that single detachments may have turned eastward via 
Carignan, which should be observed. Care to be taken for the securi- 
ty of the depot in Etain. General attack to be continued today. 



No. 242 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 
Malancourt. 

General Hq., Vendresse, 31 August 1870, 10:00 P.M. 

In continuation of my letter of today (See No. 240), you are in- 
formed that Army Detachment under H. R. H. The Crown Prince of 
Saxony and the Third Army have continued today their advance with 
good success. 

As has been ascertained today, the result of yesterday's battle is 
materially greater than heretofore assumed. The Corps of Failly and 
Douay and a portion of the Corps of Lebrun appear to be in complete 
dissolution. More than 20 guns and several thousand prisoners were 
taken. Our leading elements today reached the Meuse at several 
points, and even crossed that river. The hostile army is attempting 
to march along the right bank from Sedan to Mezieres. An advance 
on Donchery, which is already in our hands, will be made early to- 
morrow. Dismounted Hussars and Uhlans of the 4th Cavalry Divi- 
sion have cleaned out the villages of Frenois and Wedelincourt of hos- 
tile infantry. 

Under these conditions it is improbable that the army in front 
of Metz will be interfered with seriously by portions of MacMahon's 
army. 



*His Majesty, accompanied by the general staff, had proceeded 
at 8:30 A.M. from Buzancy to the hill near Sommauthe and proceeded 
in the afternoon by way of Beaumont, Roncourt and Chemery to Ven- 
dresse. 

—290— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

On the other hand, it would to the interests of the combined ar- 
mies here, if your troops could completely invest the fortress of Ver- 
dun. Forces for that purpose can be easier spared by your command 
because the leading elements of the corps under command of H. R. H. 
the Grandduke of Mecklenburg have arrived at Metz. 

Thus, everything in this matter is left to your discretion. 



No army orders were issued by General Headquarters 
for the 1st of September, as the orders issued the evening 
of August 30th (see No. 238) contained the general points 
for the conduct of both armies and especially as everything 
material concerning the movements of the Third Army had 
been verbally discussed by Generals von Moltke, von Pod- 
bielski and von Blumenthal on August 31st at Headquar- 
ters of the Third Army, Chemery, and enroute of the Gen- 
eral Headquarters from Sommauthe to Vendresse (see note 
to No. 241). However, the observations made by Lieu- 
tenant Colonel von Brandenstein, chief of section, general 
staff of General Headquarters, in the vicinity of Remilly 
caused General von Moltke to address a letter the evening 
of August 31st to the chief of staff of the Third Army: 

No. 243 

To Lieutenant General von Blumenthal. 
Chemery. 

General Hq., Vendresse, 31 August 1870, 7 :i5 P.M. 

Lieutenant Colonel von Brandenstein, returned from Remilly 
just now, confirms that the French, leaving all impedimenta behind, 
have marched off westward and probably continue their march dur- 
ing the night. Attainment of large results may be made impossible 
thereby. Your Excellency will consider whether it would not be well 
to cross the Meuse with the Xlth Corps and the Wiirttemberg Divi- 
sion still during the night, so that the attack can be continued very 
early in the morning in the direction of the Sedan — Mezieres road on 
a deployed front. 



No written orders were required during the battle of 
Sedan, and only the start of negotiations caused the issue 
of the following army orders: 



-?91- 



Moltke's Correspondence 

No. 244 

To Headquarters of the Third Army and H. R. H. the Crown 
Prince of Saxony. 

On the Hill near Sedan, 1 September 1870, 7:15 P.M. 

Negotiations have been started; therefore no offensive move- 
ments must be made by us during the night. On the other hand, 
any attempt on the part of the enemy to pierce our lines must be de- 
feated by force of arms. If negotiations should be resultless, then 
hostilities will be resumed, but not before orders therefor are re- 
ceived from these Headquarters. Opening of artillery fire from the 
heights east of Frenois vi^ill be the signal to resume hostilities. 



No. 245 

To H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles. 
Malancourt. 

General Hq., Frenois, 1 Setember 1870, 7:15 P.M. 
Telegram. 

French army was attacked today enveloped in front of Sedan, and 
completely beaten. About 20,000 prisoners, many cannon and eagles 
taken. Napoleon, in Sedan, has offered his sword to the King. Capitu- 
lation negotiations are going on. 

Based thereon demand surrender of Marshal Bazaine — this in your 
discretion. 



No. 246 

NEGOTIATIONS 

The following agreement has been arrived at between the under- 
signed, the Chief of the General Staff of His Majesty the King of Prus- 
sia, Commander-in-Chief of the German Armies, and the Commander- 
in-Chief of the French Army, both having plenipotentiary powers from 
King William and Emperor Napoleon: 

Article 1 : 

The French army under command of General von Wimpffen, at this 
moment invested in Sedan by superior forces, is considered prisoners 
of war. 

Article 2: 

Considering the brave defense of this army, all generals and offi- 
cers are excepted therefrom, as well as higher officials with commis- 
sioned rank, who give their word of honor in writing not to carry 
arms again against Germany until the completion of the present war, 
and not to act in any manner injurious to the interests of Germany. 
Officers and officials, accepting these conditions, will retain their arms 
and personal property. 

—292— 



Operations July 18 to September 2, 1870 

Article 3: 

All other arms, as well as all army materiel, such as eagles, 
colors, standards, guns, horses, moneys, army vehicles, ammunition, 
etc., will be delivered to some authority in Sedan, appointed by the 
French Commander-in-Chief, to be immediately transferred to a Ger- 
man Plenipotentiary. 

Article W- 

Thereupon the fortress of Sedan, in its present condition, will be 
delivered, and not later than the evening of September 2d, into the 
hands of His Majesty, the King of Prussia. 

Article 5: 

Those officers who refuse the conditions mentioned in Article 2, 
as well as the disarmed men, will be conducted off by regiments and in 
military order. This measure will commence September 2d and must be 
finished by September 3d. The detachments will be brought to the 
,^;-"'ain at Iges surrounded by the Meuse, to be delivered by their 
of-uers to the German Plenipotentiaries, which latter will then issue 
orders to the noncommissioned officers. 

Article 6: 

Military surgeons, without exception, remain behind, to take over 
the care of the wounded. 

Agreed to at Frenois, on 2 September, 1870. 

VON MOLTKE VON WiMPFFEN. 



No. 247 

To Headquarters of the Third Army and H. R. H. the Crown 
Prince of Saxony. 

General Hq., Frenois, 2 September 1870, 12:00 Noon. 

The French army, today still in and around Sedan, has capitulated. 
Officers dismissed on their word of honor. Noncommissioned officers 
and privates are prisoners of war. Arms and army materiel to be 
surrendered. Copy of the convention enclosed. 

The prisoners of war, the strength of which cannot yet be ascer- 
tained, will be assembled in the arc of the Meuse at Vilette and Iges 
and then conducted off in echelons. As first guard, the Xlth and the 
lid Bavarian Corps are designated, both under command of General 
von der Tann. 

General von der Tann will regulate the subsistence of the prison- 
ers of war, for which, according to the promise of the French command- 
ing general, supplies will be brought by rail from Mezieres to near 
Donchery. Great care is to be exercised that no obstructions are made 
for any train. , 

The Xlth Army Corps will detach one infantry regiment during 
the course of tomorrow, after Sedan has been evacuated by the French 
troops, to serve as garrison for the fortress. 

For the rest, the Third Army and Army Detachment under H.R.H. 
the Crown Prince of Saxony will withdraw from Sedan tomorrow to 
the west and south; the Remilly — La Besace — Le Chesne road being 
assigned as western boundary to the Army Detachment. Trains of 
the Bavarian Army Corps will evacuate that road in good time. 

—293— 



Moltke's Correspondence 

The prisoners of war will be sent in two columns via Stenay — 
Etain — Gorze to Remilly and via Buzancy — Clermont — St. Mihiel to 
Pont-a-Mousson respectively by the Army Detachment under H. R. H. 
the Crown Prince of Saxony, and headquarters of the Third Army re- 
spectively. 

To prevent all doubt, it is ordered that the French officers cap- 
tured in battle yesterday and today prior to completion of negotia- 
tions at 11:00 A.M. are to be treated according to existing regulations. 

The Third Army will immediately designate a commandant for 
Sedan and also one general officer to be charged with taking over the 
arms, etc., to be laid down in Sedan. It is left to your discretion to 
assign to him a sufficient number of officers and officials as assis- 
tants. Both officers will report as soon as possible to the Quartermas- 
ter General of the Army. 

The horses to be delivered by the French army are to be distri- 
buted, in compliance with directions of His Majesty the King, among 
the entire German forces; and the different army headquarters will 
receive information later as to their quota. 

Police of the battlefield is the duty of the Headquarters, Lines of 
Communications of the Army Detachment under H. R. H. the Crown 
Prince of Saxony. Burial of the dead is to be hastened by means of 
requisitions on civil authorities. 



No. 248 

To Headquarters of the Army in Front of Metz. 
Malancourt. 

General Hq., Frenois, 2 September 1870, 12:00 Noon. 
Telegram. 

Capitulation of MacMahon's army signed. Army is prisoner of 
war. Today commence transportation of prisoners in two columns — 
Stenay — Etain — Gorze — Remilly and Buzancy — Clermont — St. Mihiel 
— Pont-a-Mousson. 

Daily echelons of 10,000 men each on each line; first echelons 
reach entraining points on the 5th. The army in front of Metz will 
take over the columns at Etain from the 3d on, at Pont-a-Mousson 
from the 5th on, subsist them and continue them on. In case delays 
occur in rail transportation, the columns will continue the march on 
foot along the railroads. 



—294— 



EXTRACT FROM 

CAMPAIGN OF 1870-71 

The Operations of the Second Army 

From the Commencement of the Campaign to the 
Capitulation of Metz 

Compiled from the Official Reports of Headquarters of the 
Second Army 



BY 
VON DER GOLTZ 

Captain, General Staff 



Berlin, 1873 

Ernest Siegfried Mittler and Son 



Translated by 
HARRY BELL 



FOREWORD 

This work has been compiled from the official reports of 
Headquarters of the Second Army and the events have been 
narrated as they were seen from the viewpoint of those 
headquarters. It has been more the endeavor to pursue the 
course of developments on which the decisions of those head- 
quarters were based, than to go into all the minor details 
connected therewith. 

The Compiler. 
Berlin, November, 1873. 



—296- 



Chapter II 



TO THE SAAR 
THE 4th AND 5th OF AUGUST 

A nevN^ epoch opened for the Second Army on August 
4th ; for its corps, after executing the orders of August 3d, 
stood fully concentrated with their fighting units closed up 
within themselves, and nothing serious was to be expected 
of the enemy. 

On the 4th the First Army was concentrating in the 
triangle Lebach — Tholey — Ottweiler; that day the Third 
Army crossed the frontier in four columns to drive the 
enemy opposite it back onto Strassburg and then to march 
off to the right through the Vosges, 

Prince Frederick Charles, who transferred his head- 
quarters in the morning of the 4th to Winnweiler, received 
information from both the other armies direct. 

This day gave the Second Army complete freedom 
of action according to its own missions. After having exe- 
cuted the task set for the third, it could start an offensive 
against the Saar line early on the 5th. 

The conception of the nature of the terrain which army 
headquarters had gained made it appear correct to send four 
corps, i.e., the main body of the army, along the good 
southern road through the depression of the Landstuhl, 
"badlands," and to march with only two corps along the 
worse northern road via Kusel. Difficult marches along 
rocky roads, devoid of shade, were to be expected, and ma- 
terial casualties on account of heat exhaustion could proba- 
bly not be avoided. 

However, an attack against the central Saar, executed 
by all the forces of the Second Army, appeared to promise 
important results. The French Army still stood with its 
forces dispersed along the long frontier line from Hagenau 
to opposite Saarlouis. Should the Second Army be success- 
ful in piercing the center of this line, around Saargemiind, 

—297— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

the enemy, not yet fully mobilized, would be cut in two, 
his lines of communications to the rear threatened, and 
he would be brought to a critical situation. It could be 
assumed that he had so far no reliable information of the 
approach of the Second Army via Kusel and Kaiserslautern, 
as only cavalry had been shown on the German side so far. 

This penetrating operation was consequently considered 
as the next objective of the Second Army. Therefore the 
commanding general issued his orders for the concentra- 
tion on the line Zweibriicken — Neunkirchen the evening of 
August 4th. 

According to these orders the Hid Army Corps was to 
march on the right by St. Wendel to Neunkirchen, to reach 
that place with its main body on the 6th and to send an ad- 
vance guard on the 7th as far as Sulzbach. The Xth Army 
Corps was to follow on the 3d via Kusel and Wladmohr with 
orders to concentrate on the 7th along the railroad at Bex- 
bach and to send its advance guard on the 8th to St. Ing- 
bert. 

The other four corps received as march direction the 
road Kaiserslautern — Landstuhl — Ho'mburg. 

On August 5th and 6th the IVth Corps, from Homburg, 
was to debouch with its two divisions on Zweibriicken and 
to send an advance guard as early as the 6th to New Horn- 
bach, while the Guard Corps was to advance from Homburg 
to Bliescastel, to be with its main body there on the 7th and 
to send two advance guards the next day, one along the Blies 
valley, the other towards Assweiler. The IXth Corps to 
follow in rear of the Guard Corps with orders to march on 
the 5th and 6th by Otterberg, if possible north of the Reich- 
wald and Landstuhl badlands to Waldmohr, to reach 
there on the 7th. The main highway was placed at its dis- 
posal for the 6th of August. Along this road also the Xllth 
Army Corps was to reach Kaiserslautern on the 6th, Land- 
stuhl on the 7th and Homburg on the 8th. 

As the Guard Corps, the IXth and the Xllth Army 
Corps followed each other without interval in the 20 miles 
long defile from Kaiserslautern to Homburg, these three 
corps received orders to leave the 2d Section of their trains, 

—298— 



Operations Second German Army 

as well as all field trains, in the terrain they occupied on Au- 
gust 4th in order to avoid any unnecessary intervals in the 
march column. This difficult march of an army of more 
than 80,000 men through a single defile could be accom- 
plished without interruption only by adhering to the most 
minute order and precision.* 

The trains that had been left behind started their march 
on August 8th in the same sequence as their army corps, and 
it took hours to properly regulate their march through the 
comparatively narrow streets of Kaiserslauternf and the 
field military police was charged with supervision of the 
road as its first task and trial of its achievements during 
this war. 

The outpost service was performed throughout these 
important days by the cavalry divisions. No relief was to 
be made by the corps arriving on the first line without ex- 
press orders from the army commander, as the main 
point was to hide knowledge of the presence of the army 
from the enemy as long as possible. 

According to reports sent in by General von Rheinbaben 
the main body of the 6th Cavalry Division had reached 
Klein-Ottweiler on August 3d, and the left column of the 
5th Cavalry Division Homburg — Blieskastel, while the right 
column had passed on August 2d the line Assweiler — St. 
Wendel — ^Werschweiler and had continued its march from 
there on the 3rd. Along the entire front squadrons had 
been sent out towards the enemy. 

However, for the solution of the task now confronting 
it, the location of the main body of the cavalry appeared to 
be still too far away from the frontier. If those detach- 
ments that were charged with keeping close touch with the 
enemy, were to appear rapidly, by surprise, and effectively, 



*Delays could not be totally avoided in those days — especially 
as the Guard Corps was brought forward simultaneously — but no 
blockades occurred which would have prevented the corps from reach- 
ing their march objectives. 

fOf course not all the trains adhered to their proper sequence; 
imbued by the quite natural impulse to follow their proper organi- 
zations as soon as possible, some endeavored to get ahead through the 
march columns and greatly interfered thereby with the march on the 
7th. 

—299— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

they should not have to make very long marches from the 
bivouac places of the main bodies to the hostile outposts. 
Therefore the main bodies received instructions to move 
farther forward and orders were also issued — as it was 
very important to send messages as rapidly as possible by 
relays, — for both divisions to report direct to army head- 
quarters. 

The cavalry had its first brush with the enemy as early 
as August 3d. One squadron of the 3d Uhlan Regiment had 
entered St. Johann, opposite Saarbriicken, and had suc- 
ceeded in capturing the first prisoners — 7 — there. The 
statements of these prisoners confirmed the reports that the 
hostile 2d Corps stood in front of Saarbriicken and that the 
3d Corps had been in readiness behind the 2d in the engage- 
ment on August 2d. 

General von Rheinbaben had reported that larger op- 
erations would be carried out on the 4th. Thus, detailed re- 
ports concerning the defenses and dispositions of the 
hostile fighting forces could be counted on. General head- 
quarters had oriented army headquarters along general 
lines as to the enemy's positions. 

According to them, the French 1st Corps (MacMahon) 
was at Hagenau, the 5th (Failly) at Bitsch, one division 
or brigade was at Saargemiind — this had been ascertained to 
belong to the hostile 5th Corps by the cavalry of the Sec- 
ond Army. The 2d Corps (Frossard) was still at Saar- 
briicken, the 3d (Bazaine) at Boulay, the 4th (Ladmirault) 
in the vicinity of Bouzonville and in front thereof. It had 
been learned that the Guard Corps had been brought from 
Nancy to Metz ; and only of the 6th Corps we had no definite 
information. A regiment belonging to that corps had been 
seen in the Camp of Chalons and it was possible that the 
entire corps could be looked for there. The 7th Corps was 
being concentrated at Belfort, but there was no reliable in- 
formation concerning its destination. 

The Third Army, after having completed its task in 
Lower Alsace, was to proceed against the hostile main posi- 
tion in such manner as to reach on the 9th the river line 
above Saargemiind. That day ought also to have been desig- 

—300— 



Operations Second Geiman Army 

nated for the attack of the Second Army. The dispositions 
made for the 4th for the advance, would have brought that 
army in the situation to be able to force the Saar with all 
units on the 9th. 

The assumptions on which army headquarters based 
hopes for the success of such an offensive, were confirmed 
by the information received (mentioned above) of conditions 
with the enemy. But nevertheless conditions were to change 
very soon and the entire war situation unexpectedly assume 
a new shape. 

If touch with the enemy has once been gained, that 
touch becomes the normal form for all actions. Decisions 
arrived at in advance have to be sacrificed to momentary 
requirements and new dispositions must be adapted to new 
conditions. 

During August 4th the thunder of cannon had been 
heard several times on the left wing of the Second Army. At 
6:00 A.M. August 5th information of the victory of Weis- 
sembourg was received at army headquarters in Winnweiler. 
The first action on a large scale had been fought and had re- 
sulted in a brilliant victory. The prestige of the enemy — 
who had astonished the world by the confident manner of 
his declaration — had been materially damaged by a defeat 
within fourteen days after his declaration of war in 
the midst of peace, by a defeat in which he lost not only a 
number of trophies but also an unusual number of un- 
wounded prisoners seldom found in military history. 

The Second Army had now to pay its utmost attention 
to find what effect this event had on the enemy in front of 
the Second Army. The cavalry was directed to increase its 
efforts in closing with the enemy and to lose no opportunity 
that might furnish some clue as to the enemy's intentions. 
The main body of the cavalry was on the line Biittlingen — 
Dudweiler — St. Ingbert — Bliescastel — Zweibriicken and Pir- 
masenz. It had taken this position independently on receipt 
of orders from Army Headquarters on the 4th. Its advanced 
troops on the Blies and Saar reported — and the reports from 
the right wing and center corresponded — that it appeared 
that the enemy was marching oft". It was believed that mov- 

—301— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

ing troops could be seen between Saarbriicken and Forbach 
and that hostile camps, abandoned by troops, were seen at 
the frontier. 

These reports did not come singly, but were repeated 
during the course of the 5th of August.* Therefore the 
cavalry received information at 7:00 P.M. of the events at 
Weissembourg and instructions to remain close to the enemy 
to ascertain his route of retreat and to push forward in 
strength especially in the direction of Rohrbach. The corps 
were left to the execution of the dispositions of August 4th. 

During the forenoon of August 5th Prince Freder- 
ick Charles transferred his headquarters to Kaiserslau- 
tern.f 

THE 6th OF AUGUST 

Early reports of August 6th were awaited with great 
tension in Kaiserslautern. These reports still stated, com- 
ing from the vicinity of Saarbriicken, that it appeared as if 
the enemy was getting ready to march off. It was said 
that troops were entraining for St. Avoid at the Forbach 
station. 

Therefore the Prince wired at 8:05 A.M. from Kaisers- 
lautern to General von Alvensleben II, "the 5th Infantry 
Division will march to Saarbriicken during the 6th, as the 
cavalry divisions are closely following the retreating en- 
emy. J 

Thereupon Army Headquarters proceeded to Homburg. 

A wire from General von Alvensleben arriving in Hom- 
burg at noon was already dated from Saarbriicken. The 



*Subsequently proved to be erroneous. 

fDuring the course of August 5th the corps of the Second Army 
reached the following points in executing their tasks as directed on 
the 4th: 

1. The Hid Army Corps, St. Wendel — Neunkirchen. 

2. The IVth Army Corps, Homburg — Einod, 

3. The Xth Army Corps, Kusel — Altenglau. 

4. The Guard Corps, Landstuhl — Kindsbach. 

5. The IXth Army Corps, Otterberg— Otterbach. 

6. The XHth Army Corps, Miinchweiler — Enkenbach (be- 

tween Winnweiler and Kaiserslautern). 

JAt the same time the IVth Army Corps sent an advance guard 
on the 6th to Neu-Hornbach. 

—302— 



Operations Second German Army 

enemy had actually evacuated that place and a portion of 
the cavalry of the Second Army occupied it,* Infantry and 
artillery, apparently covering the retreat of the French still 
were on the hills at Spicheren. 

Events now took a rapid course and quite unexpectedly 
drew the right wing of the Second Army into a bloody battle. 

General von Rheinbaben reported at 1 :30 P.M. that the 
enemy was deploying against his advancing leading elements 
and that at that time the leading elements of the 14th Infan- 
try Division of the First Army were arriving in Saar- 
briicken. 

As was soon learned, headquarters of the Illd Army 
Corps had already arrived at the decision to occupy Saar- 
briicken and did so, when the orders of the Prince of the 
morning of that day were received. At 3 :30 P.M. the fol- 
lowing telegram was received at Homburg from Neunkir- 
chen: 

"5th Division reports from Saarbriicken that the 14th Divi- 
sion is engaged in battle. Colonel Doring advances in support 
with the 9th Brigade.f I am proceeding to that place. All avail- 
able troops march or proceed by rail to Saarbriicken." 

Report from Saarbriicken : 

"Engagement proceeding victoriously. 

VON Alvensleben." 

Thus troops of the First and Second Army became 
mixed at Saarbriicken. It could be seen as early as August 
4th that blockades in the march columns could easily occur 
because of the orders for the march to the left of the First 
Army, directed by Army Headquarters, into the triangle Le- 
bach — Tholey — Ottweiler. For instance, the First Army 
had occupied the village of Ottweiler, while the St. Wendel 
— Neunkirchen — Saarbriicken road leading through Ott- 
weiler, had been assigned to the right wing of the Second 
Army. Therefore Army Headquarters at once communi- 
cated with General von Steinmetz. Regulating conditions 
on the left wing of the First and the right wing of the 



*In evacuating Saarbriicken, the French left the bridges un- 
damaged. — C.H.L. 

fAdvance guard of the 5th Infantry Division. 

—303— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Second Army appeared the more necessary as the 1st Army 
Corps was also drawn into the same terrain in which they 
moved. This corps detrained on August 3d and 4th at Bir- 
kenfeld and Kaiserslautem and marched into the triangle 
Tiirkismiihle — St. Wendel — Tholey. There it was to hold 
itself in readiness at the start to serve as support for either 
the First or Second Army as conditions might require. Thus 
we might expect overcrowding in the direction of Birken- 
feld toward Saarbriicken similar to that between Kaisers- 
lautem and Saargemiind. 

Regulation of the march direction of the two armies — 
which could of course be accomplished only by direct or- 
ders from General Headquarters — was not yet completed on 
August 6th. And the engagement at Saarbriicken now 
made regulation impossible. The thunder of cannon had to 
exert its influence on the troops marching on the adjoining 
flanks, and we had waited to see how many troops of the 
two armies the tactical decision would mix, as is the case in 
every action. Only after the close of the action could steps 
be taken to bring the troops back to their proper roads for 
a continuation of the operations. 

Let us now turn briefly to the development of the ac- 
tion at Saarbriicken: 

The Illd Army Corps, foreseeing the approaching pri- 
mary tactical decisions had accomplished more than had 
been ordered by material marches and on the morning of 
the 6th, it with the 5th Infantry Division was in and south 
of Neunkirchen, with the 6th Division and the corps ar- 
tillery between there and St. Wendel. 

According to the orders of its commanding general the 
corps should, on the 6th, march with its leading elements 
as far as Dudweiler, with the remainder as far as the vicin- 
ity of Neunkirchen. These orders soon were enlarged, in 
consequence of reports received direct from the cavalry that 
Saarbriicken also should be reached. When in addition Gen- 
eral von Alvensleben received at 11:00 A.M. the wire of the 
Prince from Kaiserslautem, dated 8:05 A.M., he directed 
the 5th Infantry Division to occupy the city and to concen- 
trate north thereof with a depth of four miles. When then 

—304— 



Operations Second German Army 

the thunder of cannon was heard at Saarbriicken at noon 
and as the advance guard of that division was already 
marching to the sound of cannon, the Illd Corps Headquar- 
ters decided to march to the battlefield with all troops that 
could be reached, or to send them there by rail. The bat- 
talions in Neunkirchen and St. Wendel were at once en- 
trained and started for Saarbriicken. Thus it happened that 
not only the 5th Infantry Division but also portions of the 
6th and the corps artillery reached the battlefield. 

By 3:00 P.M. the action had spread to the line Stifts- 
wald of St. Arnual to Stiri.ng and by that hour assumed such 
a serious aspect that it appeared desirable to support the 
troops engaged as soon as possible. Therefore troops of 
the 5th Infantry Division participated on all portions of the 
battlefield as a very welcome support in the battle. 

The action proper, as well as reports thereof, are within 
the province of the battles of the First Army (see v. Schell, 
Operations of the First Army). 

The loss of the 5th Infantry Division in the short but 
heavy engagement was in dead and wounded: 72 officers, 
1921 men, that of the 5th Cavalry Division, 2 officers, 32 
men. 

In the evening the 6th Infantry Division concentrated 
around Neunkirchen between eight and nine o'clock. A por- 
tion of that division and of the corps artillery reached the 
battlefield during the course of August 6th, formed in re- 
serve there, but did not have a chance to participate to 
any extent in the action.* 

This action did not only involve the Hid Corps, but also 
the cavalry of the Second Army, though the latter did not 
succeed in gaining a tactical success. f 

During the night General von Rheinbaben issued orders 
not only to those portions of the 5th Cavalry Division that 
were close at hand, but also to the entire 6th Cavalry Divi- 



*One battalion of the 20th Infantry Regiment, which had been 
entrained in St. Wendel, participated in outpost service during the 
night; it had some losses during the day. 

fThe Brunswick Hussar Regiment suffered not immaterial los- 
ses in its attempt to support the infantry, undertaken with the 
greatest bravery. 

—305— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

sion to march immediately toward the battlefield. This 
movement was made use of at the same time to transfer the 
6th Cavalry Division to the right wing of the entire cavalry 
line and to do away with the separation of the 5th Division 
by regiments of the 6th. 

The development of an action at Saarbriicken did not 
contradict the opinion held at Headquarters of the Second 
Army that the enemy was retreating from the frontier, as 
had been several times reported by the cavalry. It is likely 
that at Saarbriicken only the rear elem,ents of Frossard's 
Corps had been overtaken and that the enemy had 
brought back stronger bodies of troops only to disengage 
those troops. Therefore the army orders issued the after- 
noon of the 6th — while the action was progressing — started 
with that assumption. It contained the additions that had 
now become necessary to the orders issued on the 4th to 
advance to the line Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken. It was 
known that the main forces of the Illd Army Corps were al- 
ready at Saarbriicken, that is, a day's march farther to the 
front than they ought to have been originally on the 6th.* 

If we therefore intended to keep up close connection 
permanently between the different units of the armies and 
be ready for a possible rapid pursuit of the enemy, the rest 
of the corps would have to increase their marches on Au- 
gust 7th, which, of course, would mean increased efforts and 
fatigue. 

Consequently, on that day the corps were to reach: 

The Xth Army Corps — designated to support the Illd 
Corps — St. Ingbert; 

The Guard Corps, Assweiler with one infantry division, 
rear elements closed up if possible opposite Bliescastel. - 

The IVth Army Corps, Neu-Hornbach, advance guards 
towards Bitsch and Rorbach. 

The IXth Army Corps with leading elements ready for 
action at Bexbach. 

The Xllth Army Corps Homburg. 

Army headquarters, Blieskastel. 



*According to army orders of August 4th, the corps was to be 
at Neunkirchen on the 6th of August. • 

—306— 



Plan of the Battle-field of Spicheren 



pcisrtions oJ the l^Anay under General voii Stemmcte 




Htivjj S KinJ &C9 65 Cornhill. Lonion 



Operations Second German Army 

The Second Army received at that very time reinforce- 
ment through the lid Army Corps which had been brought 
by rail from the interior of the monarchy, and which was to 
arrive in Homburg and Neunkirchen during the 8th to the 
11th of August. An area around Neunkirchen was assigned 
to this army corps for its concentration. That corps num- 
bered : 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 14 batteries, 25,000 in- 
fantry, 1200 horses and 84 guns. 

Thus, the strength of the army now was: 181 battal- 
ions, 156 squadrons, 105 batteries with 181,000 infantry, 23,- 
400 horses, 630 guns.* 

The 1st Army Corps now definitely joined the First 
Army, the Vlth Army Corps the Third Army. 

It is known of the 1st Army Corps that it had been 
transferred to the zone between Tiirkismiihle — St. Wendel — 
Tholey. The Vlth Army Corps had detrained at Landau. 
The 12th Infantry Division belonging to that corps was to 
reach the vicinity of Pirmasenz on August 7th, and there- 
fore the IVth Army Corps today received orders to make 
connection with it. 

Prior to that on August 3d, the 1st Cavalry Division 
had been assigned to the First Army, the 2d Cavalry Divi- 
sion to the Third Army. 

THE 7th AND 8th OF AUGUST 

General von Alvensleben II reported the victorious 
finish of the action at Saarbriicken by wire at 3 : 15 A.M. Au- 
gust 7th. He added that the fight had been heavy and bloody. 
Thus it had been a question of a decision of tactical impor- 
tance. The commander-in-chief of the Second Army also 
received in Bliescastel, the news of the decisive victory of 
the Third Army at Worth. Thus, on the 6th of August the 
enemy had been beaten on both of his wings. 

Under these circumstances some reports became of 
great importance, as they opened an expectation of partici- 



*The losses during the action of Spicheren and the march losses 
up to then should be deducted from the above numbers. 



—307- 



Campaign of 1870-71 

pating in the defeat of the hostile troops beaten at Worth 
or to capture the French troops still remaining on the Saar. 

General von Moltke added to his telegram of the vic- 
tory the notation that it could be concluded from the fact 
that the enemy held out at Worth and Saarbriicken, that 
strong hostile forces were still near the Saar and that cav- 
alry reconnaissance was necessary. Then followed a report 
from the IVth Army Corps which had received information 
of events at Worth from the 12th Division (which was at 
Dahn on August 6th) and had learned that during the ac- 
tion portions of the enemy had retreated on Bitsch. The 
12th Division was about to pursue. Army headquarters also 
received information from General Headquarters by wire 
that those hostile masses that had turned towards Bitsch 
would reach that place by August 7th and could probably be 
reached on the 8th in the vicinity of Rohrbach by the left 
wing and by the cavalry of the Second Army. 

In order to clearly estimate the situation of things it 
will be necessary here to go back to the events of the past 
few days. 

On August 4th touch had been gained in the terrain 
between Bitsch and Saargemiind between the left wing col- 
umn of the cavalry and the enemy. At Habkirchen and 
Bliesbriicken French infantry detachments were encoun- 
tered, French cavalry at Klein-Rederching, and stronger 
detachments of all arms at Holbach. The Scheide woods 
were also found occupied by French and at Opperdingen 
hostile cavalry and infantry was encountered. All these re- 
ports were received by army headquarters on August 5th. 

In consequence of the orders issued on August 5th to 
the cavalry, to follow the enemy who, as stated, was reported 
to be marching from the Blies to the Saar, and to push for- 
ward in force especially in the direction of Rohrbach, fur- 
ther reports were received from that vicinity. 

It was reported that strong columns were marching on 
the 6th from Bitsch toward Saargemiind and that the camp 
at Saargemiind had greatly increased. On the other hand, 
movements of the enemy in the opposite direction from 

—308— 



Operations Second German Army 

Kohrbach to Bitsch were reported, as well as that material 
French forces were at Bitsch.* 

Second Army Headquarters had all these reports when 
it took measures for the left wing of the army, in order to 
concentrate as many troops as possible against Rohrbach by 
the 8th of August. There were disposable for this princi- 
pally the IVth Army Corps, which received orders to con- 
tinue its march the afternoon of August 7th to south of Vol- 
miinster and to send its advance guard as far as Rohrbach. 

By the forenoon of August 8th the entire Army Corps 
was to be at Rohrbach, and the left column of the cavr 
alry,t which was attached to that corps, was to be sent 
against Lemberg and Lorenzen.J 

The Guard Corps was designated to support any action 
that might occur probably at Rohrbach. Accordingly the 2d 
Guard Infantry Division and the Guard Cavalry Division 
were to be started on the marcH on the 8th in the Blies val- 
ley early so as to be in readiness between 10 and 11 o'clock 
at a suitable point north of Gross Rederching. It was left 
to the discretion of the commanding general of the Guard 
Corps to send the remainder of his corps so that it could 
support the units ahead. 

The hostile fighting forces observed on the 6th at Saar- 
gemiind had to be held there. For that purpose the Xth Army 
Corps was to reach Saargemiind with its leading elements 
at 10:00 A.M. August 8th and there engage in a containing 
action. 



*At 7:00 P.M. patrols of General von Bredow's command had 
struck a hostile squadron marching from Saargemiind; it was re- 
ported that Rorbach was occupied by the French; at Frohmiihle 
a picket was encountered, while hostile infantry, estimated to be 
one regiment, held the crest of the ridge at Freudenberg and that a 
column of wagons was seen in rear of it near Bitsch, apparently artil- 
lery. The strength of the enemy at Bitsch was said to be 20,000 
men. 

fGeneral von Bredow with his four cavalry regiments and one 
horse battery. 

{Orders had been sent as early as the morning of the 7th to 
General von Bredow to prolong his outposts then extending from 
Schweix to Bliesbriicken, to the right via Bliesbolgen and beyond 
ito cover the IVth and the Guard Corps, as the right column of 
the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions was pursuing the enemy. These 
orders were sent to the IVth Army Corps for transmission to General 
von Bredow. 

—309— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

In this it was not the intention to force a crossing of 
the Saar should the enemy deploy stronger forces there, 
for it appeared in that case far better to send the Illd Army 
Corps, which was then on the left bank of the Saar upstream 
and thus open the defile for the Xth Army Corps. Both 
corps received directions to communicate with each other 
regarding this point. 

In addition, the leading division of the Vlth Army 
Corps, the 12th, of the Third Army, which was marching 
from Landau on Pirmasenz, could reach Rorbach on Au- 
gust 8th. Therefore this division received information of 
the measures taken and was requested to cooperate. It 
already had received instructions from headquarters of the 
Third Army to make a demonstration against Bitsch. 

On the other hand, on the right wing of the army the 
Illd Army Corps received orders to remain for the present at 
Saarbriicken in view of the hardships it had so far under- 
gone. The pursuit of the enemy beaten there was left, in 
addition to the First Army, to the four cavalry brigades 
that had been brought up to the battlefield by General von 
Rheinbaben. 

The IXth and the Xllth Army Corps received orders to 
close up and rest at Bexbach and Homburg respectively. 

Now, during the afternoon hours of August 7th reports 
were received from Saarbriicken from the Illd Army Corps, 
which made it appear that the victory gained on the 6th was 
far more important than expected. General von Alvens- 
leben wired at 2 :45 P.M. that 600 to 700 unwounded prison- 
ers had been brought in* and that many arms and materiel 
as well as portions of the camps had been captured. The 
enemy had left the Saar and the Blies line during the night. 
It was found that the enemy only held Saargemiind the 
morning of the 7th. And the 5th Cavalry Division (17th 
Brunswick Hussar Regiment) found that place evacuated in 
the afternoon. 

Information of this fact reached headquarters in Blies- 
castel in the evening; it lessened the chances of any action 



*Later on the numbers were ascertained to be more than 1000. 

—310— 



Operations Second German Army 

at Rohrbach, but did not preclude the possibility that the 
enemy's columns marching farthest to the north, retreating 
from Alsace, might be struck the following morning at Ror- 
bach or south thereof. 

Therefore the orders already issued remained un- 
changed. 

On the morning of August 8th the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Second Army proceeded to the IVth Army Corps, 
which stood in readiness in the vicinity of Klein Rederch- 
ing. The Xth Army Corps with all its units had started its 
march towards Saargemiind. It was left on the march toward 
that point, and only its advance guard received orders to ad- 
vance farther towards Puttelange and Metzing. The Guard 
Corps had taken measures in such manner that it reached 
in its entire strength the terrain north of Gross-Rederching 
between 10 and 11 o'clock and could send its cavalry, fol- 
lowed by advance guards in support, to beyond the line 
Achen — Rohrbach. Portions of the 5th Cavalry Division had 
been brought forward through Saargemiind, to find and keep 
close to the enemy, and to gain definite knowledge of his 
whereabouts. 

Thus, sufficient forces were in readiness for action at 
Rohrbach, but the advanced cavalry found the vicinity as 
far as Lemberg and Lorenzen free of the enemy.* 

The troops beaten at Worth appeared to have taken 
their line of retreat farther south, and there was no hope 
of reaching them. But the cavalry received instructions 
to extend its reconnaissances as far as Driilingen (la Petite 
Pierre — Fenetrange road). Prince Frederick Charles then 
transferred his headquarters to Saargemiind and the troops 
went into close cantonment and bivouacs. 

Immense supplies were captured in Saargemiind and 
also one railroad train loaded with subsistence stores that 
could not be moved by the French in their retreat. This 
indicates the haste with which the enemy executed his re- 
treat. Only single prisoners of the French 2d, 3d and 5th 
Corps were brought in ; otherwise nothing was seen of the 



*The fortress of Bitsch was called on to surrender, but de- 
clined. 

—311— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

enemy between Puttelange and Saaralbe. The brigades of 
the 5th Cavalry Division that had ridden in that direction, 
the 11th and the 13th, established themselves on the line 
Puttelange — Saaralbe with their outposts. 

The enemy stood in force only on the right wing of the 
Army, opposite the Hid Army Corps, on the heights this 
side of St. Avoid. He was observed there by the 6th Cav- 
alry Division. It was possible that the French 2d, 3d and 
4th Corps had concentrated there. There were many rumors 
among the rural population of the approach of the French 
Guard Corps to that vicinity and it appeared possible that 
the enemy intended to concentrate all available forces on his 
left wing to offer a decisive resistance this side of the 
Moselle. 

This possibility was taken into account in the orders 
issued the afternoon of the 8th, while at the same time pre- 
paratory steps were taken for an advance on the Moselle on 
as large a breadth as possible. 

It was desirable for reconnaissance or pursuit of the 
enemy to make each column of marching troops of the 
army as strong in cavalry as possible. The different por- 
tions of both cavalry divisions were therefore from now on 
placed under the orders of that army corps, in front of which 
they found themselves in the course of their operations ; 
that is, the 6th Cavalry Division under orders of the Hid 
Army Corps, General von Rheinbaben with the 11th and 
13th Cavalry Brigade under the Xth Corps, and General 
von Bredow with the 12th Cavalry Brigade under orders of 
the IVth Army Corps.* But the cavalry commanders nearest 
the enemy had also orders to report everything important 
direct to army headquarters. The Prince also retained 
control over the dispositions of the cavalry divisions for 
battle. t 



*The Guard Corps, which also was in the first line, had the dis- 
posal of its own cavalry division. 

fBy army orders of July 31st, which regulated the conduct of 
the artillery in a tactical sense, H. R. H., the commander-ir,-chief 
had retained, on the battlefield, the disposition of the horse batteries 
with the corps artillery. 

—312— 



Operations Second German Army 

In accordance with army orders the corps in the first 
line were to be on the 9th as follows : 

The Illd Army Corps in a selected position at Forbach ; 

The Xth Army Corps at Saargemiind, all its troops on 
the left bank of the Saar, 

The Guard Corps in the vicinity of Gross-Rederching 
and Rimeling, in readiness to be called up to Saargemiind. 

The IVth Army Corps echeloned on the Saarunion — 
Rohrbach road, its patrols as far to the south as practicable 
to obtain connection with the Third Army. 

In the second line, the IXth Army Corps was to reach 
St. Ingbert, the Xllth Habkirchen ; this latter corps was to 
keep its cavalry divisions out in front.* 

The 8th of August also brought the opportunity to 
regulate conditions with the First Army on the right wing. 

The First Army took the Volklingen — Ludweiler — Car- 
ling road. 



Chapter III 



FROM THE SAAR TO THE MOSELLE 
THE 9th AND 10th OF AUGUST 

At the same hour when at General Headquarters in 
Saargemiind on August 8th the army orders for August 
9th were sketched out, conditions with the enemy had again 
changed. The 6th Cavalry Division on August 8th found St. 
Avoid evacuated. t A hostile rear guard that had been 
observed in the forenoon on the hills of St, Avoid, in the 
afternoon followed its corps which marched towards Metz 
and halted, only when darkness fell, on the other side of 
Longeville. Troops of Bazaine's Corps were recognized in this 
rear guard, which undoubtedly had the duty to cover the 



*As a matter of fact the corps had its cavalry division out in 
front on the morning of August 8th. 

fThe 15th Ulan Regiment, one squadron of which went as far as 
Longeville. 

—313— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

enemy's retreat. General von Alvensleben II, who received 
information of this during the night, immediately decided 
to reach St. Avoid by a forced march on the 9th, and to push 
ahead his advance guard to the fork of the St. Avoid — Faul- 
quemont and the St. Avoid — Metz roads. These events and 
details, which cleared up the situation with the enemy, were 
reported to army headquarters during August 9th. 

The day before Marshal Bazaine had been in the city of 
St. Avoid ; his entire corps had been there. In the hospital 
of that city were found sick men from the 2d and 4th Corps. 
The supposition that the main hostile force was marching 
from the vicinity of St. Avoid towards Metz in front of the 
right wing of the Second Army, thus became a certainty.* 
Therefore the next succeeding orders had to reckon with 
the security and sufficient strength of this wing. On the 
other hand, in front of the left wing of the Second Army 
at Saarunion and Saaralbe nothing was seen of the enemy 
on August 9th. Here, considerations of connections and co- 
operation with the Third Army remained the only thing to 
be considered; patrols of both armies had already met in 
Lemberg on August 8th. 

Thus it quite naturally resulted that for the 10th of 
August the four corps of the Second Army in front (the 
Hid, Xth, Guard and IVth Corps) were to come up to the 
line St. Avoid — Puttelange — Sarralbe — Saarunion, while the 
IXth Corps was to remain at Saarunion, and the Xllth, 
closed up at Habkirchen. The lid Army Corps also soon 
took position in this second line, and it received orders to 
echelon itself for the present from Saarbriicken up the Dud- 
weiler valley. 

The 10th of August brought orders from General Head- 
quarters for operations to commence against the Seille and 
Moselle. 

The enemy continued his retreat toward these two 
stream lines and all three German armies were to follow 
him. The Second Army received the zone between the 



*The outcome of the battle of Spicheren had induced the French 
2d Corps to retreat south by way of Saargemiind. 

—314— 



Operations Second German Army 

St. Avoid — Nomeny roads* and the Saarunion — Dieuze 
roads. t North of this zone, about opposite the Second 
Army, the First Army advanced. The Third Army could 
only reach the upper Saar on August 12th; and the corps 
of the right wing consequently had to make but short daily 
marches in order to make it easier for the corps of the Third 
Army which were marching along a large arc. 

The Second Army found itself for this advance in the 
favorable situation of being able to march with four army 
corps in the first line line along parallel roads. The other 
three corps had to remain in the second line ; the IXth and 
the lid — on account of news of the enemy — behind the 
right wing, the Xllth Corps on a more extended front in 
rear of the center. 

The following roads were assigned to the corps : 

1. To the Illd Corps the St. Avoid — Faulquemont — 
Han-sur-Nied — Buchy — iCheminot road ; 

2. To the Xth Army Corps the Puttelange — Gros Ten- 
quin — Brulange — Delme — Nomeny road ; 

3. To the Guard Corps the Saaralbe — Altroff — Virming 
Munster — Marimont — Chateau Salins — Manhoue road. 

4. To the IVth Army Corps the Saarunion — Altweiler — 
Munster — Marimont — Chateau Salins — Manhoue road. 

Directions, as to how far the different corps were to 
proceed along these roads each day, were to be contained 
in daily orders, as that matter would depend mainly on in- 
formation received of the enemy. 

The prolongation of the direction of the four march 
routes led to the Moselle crossings at Pont-a-Mousson, Dieu- 
louard and Marbache. In the advance to those points the 
cavalry of all four corps was to hasten on ahead, followed 
by the advance guards designated for their support. The 
right and left wings were directed to keep connection with 
the other two armies. 



*This road inclusive. Under the general expression St. Avoid — 
Nomeny, headquarters of the Second Army is understood to be meant 
the Forbach — St. Avoid — Tritteling — Faulquemont — Herny — Han-sur- 
Nied^ — Buchy — Cheminot road. 

fThis road exclusive. 

—315— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The Hid Corps was to be followed at a day's march by 
the IXth Corps, the IXth Corps, at a greater distance by the 
lid Corps as soon as it was assembled at Saarbriicken. The 
Xllth Corps was to use as its main route the Metzing — Barst 
— Val Ebersing — Lixing — Lelling — Vahl les Faulquemont — 
Chemery — Thonville — Brulange — Vatimont — Baudrecourt — 
Morville-sur-Nied — Soigne road. 

These lines of communications, which correspond but 
little with the course of the main roads, were in many 
cases supplemented by cross and communicating roads which 
had been drawn on so that with the exception of the IXth 
and the lid Corps each army corps had free control of its 
roads of communications to the rear. 

Considerations of subsistence made it necessary to re- 
move each and every obstacle that could interfere with the 
movement of the trains. It could be foreseen that in any 
case the troops would have to live during the next few days 
by requisition. In order to avoid collisions in this, the corps 
were assigned definite sectors. A start had been made in es- 
tablishing an army reserve depot in Saargemiind since that 
place had been occupied, and the headquarters of the field 
bakeries was also brought to that place. And by orders of 
General Headquarters a depot had been established in Saar- 
albe for the right wing of the Third Army.* But in the 
rapid advance that was to be expected, there was danger 
that the communication of the troops with those points 
would be very slight and irregular. 

THE 11th OF AUGUST 

Early the 11th of August Prince Frederick Charles 
moved his headquarters from Saargemiind to Puttelange. 
That day the troops were to reach : 

The lid Army Corps (by rail) Neunkirchen with the 3d 
Infantry Division and Corps artillery, Homburg with the 
4th Infantry Division and headquarters. 



*August lOth 100 wagons, loaded from the depot in Saargemiind, 
of the provisional wagon park of the Xllth Army Corps were brought 
to the Third Army under escort of one squadron of the 17th Ulans 
to Saarunion, and returned empty on the 11th of August. 

—316— 



Operations Second German Army 

The Illd Army Corps, Faulquemont ; 

The IVth Army Corps, Saarunion ; 

The Guard Corps, Guebelange; 

The Xllth Army Corps, Saargemiind ; 

The Xth Army Corps, Heliimer (advance guard, Gross- 
Tenquin) ; 

The IXth Army Corps, Forbach, 

But in the morning of that day new reports indicated 
a sudden change in the enemy's decision. 

The cavalry of the right wing and center had closely 
stuck to the retreating corps of Bazaine, and it reached the 
French Nied towards evening. It found that sector strong- 
ly occupied, and perceived in rear strong hostile forces 
in an excellent position. It observed bivouacs, camps and 
outposts, and also observed the march of columns from 
the direction of Metz towards Courcelles, Pange and Mont. 
Inhabitants, coming from the direction of Metz, confirmed 
the report that troops had arrived there coming from the 
camp at Chalons* and that other troops had marched off 
toward the Nied. They also stated that they had heard 
that the army was expecting orders for an advance east- 
ward. Traces of the 2d and 5th Corpsf found in Landroff 
and pursued via Herny to Remilly also led to the Nied posi- 
tion. Farther south the terrain was free of the enemy and 
Chateau Salins had been found to be free of the enemy. All 
this indicated the possibility that the enemy intended to 
seek a tactical decision on the right bank of the Moselle and 
that he was concentrating his fighting forces for that pur- 
pose in rear of the Nied. In that case we ought not to attack 
him with single units, but rather with all of the corps of 
the Second Army combined and to execute. that attack in 
conjunction with the First Army. Therefore Second Army 
headquarters decided, as soon as these reports were con- 
firmed, to execute a right turn with the entire Second Army 
and to deploy for an offensive battle on the line Faulque- 
mont — Verny. This movement could be completed by the 



*The first echelons of the French 6th Army Corps. 
fBrigade Lapasset, that had. been in Saargemiind. 



-317- 



Campaign of 1870-71 

14th of August by calling for the utmost exertion of the 
troops and by leaving all unnecessary impedimenta in the 
zone occupied on August 11th. The 15th would remain 
for the approach, and the battle could be waged on the 16th 
or 17th. It would then be the intention to hold the enemy 
on the Nied in front, but to utilize the main forces of the 
army on the left of the Nied against his right flank. In or- 
der to deprive the enemy at the same time of his communi- 
cations in the Moselle valley, the enveloping left wing would 
send detachments toward Pont-a-Mousson. 

Up to the 15th of August, of course, the situation of 
the Hid Army Corps would be difficult. That corps formed 
the pivot of the movement. It was closest to the enemy, 
and if he decided to use the advantage still remaining to him 
for three days for an active defense, it could easily become 
engaged in a battle against superior hostile forces. On Au- 
gust 12th the Hid Corps could be supported only by the 
IXth Corps starting early from Forbach, and leading ele- 
ments of the Xth Corps, which could be sent towards Che- 
mery.* 

We could of course not count on the rest of the corps 
on that day ; as shown by the just explained position of the 
corps on August 11th (see page 317). It was presumed in 
this that the First Army would be about on the line Boulay 
— Marange. 

As long as there was no absolute certainty of the ene- 
my's intentions, the initial steps of an offensive against the 
Nied had to be combined with an exceedingly rapid advance 
against the Seille. Otherwise valuable time might be lost 
by useless movements which would much favor the enemy 
if he decided on retreat and if he intended to hide his true 
intentions by a halt on the Nied. 

An advance in echelons from the left wing, which could 

be started on August 12th, would best correspond with these 

intentions for the next few days. The IVth Corps — on the 

V 

*According to the dispositions received at midnight August 11th 
in Puttelange from General Headquarters, the Xth Army Corps was 
to be brought up behind the Illd Corps (probably via Lelling). 

—318— 



Operations Second German Army 

left of the Army — would then, as could be foreseen, also 
come into second line. 

However, caution made it necessary in any case to have 
the Illd Army Corps halt at Faulquemont and prepare a 
selected position for defense there. As early as the fore- 
noon of August 11th General von Alvensleben II received 
orders for this. At the same time a report was sent to Gen- 
eral Headquarters stating that Second Army Headquarters 
would take no further measures for a combined battle of the 
First and Second Army this side of Metz on August 16th 
or 17th until the situation had cleared and orders had been 
received from General Headquarters. 

General Headquarters still believed the position of the 
French behind the Nied to be a mere observation position. 
This view was expressed in a note from General von Moltke 
dated at 10:45 A.M., received in Puttelange at 2:00 P.M.* 
This note left it to the discretion of the Second Army Head- 
quarters as to whether the Illd Corps should halt to let the 
remaining corps come up. This had already been ordered. 

There was, by 5:00 P.M., no definite answer to the let- 
ter of Second Army Headquarters of that forenoon, at 
which time the Army Commander issued his orders for the 
remaining corps of the army. These orders therefore, as 
the situation was still in doubt, had to reckon with a fur- 
ther advance westward as well as with a turn to the right 
by the Army. 

The IXth Army Corps was to concentrate at St. Avoid 
on the 12th and to advance its leading elements to Longe- 
ville. There it would be ready to support the Illd Army 
Corps. 

In addition, on that day corps were to reach : 

the Xth Corps, Landroff ; 

the Guard Corps, Morhange ; 

the IVth Corps, Munster, its leading elements Bourg 
Altroff ; 

the Xllth Corps, Barst, its leading elements Lixing ; 

the lid Corps, Saarbriicken. 



''See No. 139, von Moltke's Correspondence, page 247. 

—319— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Through this movement the corps of the army would 
approach the right wing and the line of concentration Faul- 
quemont — Verny, while at the same time ground would be 
gained toward the front. 

THE 12th OF AUGUST 

At midnight of August 11th, the answer to the letter 
from Army Headquarters of the forenoon of the 11th was 
received from General Headquarters in Puttelange. This 
answer was dated St. Avoid 7 :00 P.M., August 11th.* 

General Headquarters believed it not improbable that 
a material part of the hostile fighting forces still were on the 
left bank of the French Nied in front of Metz. It was 
the intention to bring about closer connection between the 
First and the Second Army and therefore His Majesty or- 
dered the following: 

"The lid Army Corps in Faulquemont will be the supporting 
point for the junction of both armies. 

"The First Army will march early tomorrow with two corps 
to the line Boulay — Marhange, with one corps to Boucheborn. 

"The Second Army sends the IXth Corps to Longeville, west 
of St. Avoid, toward which latter place the lid Army Corps, as 
far as it is available, will close up. The Xth Army Corps pro- 
ceeds (about via Lelling) to in rear of the Hid Corps. The 
Guard, IVth, and Xllth Army Corps are to be drawn up towards 
the left of the above designated position in such manner that they 
can join that position if required, or continue the march in the 
direction of Nancy. 

"The outposts of the First Army will in general be advanced 
to the German Nied. 

"All army corps will leave the second section of their trains 
in the districts occupied today, leaving the roads completely clear." 

The orders issued by Second Army Headquarters at 
5:00 P.M., August 11th, corresponded almost completely 
with these orders from General Headquarters. Both Head- 
quarters started with the same point of view and this fact 
saved the troops hard marches which otherwise could not 
have been avoided as the situation was precarious. 

Only the Hd Army Corps received orders by telegraph 
on the morning of August 12th to march, in so far as it was 
ready therefor, on the same day and on August 13th to St. 



'^See No. 141, von Moltke's Correspondence, page 247. 
—320— 



Operations Second German Army 

Avoid. As was ascertained later on, these orders did not 
reach the corps, but a duplicate thereof, dated at noon, did 
reach the corps. Therefore the army corps was only able 
on the 12th to send one infantry regiment by rail to St. 
Avoid. 

On the morning of August 12th the Prince moved his 
headquarters to Gross-Tenquin. There new reports arrived 
in the course of the day which showed that, even if the en-' 
emy had drawn all his available forces on the Moselle to 
Metz, he was nevertheless about to withdraw across that 
river through Metz.* The position on the Nied had been 
evacuated on August 11th, and the French army camped un- 
der the guns of the fortress ; officers' patrols of both cavalry 
divisions had observed bivouac fires there the evening be- 
fore. In the morning of August 12th detachments of both 
cavalry divisions had followed the French to across the 
Nied as far as the line Coincy — Ars-Laquenexy — Peltre 
and had there seen large tent camps close to Metz and north- 
east of that city. The terrain behind the Nied was found to 
be fortified as a battlefield. Walls had been loopholed, 
trenches and gun emplacements constructed. Some shots 
were exchanged, until the enemy pushed the cavalry back 
with his infantry. 

The thought arose that the enemy would cross the river, 
take position on the left of the Moselle and utilize Metz as 
a bridge head. 

However, on the 11th the leading elements of the cav- 
alry of the Second Army had ridden as far as the Moselle 
and the Meurthe towards Pont-a-Mousson, Dieulouard, 
Nancyf and St. Nicholas-du-Port, without seeing anything 
whatever of the enemy. It was found that the bridges 
across the Moselle at Dieulouard were intact and our 
cavalry then destroyed there the telegraph line be- 
tween Metz and Nancy. These reports contradicted 



*With due regard to the intended concentration on the line Faul- 
quement — Verny, Headquarters in Gross-Tenquin had outlined or- 
ders for the 13th of August, but which now, as the situation had 
changed, could not be published to the troops. 

fNancy itself was found by one squadron of the 10th Hussars 
free of the enemy on August 12th. 

—321— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

the views held. In order to determine matters, it 
appeared necessary to send larger bodies of cavalry 
as rapidly as possible across the river to the pla- 
teau between the Moselle and Meuse. Therefore General von 
Voights-Rhetz received orders at 2:00 P.M., August 12th, 
to charge General von Rheinbaben with that important 
task. It was intended to again assemble the entire 5th 
' Cavalry Division into one body. The IVth Army Corps was 
instructed to bring Bredow's Brigade, so far under its or- 
ders, to the front on August 13th and have it join the divi- 
sion. August 12th General von Rheinbaben was to march 
on Pont-a-Mousson and Dieulouard and his command was 
to be followed early on the 13th by one infantry division of 
the Xth Army Corps with the light field bridge train via 
Delme to Pont-a-Mousson. The advance guard of that divi- 
sion was to be sent out as soon as possible. Thus it was in- 
tended to take possession of the important point of Pont-a- 
Mousson and keep up permanent connection with the cav- 
alry ; and the cavalry now received orders to advance along 
the plateau between the Moselle and the Meuse in a nor- 
therly direction against the Metz — Verdun road and to as- 
certain as soon as practicable if the enemy was retreating 
from Metz along that road. 

The Illd Army Corps was to instruct the 6th Cavalry 
Division to extend its left as rapidly as possible across 
the Seille towards the Moselle above Metz, so as to keep 
an eye from there on the roads leading west and to screen 
the entire intended movement against the fortress. The 
orders therefore called special attention to the prominently 
situated Chateau St. Blaise east of Jouy-aux-Arches from 
which place a good view could be had on the important 
roads and on the fortress of Metz. The 6th Cavalry Divi- 
vision also was instructed to seek connection with General 
von Rheinbaben. 

The First Army was informed of these orders. It was 
presumed that the First Army would direct a similar opera- 
tion of its cavalry below Metz and it was hoped to thus gain 
a clear insight into the enemy's intentions. 

—322— 



Operations Second German Army 

Before the army corps received their orders for the 
march on the 13th, orders from General Headquarters 
had to be awaited. These latter were received in Gross-Ten- 
quin at 5 : 15 P.M.* According to them all three armies were 
to continue the advance towards the Moselle, the First Army 
was to start on the 13th for the line Les Etangs — Pange, its 
cavalry to proceed toward Metz and cross the Moselle below 
that place. This move would at the same time secure the 
right flank of the Second Army. The Second Army received 
orders to reach the line Buchy — Chateau Salins on August 
13th, to push outposts to the Seille, to gain if possible the 
crossings over the Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson, Dieulouard, 
Marbache, etc., and to have its cavalry reconnoiter to be- 
yond the Moselle. 

The Third Army received orders to continue its advance 
towards the line Nancy — Luneville. 

As far as the Moselle and the Meurthe it was permitted 
to have the trains follow their respective army corps. 

Prince Frederick Charles, while in Puttelange, had es- 
tablished connection with the Third Army and telegraphic 
communication had been established into the district of that 
army by way of Saargemiind — Saaralbe — Saarunion. It 
was then known that that army would reach on August 13th 
the line Loudresing — Bisping — Azoudange — Avricourt — Re- 
paix (near Blamont). 

The corps of the Second Army now received the fol- 
lowing march objectives for August 13th: 

th€ Illd Army Corps, Bechy, leading elements, Buchy; 

the IXth Army Corps, Many, leading elements, Herny ; 

the Xllth Army Corps, Chemery, leading elements, 
Thonville ; 

the Xth Army Corps, in so far as not already started 
toward the Moselle, Lucy ; 

the Guard Corps, Oron, leading elements, Lemoncourt; 

the IVth Army Corps, Chateau-Salins ; 

the lid Army Corps, St. Avoid. 



''See No. 149, von Moltke's Correspondence, page 251. 

—323— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

On receipt of the orders dated at 2:00 P.M. General von 
Voigts-Rhetz had sent not only the cavalry under General 
von Rheinbaben but also the 19th Infantry Division to- 
wards Pont-a-Mousson, and the latter division had reached 
Delme by August 12th. The cavalry scouted as far as the 
Moselle, one squadron of the 17th Brunswick Hussars even 
going beyond the river to the railroad depot at Frouard and 
there destroying the telegraph line and the roadbed by 
removing some rails. The squadron became engaged with 
the enemy there. A train had just arrived at that depot 
carrying hostile infantry. That infantry left the cars and 
opened fire on the squadron, which then retreated but 
taking along its wounded and some prisoners.* At Cham- 
pigneulles patrols also encountered French infantry. 

An officer's patrol that had been sent to Pont-a-Mous- 
son had been attacked in the evening by hostile cavalry and 
it appeared that Pont-a-Mousson had been reoccupied by 
the French with all arms. 

THE 13th OF AUGUST 

After Pont-a-Mousson had been reoccupied by the ene- 
my it was believed that the defile would have to be forced by 
fighting. In the course of the forenoon however the cavalry 
found that that place had again been evacuated, that the 
bridge there was intact, and General von Rheinbaben imme- 
diately proceeded across the river (the 17th Brunswick Hus- 
sars proceeded as far as Regneville). The 19th Infantry 
Division had also continued its march during the forenoon of 
the 13th, reached Pont-a-Mousson with its advance guard, 
and brought the main body also up to that place. Thereafter 
General von Voigts-Rhetz brought the rest of his command 
up to Delme so as not to let the march column of his corps 
get too long and took his headquarters to Aulnois-sur-Seille. 

Thus, the Xth Army Corps had executed far more than 
it was charged with by orders from army headquarters and 



*The prisoners belonged to the 26th and 68th Line Regiments, 
the 1st Regiment Algerian Tirailleurs, the 16th Battalion Chasseurs 
a pied and also to the French 6th, 5th and 1st Corps. They stated 
in general that that train came from Metz and its destination had been 
Chalons. 

—324— 



Operations Second German Army 

had gained the advantage for that army of being, on August 
13th, in secure possession of the most important Moselle 
crossings. 

In the morning the commanding general of the Second 
Army had transferred his headquarters to Delme and there 
received the first reports in the afternoon from the Xth Army 
Corps concerning the occupation of Pont-a-Mousson. It ap- 
peared important to have a second crossing at that point 
as soon as possible, and therefore the chief engineer officer 
of the army received immediate orders to start the construc- 
tion of a ponton bridge there. 

The task of the Second Army was now a double one. 
It was known for certain that there was at Metz, or march- 
ing through that place towards the Meuse, the French 2d, 
3d, 4th and portions of the 5th Corps (Brigade of Lapasset) , 
which had been opposite the German armies on the frontier. 
In addition, the presence of the French Guards had been 
ascertained by sick of that corps found in the hospital at 
Courcelles — Chaussy. The 5th Cavalry Division had taken 
some prisoners at Frouard belonging to the French 6th 
Corps. The forces which the enemy had concentrated at 
Metz were therefore so strong that they would require the 
entire attention of the German First and Second Army. On 
the other hand, it was necessary to keep ahead of the enemy 
for subsequent operations into the enemy's country and to 
utilize the advantages so far gained. 

For this it was necessary to cross the Moselle as rap- 
idly as possible and gain a firm foothold in full force on the 
plateau between the Moselle and the Meuse. 

To correctly estimate the events now starting it is nec- 
essary to remember that the fortress of Metz dominated 
with the guns of its forts on both banks of the Moselle an 
area of about six [English] miles square. 

In this space sides on both the banks of the river are 
covered with woods, vineyards, orchards, villages and sin- 
gle farm houses making a view difficult. Only from some 
of the higher points along the banks of the Moselle, as for 
instance from the Chateau St. Blaise, can a clear view be 

—325— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

had into the terrain between the forts. If these points were 
not immediately located, patrols could nevertheless ascer- 
tain that hostile troops were camped in that terrain; but 
it would remain difficult to estimate the strength of those 
troops, even if only approximately. The question whether 
the main body of the French army still was between the 
forts and the fortress, or had already started for the Meuse 
could be definitely answered only after the roads to Ver- 
dun and north thereof had been occupied by the German 
cavalry. Until that happened, the dispositions of the Second 
Army had to be based on a double task. The army orders 
issued from Delme on the 13th, at 8 :00 P.M., were also based 
on that view. 

These orders contained the following directions for 
August 14th : 

"Tomorrow (the 14th) the Second Army will approach 
closer to the Moselle and in doing so keep a sharp eye on 
developments around Metz. 

"1. Tomorrow the 5th Cavalry Division will proceed to 
the plateau between the Moselle and the Meuse toward 
Thiaucourt and will send its leading elements in a northerly 
direction to observe the Metz — Verdun road. The point Les 
Baraques east of Chambley and the plateau northwest of 
Gorze permit a good view along that road. 

"2. In rear of the 5th Cavalry Division the Xth Army 
Corps will concentrate in and around Pont-a-Mousson along 
both banks of the Moselle. It will occupy with infantry de- 
tachments the roads leading to Metz in the valley of the 
Moselle on both banks and to the point where the Pont-a- 
Mousson — Flirey and Pont-a-Mousson — Thiaucourt roads 
diverge. Connection with the advance guard of the Guard 
Corps on the left bank is to be sought. 

"The Xth Army Corps will construct a crossing over the 
Mosel at about Atton on the 14th and may use for that pur- 
pose, if necessary, the light field bridge train of the Illd 
Army Corps. That portion of the Xth Army Corps still on 
the right bank of the Seille will not start until after 3:00 
A.M." 



—326- 



Operations Second German Army 

Thus, the Xth Army Corps now assumed the role of 
advance guard to the Army, 

"3. The Illd Army Corps will tomorrow reach with its 
leading elements and headquarters Cheminot by way of 
Louvigny-sur-Seille, rear elements closing up to Vigny. A 
few squadrons of the 6th Cavalry Division will tomorrow 
take over the security of the right wing of the Second Army 
against Metz. 

"4, On the 14th the IXth Army Corps will reach Buchy 
with its leading elements and its headquarters will take 
station there. Rear elements closed up as far as Many.* 

"5. The Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps marches via 
Brulange, Vatimont, Vaudrecourt, Morville-sur-Nied, Trag- 
ny and Moncheu with its leading elements to opposite 
Soigne, where its headquarters will be, and its rear ele- 
ments will close up to Vatimont. The cavalry division will 
march with the leading elements, as the commanding general 
of the Second Army intends to employ the cavalry on the 
other side of the Moselle. 

"6. The Guard Corps will tomorrow send two cavalry 
brigades with horse artillery and the advance guard (which 
must have crossed the Seille by 9 o'clock) to Dieulouard. 
Rear elements to close up on the Seille. Headquarters Ar- 
raye. 

"7. The IVth Army Corps will march tomorrow towards 
the Seille in the direction of the Moselle crossing at Mar- 
bache, headquarters in Manhoue-on-the-Seille. Rear ele- 
ments closing up as far as Chateau Salins. 

"8. Army Headquarters goes to Pont-a-Mousson." 

Thus, it was the intention on the right wing of the 
Army to free the Hid Army Corps for further operations 
against and beyond the Moselle. 

On August 14th the IXth Army Corps, in readiness 
at Buchy, resumed its prior role of supporting the First 
Army. The lid Army Corps, which again had orders to 
follow the IX Corps in a similar manner, could not bring 



*The Corps was to leave infantry at Herny as long as General 
Headquarters remained there. 

—327— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

its main body on the 14th to beyond St. Avoid. Orders 
from army headquarters reached it too late, as stated above. 
Material loss of time had occurred in the transportation by 
rail of its last echelons. It was impossible to transport 
these echelons by rail direct via Homburg and Neunkirchen 
and thus the corps could only be concentrated at St. Avoid 
by August 14th.* 

After orders had been issued a report arrived at Head- 
quarters in Delme on the evening of the 13th that the ad- 
vance guard cavalry of the Guard Corps had reached the 
bridge at Dieulouard. One horse battery was with the cav- 
alry (the Guard Dragoon Brigade) ; one company of the Fus- 
ilier battalion of the Kaiser Alexander Guard Grenadier 
regiment was sent there in the afternoon by wagons to 
guard that bridge, and for the same purpose the 19th In- 
fantry Division detached two battalions from Pont-a-Mous- 
son to Dieulouard (these battalions belonged to the 57th 
Infantry). During the afternoon four trains loaded with 
French infantry came from Frouard towards Dieulouard 
as far as the interruption of the road. Three of them im- 
mediately went back, while the fourth was fired on by the 
horse battery that just then arrived; it then also went 
back.f 

As the river crossing at Dieulouard was now also in 
secure possession of the Second Army, its cavalry hav- 
ing made use of it twice before on the 11th and 12th, the 
Moselle could now be crossed at several points without loss 
of time. The rapidity with which the Second Army ad- 
vanced to the other side of the Moselle now depended only 
on conditions at Metz. These were to take such shape that 
as a matter of fact a delay had to occur on the 14th on the 
part of the right wing of the Army. 

THE 14th OF AUGUST 

Large hostile bodies had been on the 13th at Borny 
and Servigny east of Metz. In the afternoon of that day 



^Leading elements and headquarters marched on the 14th to Faul- 
quemont, the rest closed up to St. Avoid. 

fThus the trains of the French 6th Corps were definitely stopped. 

—328— 



Operations Second German Army 

General Headquarters had been moved to Herny. From 
there, at 1 :30 A.M., the 14th of August, the following orders 
were received in Delme, dated 9:00 P.M., August 13th:* 

"The First Army remains tomorrow, the 14th August, 
in its positions on the French Nied and observes by ad- 
vanced advance guards if the enemy withdraws or if he 
advances to attack. 

"Should the latter be the case the Hid Corps of the Sec- 
ond Army will be sent tomorrow to opposite the heights of 
Pagny, the IXth to Buchy in the direction of the Moselle 
(Pont-a-Mousson) , where, by starting early, they will be 
in readiness at a distance of 4| [English] miles to par- 
ticipate in any serious action in front of Metz. The road 
from Herny via Buchy to Pagny is to be kept clear of all 
trains. 

"On the other hand, the First Army is in a situation to 
prevent any advance of the enemy southward by a flank at- 
tack. 

"The other corps of the Second Army will continue their 
advance toward the Moselle stretch Pont-a-Mousson — Mar- 
bache. 

"The Xth Corps will take position in front of Pont-a- 
Mousson. 

"The cavalry of both armies will be sent ahead as far 
as possible and must interrupt a possible retreat of the 
enemy along the Metz — Verdun road." 

Thus, the masses which the enemy had assembled 
at Metz appeared to be important enough to keep two 
corps in readiness to cooperate with the First Army. 

Both corps had received instructions as to their task 
direct from General Headquarters. 

Still they received special orders from the Prince at 
6:00 A.M. on the 14th — the Hid to concentrate at Pagny-les- 
Coin, the IXth to close up towards Buchy. 

Headquarters of the Second Army no longer thought 
it possible that a hostile offense would take place from Metz 
along the right bank of the Moselle, but still reckoned with 



'See No. 155, von Moltke's correspondence, page 253. 
—329— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

that possibility. It was the intention at that time, if the 
French Army did not advance, to concentrate the IXth and 
the Illd Corps in first Hne, the Xllth in rear of the right, 
the Xth, which in the meantime was still to occupy Pont-a- 
Mousson, in rear of the left wing in a defensive position, 
say at Soigne. These corps were to participate in any case 
in any action that might start. For August 15th the line 
Font-a-Mousson — Delme appeared to be advantageous for 
deployment. 

To that point the enemy would have to cover a longer 
distance and it could well become possible that other por- 
tions of the Third Army might be brought up for the decis- 



ion 



* 



In the forenoon of August 14th Army Headquarters 
was transferred to Pont-a-Mousson. 

There reports were received in the afternoon from the 
5th Cavalry Division, dated 12:45 noon, which stated that 
the division had entered Thiaucourt and Beney and would 
send forward detachments toward the Metz — Verdun road 
in the afternoon. 

Nothing had been seen of the enemy in front of the 
division nor in the vicinity of Pagny in the Moselle valley ;t 
connection with the Guard Dragoon Brigade had been estab- 
lished. 

The Xth Army Corps completed its concentration 
around Pont-a-Mousson on both banks of the Moselle. 

The Guard Cavalry DivisionJ arrived at Rogeville and 
sent detachments toward Flirey, Toul and Gondreville. The 
enemy was encountered only in the outskirts of Toul, other- 
wise the entire terrain west of the Moselle was found free of 
the enemy. The Guard Corps increased on that day the 
marches of the troops of its main body to beyond the objec- 
tive originally set it. Its first infantry division marched as 



*But these measures did not come up for execution, as the enemy 
remained on the defensive. 

fin the course of the day the Brunswick Hussars encountered 
Chasseurs d'Afrique. 

$The Guard Dragoon and Guard Ulan Brigade with two 
horse batteries, the Guard Cuirassier Brigade remaining at Jean- 
delaincourt. 

—330— 



Operations Second German Army 

far as Dieulouard from where an advance guard was sent 
still further west; the remainder of the corps marched to 
the vicinity of Sivry.* 

The plateau on the other side of the Moselle was now 
covered with German cavalry and there was no longer any 
possibility of the enemy's marching southwestward from 
Metz. Only to the west and northwest was there a way open 
to him. 

The IVth and the Xllth Corps completed the marches 
ordered. 

On the right wing of the army was the Illdf and the 
IXth Army Corps at the points assigned them ready to sup- 
port the First Army. However by 3 :30 P.M. no reports had 
arrived at Headquarters in Pont-a-Mousson that an engage- 
ment was developing at Metz and the army commander 
thought the time had arrived to leave it to the discretion 
of the nid Army Corps to today still fulfill its task and to 
march to Cheminot. 

When by 6:00 P.M. no reports had been received from 
the district occupied by the right wing, the army orders for 
the 15th were issued. The intention was to bring the en- 
tire army to the Moselle on that day, to have all corps 
cross the river, and to start operations with all forces con- 
centrated toward the northwest. These orders contained 
the following principal points : 

1. The Xth Army Corps will concentrate in Pont-a- 
Mousson and on the left bank, will cover the Moselle valley 
downstream towards Metz and will reinforce its advance 
guard.J 



*The other infantry division of the corps was between Moivrons 
and Arraye, the corps artillery between the two infantry divisions at 
Belleau, with headquarters at Sivry. 

fThe Illd Corps was located as follows: The 5th Inf. Div. with 
Louvigny in its front, the 6th Inf. Div. with Pagny in its front, 
right at Vigny, behind the hills. The corps artillery was in the 
valley north of Allemont, the 6th Cavalry Div. ahead on the line 
Corny — Coin-les-Cuvry — Cuvry — Chesny, its main body at Orny, 
Cheresey, Pournoy and Verny. Headquarters in Allemont. The 
IXth Corps went into bivouacs at Buchy, Bechy and Luppy. Details 
concerning these corps will be found below (see page 332). 

JThe advance guard was at the fork of the Pont-a-Mousson — 
Flirey and Pont-a-Mousson — Thiaucourt roads. 

—331— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

2. The Guard Corps will close up toward Dieulouard, 
its advance guard to be sent as far as les Quatre Vents ; its 
cavalry now at Rogeville to move out still farther in close 
connection with the 5th Cavalry Division. 

3. The IVth Army Corps will march to Custines — ad- 
vance guard and cavalry to Marbache — and will connect to- 
ward the left in the direction of Nancy with the Third Army. 

4. The Hid Corps, on the right wing of the army, 
marches with the 6th Cavalry Division* on the 15th to 
Cheminot, in so far as that march has not been made on the 
15th. 

5. The IXth Army Corps remains at Buchy to be on 
hand on the 15th in case of an engagement in front of the 
works of Metz. 

6. The lid Army Corps marches with its leading ele- 
ments to Han-sur-Nied and in echelon if conditions re- 
quire as far as to beyond Faulquemont.f 

^ 7. The Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps will reach 
Nomeny with its leading elements, its headquarters taking 
station there, its rear elements brought up in line with 
Soigne. 

8. Headquarters remains in Pont-a-Mousson on the 
15th. 

The basis of the directions sent at 3:30 P.M. to the 
Illd Corps and also for these army orders was that no change 
had occurred in the situation at Metz. But at 8:15 P.M. 
th^ Prince received a report from the observation post at 
Chauteau Mousson that extensive lines of powder smoke 
were seen since 7 o'clock east of Metz, apparently the re- 
sults of a hot fight. 

The 6th Cavalry Division had heard the thunder of 
cannon at 5 :00 P.M. coming from west of the French Nied. 
The division reconnoitered in that direction, and General 
von Alvensleben II with the 5th Infantry Division and the 
corps artillery remained in readiness for starting at Verny 



*When these orders were issued it was not known at head- 
quarters what General von Alvensleben had done in pursuance to 
orders of 3:30 P.M. 

fGeneral Headquarters at Herny was to receive an infantry 
guard from this corps. 

—332— 



Operations Second German Army 

for the battlefield, the more so as he learned that portions 
of the IXth Corps had already been alarmed. Therefore the 
march to Cheminot was not made on the 14th. 

These events were known at Headquarters at Pont-a- 
Mousson, when toward midnight orders were received from 
General Headquarters directing for the 15th that, on the 
right wing of the Second Army, the Hid, IXth, and XHth 
Corps were to halt with their leading elements, close up and 
cook meals. The First Army also received directions to re- 
main in general in its positions as held on the 14th. The 
VHIth Army Corps was to be brought into line at Bazon- 
court — Aube, thus approaching the right wing of the Second 
Army, and the shifting to the left, becoming necessary later, 
was thus inaugurated. The cavalry of that army, especially 
the 3d Cavalry Division, did not receive any limits as to its 
forward movements. 

It was emphasized that it was necessary to advance with 
stronger forces on the left bank of the Moselle against the 
enemy's lines of communication from Metz to Verdun. 

"For that purpose," read the orders, "the Second Army 
will send all cavalry available to the left bank of the 
Moselle and support it in the direction of Gorze and 
Thiaucourt by those corps that cross the Moselle first. There- 
fore the Hid Army Corps must prepare a crossing tomorrow 
below Pont-a-Mousson. The lid Army Corps will continue 
its march in its present direction." 

Concerning the start of operations on the other side of 
the Moselle, the measures taken by Second Army headquar- 
ters were a proper basis for the execution of the orders 
from General Headquarters. They diverged from those or- 
ders only in regard to the three corps of the right wing. But 
these three corps had received orders direct from General 
Headquarters.* And the letter from General Headquarters 
was dated at Herny at 6:00 P.M. the 14th, that is, at an 



=^In regard to this H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Saxony re- 
ported at 10:30 P.M., August 14th, that the Xllth Army Corps, 
in accordance with orders from General Headquarters received by 
it at 9:00 P.M., would be concentrated at 7:00 A.M. on the road from 
Delme to Soigne and would there await further orders. 

—333— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

hour when the development and result of the action in front 
of Metz could have had no bearing on the decisions arrived 
at. It remained therefore possible that the orders issued 
would be modified in accordance with the changed conditions, 
and that event was then awaited. 

THE MORNING OF AUGUST 15th 

Concerning the engagement of the First Army on the 
14th of August Second Army Headquarters learned at 4:15 
A.M., August 15th, from General von Alvensleben II, that 
it had been victoriously finished through the effective inter- 
ference of the 18th Infantry Division. Two hours later Gen- 
eral von Moltke wired that the 1st and Vllth Corps had, after 
a heavy fight on the evening of the 14th thrown strong hos- 
tile forces into Metz, that portions of the 18th Infantry Divi- 
sion had participated, that the IXth Corps would march to 
the battlefield today, and that General Headquarters would 
retain disposition of the Illd Corps for the present. He 
added that pursuit along the Metz — Verdun road was im- 
portant. 

Details had become known in the meantime through 
reports from the IXth Army Corps. From these it was 
learned that portions of the 18th Infantry Division advanc- 
ing along the Buchy — Metz road, had become active in the 
battle during the final phases thereof. 

Prior to the battle the IXth Corps was camped with the 
18th Infantry Division at Buchy, the 25th Division at Bechy 
with the corps artillery at Luppy, v^here also corps head- 
quarters was. The outposts had been advanced as far as 
Orny and Remiliy. From 5 :00 P.M. on the thunder of cannon 
was heard at Orny and it was seen from the hills there that 
an engagement was in progress at Colombey. Reports re- 
ceived from the battlefield caused the commander of the 
18th Infantry Division (General von Wrangel) to assume 
that an advance against the enemy's right flank would be 
very advantageous for the course of the battle. He there- 
fore alarmed his division and at once started (at 6:00 P.M.) 
with the advance guard. The enemy was seen at Peltre and 

—334— 



Operations Second German Army 

Mercy-le-Haut and the march was directed on those points. 
Both places were taken at dark with little loss and then, 
especially through the artillery effect at Mercy-le-Haut, the 
operation was continued against the enemy's right flank. 
Only during the night did the troops that had been engaged 
return to their bivouacs ; their loss being about 36 men. 

In the meantime the corps artillery of the IXth Army 
Corps had been moved to Buchy, and the 25th Infantry Divi- 
sion to Luppy, to be in readiness there on the 15th for either 
employment towards the north or for marching westward. 

Guarding all the roads leading west from Metz, and 
rapid pursuit 'if the enemy should turn westward, were now 
the two important missions. Of great importance were 
now two reports from the 5th Cavalry Division which were 
received by Second Army Headquarters about midnight 
August 14th and which contained information of the results 
of reconnaissances carried on on the 14th. The first report 
came from an officer's patrol that had been sent towards 
Les Baraques and which stated that at 11:30 A.M. nothing 
had been seen of the enemy either on the Metz — Verdun 
road or anywhere west of Metz. 

General von Rheinbaben had added to this message 
that — according to the statements of a reliable inhabitant 
— Marshal Bazaine had been appointed commander-in-chief 
of the French army at Metz and that that army would ac- 
cept a decision there. 

The second report came from an officer sent to the 
heights near Jouy-aux-Arches. According to this, only un- 
important bivouacs were in front of Metz and on the left 
bank of the Moselle. The Forts gave the impression of being 
unfinished, the entire country seemed deserted and indica- 
tions were that strong columns had marched early the 14th 
from Metz westward. But the engagement on the 14th con- 
tradicted in part this second report, nevertheless Head- 
quarters at Pont-a-Mousson was justified in assuming it 
possible — according to the reports it had on the forenoon of 
the 15th concerning the battle — that only strong rear guards 
of the hostile army had made a stand there. The contra- 

—335— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

diction between the two reports remained unsolved; it was 
very important to fully clear up this matter. 

The commander-in-chief now decided, to make the en- 
tire Xth Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division available 
for operations on the left bank of the Moselle, and to rein- 
force the corps by the Guard Dragoon Brigade at Rogeville. 
The Guard Corps received orders to send that brigade on 
the 15th to Thiaucourt. It placed a second cavalry brigade 
in readiness (the 1st Guard Cavalry Brigade) at Vernecourt. 
General von Voigts-Rhetz was to send his thus reinforced 
cavalry with horse artillery to the Metz — Verdun road as 
rapidly as possible, and he then was to march along that 
road towards Metz until a clear view was gained as to condi- 
tions there, connection to be made in this movement with 
the cavalry of the First Army to the west of Metz. The 
general was to dispose of his infantry divisions so that they 
could serve as a support for his cavalry, and so as to cer- 
tainly determine in the Moselle valley and on its left bank 
the conditions with regard to the enemy. 

It was the intention to relieve the Xth Corps from the 
duty of securing Pont-a-Mousson and to bring to that place 
one division of the Guard Corps; but General von Voigts- 
Rhetz sent instead the 19th Infantry Division to Thiaucourt 
and one detachment of that division down the Moselle val- 
ley to Noveant and remained with the 20th Infantry Divi- 
sion in bivouac at Pont-a-Mousson, so that that place was 
covered thereby. His cavalry marched on Fresnes-en-Woe- 
vre, and was now to debouch towards Metz and solve its 
task in that manner. 

As the measures which General Headquarters had taken 
on the 14th, prior to its knowledge of the battle east of Metz 
still remained in force after the battle, to the effect that 
the Hid, IXth and Xllth Corps had to be in readiness on the 
15th for carrying on any engagement on the 15th east of 
Metz, General von Alvensleben II received orders at 7:00 
A.M. the 15th not to continue his march on Cheminot. He 
was to halt with his corps, rest, cook meals, and await orders 
direct from General Headquarters. 



—336- 



Operations Second German Army 

However, these orders crossed with a report of the 
General sent to Pont-a-Mousson that he had decided not to 
execute the army orders of the 14th, but to march to the 
Moselle and still cross that river today if possible. He had 
arrived at that decision as the result of the battle of the 
14th. 

In addition, the Hid Army Corps was able to perform 
material marches on the 15th and there was a wish to act 
as rapidly as possible in the very tense situation now ob- 
taining. The commander of the Second Army did not with- 
hold his approval of this striving for independent action, 
but repeated his orders to halt, as the General could not 
know the contents of the last telegram from General Head- 
quarters to Second Army Headquarters. 

But the preparations for the crossing of the Moselle 
were to be continued. 

It could be only a question of hours until the intentions 
of the enemy became known for certain and until the Second 
Army received full freedom again as to disposing of its 
corps. Then all doubts would be raised and operations to 
the west could be" continued with greater energy. 

No further orders were issued to the IXth and Xllth 
Corps; for army orders of the afternoon of the 14th con- 
tained important directions for the IXth Corps. The Xllth 
Corps had reported that, according to orders from army 
headquarters, it would bs echeloned on the Delme — Soigne 
road and it was certain that it would receive necessary or- 
ders direct from General Headquarters. 



Chapter IV 



THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 

SECOND ARMY DURING THE ADVANCE 

TO THE MOSELLE 

It may be well here to briefly recount how the supply 
matters of the army were regulated during the rapid ad- 

—337— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

vance to the Saar and from there to the Moselle. The meas- 
ures that were taken at the opening of the campaign to pro- 
vide subsistence for the army have been mentioned. The 
difficulties that were foreseen during the advance through 
the mountains of the Palatinate — so poor in animals and 
grain — had caused Second Army Headquarters to recom- 
mend as early as August 1st in Alzey that provision trains 
be inserted among the field trains. In consequence there- 
of three provision trains were sent daily after August 3d 
to the army by way of Bingen. When the cavalry started 
for the frontier the supplies stored along the Rhine were also 
sent forward along the Ludwigshafen — Kaiserslautern — 
Homburg railroad. Thus, there had been plenty of subsis- 
tence stores for the army until it reached the Saar. In the 
subsequent operations to the Moselle, during which the army 
traversed a relatively rich district in its rapid advance, re- 
quisitions were found to be an excellent auxiliary means, 
so that supplies carried on the trains could be saved for 
more difficult times. The supplies captured from the ene- 
my in Saargemiind and Forbach also came in very handily 
for the troops. Starting on August 13th all available sup- 
plies in Neunkirchen, where the supplies brought by way 
of Bingen had been stored, were brought to Forbach, St. 
Avoid, Faulquemont and Herny. But the army corps re- 
ceived instructions to replenish their trains, as soon as 
necessary, from the supplies at Neunkirchen. When the 
army arrived at the Moselle it still had from four to five 
days' provisions on hand, so that steps could then be taken 
without danger directing that all provisions not of the best 
quality could be left behind by the trains, which could then 
send their empty wagons to the stations along the Saar- 
briicken — Remilly railroad to reload new supplies. In the 
meantime the station of Remilly had become headquarters 
of the lines of communications. 

It is known that the regulation of the lines of com- 
munications to the rear of the army at the opening of 
the campaign was in the hands of the lines of communica- 
tion headquarters of the army. These headquarters had 
under their orders different units for construction and traf- 

—338— 



Operations Second German Army 

fie of railroads the telegraph lines in the enemy's country, 
that is, one fortress company and the personnel for estab- 
lishing lines of communication stations and depots, etc. 

L. of C. headquarters followed Second Army Head- 
quarters by way of Saargemiind and Delme to Pont-a-Mous- 
son. 

To secure the connections, occupation of L. of C. depots 
and stations and the points becoming of importance in the 
rear of the army, the 3d Landwehr Division had originally 
been assigned to the L. of C. But as early as August 8th 
Second Army Headquarters received a letter from General 
Headquarters informing them that this Landwehr Division 
had received other orders. It was to be detrained at Kaisers- 
lautern and remain in readiness there for other employment. 
In its place the L. of C. of the Second Army received eight 
battalions and four squadrons of occupation troops and these 
were: the 53d, 56th, 16th and 55th Landwehr Regiments 
and the 5th Hussar Regiment. But of these infantry regi- 
ments the first two were located in Wesel, the other two in 
Minden and the Hussars in Paderborn. From these places 
they were to be transported by rail to Mosbach, and to be 
disposable there on and after August 10th. The fact that 
great delays occurred in the transportation of troops from 
the home districts to the frontier has been explained when 
discussing the bringing up of the II Corps to the Army. Con- 
sidering the very rapid advance of the Second Army to- 
wards the Mosel, which had started in the meantime, the 
difficulties of bringing these occupation troops up became 
greater and greater and when on August 12th General 
Headquarters assigned railroad lines A and C to the Second 
Army as well as the French railroads west of Saar- 
briicken for supply purposes. Headquarters of the L. of 
C. as a matter of fact had no troops at all. Even the fortress 
pioneers assigned for duty to it had not yet arrived. And 
the Second Army could make no detachments for L. of C. 
purposes now nor in the next few days, considering the 
very tense tactical situation. 

However, as the single railroad line in question, 
the Saarbriicken — Remilly railroad, was secured by the 

—339— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

advance of the Second Army, this bad feature of having no 
L. of C. troops was the less felt. That line could resume 
operation at once, and as early as the 13th provision trains 
were running on it to the troops. August 15th traffic was 
extended to Remilly and immediately thereafter to Cour- 
celles. Thus Remilly became the headquarters of the L. of C. 
of the Second Army, Courcelles of the First Army. 

In addition, on August 13th construction was started 
on the Remilly — Pont-a-Mousson railroad (for passing 
around Metz). 

We should not forget to mention here that the army had 
so far been in uninterrupted telegraphic communication with 
home and with General Headquarters. The construction 
and repair of the French telegraph lines kept step with the 
advance of the troops. The great advantage accruing by 
this to the leadership of the army, is of course seen in the 
rapid exchange of reports and orders which made it re- 
peatedly possible to dominate the situation without causing 
the troops to make detours. 



Chapter V 



THE BATTLES OF VIONVILLE AND 
IN FRONT OF METZ 

FURTHER EVENTS ON AUGUST 15th 

The situation of the Second Army during the forenoon 
of August 15th was, briefly repeated, as follows : 

On the right was the Hid Army Corps, stopped in its 
march (which had been commenced early that morning 
towards Cheminot) by direct orders of Prince Frederick 
Charles, between the Seille and Moselle;* the IXth Corps 



*The 5th Infantry Division from Pournoy-la-Chetive to Sillegny, 
the 6th at Bouxieres-sous-Froidemont, the corps artillery south of 
that place, the 6th Cavalry Division on the line Marly-sur-Seille — 
Jouy-aux-Arches covering against Metz, headquarters in Sillegny. 

—340— 



.Operations Second German Army 

by direct order from General Headquarters at Mercy-le- 
Haut and Grugy; the Xllth Corps on the Delme — Soigne 
road waiting further orders from General Headquarters. 

The other corps of the army were carrying out the 
army orders of the afternoon of the 14th, which had not been 
changed as far as those corps were concerned. 

The Xth Corps was with one division on the march to 
Thiaucourt* and had the other assembled at Pont-a-Mous- 
son ; its attached cavalry was far in front towards the Metz 
— Verdun road. 

The Guard Corps was closing up towards Dieulouard, 
its advance guard advancing on Les Quatre Vents. The 
Guard Dragoon Brigade had been started towards Thiau- 
court to effect a junction with the Xth Army Corps, the 
Guard Ulan Brigade scouted in the direct western direction 
along the plateau between Moselle and Meuse. 

The IVth Army Corps was approaching Marbache. 

The nd Army Corps was approaching Han-sur-Nied. 

The fact that the battle east' of Metz was not renewed 
on the 15th was known at army headquarters at Pont-a- 
Mousson during the early forenoon hours. Otherwise in- 
formation would have been received from General Headquar- 
ters in Herny, with which telegraphic communication ex- 
isted, and from the Mousson observation post. 

The reports that were received in the course of August 
15th on the other hand called the attention of army head- 
quarters more and more to the west of Metz. The first 
report came from the Xth Army Corps : 

"Corps Headquarters informs Army Headquarters that 
the following message has just been received: 

Corny, 6:00 A.M. 

'Corny is occupied by a squadron of the 3d Ulan Regi- 
ment [here followed statements concerning the bat- 
tle of the 14th] Since 11 :00 P.M. we heard much noise 

of moving vehicles. An officer's patrol, which almost reached 



*One detachment of two battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery under 
Colonel von Lynker had been sent along the Moselle valley towards 
Metz. 

—341— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Gravelotte, at 2:00 A.M. encountered outposts there, and 
the officer heard the movement of troops marching in the 
direction of Verdun. 

'One patrol was heavily fired on at 4:30 A.M. north of 
Ancy by one platoon of French infantry. The 3d Ulan Regi- 
ment is just now reconnoitering by way of Augny towards 
Metz. (signed) von Willich, 1st Lieut and Adjt.' "* 

Thus, the first contact with the enemy west of Metz 
had taken place. 

Early in the morning of the 15th detachments of the 
6th Cavalry Division (3d Ulans, 6th Cuirassiers) had rid- 
den towards Montigny and le Sablon, each detachment con- 
sisting of three squadrons and two horse artillery guns. 

These detachments found the fort of St. Privat, which 
was then under construction, and the camp of the enemy in 
rear of it unoccupied. The advance guard platoon of the de- 
tachment that proceeded towards Montigny, rode through 
that village, and was fired on by hostile infantry only when 
it came to the fortifications at that place. Four French 
soldiers were taken prisoners in the outskirts and one pro- 
vision wagon was also captured.f Le Sablon also was found 
unoccupied, but inhabitants there fired on the patrols en- 
tering the place. 

From the railroad junction south of Montigny a rather 
large hostile camp was discovered between Moulins-les- 
Metz and Longeville, which could be clearly seen despite the 
morning fog. 

The detachment that had proceeded towards Montigny 
brought its guns into position at Bradin Ferme and fired 
some shells into that camp. The result was visible. The 
enemy was alarmed, in the utmost hurry and confusion, and 
had been apparently taken entirely by surprise. 

Only after quite a while did fort St. Quentin reply 
to that fire. The fog lifted, and after destroying telegraph 
and railroad, both detachments retreated. At 10:00 A.M., 



*Adjutant of the X Army Corps. 

fFrom the baggage train of French Imperial headquarters. 



—342- 



Operations Second German Army 

when this retreat had already started, the enemy blew up 
the railroad bridge at Longeville. 

According to statements of inhabitants the entire 
French army was about to march off. It was said that 
troops had been entrained* and that large bodies of troops 
were marching on the Metz — Verdun road. 

The mere fact that the cavalry of the Second Army had 
been able to push through Montigny as far as the principal 
walls of the fortress, indicated the departure of the French 
army. If that army had intended to remain in the camp at 
Metz, it ought not to have completely evacuated the ter- 
rain on the south side of that fortress and ought not to have 
given up the works then under construction without a light. 

Therefore the commander-in-chief of the Second Army 
at about noon asked permission from General Headquarters 
to be still allowed to cross the Moselle on the 16th of August 
with the Illd, Xllth, and IVth Corps and to let the IXth and 
the lid Corps march to that river. 

Now, this telegram crossed a telegram sent by General 
von Moltke at 2:00 P.M., which road: 

"Courcelles, August 15th, 12:30 P.M.f 

"The French completely driven into Metz and probably 
now in full retreat on Verdun. All three corps of the right 
wing (the Hid, Xllth and IXth) are now again at the com- 
plete disposal of the Second Army; the Xllth Corps is al- 
ready on the march to Nomeny."$ 

VON Moltke. 

General Headquarters at Pont-a-Mousson started as a 
matter of course with the assumption that the enemy would 
have utilized the night for his retreat. He had at his dis- 



*This subsequently was proven to be erroneous. 

fSee No. 167, von Moltke's correspondence on page 258, which 
does not correspond exactly with the message as here given. — C.H.L. 

JH.R.H., the Crown Prince of Saxony had sent an officer to 
General Headquarters early the 15th, who received from General 
von Moltke at 8:00 A.M. at Coligny the following orders: "The Xllth 
Army Corps remains stationary until 12 noon and — if the situation 
remains unchanged — can then start for Nomeny in accordance with 
orders from headquarters of the Second Army." 

—343— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

posal three principal parallel roads from Metz westward.* It 
was therefore assumed that he would already have left the 
fortified camp of the fortress in the early afternoon hours 
with three army corps, and that he was now about ready 
to do the same with the remainder. The Second Army 
still had to cross the river with the main part of its troops 
and ascend the steep slope on the other side. Therefore 
haste was necessary. f 

Therefore the Hid Army Corps received orders at 2 :00 
P.M. to march off again the evening of the 15th for the pur- 
pose of reconnaissance and an intended river crossing, and to 
reach on the 16th by way of Gorze, the Metz — Verdun road 
at Mars-la-Tour. A note was added that the Xth Army Corps 
with the 5th Cavalry Division in its front, would march to- 
morrow from Thiaucourt toward St. Hilaire. 

As stated in the wire from General Headquarters, the 
Xllth Corps was already on the march to Nomeny, its 
march objective. The IXth Corps had of course also re- 
ceived orders direct from General Headquarters. J 

In the course of the next few hours numerous reports 
arrived, confirming the army commander in the correctness 
of his estimate of the situation. 

The Xth Army Corps sent in a notice of the expedition 
of a squadron belonging to the 5th Cavalry Division: "The 
squadron bivouacked at Chambley and early this morning 
started towards the Metz — Verdun road, in the direction of 
Mars-la-Tour. In Rezonville the squadron received infantry 
fire. "One platoon went to Bruville, which was found oc- 
cupied by chasseurs. That platoon observed hostile infan- 
try detachments on the Metz — Etain road, between which 



*From Metz via: 1 Ste. Marie — Briey. 

2 Amanvillers to Jarny — Conflans. 

3 Gravelotte — Mars-la-Tour. 

fAs a matter of fact the French army utilized only the two roads 
from Metz via Mars-la-Tour and via Conflans, and its departure 
was delayed materially as will be shown below. 

JAt 12 noon the corps was relieved from the duty of remaining in 
readiness and it started in the afternoon to the vicinity of Verny and 
Sillegny; strong hostile columns were observed during that march 
on the left bank moving from Metz westward. 

—344— 



Operations Second German Army 

were many cavalry patrols; Forced by the chasseurs, the 
squadron fell back on Mars-la-Tour and then found that 
place occupied "* 

Headquarters of the Xth Army Corps then sent a mes- 
sage from Thiaucourt, dated 3:30 P.M., that a staff officer 
of that headquarters had made a reconnaissance early that 
morning on the right bank of the Moselle towards Metz. This 
officer had seen no enemy on this side of the fortress. Con- 
cerning events on the left of the Moselle, the message from 
General von Rheinbaben concerning the march of the 5th 
Cavalry Division on the forenoon of the 15th gave all infor- 
mation. This notice, sent to the Xth Corps, was submitted to 
the commander-in-chief of the Second Army with the above 
report and read : 

"Arrived with five regiments and one battery at 12 
noon at Tronville; encountered hostile cavalry and superior 
artillery which at the present moment are falling back on 
Metz. The light cavalry is now going closer to Metz. 
Bredow'st Brigade will also soon follow. I intend to remain 
in Tronville or nearer Metz. Communication with First 
Army not yet established.J Tronville, 1:00 P.M. (signed) 
von Rheinbaben." 



*One brigade of the French Cavalry Division of Forton had 
reached and passed Mars-la-Tour in the course of the forenoon. 

tl2th Cavalry Brigade and 10th Hussar Regiment. 

{Concerning events on August 12th it has already been stated 
that headquarters of the Second Army vi^ere convinced that the 
First Army would be able to send its cavalry across the Moselle 
below Metz and thus envelop the fortress and the hostile army 
from the north. At 4:30 P.M. the afternoon of August 12th Gen- 
eral Headquarters had directed the First Army to have its cavalry 
reconnoiter towards Metz and have it cross the river below the 
city. Thereupon headquarters of the First Army issued orders to 
the 3d Cavalry Division at 9:00 P.M. August 12th for August 13th 
as follows: "The 3d Cavalry Division will go as far as Avancy, 
send detachments towards Metz and Vigny and attempt to 
send detachments across the Moselle to find out what is there." 
In pursuance thereof the 3d Cavalry Division started on 
the 13th along the Metz — Bouzonville road towards Metz. On the 
plateau of Ste. Barbe its advance guard, the 7th Ulan Regiment, 
struck the enemy; its point received fire from Vremy from hostile 
pickets. At Servigny a large French camp was seen. With three 
regiments and one horse battery the division then went into bivouac 
at Vry. The advance guard placed videttes on the line Sanry les 
Vigy to Ste. Barbe and camped at Avancy, sending one squadron 

—345— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The evening of August 15th the Guard Dragoon Brigade 
and one battery arrived at Thiaucourt ; the Brigade of Bre- 
dow was also on the 15th in march with one battery. This bri- 
gade, coming from the IVth Army Corps, reached Hannon- 
ville-au-Passage and Suzemont in the afternoon. The two 
horse batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps 
had already been started to Thiaucourt to join the advance 
guard and were to join the cavalry also the following morn- 
ing. Thus, on August 16th, the Xth Army Corps would have 
at its disposal four cavalry brigades with five horse bat- 
teries to delay the hostile retreat.* 

to Vigy to secure against Thionville. From this squadron an of- 
ficers' patrol went as far as the open gate of Thionville before it 
was fired on, and another one — there being no permanent bridges 
available, went across the river on a ferry found at Hauconcourt to 
the left bank to reconnoiter on that bank. It did not encounter any 
enemy there. Connection west around Metz could not be gained 
considering the long distance still obtaini|ng between the points 
of the First and Second Armies. The iiostile masses discovered on 
August 13th by the 3d Cavalry Division in its front absorbed the en- 
tire attention of that division until the battle of August 14th brought 
a different course to events. 

*Many interesting details in the movements of the cavalry 
during those days did not come to the knowledge of army head- 
quarters. As above we could count only on what was learned at 
Pont-a-Mousson from the reports received and we will here briefly re- 
count what actually happened with the 5th Cavalry Division on 
August 14th and 15th. 

According to its general instructions "to advance against the 
Metz — Verdun road and reconnoiter beyond it" the 5th Cavalry Di- 
vision marched on the 14th with the 13th Brigade to Beney, outposts 
at St. Benoit, with the 11th Brigade to Thiaucourt, while the 12th 
Brigade coming from the left wing of the army — the IV Army 
Corps— reached Pont-a-Mousson. To give some stability to the 
cavalry, the Xth Army Corps sent on the 14th, as already stated, its 
advance guard to Pont-a-Mousson. Of the 13th Brigade two squad- 
rons of the 11th Hussar Regiment rode via Pagny and Onville to 
the hills of Buxieres, from where they reported at 1:30 P.M. that 
the Metz — Verdun road was completely free of the enemy. One 
military "fourgon" remaining on that road was the only sign that 
troops had passed. The 11th Brigade sent one squadron of the 13th 
Ulans down the Moselle valley towards Ancy; there it received fire. 
Two other squadrons of that brigade, also from the 13th Uhlan Regi- 
ment, were sent south towards Flirey and established communica- 
tion with the Guard Dragoon Brigade. 

As has been stated, August 15th the 5th Cavalry Division 
had at the start marched toward Fresnes-en-Woevre ■ and as is 
known, the 19th Infantry Division marched to its support to Thiau- 
court. Now General von Rheinbaben sent the 13th Brigade — leav- 
ing one regiment in Beney, but taking along the battery of the 
brigade — to Lachaussee and one regiment of the brigade to Dom- 

—346— 



Operations Second German Army 

After these reports had been received, at 7:00 P.M., 
headquarters of the Second Army received the following 
instructions for August 16th : 

"Last evening the enemy was attacked by portions of 
the First Army and the 18th Infantry Division in front of 
Metz and driven back into the fortress. 

"The hostile army is on the retreat towards the Meuse. 

"The Second Army will pursue the enemy without delay 
towards the Meuse. 

"The Illd Army Corps will cross the Moselle below Pont- 
a-Mousson, as it has started, and will, by way of Noveant 
and Gorze reach the main Metz — Verdun road tomorrow 
near Mars-la-Tour and Vionville respectively. If possible 
headquarters to be moved to Mars-la-Tour. The 6th Cavalry 
Division can be sent on ahead from Pagny via Preny and 
Thiaucourt to that road. If it is impracticable for the 
trains to cross on the bridge that is to be constructed, they 

martin. The 12th Brigade marched from Pont-a-Mousson towards 
Thiaucourt. The detachment at Lachaussee did send on the morn- 
ing of August 15th single squadrons to Latour-en-Woevre and 
to beyond Sponville, but these found no trace of the enemy. On 
the other hand, shots were fired on the right in the direction of Metz 
and the rest of the detachment (four squadrons and the battery) 
rode towards the sound thereof. When Xonville was reached two 
French cavalry regiments were seen approaching on the heights of 
Puxieux. The battery went into position and by a few rounds in- 
duced these regiments to face about; the four squadrons followed. 
From a hill near Puxieux could then be seen larger hostile masses 
of cavalry in the depression at Mars-la-Tour (five to six cavalry 
regiments). One of these regiments was fired on with shells by 
the battery and it then disappeared behind the buildings of Mars-la- 
Tour. But now hostile artillery, three batteries strong, returned 
the fire. 

The two squadrons of the 13th Brigade, that had been in that 
vicinity the day before, had in the meantime joined the brigade. 
They had renewed their reconnaissance attempts in the morning 
towards Rezonville but had, at that place encountered strong French 
cavalry with two batteries and had been forced to fall back on 
Vionville and Tronville — carrying along 9 captured French dra- 
goons. In conjunction with one squadron of the 11th Brigade they 
had then observed the enemy until the detachment came up from 
Lachaussee. The squadron of the 11th Brigade belonged to the regi- 
ment that had been sent to Dommartin, which latter now also was 
called up. 

In the meantime the artillery fight continued, but the com- 
mander of the 13th Brigade, who was there, broke it off and took 
the regiments assembled around him back to a fold in the terrain 

—347— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

can use up to 7:00 A.M. tomorrow — but no longer — the 
stone bridge at Pont-a-Mousson and from there take the road 
to Noveant-sur-Moselle downstream. The field bridge of 
the Illd Army Corps will remain for the present available 
for the IXth Corps for the investment of Metz or other duty ; 
a sufficient guard will be left there for its security. 

"The Xth Army Corps, which today has been started 
partially, with the 5th Cavalry Division ahead, towards 
Thiaucourt, will continue the march tomorrow on the road 
towards Verdun, say to opposite St. Hillaire — Maizeray and 
will as far as possible bring up those portions of the corps 
that are still at Pont-a-Mousson and in the Moselle valley. 
Heiadquarters, if practicable, at St. Hillaire. The cavalry 
will reconnoiter beyond Haudiomont and Vigneulles. 

"The Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps will march to- 
morrow from Nomeny via Pont-a-Mousson with its advance 
guard as far as Regneville-en-Haye, and close up with its 
rear elements as far as Pont-a-Mousson, which is to be fully 
utilized for night shelter and where headquarters will take 



some distance off. The enemy pursued this movement only with a 
few rounds from his batteries which thereupon disappeared in the 
direction of Metz. Called up by the thunder of cannon, the 3d Regi- 
ment of the 13th Brigade came along from Beney (about at 11 A. 
M.), and the brigade — now fully assembled — rode ahead west of 
Bois la Dame to attack the enemy who had again become visible 
east of Mars-la-Tour. The division commander, who arrived on 
the scene in the meantime prohibited that attack — in the face of 
the apparent superiority of the enemy. The thunder of cannon also 
drew the rest of the 11th Brigade to the spot; soon thereafter also 
the 12th Brigade arrived, so that by 2:00 P.M. 34 squadrons (about 
4200 troopers) with their two horse batteries were assembled. 
General von Rheinbaben caused all three brigades to go into biv- 
ouac opposite the enemy; the 11th at Puxieux, the 13th at Xonville, 
the 12th at Suzemont on both sides of the main road. 

In order to seek, as directed, communication with the First 
Army to the west of Metz, one squadron of the 12th Brigade (the 
16th Ulan Regiment) was sent northward. This squadron en- 
countered a strong body of French cavalry at Jarny and one bat- 
talion of infantry; it had to retreat and had some losses during the 
retreat at Mars-la-Tour, because of an ambush prepared by Chas- 
seurs d'Afrique. The French flankers swarmed around the Prus- 
sian outposts so audaciously that several squadrons had to go out 
to chase them off. With their long range carbines the chasseurs 
fired, for instance, continually into the bivouac of the 11th Brigade, 
so that that bivouac had to be moved to the rear. One squadron 
of the 13th Brigade, which rode in the evening towards Vionville, 
observed in rear of that place camps of large bodies of troops of all 
arms. 

—348— 



Operations Second German Army 

station. The cavalry division will be detached towards Vig- 
neulles and to the south boundary as far as Buxieres toward 
the Meuse and will secure communication on the right with 
the 5th and on the left with the Guard Cavalry Division. 

"The Xllth Army Corps can cross on the stone bridge at 
Pont-a-Mousson from and after 7:00 A.M. or even earlier. 

"The Guard Corps will reach with its advance guard 
Rambucourt tomorrow, with the main body and headquar- 
ters (which are to take the road via Villers-en-Haye and 
Rogeville) in the vicinity of Bemecourt. The cavalry, 
sent on ahead, will secure communication on the right by 
way of Buxeriulles with the Royal Saxon Cavalry Division. 
, "The IVth Army Corps will advance its advance guard 
from Marbache by way of Les Saizerais to Jaillon. The 
army corps will close up its rear elements to Marbache and 
will make its headquarters in Les Saizerais. 

"Connection with the right wing of the Third Army will 
be made towards Nancy. 

"The IXth Army Corps will march tomorrow to the 
vicinity of Sillegny, where headquarters will be, in order to 
follow the next day the Illd Army Corps, across the field 
bridge constructed by that corps, by way of Noveant-sur- 
Moselle to Gorze. 

"The lid Army Corps will with its leading elements 
reach Buchy near Logne tomorrow and, leaving a sufficient 
guard for General Headquarters in Herny, will close up suffi- 
ciently to be able to commence crossing on the next day the 
Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson. Headquarters in Buchy. 

"The cavalry divisions out in front will reconnoiter as 
the advance proceeds the roads leading to the Meuse and the 
crossings there, keeping in mind that the 6th Cavalry Divi- 
sion will reconnoiter the crossings for the Xth, Hid, IXth, 
Corps at Dieuse-sur-Meuse and Genicourt; that the Royal 
Saxon Cavalry Division will reconnoiter for the Xllth Corps 
the Meuse crossing at Bannoncourt, and that the crossings at 
St. Mihiel, Pont-sur-Meuse and Commercy are to be recon- 
noitered for the Guard, IVth and lid Army Corps by the 
Guard Cavalry Division. All reports to be sent to these 

—349— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Headquarters by the respective corps headquarters as soon 
as practicable. 

"Second Army Headquarters remains in Pont-a-Mous- 
son tomorrow. 

"Considering the long marches which the situation de- 
mands, I leave it to the discretion of the corps to form all 
men temporarily unable to march into provisional com- 
panies, attaching sufficient officers and noncommissioned offi- 
cers, and station these as garrisons in the principal places 
along the route of march and to report these facts to head- 
quarters of the Line of Communications — which is now in 
Delme, but will be in Pont-a-Mousson from the 17th on. 

"Those headquarters will then take the necessary steps 
to relieve these garrisons and send them to join their respec- 
tive organizations. All horses unable to march will be left 
with caretakers with these garrisons. 

Prince Frederick Charles, 

General of Cavalry." 

These orders were changed only in some minor points 
when Army Headquarters received orders from General 
Headquarters at 10:30 P.M. 

According to those orders two corps of the First Army 
were to take position on the 16th of August in the terrain 
between the Seille and Moselle on the line Pommerieux — 
Arry, to follow across the Moselle. One corps of that army 
had to remain in the vicinity of Courcelles as long as it was 
not absolutely certain whether more than a regular garri- 
son had remained in Metz. 

Thus, the IXth Army Corps of the Second Army had to 
be kept on the march on the 16th and had to evacuate the 
right bank of the Moselle as much as possible. It therefore 
received special orders to cross the Moselle directly in rear 
of the Hid Army Corps. 

For the subsequent operations the letter from General 
Headquarters cited the following viewpoints:* 

"Conditions under which the 1st and Vllth Army Corps 
and portions of the 18th Infantry Division victoriously 



*See No. 168, von Moltke's Correspondence, page 258. 

—350— 



Operations Second German Army 

fought on the evening of the 14th, precluded any pursuit. 
The fruits of the victory can be gathered only by a forcible 
offensive of the Second Army against the roads from Metz, 
a's well as via Fresnes and Etain toward Verdun. It is left 
to the Second Army headquarters to conduct such an offen- 
sive with all available means at hand. Even if, through this, 
the Second Army will find itself temporarily ahead of the 
First Army, care will be exercised at these headquarters in 
arranging the further advance westward, which steps can- 
not be foreseen at present, and steps will also be taken to 
give the troops the necessary rest." 

The movements directed by Headquarters of the Sec- 
ond Army were in accordance with what was now necessary 
and no new orders were required. 

THE 16th OF AUGUST 

During the night of August 15th-16th extensive bivouac 
fires had been observed west of Metz and this fact was re- 
ported from different points to Pont-a-Mousson by 9:30 
A.M. 

There could be no longer any doubt but what the ene- 
my was about to march off from Metz. How far he had pro- 
ceeded and where he would be met could of course be ascer- 
tained only during the course of the 16th of August from 
direct contact. 

The attention of the Xth Army Corps had been called as 
early as 8 o'clock to the great importance of the road leading 
through Etain. 

The first report bringing details of the enemy came 
from the Hid Army Corps from the vicinity south of Vion- 
ville. It, dated at 10:30 A.M., reached Army Headquar- 
ters at noon and stated: 

"Hostile camps at Vionville and Rezonville. The Illd 
Army Corps is advancing as a unit ; left wing towards Jarny, 
to eventually cross at Conflans. 5th Cavalry Division at 
Mars-la-Toiir, ihe 6th at Rezonville." 



—351- 



Campaign of 1870-71 

It was added that the enemy was withdrawing north- 
ward.* 

The following was dictated to the Adjutant who brought 
this report, which in accordance with directions from Gen- 
eral Headquarters, lay near to the intentions of the Prince : 

"As long as the enemy retreats in front of the Illd Army 
Corps, that corps must pursue him vigorously, pushing its 
left wing forward. t Continued communication with the Xth 
Army Corps. 

"The IXth Army Corps, which will be at Mars-la-Tour 
tomorrow noon, will secure the right flank against Metz and, 
if necessary, will act in support." 

The Prince designated the objective of the entire opera- 
tion for the Illd Army Corps as being to drive the enemy in 
a northerly direction. 

In a similar manner General von Manstein was sent in- 
formation — through the officer that had been sent from the 
IXth Corps to headquarters to receive orders — that the Illd 
Army Corps was pursuing since 10 o'clock hostile masses 
of troops, which apparently were falling back towards the 
north. 

The Prince added^ — concerning the IXth Corps, itself: 

"It is important that the IX Corps occupy Mars-la- 
Tour as soon as possible and that it cover today the right 
flank of the Illd Corps against Metz and serve as support 
for that corps." 

About the same time as the first report arrived from 
the Illd Army Corps, Headquarters in Pont-a-Mousson was 
engaged in drafting the army orders for the 17th of August. 

These army orders — issued during a situation the im- 
portance of which to the Second Army was clear to every 
one — shows the views held at that time at Second Army 
Headquarters. It appears to be well therefore for the study 
of military history to go more into the details of these or- 



*This soon proved to be erroneous, as only the hostile advanced 
troops made a retrograde movement. 

fThese instructions were based on information in the report 
from the Hid Army Corps that the enemy was retreating northward. 

—352— 



Operations Second German Army 

ders, notwithstanding, the fact that they were overtaken by- 
events and were executed actually only by the lid and IVth 
Army Corps. 

Since the intact bridge across the Moselle at Pont-a- 
Mousson had fallen into Prussian hands on the 13th of 
August, Headquarters of the Second Army had gained the 
view that the commander of the French Army of the Rhine 
did not have any intention to accept a battle in rear of the 
Moselle at Metz. It was believed just as improbable that the 
French had selected the plateau between the Moselle and 
the Meuse for the decisive battle. 

It would have been far better to credit the hostile gen- 
eral with the intention — the best that he could do — to bring 
the Army of the Rhine as rapidly and as intact as possible 
to behind the Meuse. Once there it would have plenty of 
roads to safety reach the west of France and effect 
a junction with the rest of the French fighting forces. This 
had to be prevented. We must not allow the Army of the 
Rhine to reach the Argonne passes ; we had to force it to 
the north and thus separate it from portions of the army 
that had retreated directly westward. 

The plans, which we thought the enemy did have, could 
be best frustrated by the Second Army if as early as possi- 
ble it secured the crossings of the Meuse and forced the 
enemy by a parallel march toward the Meuse to remain on 
the move without rest. As a matter of course steps had to be 
taken for harassing and delaying the French march columns. 
This was to be the task of the right wing which was strong 
and supplied with numerous cavalry and under one com- 
mander. It was of course supposed that the enemy had two 
days' start. The northern roads from Metz westward had 
not been reached nor reconnoitered by the German cavalry. 
The enemy might have utilized the 14th and loth of August 
to start the execution of his intentions. 

The dispositions taken in those days were based on 
these views, as was also the army order of August 16th, 
noon, which read: 



-353— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

"Headquarters Pont-a-Mousson, 16 August, 1870, 

12:00 Noon. 

"The Second Army will continue its forward movement 
tomorrow toward the Meuse. 

"During the next few days the First Army will be in 
rear of the right wing of the Second Army. 

"The right wing of the Second Army will be governed 
in its movements by the direction of the hostile retreat, and 
so that later on the Xth Army Corps will cross the Meuse 
below Verdun. Detachments will be made against the for- 
tress of Verdun. 

"Should the Xth Corps be drawn far to the north in the 
pursuit, Clermont-en-Argonne and St. Menehould are desig- 
nated as the points on which the present right wing of the 
army will march. 

"The Hid Army Corps will march on Etain, which its 
advance guard will occupy unless conditions regarding the 
enemy require something else. The detachment left to 
guard the field bridge across the Moselle will be withdrawn 
as soon as the IXth Army Corps sends a relief, which will 
be done today. 

"The IXth Army Corps will reach Mars-la-Tour tomor- 
row. 

"If practicable the IXth Corps will replace the field 
bridge of the Hid Army Corps tomorrow by a ponton bridge 
constructed from Moselle river boats and, after that has 
been accomplished, will send the light field bridge train to 
join the llld Corps. 

"The three corps of the right wing, enumerated in the 
preceding paragraphs (and which will report their where- 
abouts daily to these headquarters), will keep in touch with 
each other and in case of a large engagement with the 
enemy General von Voigts-Rhetz will assume command at 
first of the Hid and later also of the IXth Corps. 

"If such an engagement does not take place, as is ex- 
pected, on August 18th the Hid Corps will march in the 
direction of Dieuse-sur-Meuse, the IXth Corps in the direc- 
tion of Fresnes — Genicourt-sur-Meuse and secure the Meuse 



-354— 



Operations Second German Army 

crossing there as early as possible. In case the IXth Corps 
is the first to arrive, it will secure both crossings. 

"The Xllth Army Corps will march tomorrow with its 
leading elements to Vigneulles, with the main body to St. 
Benoit-en-Woevre, where headquarters will be. The cav- 
alry will be sent to and beyond the Meuse. On the 18th the 
Xllth Corps will direct its march on Bannoncourt and secure 
the Meuse crossing there. 

"The Guard Corps will march tomorrow to St. Mihiel, 
will send a strong advance guard to the left bank of the 
Meuse to secure important crossings; its headquarters will 
be in St. Mihiel. The cavalry will proceed toward Bar-le- 
Duc. 

"The IVth Army Corps will move in the direction of 
Jaillon — Sancey — Boucq toward Commercy during the next 
few days, in so far as the fortress Toul may not demand a 
delay in this advance. 

"The lid Army Corps will reach Pont-a-Mousson tomor- 
row and will send its point in the direction of Limey, Flirey, 
St. Mihiel. Headquarters Pont-a-Mousson. 

"Second Army Headquarters will be in Thiaucourt from 
and after 5 P.M. today, from noon tomorrow and until fur- 
ther orders in St. Mihiel. 

"After the Second Army has reached the Meuse and 
secured the crossings there, a halt will probably be made for 
several days until the flank armies have arrived on the 
same line. 

"All corps will send liaison officers to these headquar- 
ters daily. These officers may use wagons, tying their 
horses to them, and take along infantry orderlies as guards. 

Frederick Charles, 
General of Cavalry." 

Transfer of Second Army Headquarters to Thiaucourt 
had been directed to be made tl;ie afternoon of the 16th, be- 
cause General Headquarters was to come to Pont-a-Mousson 
and there was not enough room there for both headquarters. 

H.R.H. the Prince himself decided to proceed with a por- 
tion of his staff in the afternoon to the III Army Corps in 
the vicinity of Vionville. 

— 355 — 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Shortly before he mounted at Pont-a-Mousson a report 
arrived which showed that conditions were changing from 
what had been up to then assumed. At 2:05 P.M. General 
von Kraatz, commanding the 20th Infantry Division, re- 
ported "that the Illd Army Corps were engaged north of 
Gorze in a heavy fight against superior forces." 

To this report was added "that the 20th Infantry Divi- 
sion is about to march via Xammes to the battlefield to sup- 
port the Illd Corps and information has been sent to the 
19th Division." There was no doubt now but that the ques- 
tion was one of an important tactical decision and it became 
clear that only from the battlefield could it be determined 
what measures the Second Army would now have to take. 

Before we continue the further narrative of events as 
they developed at army headquarters, it is necessary to re- 
turn briefly to the events of the morning concerning the de- 
tached portions of the Second Army. 

The Illd Army Corps had crossed the Moselle early the 
evening of the 15th with the 5th Infantry Division via the 
permanent bridge at Noveant, and with the 6th Infantry 
Division via the ponton bridge at La Lobe. The corps artil- 
lery was brought up by way of Pont-a-Mousson. Only the 
6th Cavalry Division remained on the right bank of the 
Moselle in position from Frescaty to the Moselle, observing 
towards Metz. 

During the night both infantry divisions sent detach- 
ments from Noveant to Gorze and from La Lobe via Pagny 
and Arnaville to Onville respectively. 

For the 16th of August the army corps had, as stated, 
the following orders from army headquarters: "To reach 
the Metz — Verdun road via Gorze at Mars-la-Tour." 

General von Alvensleben II ordered as follows in order 
to carry out these orders : 

1. The 6th Infantry Division will march at 5:00 A.M. 
via Onville to Mars-la-Tour and the corps artillery will fol- 
low it. 



—356— 



Operations Second German Army 

2. The 6th Cavalry Division will have crossed the 
Noveant bridge by 5 :30 A,M. and v^^ill march via Gorze to 
Vionville; the 5th Infantry Division following it.* 

This march was started early the 16th as ordered. 

The Illd Army Corps ascended in two columns through 
the deep-cut valleys of Gorze and Onville to the top of the 
plateau on the left bank of the Moselle. Though still early 
it was extremely hot and the march exceedingly difficult, 
as the corps had either been up half, or the whole night, 
and had undergone great fatigue the day before. 

On the plateau itself, in the vicinity of Mars-la-Tour — 
the march objective of the Hid Army Corps — General von 
Rheinbaben scouted with his cavalry. This cavalry, as 
stated above, had stopped hostile troops on the 15th coming 
from Metz via Gravelotte towards Mars -la-Tour and induced 
them to halt for the night at Vionville. 

How strong the hostile forces opposite the Illd Corps 
were, was not known either the evening of the 15th nor 
early on the morning of the 16th. Though French bi- 
vouac fires had been seen during the night immediately west 
of Metz, that was not indication enough to estimate closely 
the place and strength of the camping troops, and thus gain 
the desired certainty. 

It remained probable that the hostile fighting forces 
on the Metz — Mars-la-Tour road were merely a flank or a 
rear guard of the army marching off to the west; for the 
enemy no doubt had full information that the Second Army 
had already crossed the Moselle above Metz and he had 
therefore no choice but to utilize the northern roads for his 
retreat. Only those roads offered him some kind of secur- 
ity. But, as a matter of fact we still had the entire hostile 
army in our front immediately west of Metz, for the depar- 
ture of that army had been delayed by the battle of August 
14th and by the blockades in the march columns on the 
15th so much that the leading elements had not gotten to 



*The crossing of the 6th Cavalry Division w^as delayed on the 
IGth until 6:15 A.M., and this in turn delayed the start of the 5th 
Infantry Division. 

—357— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

beyond Vionville and St. Marcel respectively by the evening 
of Aug-ust 15th.* 

. On August 15th Forton's French Cavalry Division 
marched along the southern road by way of Mars-la-Tour, 
ahead of its army; it was followed by the French 2d, 6th, 
and Guard Corps. The 2d Corps was to reach Mars-la-Tour 
on the 15th, but remained at Rezonville when the Division 
of Forton halted at the sight of the cavalry under General 
von Rheinbaben appearing at Mars-la-Tour and fell back 
on Vionville. The French 6th Corps also arrived at Rezon- 
ville and both corps camped alongside the road to Vionville, 
the 6th north of it, the 2d south of it. The Guard Corps 
came as far as Gravelotte in rear of the two corps. 

Du Barail's French cavalry division scouted ahead 
along the northern road by way of Doncourt and Conflans 
and reached the vicinity of Jarny, its march objective. The 
4th Corps, which was to follow it to Doncourt, was over- 
taken by the 3d Corps however, which latter corps, accord- 
ing to orders received, marched to the line Verneville — St. 
Marcel. It left the 4th Corps in its rear. That corps re- 
mained with both the divisions of Grenier and de Cissey at 
Woippy; Lorencez' division was still further in rear at the 
Moselle defiles. The battle of the 14th had caused this latter 
corps to be late. 

Thus it happened that on August 16th Marshal Bazaine, 
who actually had taken supreme command on August 12th 
of the hostile army at Metz, had available all five corps of 
his armyf in the confined space between Vionville, St. Mar- 
cel, Verneville and Gravelotte. 

Marshal Bazaine had issued orders on the evening of 
August 15th that the army was to be in readiness very early 
the morning of August 16th to start westward — these or- 



*Along the northern road only the Cavalry Division of du Barail 
which had been sent ahead reached the vicinity between Doncourt 
and Jarny. 

fWith exception of Lorencez' Division of the 4th, and Met- 
mann's Division of the 3d Corps. Laveaucoupet's Division of the 
French 2d Corps had remained in Metz as garrison, and the 2d Corps 
had received in its place Lapasset's Brigade of the 5th Corps which 
had retreated from Saargemiind. 

—358— 



Operations Second German Army 

ders were in consonance with the assumption held at Head- 
quarters in Pont-a-Mousson. But the Marshal changed 
these orders ; the army remained in its camps. 

A portion of the plateau on which the French army- 
stood on the 16th is rolling, covered by clumps of woods, 
the balance generally open and affording good views. The 
terrain slopes down to many ravines in long, irregular slopes. 
These ravines become deeper towards the south and finally 
run into the deeply cut, wooded slopes of the Gorze valley, 
hard to ascend, and which has a real mountain character. 
The Gorze valley bounds the entire portion of the plateau 
in question from Noveant on the Moselle as far as Tronville, 
4i [English] miles northwest. South of that valley the left 
bank of the Moselle is cut into ravines running deep into 
the country and covered with forests — a close irregular 
terrain. 

If we ascend towards the north the steep slope from 
Gorze, where the ravines dividing the northern plateau join 
concentrically, the picture takes an entirely different aspect. 
Out of a wooded, romantic mountain country we step onto 
a flat, regular hilly country. In the east we see the village 
of Gravelotte high up on the plateau; Rezonville and Vion- 
ville are partly hidden deep in depressions. None of these 
villages are surrounded by gardens or orchards, but rise as 
cold stone masses between cultivated lands. A very similar 
view is offered bj^ the smaller village of Flavigny southeast 
of Vionville. 

After ascending the ravine at Gorze it is at first believed 
that all difficulties have been overcome. Now the ter- 
rain dominates the country northward and also the Metz — 
Mars-la-Tour road", which runs through Gravelotte, Rezon- 
ville and Vionville. But this is in part erroneous. No mat- 
ter where we advance toward that road and the villages 
along it, we must pass one of many cross ravines and climb 
up the steep slope on the other side, which, glacis like, at no 
point offer protection nor cover. North of the Metz — Mars- 
la-Tour road the terrain cannot be seen from the Roman road 
on. Clumps of woods hide it and reserves may be brought 

—359— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

up here against the Metz — Mars-la-Tour road without an 
attacker coming from the south being able to see them or 
estimate their strength. 

When now at 8:00 A.M. August 16th the cavalry points 
of the Illd Army Corps ascended the southern slope of the 
plateau, they perceived hostile outposts at Vionville and 
behind them, towards Rezonville, large camps. 

It remained doubtful if the entire French army was 
still immediately west of Metz, or if only one corps was 
camped here covering the departure of the main forces 
westward. It is certain that the entire hostile army was 
not seen, but only portions thereof. In order to hold these 
at all events, General von Alvensleben II decided to attack. 

He first caused the 6th Infantry Division to deploy be- 
hind the hills of Buxieres.* But before this was accom- 
plished the appearance of the 5th Infantry Division at the 
upper end of the Gorze defile had to be awaited. Then he 
ordered the 6th Cavalry Division to march off to the left, 
through the ravine to the Anconville farm and the Bois 
de Gaumont and to ascend the plateau from there. But by 
orders of General von Voigts-Rhets General von Rheinba- 
ben came with his cavalry from the bivouacs at Xonville 
and reported to the Illd Army Corps for orders. As has been 
stated, Bredow's Brigade with its battery had rejoined 
that division, so that it had at its disposal its three bri- 
gades and four horse batteries; besides early in the morn- 
ing the two horse batteries of the corps artillery of the X 
Army Corps also arrived. f 

The 6th Cavalry Division proceeded, as ordered, from 
about the point Tantelainville on the plateau in the direc- 
tion of Flavigny and on its left advanced the 5th Cavalry 
Division towards Vionville. 

The enemy was still at rest, little dreaming of the ap- 
proach of the two hostile columns of the Illd Corps and cav- 
alry. The two cavalry divisions brought their artillery to 
the front, threw some shells into the camp and the 5th 



*The corps artillery had been brought to the front. 
fUnder guard of one squadron of the 2d Guard Dragoon Regi- 
ment. 

—360— 



Operations Second German Army 

Division rapidly drove off Murat's French Cavalry Brigade 
which, at Vionville, covered the front of the troops 
in camp towards Rezonville.* In the confusion the French 
troops rode through the infantry of the French 2d Corps 
and in that manner alarmed the corps. The corps took arms 
at once and took position, Batailles' Division on the line 
Vionville — Flavigny, the Verge's Division on its left on the 
plateau and Lapasset's Brigade to the left of the latter 
division. 

On the right of the French 2d Corps north of the road 
the 6th Corps went into position; in rear of it the Guard 
Corps, at Gravelotte. 

Thus, a French army of about 80,000t men with more 
than 300$ guns was in readiness to take up battle, while 
30,000 § men with only 114 guns on the Prussian side ad- 
vanced from difficult mountain ravines against this num- 
erically superior force which awaited the attack in advan- 
tageous defensive positions. 

But the inequality of numbers could not be perceived 
at once ; it made itself felt in its entire importance only dur- 
ing the course of the battle. 

In the meantime the action had commenced, for the 
enemy prevented the 5th Infantry Division from deploying 
from the valley of Gorze. 

It will be well here to take a short view of the situation 
of the other corps of the Army. 

Of the Xth Army Corps, the 5th Cavalry Division 
under Rheinbaben had passed the night at Xonville, the 



*As a matter of fact artillery here executed a surprise attack 
against cavalry. This happened at about 9:45 A.M. 

fMetz, Campagne et negociations par un officier superieur de 
Tarmee du Rhin, page 68. 

tThe French 2d Corps 12 batteries — 72 guns. 

The French 6th Corps 9 batteries — 54 guns. 

The French Guard Corps 12 batteries — 72 guns. 

Forton's Cavalry Division 2 batteries — 12 guns. 

The reserve artillery 

camping between Rezonville 

and Gravelotte 16 batteries — 96 guns. 

306 guns. 
§The Illd Army Corps had only 23 battalions there. 

—361— 



Campaign of 1870^71 

19th Infantry Division with the Guard Dragoon Brigade at 
Thiaucourt and in rear of that place— one detachment 
(Lyncker) was in the Moselle valley at Noveant; the 20th 
Infantry Division with the foot batteries of the corps ar- 
tillery in and near Pont-a-Mousson. 

On the 16th the Xth Army Corps had had St. Hillaire 
as its objective. It issued the following orders for that 
day : 

1. The 5th Cavalry Division will advance reconnoiter- 
ing towards the enemy at Rezonville (this had been done, as 
stated above) ; 

2. 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 batteries of the 19th 
Infantry Division will march to Chambley and there, under 
orders of Colonel Lehmann, will form the support for the 
5th Cavalry Division ;* 

3. The rest of the 19th Infantry Division and the 
Guard Dragoon Brigade marched to St. Hilaire under com- 
mand of Lieut.-General von Schwartzkoppen. 

4. The 20th Infantry Division and the corps artillery 
followed to north of Thiaucourt. 

But from the dispositions made of the Xth Army Corps 
it is seen that in the course of the 16th all portions thereof 
could reach the vicinity of Vionville, some of them of course 
only after a march of some twenty miles. 

Undoubtedly the Xth Army Corps considered the possi- 
bility of more serious engagements in the vicinity of Mars- 
la-Tour and that the different columns would have to ex- 
pect to have to deploy to the right of that point. 

The remaining corps of the Second Army were engaged 
in executing the army orders of the afternoon of August 
15th. Therefore- of these corps only the leading elements 
of the IXth Army Corps could reach the vicinity of Vion- 
ville. 



*For this duty were selected: the 37th Infantry Brigade (Leh- 
mann), the 9th Hannoverian Dragoon Regiment (1st squadron), 2 
batteries of the 19th Infantry Division. From these had been sent out 
during the night: (1) Lehmann's detachment 4 battalions, 2 squad- 
rons, 1 battery to and around Thiaucourt; (2) Lyncker's detachment 
2 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery at Noveant to the Moselle valley. 
Both detachments were to concentrate at Chambley early on August 
16th. 

—362— 



Operations Second German Army 

Let us now turn back to that point. 

The battle in which the Illd Army Corps was engaged 
became very serious within a very short time. The numeri- 
cal superiority of the enemy soon drew the entire forces of 
the corps into action. 

At 9 :30 o'clock General von Stiilpnagel (commander of 
the 5th Infantry Division) had received a report in Gorze 
that the enemy was on the plateau of Vionville. He im- 
mediately directed his advance guard (9th Infantry Brigade 
under General von Doring) to take possession of the pro- 
jecting ridge at the Bois de Vionville, which dominated the 
ascent from the ravine of Gorze, 

The advance guard succeeded in quickly gaining a firm 
foothold in the Bois de Vionville with those troops which 
had passed the night in Gorze. 

However, the enemy, alarmed by the Prussian cavalry, 
advanced different columns to Vionville, Flavigny and 
against the exit of the Gorze ravine, and disputed the pos- 
session of the Bois de Vionville and of the heights west 
thereof. An engagement also ensued in the Bois de St. 
Arnould. 

In the meantime the right wing of the Division held its 
own in the wooded terrain it had taken, and this wing be- 
came the supporting point for the deployment of the divi- 
sion. Battalions coming one after the other out of the Gorze 
ravine prolonged the front to the left, these battalions 
soon reaching to beyond Anconville farm. The batteries 
also succeeded in gaining a firm foothold on top of the pla- 
teau. 

These engagements were from the very start very hot 
and bloody, but by 1:00 P.M. the hill had been completely 
taken. The 5th Infantry was by now on the plateau and had 
driven the enemy across the first deep depression towards 
the hill of Rezonville. 

At 10:15 o'clock General von Buddenbrock* had re- 
ceived orders through General von Alvensleben II to also 



*Commander of the 6th Infantry Division. 

—363— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

advance to the attack. The general idea of operations in 
those days — "to push the enemy away from his route of 
retreat on Verdun" — was firmly adhered to. In accordance 
therewith the 6th Infantry Division executed a turn to the 
right in its advance, and marched on Flavigny, Vionville 
and the woods situated northwest of Vionville (Tronville 
woods).* 

In the execution of this movement it came square 
across the Metz — Verdun road in front of the enemy. The 
attack succeeded. Vionville and Flavigny were taken. In 
the fights around the latter village portions of the left wing 
of the 5th Infantry Division participated.! But in the Tron- 
ville woods the extreme left wing of the Division completed 
its right turn, emerged from the northeastern edge of the 
woods, passed the ravine running parallel with the edge of 
the woods, and held its own on the other edge opposite the 
masses of the French 6th Corps. 

Strong artillery prepared and supported this attack. 
West of Vionville 42 guns went into action; J south of Vion- 
ville on the plateau from about behind the left wing of the 
5th Infantry Division, and on a line with the batteries of that 
division§ were 48 guns from about 10 :45 A.M. to about 1 :00 
P.M. The cavalry also participated as early as 1:00 P.M. in 
the fighting around Vionville and Flavigny, as the enemy 
there attempted to relieve his hard pressed troops by cav- 



*The 11th Infantry Brigade (von Rothmaler) advanced against 
the position at Flavigny — Vionville, the 12th Infantry Brigade (von 
Bismarck) against Vionville and the Tronville vi^oods. 

fit is said that Flavigny was tw^ice occupied by the French and 
tw^ice captured from them, the first time by the 5th Infantry Division, 
which abandoned it again in its advance, and the second time by 
the 6th Division, which captured it again. The details concerning 
this interesting phase of the action will have to be left to the spe- 
cial reports of the Battle of Vionville, which will be issued soon, 
and we can therefore pass them over here. 

$4 batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division, 3 batteries of the 6th 
Infantry Division. 

§The corps artillery of the Illd Corps with its 6 batteries, 1 
battery of the 6th Infantry Division, 1 battery of the 6th ' Cavalry 
Division. 



—384— 



Operations Second German Army 

airy charges.* By 1 :30 P.M. these actions came to an 
end. 

The task of the Hid Army Corps had been solved; it 
had deprived the enemy of his direct route of retreat on 
Verdun, had battled for and gained a position on the pla- 
teau and extended that position square across the Metz — 
Mars-la-Tour road. 

From now on the main point was to maintain the advan- 
tages gained. And thus commenced the defensive portion 
of the battle. 

For the execution of the defense there were in readi- 
ness: 

1. The main body of the 5th Infantry Division in the 
Bois de St. Arnould, the Bois de Vionville and on the heights 
west of this wood. 

2. On the hill in front of the Gorze — Vionville road 
were 78 guns in one long artillery line.f 

3. The 6th Infantry Division in the vicinity of Fla- 
vigny — Vionville and in front of the eastern edge of the 
Tronville woods as far as the Roman road (in addition at 
Flavigny were some portions of the 6th Infantry Division) 
supported by the 42 guns that had gone into position in the 
center west of Vionville. J 



* These cavalry fights were started by a charge of the hostile 
3d Lancers and Guard Cuirassiers against Prussian infantry de- 
tachments emerging from Flavigny. The 17th Brunswick Hus- 
sars and the 11th Hussars of Redern's Brigade of the 5th Cav- 
alry Division answered by a counter-attack;, one dragoon, squadron 
participated. The hostile cavalry was defeated and pursued towards 
Rezonville. There the Hussars perceived a French battery in front 
of Rezonville and south of the road, charged that battery, and dis- 
persed Bazaine's staff, who had brought the battery up in person. 
But the Marshal's personal escort came up from Rezonville, disen- 
gaged the French commander-in-chief and the battery, which the 
hussars just then endeavored to bring to the rear. After these 
events the entire 6th Cavalry Division and some squadrons of the 
12th and 9th Regiments started to attack; portions actually did 
attack, but encountered intact hostile infantry that had by then come 
up. 

t4 batteries of the 5th Infantry Division, 6 batteries of the 
corps artillery of the Hid Corps, 1 battery of the 6th Infantry Division, 
and 1 battery of the 6th Cavalry Division, and 1 battery of Lyncker's 
detachment which had also come up. 

$4 horse batteries which were at the disposal of General von 
Rheinbaben and 3 batteries of the 6th Infantry Division. 

—365— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

All these troops had already been engaged and some of 
them had suffered severe losses.* 

There were available in reserve: two cavalry divisions, 
the 6th in rear of Flavigny, the 5th with its three brigades 
divided on the left wing. 

Redern's Brigade was in rear of Flavigny, the Bri- 
gades of Bredow and Barby between Vionville and Mars-la- 
Tour. Barby's Brigade at the same time covered the ex- 
treme left through detachments. 

But by then portions of the Xth Army Corps were' ap- 
proaching the battlefield or had already become engaged 
there. 

During the afternoon hours the detachment of Lyncker 
of the Xth Army Corps had reached Gorze coming from 
Noveant, reported for orders to the 5th Infantry Division, 
prolonged with its battery the long artillery line of the 
right wing of that division at the Bois de Vionville and 
participated in the subsequent engagements around the 
wooded terrain on the right wing. 

The detachment of Lehmann had reached Chambley and 
had received orders from General von Alvensleben II to re- 
inforce the Prussian left wing. 

General von Voigts-Rhetz, who had wanted to reach 
St. Hilaire with his headquarters on the I6th, marched 
that morning to Xonville where he received the reports of 
the 5th Cavalry Division. The thunder of cannon induced 
him to send orders to all portions of his command to march 
to the battlefield. 

But there the counter-attack was not delayed. For 
that purpose the enemy brought up the mass of his Guard 
Corps to the front of the fighting troops and directed his 
3d Corps toward the right of the battle line. The 4th 
Corps followed. The French army threatened to employ its 
masses and to bring about a decision by its greatly super- 
ior numbers. 



*One intact battalion (the 2d of the 20th Infantry Regiment) 
was still disposable with the 6th Infantry Division. 

— 3G6— 



Operations Second German Army 

Numerous artillery prepared this offensive.* By 1:45 
P.M. this offensive commenced carried out by the full force 
of the French Guardf and the 6th Corps. $ This general 
attack of the enemy was however defeated. § 

However, in spite of the successful resistance the situa- 
tion became very grave. On the left wing, which vainly en- 
deavored to free itself by a counter-attack, the French super- 
iority over the Prussian left made itself felt. 

It is true that at this time the battalions of the Leh- 
mann detachment arrived in rear of the Tronville woods, 
but it appeared that participation in the battle was so neces- 
sary that only cavalry could do it. Therefore, by orders of 
General von Alvensleben II Bredow's Brigade of the 
5th Cavalry Division made a charge. 1 1 This charge 
was directed against the hostile infantry in front of 
Rezonville and the batteries on the Roman road. It pierced 
the hostile infantry and artillery lines, and ended deep in 
the French center and brought about the desired pause in 
the battle, which lasted longer than one hour. The hostile 
batteries kept almost completely silent and the infantry 
fight proceeded very slowly. The battalions of the Lehmann 
detachment reached in the meantime the edge of the Tron- 
ville woods facing the enemyT] and these woods remained in 
Prussian hands up to 3:30 P.M. Only then did the fight 
take another turn; the enemy, reaching farther around** 
pushed back the decimated battalions, by then greatly fatig- 
ued and which had lost the larger portion of their officers. 



*About 224 French against 114 Prussian guns. 

t6 battalions Guard Grenadiers under General Picard, com- 
manding the Guard Grenadier Division. The Guard Voltigeurs un- 
der General Deligny remained in reserve in rear at Rezonville. 

JLafont's Division and one brigade of the Division of Levassor- 
Sorval. 

§In the 6th Infantry Division, the leading elements of Leh- 
mann's detachment of the Xth Army Corps participated at the cis- 
tern of Flavigny. 

1 1 The 7th Cuirassiers and 16th Uhlans charged; each regiment 
detached a squadron to the left flank, so that 6 squadrons partici- 
pated in the charge. 

TJThe east, northeast and north edges. 
=^*The French 3d Corps, Leboeuf. 

—367— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

fighting in and near the Tronville woods. But that French 
offensive was soon stopped by the Prussian batteries 
in position west of Vionville. At the same time the leading 
elements of the 20th Infantry Division arrived at Tronville. 
There was now additional support available. 

Here the battle came momentarily to a pause. 

In Stiilpnagel's Division the fire fight, carried on at 
longer range, continued. 

In the meantime Prince Frederick Charles and his staff 
had reached the battlefield. 

During his ride from Pont-a-Mousson to the battlefield 
the Prince encountered a battery of the 16th Infantry Divi- 
sion in Noveant. Infantry columns were seen marching 
along the right of the Moselle valley, and these were be- 
lieved to be columns of the IXth Army Corps hastening 
up. When the Gorze valley was entered all indications of 
a hot, bloody struggle were seen. Lines of French pris- 
oners came down the plateau. Trains under guard were 
along the roads; everywhere hospitals were seen. Wounded 
— in masses — such as the commander-in-chief never had 
seen before — greeted him with endless hurrahs. Afoot and 
on wagons in a continuous stream these wounded gave the 
best proof that an enormous crisis was impending. But 
they also gave a clear picture of the morale of the troops 
and the confidence in victory which took possession of them 
on the appearance of their commanding general. 

The thunder of cannon, only weakly heard in the Mo- 
selle valley, now became louder and louder. On the right, 
over the woods, French shells were seen exploding. 

At St. Catherine on the right bank of the Gorze brook 
was the cavalry of the 16th Infantry Division,* whose com- 
mander reported to H.R.H. that the leading elements of the 
infantry of the division would arrive in about one hour, 
that is, between 4:00 and 5:00 P.M. Though late, these 
supports could still effectively participate and would be 
very welcome to the fighting troops. 



"One squadron of the 9th Rhenish Hussar Regiment. 
—368— 



Operations Second German Army 

The little town of Gorze was in dead stillness — the main 
street was empty. It appeared that the wounded had all 
been sheltered in the houses. 

Arrived on the plateau, H.R.H. the Prince proceeded 
first to the northwest corner of the Bois de Vionville and 
met the 1st Battalion of the Body Grenadier Regiment 
there. He had covered the 4 [English] miles from Pont- 
a-Mousson to that point, from which a good view could be 
had of the battlefield, in the short time of 55 minutes. 

From there a clear picture was had of the situation on 
the eastern portion of the battlefield. 

Over the treetops of the lowlying corner of the forest 
to the front could be seen the hills, the village and the post 
office building of Gravelotte, and even the Gravelotte — Ver- 
neville road as far as the hill of the Bois de la Juree. Re- 
zonville and its surrounding hills, as well as the terrain to 
the rear as far as the Roman road, could also be seen. 

A view of this battlefield showed how serious the battle 
was and that still great demands would have to be made 
on the fighting troops. At the point occupied by the Prince 
very soon arrived the commander of the 5th Infantry Di- 
vision, Lieutenant-General von Stiilpnagel, who oriented 
the commander-in-chief on the course of the battle so far. 
At that moment the infantry fighting seemed to have slowed 
up, and only the heavy batteries were firing. From where 
the Prince stood it could be plainly seen that the enemy was 
far superior in numbers to the available Prussian troops. 
On the French side we could still see intact troops; on our 
side were none. 

The long French artillery line was in action along the 
Roman road. However the fusilade that could be heard 
in the Tronville woods proved that this artillery did not 
form the French right wing, but that that wing reached 
still far beyond. It was seen from the clouds of powder 
smoke that enveloped Rezonville and the west and south 
that the enemy was also deploying strong forces there. 
His fighting line ran east from there as far as the Bois des 
Ognons. Reserves were halted in rear between Gravelotte 

—369— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

and Rezonville, and also in Gravelotte itself. The main 
highroad and the Verneville— Gravelotte road* were cov- 
ered with marching troops. 

The French positions still had sufficient depth for stub- 
born fighting. On the other hand, the Prussian troops 
were fighting in a single thin battle line. On our side there 
were no more reserves, the losses were very great, many bat- 
talions had no officers, the guns had insufficient comple- 
ments and teams. After a hot fight lasting more than six 
hours the fatigue of the troops made itself felt. But at 
that very moment an offensive by Prussian infantry was 
starting against Rezonville. Of course success was not at- 
tained in capturing that village.f 

Before we recount the activity of army headquarters 
during the further course of the battle, we will call to 
mind that this account is strictly from the standpoint of 
army headquarters. Strictly speaking, in the narrative 
here we should mention only that which army headquarters 
saw, learned of and performed on the battlefield. But for the 
purpose of giving a complete picture, a short synopsis of 
what happened on the battlefield prior to the arrival of 
Prince Frederick Charles has been given above. The scenes 
of the last hours of the battle are of course more vivid in 



*At this time the French position was about as follows: 

1. The French 4th Corps on the right approaching by way 
way of Bruville in the direction of Mars-la-Tour ; 

2. Two divisions of the French 3d Corps in and at the 
Tronville woods; 

3. The French 6th Corps and the Guard Grenadiers west 
and south of Rezonville; 

4. On the left wing the Brigade of Lapasset, the Guard Vol- 
tigeurs and one division of the 3d Corps. In rear, in reserve, 
two divisions of the 2d Corps, reassembled, at Gravelotte for 
security against the exits from Ars-sur-Moselle. 

fOf the 20th Infantry Division, the leading elements of which 
arrived at Tronville at 3:30 P.M., two battalions of the 56th In- 
fantry Regiment, one battalion of the 79th Infantry Regiment and 
two batteries, which were joined by two batteries of the corps ar- 
tillery had been detached, on the march to Tronville, to join the 5th 
Infantry Division and the arrival of these fresh troops on the bat- 
tlefield of the Division, which happened at about 4:00 P.M., started 
this offensive. One battery accompanied the battalions advancing 
on Rezonville. The advance became general without orders there- 
for having been issued by higher authority, and even in the forest 
terrain on the right wing the Prussian infantry renewed the offen- 
sive. 

—370— 



Operations Second German Army 

this narrative in relation to the first hours of the battle. 
Therefore the former should not be compared with the lat- 
ter as to their value and importance of this narrative. For 
such a comparison the detailed reports of the first part 
of the battle should also be consulted. 

The offensive of the Prussian left against the hostile 
right entirely corresponded tactically to the thought on 
which the operations of the last few days were based, as 
has been stated before. 

On the Prussian right reinforcements could only ar- 
rive in driblets from the Gorze ravine while large masses 
could arrive complete on the left, where the Xth Army 
Corps became effectively engaged. There lay the field for 
the Prussian offensive. Prince Frederick Charles adhered 
to this view, as it appeared more dangerous to leave to the 
plainly visible superior hostile force the time and oppor- 
tunity for using their available fighting forces for a crush- 
ing attack, than to decisively oppose, them with inferior 
forces. 

Of course the real amount of the great preponderance 
of the enemy could not be perceived at that moment. 

The arrival of the 20th Infantry Division had been re- 
ported to the Prince. He explained his views to General 
von Stiilpnagel and also to General von Barnekow* who 
had just arrived, and added to what he said to General von 
Stiilpnagel that the 16th and 25th Infantry Divisions were 
approaching and this general then promised that he would 
hold his positions under any and all circumstances. 

Thereupon H.R.H. the Prince proceeded to the hill south 
of Flavigny. From that hill a portion of the battlefield 
toward the left could be seen, Flavigny in the foreground, 
lying low, in its rear the rolling terrain ascending toward 
the Roman road and the clumps of woods on that road, as 
well as Vionville and the TronviHe woods. On the left Tron- 
ville was seen. The village of Mars-la-Tour on the other 
hand was hidden by the Tronville hills. 



^Commander of the 16th Infantry Division. 

—371— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The infantry fire was still heard raging in the Tron- 
ville woods. West of Vionville and in front of Tronville 
Prussian batteries* were in action against the hostile artil- 
lery positions along the Roman road. The reserve of the 
6th Cavalry Division to in rear of the Vionville — Flavigny 
position, to the right front thereof were a few battalions 
of the 6th Infantry Division that had reestablished order 
after a hot fight. f 

It was now about 5 :00 P.M. and time to commence the 
counter-attacks if these were still to be brought to a success- 
ful conclusion. Therefore Prince Frederick Charles sent 
orders to the 20th Infantry Division' at Tronville "to ad- 
vance with all available troops, drums beating, against the 
hostile right." 

These orders reached the division commander, General 
von Kraatz, shortly after 5 :00 P.M. on the road to Mars-la- 
Tour, 6 to 800 paces west of Vionville. At that time the 
general had only a total of eight battalions. J Of these sev- 
eral battalions were engaged in the Tronville woods, which, 
as stated, had to be evacuated about 3 :30 P.M. and which 
could not be permitted to fall into the enemy's possession 
as the left flank and rear of the Prussian battle line would 
be seriously endangered. 

The general caused the commander-in-chief to be in- 
formed of this situation and promised to start the offensive 
as soon as he would have sufficient forces assembled at one 
point. 

In the meantime the battle again became hotter on the 
right wing. 

The heavy batteries in the center fired at shorter inter- 
vals. This indicated the arrival of the leading elements of 



*2 batteries of the 20th Infantry Division, 2 batteries of the 
corps artillery- of the Xth Army Corps, hastening ahead of the 20th 
Infantry Division, had gone into position there. 

t64th Infantry Regiment. 

|0f the 13 battalions of the division three battalions were in 
action on the battlefield of the 5th Infantry Division, one battalion 
had remained in Pont-a-Mousson, one battalion was still on the 
march via Thiaucourt. 



—372— 



Operations Second German Army 

the IXth and Vlllth Army Corps.* It now appeared advan- 
tageous under all conditions to combine the offensive at- 
tacks against the enemy's right wing and flank with those 
against his left wing. 

That portion of the 19th Infantry Division, approach- 
ing from St. Hilaire, could be expected to arrive on the left 
of the 20th Infantry Division. Definite information how 
near these were now was at hand, but towards 5 o'clock 
rifle fire had commenced also in the vicinity of Mars-la- 
Tour and rising smoke clouds indicated that the village was 
in flames. Any battle there could be fought only by the 
19th Division. 

Therefore the commander-in-chief sent orders there 
and also to the commanding general of the Xth Army Corps 
for the intended offensive. 

In the meantime events took a rapid course. 



*By 4:00 P.M., of the Vlllth Army Corps (16th Infantry Divi- 
sion) there had arrived at Gorze the 32d Infantry Brigade (Colonel 
Rex), 72d and 40th Regiments, as well as the 11th Grenadier Regi- 
ment of the IXth Army Corps (18th Infantry Division) w^hich here 
turned through the Bois de St. Arnould in the direction of Rezonville 
against the French Brigade of Lapasset, which had as its first reserve 
the 3d Guard Grenadier Regiment. Farther in rear, on the hostile 
side, stood one brigade of the French 6th Corps. The Bois des 
Ognons was held by French Guard Chasseurs. In addition, Marshal 
Bazaine had between Gravelotte and Rezonville the Guard Zouaves, 
the Division of Montaudon of the 3d Corps and the Divisions of Ba- 
taille and Verge of the 2d Corps. The slopes from the forest ter- 
rain down was well covered with guns and machine guns. 

Three batteries of the 16th Infantry Division hastened ahead 
of Rex's Brigade of the Vlllth Army Corps and reinforced the long 
artillery line between the Bois de Vionville and Flavigny; in this 
line were then the following batteries: 

4 batteries of the 5th Infantry Division. 

1 battery of Lyncker's detachment. 

6 batteries of the corps artillery of the Hid Army Corps. 

1 battery of the 6th Infantry Division. 

1 battery of the 6th Cavalry Division. 

2 batteries of the 20th Infantry Division. 

2 batteries of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps. 

3 batteries of the 16th Infantry Division. 

20 batteries with 120 guns. 

In addition single batteries of the artillery in position west of 
Vionville were in action here from time to time, changing their po- 
sition as required. 

—373— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

For immediately a very heavy fire, artillery and ma- 
chine gun fire, was heard in the vicinity of Mars-la-Tour. It 
was clear that a hot fight had started there. 

The Brigade of Wedell and the Guard Dragoon Brigade 
had deployed, under command of General von Schwartz- 
koppen (commanding the 19th Infantry Division) towards 
4:00 P.M. at Suzemont and without delay whatever 
started a combined offensive to beyond Mars-la-Tour. The 
attack was directed against the hills between the Tronville 
wood and Grey ere farm.* It was executed with great 
spirit in the difficult terrain, passed under a murderous 
fire the two ravines north of Mars-la-Tour leading from the 
Tronville woods to the ravine of the Jarny brook, and as- 
cended the steep slope of the Greyere hilLf Hostile batter- 
ies had been seen on this hill and these batteries were taken 
as the objective of the attack. However, this attack was exe- 
cuted about the time that the entire division of CisseyJ of 



*Wedeirs Brigade had five battalions present (3 battalions of the 
16th and 2 battalions of the 57th Infantry Regiments), 2 pioneer 
companies and 2 batteries; one battalion had remained in St. Hillaire. 
The five battalions and tw^o companies w^ere deployed in one line 
alongside each other and led forward simultaneously, on the right 
the 57th, on the left the 16th Regiment, on the extreme right wing 
the pioneer companies. 

Of the Guard Dragoon Brigade the 1st Dragoon Regiment ar- 
rived in a body; of the 2d Dragoon Regiment one squadron had 
started for the battlefield that morning from Thiaucourt with the 
two horse batteries of the Xth Corps that had been sent to join the 
5th Cavalry Division, one squadron was with the commanding gen- 
eral, one with the 1st Guard Dragoon Regiment and the battery, 
and one was with Wedell's Brigade. 

fWhen the 16th Infantry Regiment arrived at the second ra- 
vine it found itself unexpectedly at the edge of a difficult ravine, but 
nevertheless the men slid down the steep slope thereof and passd the 
ravine. This was performed within effective range of hostile massed 
fire. 

{This division prolonged the right wing from the forest terrain 
of Tronville to Greyere farm. It received, in a good position and 
supported by strong artillery Wedell's Brigade. The attack of this 
brigade went to pieces in spite of the bravery of the troops. The bat- 
talions, decimated by the hostile fire, had to fall back. There was 
no reserve that could have received them and there was no stability 
for renewed resistance. The 16th Regiment alone lost its commander, 
49 officers and 1863 men out of a total of 62 officers and 2721 men. 
Thus the regiment lost more than 66 per cent of its strength with 
which it had arrived an hour and a half before at Mars-la-Tour. The 
two battalions of the 57th Regiment lost 15 officers and 768 men out ' 

—374— 



Operations Second German Army 

the French 4th Corps deployed alongside Grenier's Division 
and went to pieces. 

The masses of the enemy now commenced to move and 
advance. The moment was critical. Through the initia- 
tive of Cissey's division the other hostile divisions which 
were available opposite the Tronville woods and in rear 
(Grenier's division of the 4th, and Aymard's and Castag- 
ny's divisions* of the French 3d Corps) could be drawn into 
the movement and thus a general offensive by the French 
right wing could be started against which we could not op- 
pose a single fresh battalion at Mars-la-Tour. Though this 
fact could not be seen at that time and place in the midst 
of the action, still the advance of the hostile infantry led 
to the knowledge that the danger was great and that we 
would have to stop the enemy's intention of undertaking 
an offensive. The necessity for rapid action along this line 
was clear. 

For that purpose there was only the 1st Guard Dragoon 
Regiment available at Mars-la-Tour. This regiment now 
charged the French infantry, brought them to a stand and 
caused them to crowd around their eagles so that they 
offered an excellent target to the Prussian batteries in 
front of Tronville which had kept their position unshaken, 
and the fire from which batteries compelled the French in- 
fantry to desist from advancing further. 

The Guard Dragoons suffered extraordinary losses, but 
the result of the charge was of the utmost importance. The 
enemy was driven back onto the defensive and thus a crisis 
was overcome which might have been fatal. The enemy 
again took position on the hills at Greyere and remained 
there to the end of the battle. f 

The retrogade movement of the left wing had been seen 
from the place where the commander-in-chief and his staff 

of a total of 33 officers and 1825 men. Of these losses only about 
350 men were captured unwounded by the French. The 4th French 
Corps that had fought at Greyere farm and which had deployed 26 
battalions against 5 1 battalions, lost 200 officers and 2350 men. 

*At that time commanded by General Nayral. 

fTwo squadrons of the. 4th Cuirassier Regiment also partici- 
pated in these actions. 

—375— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

stood. The officers sent to the separate detachments brought 
back information of the events that had just taken place 
and it became clear that the intended attack against the 
enemy's right wing and flank had turned into a most diffi- 
cult frontal attack, as the enemy took immediate advantage 
of his numerical superiority in numbers to prolong his front 
line. 

By this time the battle line had extended from the Bois 
des Ognons to the Jarny brook, a distance of about 7 [Eng- 
lish] miles and along this long line now fought on the Prus- 
sian side hardly more than 35 to 40,000 men. 

For the further envelopment of the hostile right wing 
by infantry there were not sufficient forces available. Only 
the 5th Cavalry Division could be used therefor. 

Accordingly, the views concerning the battle changed. 
The battle had to be carried on by separate offensive at- 
tacks against all portions of the French front and the meas- 
ures of the commander-in-chief were now directed with 
that end in view. 

Wedell's Brigade had been reassembled on the Mars- 
la-Tour — Buzieres road, the 20th Infantry Division, sup- 
ported by the artillery of the Xth Corps, occupied the vil- 
lage of Tronville in strong force. Repeated reports came 
from there to the commander-in-chief that the place would 
be held under any and all conditions. 

On the Prussian right the firing line was carried for- 
ward decisively in spite of the hostile partial counter-at- 
tacks which were noticed through rolling rifle fire lasting 
for minutes at a time. On that wing arriving reinforce- 
ments made themselves felt.* 



*The 40th, 11th and 72d Regiments. The regiments commenced 
a series of successful counter-attacks from the edge of the Bois de 
St. Arnould against the heights of Rezonville and those between 
Rezonville and Gravelotte. Though in these counter-attacks the edge 
of the plateau rising from the woods could not be permanently held, 
these intrepid attacks held the hostile forces on that portion of the 
battlefield. These offensive attacks undoubtedly increased the fears 
which Marshal Bazaine had held for his left from the beginning of 
the action and prevented him from freely using his fighting forces. 
With due regard to the supposed danger he held strong forces back 
in rear of his left; namely two divisions of the 2d Corps, the Division 
of Montaudon of the 3d Corps and material portions of the Guard. 

—376— 



Operations Second German Army 

If it would now be possible to gain terrain on other por- 
tions of the battlefield, the enemy might be induced to start 
a general retreat. 

The woods of Tronville were held even after the offen- 
sive of Wedell's Brigade had gone to pieces, and they thus 
remained a supporting point for a repetition of attacks on 
the left wing. The conviction that no offensive movements 
could be made by the Prussian infantry on this flank had 
not yet arisen. 

Up to then army headquarters believed it would have 
to abandon all intentions of enveloping the enemy. 

Almost complete silence followed the hot fighting at 
Greyere farm. It was seen from the hill near Flavigny 
that the enemy made no effort to take advantage of his suc- 
cess in spite of the momentary advantages he had gained. 
Neither hostile batteries, nor skirmishers, nor cavalry were 
seen advancing. It appeared as if the enemy, shaken by the 
bloody fighting, fell back on his part, and that it probably 
would be a question now of occupying the portion of the 
battlefield he had left, in order to secure to ourselves all 
the advantages of victory. The Prince had sent requests for 
a renewed advance to those portions of the X^th Army 
Corps around Tronville, and he added thereto that the battle 
went well on the right wing. He also ordered the battal- 
ions of the 6th Infantry Division that were not at the mo- 
ment engaged and which were in a fold of the terrain south- 
west of Flavigny to maxch to the battlefield on the left 
flank, leaving Tronville on the left, and to occupy the battle- 
field as far as possible. Those battalions started this move- 
ment at once. 

The day now declined. The last decisive moments ar- 
rived; whatever was intended to be done would have to 
be done now. It is clear that there were insufficient forces 
for a far reaching offensive and pursuit if the enemy were 
defeated. 

After the long and bloody battle fatigue had become 
general. Physical strength was at the lowest ebb on both 
sides. Under these conditions however the final attack gains 

—377— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

in importance, even if only executed by exhausted troops. It 
has frequently been the decisive factor which of the com- 
manders-in-chief immediately after a battle possessed 
enough moral force to attack the enemy at the final close 
of the battle by utilizing the very last man and animal. 

However, the thought that the enemy would be imbued 
with the same conviction and could just as well do the same 
as was intended on the Prussian side, had to be considered. 
And the enemy's situation was far more favorable, be- 
cause as we well knew, he still possessed the means of obtain- 
ing not only moral but material successes. Repeated par- 
tial offensive shock by the French along the entire battle 
front proved that the enemy, though greatly shaken, still 
had fresh troops at his command. We could not expect to 
find him inactive at the last moment of the battle and in 
that there was positive danger, which we had to consider 
and overcome. It was absolutely necessary to get ahead of 
the enemy. 

Therefore Prince Frederick Charles took his measures 
to have the last shock in the battle of this day start from 
the Prussian side. 

He now sent the battalions of the 6th Infantry Divis- 
ion that had assembled at Vionville, into the ditches of the 
road leading to Rezonville against the French batteries on 
the Roman road. The fire of these batteries, which up to 
then had precluded an advance, soon ceased. Thereafter 
the long artillery line in the center received orders to ad- 
vance, commencing with its left in position at Flavigny. 
Of course these batteries could not move very rapidly for 
lack of teams. They left positions, where in addition they 
had the exact range. The small amount of ammunition 
on hand and the approach of darkness however offset this 
bad feature. The main thing, for the reasons above dis- 
cussed was that the batteries did advance. Moral impres- 
sion was of far greater value now than increased material 
effect.* 



*While this movement was being executed, a new hostile counter 
offensive had to be defeated at about 7:00 P.M. 

—378— 



Operations Second German Army 

The fire of the long artillery line once more increased in 
volume, especially as fresh batteries of the IXth Army 
Corps arrived at the right wing,* 

The Prince now decided to again have the Xth Army 
Corps with all troops available at Tronville and in front 
thereof, attack the French right. 

But these orders reached General von Voigts-Rhetz 
only after dark and in the meantime the battle on the ex- 
treme left of the Prussian fighting line had ended. 

When the attack of WedelFs Brigade went to pieces, 
General von Voigts-Rhetz issued orders not only to the 
Guard Dragoons but also to the 5th Cavalry Division to 
charge the enemy regardless of everything. The 5th Cav- 
alry Division for this purpose sent the 11th Cavalry Brigade 
to the left together with all other regiments and squadrons 
of the Xth Army Corps that could be reached.f 

Besides the French infantry that commenced to pursue 
the debris of Wedell's Brigade on the extreme hostile right 
strong cavalry masses also appeared which were seen plainly 
and of which we expected would charge at any moment 
and turn the scale of victory decisively to the French side. 

Informed that it was impossible to get forward on the 
right of Mars-la-Tour after the infantry fighting had ended 
there, General von Rheinbaben rode around the village on 
the south and brought his regiments by that road onto the 
plateau between the Jarny and Yron brooks, which were 
then held by the French cavalry. 

A heavy cavalry fight now ensued here which ended at 
dark with the defeat and retreat of the hostile cavalry. 



*0f the 25th (Hessian) Division four battalions of the 49th In- 
fantry Brigade, the 1st Cavalry Regiment and 3 batteries had crossed 
the Moselle at Noveaht and kept on the march to Gorze; two of the 
batteries, covered by the 1st Cavalry Regiment, participated effec- 
tively on the right wing of the long artillery line; that artillery 
line then numbered 132 guns. 

fBesides Barby's Brigade (19th Dragoons; 3 squadrons, 13th 
Uhlans; 2 squadrons, 4th Cuirassiers) there were the 13th and 16th 
Dragoon Regiments, the 10th Hussar Regiment (3 squadrons; one 
squadron having been detached by way of Nancy to the upper Mo- 
selle and Meuse), one squadron of the 2d Guard Dragoons and the 
horse battery. Later also another squadron of the Guard Dra- 
goons. 

—379— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The 6th Infantry Division in the center also received 
orders from Prince Frederick Charles to advance with ev- 
erything that could be gathered together along the road 
from Vionville towards Rezonville. 

On the right the firing line was being carried forward 
by that time, and the offensive appeared to have started 
there. 

Portions of the 25th (Hessian) Division* had in the 
meantime entered the Bois des Ognons and there encoun- 
tered the French Guard Chasseurs. 

When thus at 7 :30 P.M., the advance became general, 
it appeared as if the enemy was making another attack 
against the long artillery line in the center and against the 
5th Infantry Division, at least the artillery, rifle and ma- 
chine gun fire was resumed with great intensity. But it 
soon died out again — it was assumed that the last efforts 
of the French had been defeated. The approach of dark- 
ness and the clouds of powder smoke made a clear view im- 
possible and darkness in any case very soon brought the 
battle to a close. The expected and awaited for moment 
had arrived. 

The 6th Cavalry Division was in readiness and closed 
up in rear of the firing line of the Hid Army Corps. It had 
been designated by Prince Frederick Charles to play a con- 
spicuous role during the last and general advance. 

In spite of the critical moments which had one after 
the other arisen in the last few hours. His Royal Highness 
kept this closed up division at his disposition. 

He now gave to the Duke of Mecklenburg verbal 
orders for the attack. That attack was to be made in the 
general direction of Rezonville, the brigades drawing apart 
during the advance. The 14th Cavalry Brigade had for 
this resaon been placed in the right rear of the long artil- 
lery line, the 15th on the left towards Flavigny. This 



*The 49th Infantry Brigade, four battalions (one battalion 
having become separated from the brigade on the march during the 
afternoon). Of these four battalions only about one-third came 
actually under fire, as darkness setting in meanwhile prevented the 
deployment and employment of the available forces. 

—380— 



Operations Second German Army 

latter brigade was to protect, on the right, the advance of 
the 6th Infantry Division. 

When darkness fell both brigades started the charge. 
The evening fog and the powder smoke soon hid them from 
view but the rifle fire just then starting up again enabled 
army headquarters to follow the course of the attack. 

South of Rezonville the 14th Brigade encountered hos- 
tile infantry and, received by an irregular but heavy mass 
fire, rode into the midst of that infantry, through it, rallied 
in rear, and then returned to behind the long artillery line. 

Of the 15th Brigade (which the 9th Dragoons followed) 
the Zieten Hussars made an especially brilliant charge on 
the west towards Rezonville. They drove off hostile cav- 
alry and rode down masses of infantry. Single troopers 
rode to beyond Rezonville and struck the last French re- 
serve between Rezonville and Gravelotte. Thereupon the 
brigade rallied and took position in the vicinity of Fla- 
vigny- 

The advancing portions of the 6th Infantry Division 
ascended, during these charges, from Vionville along the 
road up to the edge of the heights west of Rezonville ;* the 
batteries of the long artillery line had gradually continued 
their advance and had reached to near the hostile inf antry.f 
Darkness made it impossible to reach and take Rezonville, 
as the enemy still had strong forces there. 

With this offensive by the German army the battle 
ended, which because of its duration, tenacity and bitter- 
ness may be classed as one of the bloodiest of modern his- 
tory. 

Together with the portions of the 16th Infantry Divi- 
sion that had participated, the Second Army suffered a 
loss of 581 officers and 14,239 men. In Prussian hands were 
as trophies : 1 gun and about 2000 prisoners. 

Totally exhausted, the troops bivouacked at the spots 
where they were. Outposts were placed toward the enemy 



*They were joined by portions of the 20th Infantry Division. 

fOne battery on the left was suddenly surrounded by swarms 
of hostile infantry, was entirely taken by surprise, but freed itself 
by firing canister. 

—381— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

establishing- connection with each other. In general, these 
outposts extended from the Bois des Ognons along the edge 
of the woods of the Bois de St. Arnould and the Bois de 
Vionville up to the hill between- Vionville and Rezonville 
— the farthest portion of the battlefield — thence to the woods 
of Tronville and from there, bending back at a right angle, 
towards Mars-la-Tour. Over near Rezonville French bivouac 
fires were seen. 

Between 8 :00 and 9 :00 P.M. Prince Frederick Charles 
proceeded to the right wing to Stopnagel's Division which, 
as its commander had promised, had actually held all its po- 
sitions. 

Only towards 10:00 P.M., after the last shots had been 
fired in the Bois des Ognons and everything was tranquil, 
did the commander-in-chief ride with his staff to Gorze from 
where the orders for August 17th were to be issued. 

The principal point was to secure the results attained 
by the heavy fighting. The direct Metz — Verdun road had 
been blocked to the enemy and the battle against a large 
numerical superiority was fortunately and at the very end 
finished by an offensive. This success could well be regarded 
as a considerable one. The Second Army had been engaged 
only with the Illd, Xth and minor portions of the IXth Army 
Corps, supported by parts of the Vlllth Army Corps.* 

But the supports from the Vlllth and IXth Corps ar- 
rived singly on the battlefield and some of them only late 
in the afternoon. Opposed to them, the enemy had his 
troops massed together in a confined space. It was by now 
known that the French 2d and 4th Corps, the Guard and the 
independent cavalry divisions had without doubt been en- 
gaged and that the remainder of the army possibly had been 
in the direct vicinity of the battlefield and possibly had been 
engaged in the battle. f 



*A11 in all a little more than 60,000 men against about 125,000 
men of the enemy. 

fThe presence of the French 6th Corps had not been reported 
to army headquarters during the action. It is probable that divi- 
sions of this corps were thought to be portions of the 2d Corps, which 
was the first to become engaged. 

—382— 



Operations Second German Army 

This fact then brought up the question as to what the 
next morning might bring. The crisis confronting us was 
not yet overcome, notwithstanding that the situation of the 
hostile army, held at Metz, had become so unfavorable that 
it could not long evade final defeat. It could not be seen at 
the moment how many intact brigades or divisions the en- 
emy still had. It was possible that the battle would be re- 
newed in the morning and in the case we could count only on 
the support of the entire IXth Army Corps. Whether those 
fighting forces that could be ordered up during the night 
would arrive in time on the battlefield for a final decision re- 
mained very doubtful. 

The condition of the troops that had been engaged on 
August 16th called for absolute rest. 

The actual numbers of losses which those troops had 
suffered could of course not be ascertained that evening. 
But all indications were that they would go far beyond all 
expectation. And such losses have a decided effect on any 
army. All commands had lost materially, many battalions, 
squadrons and batteries were almost without officers. 

In the extension of the battlefield, part of which con- 
sisted of wooded and mountainous terrain, tactical units had 
been disrupted. The night would be passed without doubt 
in trying to assemble troops and in reorganizing them. 

The fatigue of men and animals after a battle lasting 
10 to 11 hours was extreme. No troop unit had been able 
to cook on the 16th. The absence of water made itself felt 
on the plateau. 

There was a shortage of ammunition for infantry and 
artillery even during the battle, but the commander-in-chief 
had immediately sent orders direct to the artillery comman- 
der to have the amounts replenished during the night. 

There was no doubt but that we could not demand much 
the next morning from the exhausted men. 

Orders issued during the night had to consider, however, 
that at least some fresh troops would reach the plateau at 
daybreak. 

—383— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The corps of the army that had not been engaged, or 
which like the IXth had been only partially engaged, were 
at that time at the following points : 

1. The IXth Army Corps with the 18th Infantry Divi- 
sion at Onville and Arnaville, with the corps artillery in 
the valley below Gorze, the Hessian division in the Bois des 
Ognons. 

2. The Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps in and near 
Pont-a-Mousson,* the advance guard at Regneville-en-Haye, 
the cavalry at Vigneulles. 

3. The Guard Corps at Bernecourt, advance guard at 
Rambecourt. 

4. The IVth Army Corps at Les Saizerais — Marbache, 
advance guard at Jaillon. 

5. The Ild Corps at Buchy and in rear thereof. 
Therefore, as stated, only the IXth Corps could reach 

the battlefield by daybreak. 

To reach the battlefield the Guard Corps would have 
to march 20 miles, the Xllth Corps, which could hardly be 
brought forward on the Noveant — Gorze road as it was 
blocked by trains, but would have to march by way of Thiau- 
court, would have to cover about 22 miles with most of its 
troops. The Ild and IVth Corps, which were still further 
off, could not be counted on for the 17th. 



*Army Headquarters had directed the Xllth Corps on August 
16th to determine the exact time which the different units of the corps 
would require to cross the bridges at Pont-a-Mousson. This ap- 
pears to be of military-historical value. 

The crossing took: 

the 12th Cavalry Division over the stone bridge, 1 hour, 

20 minutes; 
the 23d Infantry Division over the military bridge, 2 hours, 

30 minutes; 
the corps artillery over the stone bridge, 2 hours. 

In the course of the afternoon the 24th Infantry Division used 
both bridges to cross and part of it remained on the right bank in 
the city. 

The trains of the army corps crossed late in the evening and 
during the night. 

In stating the time required by the 23d Infantry Division, it 
should be remembered that during the crossing a leaking ponton 
had to be replaced by the pioneer platoons of the 102d Infantry 
Regiment. 

—384— 



Operations Second German Army 

In accordance with this situation the following orders 
were issued in Gorze at 11 :00 P.M. : 

1. To the IXth Army Corps: 

"The Hid and the Xth Army Corps have today held 
superior hostile forces, which came from Metz, at Mars-la- 
Tour and Vionville in a heavy but victorious engagement; 
these corps have held all their positions, and have gained 
ground on the right. As it is probable that the battle 
will be continued tomorrow, I hereby order the IXth Army 
Corps to come up with ammunition columns via Gorze. 

"The Hessian Division, which arrived today, is to be 
assembled and will follow the division of Wrangle (18th) 
by way of Gorze.* 

"The corps will take a position in readiness by daylight, 
if possible, two miles northwest of Gorze on the plateau and 
will await further orders. The trains will be left behind 
under sufficient guard. 

Frederick Charles." 

2. To the Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Coi-ps: 

"The Illd and Xth Army Corps have today blocked a 
superior hostile force on the road through Mars-la-Tour, 
Vionville and in the direction of Gorze and have held their 
positions against the heaviest attacks. Darkness ended the 
battle. Both corps bivouac in their positions. In order to 
meet renewed attacks by the enemy early tomorrow% it is 
necessary to bring the Xllth Corps during the night by 
way of Thiaucourt at Mars-la-Tour, where the corps (if pos- 
sible at sunrise) will go into a position in readiness in rear 
of the Xth Army Corps. 

Frederick Charles." 

A note was added that the corps should bring along 
all ammunition trains but leave the remaining trains be- 
hind. 

3. To the Guard Corps after giving the same informa- 
tion as to the IXth Corps : 



*It was assumed that the 18th Infantry Division was not at 
Arnaville — Onville but at Noveant or Sillegny. 

—385— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

"In view of this I hereby order the Guard Corps to 
march via Beney, St. Benoit, and Chambley to Mars-la-Tour. 
There the corps will take a position in readiness on the left 
of the Royal Saxon Corps. Ammunition trains should be 
brought along as far as possible, and other trains left be- 
hind under guard; the cavalry continues execution of the 
task set for tomorrow: advance against the Meuse. 

Frederick Charles." 

The lid and the IVth Army Corps could continue to 
carry out the army order issued at noon the 16th, which 
was, as known : 

1. For the lid Army Corps: 

"The corps will reach Pont-a-Mousson tomorrow (the 
17th of August) and sends its leading elements toward 
Limey — Flirey — St. Mihiel. Headquarters, Pont-a-Mous- 
son." 

2. For the IVth Army Corps: 

"The corps will, in the next few days, move in the 
direction of Jaillon, Sanzey and Boucq towards Commercy, 
in so far the fortress of Toul does not demand a partial 
delay of this march." 

By special orders from Pont-a-Mousson the attention 
of the IVth Army Corps had been directed to the fact that, 
according to reports from the Guard cavalry, it would be 
possible to surprise Toul. 

This operation still remained of importance in spite 
of the events of August 16th in consideration of the pro- 
posed subsequent advance westward. 

Therefore the orders for that corps were not changed. 

The execution of the intentions of the Prince, as far as 
concerned the Xllth Army Corps had already been started 
before this by direct orders from General Headquarters. 
That army corps reported during the night that it had re- 
ceived direct orders from General Headquarters to march at 
3:00 A.M. the 17th via Thiaucourt to Mars-la-Tour.* The 



*In addition the 23d Infantry Division in Regneville had re- 
ceived the following notice from an officer's patrol of the 12th Cav- 
alry Division (one squadron of the .Guard Cavalry Regiment), which 
had reached the battlefield between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening 

—386— 



Operations Second German Army 

corps at the same time added its march dispositions, which 
contained the welcome order that the cavalry division 
should proceed to the Metz — Etain road provided it did not 
encounter the enemy on the Mars-la-tour road. The recon- 
naissance of the Metz — Etain road was of the utmost im- 
portance. It was a question if the enemy, in spite of the 
battle just finished would not attempt to accomplish his 
march westward with at least some portions of his troops. 

The cavalry on the left wing, that would have had to 
make that reconnaissance on August 17th, had fought that 
evening up to dark stubbornly, continually, and had suffered 
great loss. To bring still other regiments there during the 
night appeared impossible. This will be clear if we try to 
imagine the condition in which any army will find itself 
after a battle like the one at Vionville. 

The battle had been participated in by the entire cav- 
alry of the Second Army. The appearance of fresh regi- 
ments would be very welcome if only in consideration of 
the necessary reconnaissances to learn the intentions of the 
enemy. 

During the battle the Saxon Cavalry Division had re- 
ported by a staff officer for orders for participation.* Of 
course this offer was not accepted considering the late hour 
and the distance. 

As had been done by the Xllth Corps, the Guard Corps 
had worked ahead of the orders from army headquarters. 
It received news on the 16th through the Xllth Corps of the 
battle. The commanding general, Prince August of WUrt- 

while seeking connection with the 5th Cavalry Division, and had re- 
turned from that battlefield between 9:30 and 10:00 P.M.: 

"It is desirable that tomorrow (August 17th) at daybreak 

everything available be at Tronville, provided Prince Frederick 

Charles issues no different orders." 

(Sgd.) v. Voigts-Rhet?, 
Commanding X Army Corps. 
Prince Frederick Charles. 

In consequence the division was imrnediately alarmed, and word 
sent to General Headquarters in Pont-a-Mousson and to the Guard 
Corps. For others, General Headquarters adhered to the starting 
time at 3:00 A.M. 

—387— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

temberg, therefore immediately decided to continue the 
march to the Meuse and to concentrate the corps early on the 
17th at Richecourt and Fliery so that it would be in readi- 
ness at those points at 5 :00 A.M. Cavalry was to continue 
in observation toward the Meuse. Consequently the orders 
from Prince Frederick Charles found the corps in complete 
readiness. 

These were the measures taken by Headquarters of 
the Second Army to insure an energetic continuation of the 
battle on August 17th. 

General Headquarters sent written information con- 
cerning the measures of the First Army, dated Pont-a- 
Mousson 8:00 P.M. The First Army had been directed to 
cross the Moselle with the Vllth and VHIth Army Corps 
directly in rear of the troops of the IXth Army Corps and 
to march both corps by the shortest route against the enemy. 
The regulation for the route of march of both armies for 
subsequent operations west was retained by General Head- 
quarters until further orders at its discretion.* 

A second letter, dated Pont-a-Mousson August 16th at 
8:15 P.M., explained in brief the conception of the situation 
as gained at General Headquarters: 

"According to our views the decision of the campaign 
rests in driving northward the main hostile forces, retreat- 
ing from Metz. The more the Hid Army Corps has in its 
front today, the larger the victory will be tomorrow, when 
the Xth, Hid, IXth, Vlllth and Vllth Corps and also the 
Xllth Corps will be available against these forces."t 

And a note was added : 

"The corps of the lid Army that will not participate 
can halt today. 

"It appears that an early arrival at the Meuse is of 
lesser yalue, but the capture of Toul of greatest value. 

VON MOLTKE." 

*In this letter emphasis was further laid on the fact that the 
most important thing was to force as large a portion as possible of 
the hostile main fighting force from Chalons and Paris to the north. 

fSee No. 172, von Moltke's Correspondence, page 261. 

—388— 



Operations Second German Army 

The approach of the Guard Corps, which will not be 
considered in this narrative, would only increase the chances 
of the above plan, though an interference by that corps 
could not be counted on at an early hour. 

If then the expectations for the afternoon of August 
17th were very favorable, there were many critical hours 
to overcome between sunrise and the afternoon. 

Prior to the complete arrival of the entire IXth Army 
Corps, the results of August 16th had to be maintained by 
the troops that had gained them. 

THE 17th OF AUGUST 

Those portions of the Sacond Army that had fought on 
August 16th, passed the night at the following points: 

1. The 25th (Hessian) Division, in readiness for battle 
in the Bois des Ognons, opposite the French Chasseurs a 
pied. 

2. The regiments of the 16th Division and the IXth 
Army Corps, that had fought on the right wing, in rear of 
the Bois de St. Arnould. 

3. The 5th Infantry Division on the hills near the Bois 
de Vionville. 

4. The 6th Infantry Division at Vionville. 

5. The corps artillery of the Hid Army Corps on the 
right of the 6th Infantry Division at Flavigny. 

6. The 6th Cavalry Division in rear of the Flavigny — 
Vionville position. 

7. The Xth Army Corps at Tronville — 5 battalions, 5 
batteries of the corps, which had been engaged on the battle- 
field of the 5th Infantry Division, mixed with portions of 
the Hid Army Corps. 

8. The 5th Cavalry Division also at Tronville in rear 
of the Xth Army Corps. 

.Before sunrise August 17th Prince Frederick Charles 
proceeded to the bivouac of the 5th Infantry Division. 

What sacrifices the battle of the 16th had cost could 
now be plainly seen, more so than the evening before, when 
weak cadres, and batteries almost devoid of their comple- 

—389— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

ment were encountered. But all troops had taken their 
position and were in readiness for battle. 

The night had passed tranquilly. The outposts were 
still at the points they had taken after the close of the 
battle ; the outposts of the enemy were a short distance ap- 
posite them. 

Immediately south of Rezonville and at Gravelotte ex- 
tensive bivouac fires and troops camping were seen. 

The French army still was in front of the Prussian 
army and the resumption of the battle was very possible. 

At present deep silence reigned. After 5:30 A.M. a 
report was however received from the outposts that the 
enemy was massing at Gravelotte. Shortly thereafter num- 
erous calls were heard at Rezonville and movements became 
visible around the fires. 

The air was extraordinarily clear. Up to the line that 
was formed by the smoke of the foremost hostile bivouacs 
the battlefield could be plainly seen. The indefinite move- 
ments around the fires changed into dense skirmish swarms 
advancing against the Prussian lines. These might be skir- 
mishers of an advancing column and an attack might com- 
mence. In spite of the excellent morale that was noticeable 
in the German bivouacs at the appearance of the comman- 
der-in-chief, every hour that passed before the battle com- 
menced could be considered a distinct gain. 

The further the day advanced, the more favorable 
would be the situation of the Second Army, as its reinforce- 
ments came closer and more numerous. The Second Army 
had no interest whatever in starting a battle. Therefore 
the enemy was merely to be observed. For that observation 
the cavalry on outpost immediately in front of the enemy 
was sufficient; for the space was limited, and there was 
nowheres any extensive stretch of terrain to be covered by 
detachments sent ahead. 

But the scene soon changed. The French skirmishers 
halted at rifle range in front of the Prussian position. All 
calls and signals ceased. Life was seen only in the large 
camps opposite. Soon the enemy was seen commencing to 
retreat. The skirmishers evacuated the heights they had 

—390— 



Operations Second German Army 

held* and march columns were seen forming on all roads 
from the battlefield, mainly in the direction towards Grave- 
lotte and from there towards Malmaison. Prussian cavalry 
with flankers had advanced from Vionville towards Rezon- 
ville and followed the enemy without being fired on. Shortly 
after 6 :00 A.M. it reached the village and found therein only 
wounded, who stated that the enemy had marched off in 
haste. At 6 :00 A.M. the leading elements of the IXth Army 
Corps arrived on the plateau and this corps took a position 
in readiness under cover west of the Bois de Vionville south 
of the Gorze — Vionville road. 

Shortly after 6:00 A.M. His Majesty the King arrived 
on the battlefield at the bivouac of Stiilpnagel's Division, 
received there the report of the commander-in-chief of the 
Second Army and then selected his command post on the 
plateau southwest of Flavigny. Later on His Majesty, ac- 
companied by Prince Frederick Charles, proceeded to the 
hill at Flavigny to reconnoiter from there the hostile posi- 
tions. 

The enemy's movements continued. The roads from 
Gravelotte to Metz and also to Malmaison and Verneville 
were densely covered with troops. Between those roads and 
alongside of them strong detachments were seen marching. 
It was impossible to gain a clear idea of the purposes and 
objectives of these masses moving hither and thither. Sim- 
ultaneously with these movements it was also perceived 
that French fighting forces were marching towards Grave- 
lotte. 

A report received by the army commander from the 
outposts of the 6th Cavalry Division even stated: 

"The French have massed across the Gravelotte — Con- 
flans road, west of the former place. Strong columns of all 
arms are drawing up to that point from the northwest. It 
appears a new corps is coming up and intends to break forth 
on that road. A few companies have advanced to the left 
front and have skirmishers out, evidently awaiting orders 
to advance. 



*It is very probable that these were the last troops of the 
enemy, who had commenced to evacuate the battlefield at daybreak. 

—391— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

"New detachments are appearing from Vionville on the 
hill marching towards Gravelotte. At present one cavalry- 
brigade is in position there." 

Ascending smoke, apparently from new bivouac fires, 
hid many things from view. 

During the morning hours troops ready for battle were 
reported as seen west and south of Gravelotte, apparently 
for the purpose of covering hostile measures. Departing 
columns in rear still occupied the roads. A general staff 
officer from army headquarters was sent there for recon- 
naissance. About that time it still appeared quite possible 
that the enemy might start a battle again. 

The officer soon reported: 

17 August 1870, 11:30 A.M. 

"According to all appearances no attack by the enemy 
is to be expected. He has taken up a rearguard position at 
Gravelotte. To judge by the smoke, he is cooking. A few 
trains are departing for Metz just now." 

A sketch of the hostile position at Gravelotte was added. 

The outposts reported about the same, for instance: 

"The enemy has occupied Gravelotte with infantry, is 
foraging, and is attempting to carry away the supplies 
nearby. On the heights of the Bois de Vaux [Le Point du 
Jour'\ he has skirmishers and his last artillery is leaving 
by the road to Metz. 

"Columns, infantry and trains, are withdrawing on, the 
road to Verneville. 

"Much infantry is withdrawing from the road leading 
to Metz, towards the road leading from Gravelotte to Don- 
court ; as this move is taking place behind the village and be- 
hind a ridge its strength cannot be exactly stated. Hostile 
trumpet calls can be heard in the direction of Metz and are 
getting fainter, they can also be heard on the left flank, 
where they are louder."* 

Though these incoming reports gave no absolute cer- 
tainty as to details, and did not agree with each other in all 



* These reports came from the 6th Cavalry Division, which fur- 
nished the outposts for the Hid Army Corps. 

—392— 



Operations Second German Army 

parts, the general conclusion could be arrived at however 
that the enemy was withdrawing on this flank and that his 
withdrawal was covered by a rear guard position in Grave- 
lotte. 

During the afternoon hours hostile masses became visi- 
ble on the heights at Leipzig and Moscou Farm and when 
Prussian staff officers showed themselves reconnoitering 
south of Gravelotte*, the enemy immediately greeted them 
with machine gun fire. A slight skirmish opened up in the 
Rois de Vaux between the leading elements of the Vllth 
Army Corps and French advanced troops. 

Thus the enemy had a firm foothold immediately west 
of Metz and was in readiness to enegetically dispute any ap- 
proach to his position. 

However, what was seen there was not the whole 
French army but only its left wing. The masses that could 
be seen had a strength of about 3-4 divisions. 

The question remained, where had the right wing 
which had been engaged in battle on August 16th west of 
the Tronville woods and the other side thereof gone to? 
The supposition that a partition had occurred in Bazaine's 
army during the night of the 16-17th, had to be reckoned 
with. 

In this regard we could arrive at no conclusion from 
the standpoint of Second Army Headquarters based on our 
own knowledge. From the hills of Flavigny the terrain 
around Bruville where the hostile right wing had operated 
the day before could not be seen. This second part of the 
question to be solved this day, could be cleared up only by 
reports from the patrols sent out. 

Many of these reports came in and all stated, agreeing 
with each other, that the enemy's right wing was withdraw- 
ing westward. 

One of these reports stated: 

"Columns can be seen at St. Marcel marching towards 
Verdun. At Bruville is an extensive camp. At Farm 



*His Royal Highness Prince Adalbert and later on General 
von Zastrow, with their staffs. 

—39a— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

la Greyere are hostile pickets (infantry and cavalry). At 
Bruville, on the road to Jarny, are hostile infantry columns." 
This report was dated 9:30 A.M. and came from the 
advanced troops of the 5th Cavalry Division.* The ad- 
vanced troops of the 6th Cavalry Division also reported: 
"Strong French cavalry detachments are marching west on 
the road to Jarny." 

No reports were received contradicting these. Even 
clouds of dust were seen from St. Marcel westward and 
this appeared to confirm the observations made by the out- 
post cavalry. 

There was no reason to doubt the correctness of the re- 
ports, everything spoke for their truth. 

The possibility that the enemy would take a position 
with his rear towards Metz and the steep, wooded ravines 
on the left bank of the Moselle and there accept a second 
battle, was not entertained at headquarters of the Second 
Army. Such a decision had to be considered as fatal to the 
enemy, considering the German numerical superiority and 
the views held in those days. That superiority in numbers 
the enemy was doubtlessly cognizant of, and he also knew 
that the German troops were in the immediate vicinity. 

It could not on August 17th, be guessed that besides 
interior reasons, the condition of the troops after the 
battle of the 16th — lack of ammunition and subsistence, 
confusion in administration — chained Bazaine's army to 
the vicinity of Metz. It was beheved, for instance, that 
that army was plentifully supplied with everything as it 
had been for several days in close connection with the abun- 
dant supplies of the fortress. 

According to the view held by headquarters of the Sec- 
ond Army the march westward, though combined with dan- 
ger, offered the enemy a good chance of ending fortunately. 
If he remained at Metz, his complete destruction was merely 
a matter of time. 



*The 13th Cavalry Brigade at Puxieux had addressed that re- 
port to headquarters of the Xth Army Corps, which latter transmitted 
it to army headquarters. 

—394— 



Operations Second German Army 

But what we considered a grave error, we had no right 
to assume would be the intention of the enemy. Normal 
conditions and correct decision on the part of the enemy are 
always the correct basis on which to base our own actions. 

For that reason Prince Frederick Charles was convinced 
that that portion of the hostile army seen east of Grave- 
lotte and on the hills of Le Point du Jour, Moscou and 
Leipsig, was the minor part of the army and that the prin- 
cipal part of the French army had started a retreat west- 
ward at dark August 16th, or was marching directly north 
by way of Briey. Under the latter assumption it remained 
quite probable that he would have reached Briey by this 
time. On the morning of August 17th weak flank columns 
might have been seen on the Conflans road. 

As stated, army headquarters had reports from that 
direction of movements of the French. Of course these 
reports were unconfirmed and there was doubt as to their 
correctness. A more decided attack against the enemy 
would have furnished better results for the reconnaissance, 
but at that time everything that could have led to a prema- 
ture resumption of the battle was avoided. 

Before we explain why a more serious engagement- 
was against the best interests of the Second Army, we will 
give a short view of conditions on the extreme left of the 
Second Army. 

The Royal Saxon cavalry was active on that flank on 
August 17th. On the morning of that day in accordance 
with orders issued by the Crown Prince of Saxony it started 
from Vigneulles at a rapid gait, passed the Metz — Mars-la- 
Tour — Verdun road at Harville, 7 miles west of Mars-la- 
Tour, and as early at 9:00 A.M. reached, at St. Jean-les- 
Buzy, the northern road leading from Metz via Conflans to 
Verdun. Only a few train-troops were encountered during 
that ride. Etain also was found unoccupied in the after- 
noon.* 



*The division learned from inhabitants in St. Jean-les-Buzy 
that Emperor Napoleon with a numerous escort — about 5000 men 
— coming from Metz, had passed along the road to Conflans. 

—395— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

These events were then known to army headquarters.* 

While the different assumptions concerning the inten- 
tions of the enemy were thoroughly discussed on the bat- 
tlefield of Vionville and while definite ideas were formed, 
the army corps that had been designated for support ar- 
rived. 

Early in the afternoon the Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army 
Corps arrived in bivouacs between Mars-la-Tour and Pux- 
ieux.f 

At 1:00 P.M. the Guard Corps also reported that it had 
arrived at Puxieux and was resting there. 

Thus the corps that could have been available for the 
continuation of the battle on August 17th had arrived. The 
First Army was in close communication with the Second. 
Since 6:00 A.M. the columns of the Vllth and Vlllth Corps 
had been crossing the Moselle. The first touch of the leading 
elements of the Vllth Corps with the enemy occurred in the 
Bois de Vaux. Thus the battle could now be renewed with 
fresh forces. This intention General Headquarters held 
also and mentioned to the Prince, but the latter and some 
of the corps commanders that were present held an oppo- 
site view. 

The troops that did arrive this day had had a fatig- 
uing march. It would be necessary to continue the march 
to attack the enetny. Therefore, a serious battle could 
start only in the afternoon and might end in victory, but 
only with a partial decision. Darkness would have ended 
the battle prematurely and would have doubtlessly pre- 
vented pursuit. Headquarters of the Second Army did not 
feel inclined to do this, but now wanted to finish things 
with one stroke. 

No apprehension whatever was entertained but that 
the enemy would be found on August 18th. Prince Fred- 



*The Saxon cavalry division had sent a report to corps head- 
quarters as early as 7:30 A.M. from the direction of Mars-la-Tour. 
That report reached the Crown Prince of Saxony vi^hile he v^^as with 
the advance guard of the corps coming from Thiaucourt at 1:00 P.M. 
only, that is, at the time when army headquarters at Flavigny issued 
its orders for that day. 

fOne battalion remained with General Headquarters at Pont-a- 
Mousson. 

—396— 



Operations Second German Army 

erick Charles had no doubt at all about that. At the time 
he still believed that the enemy intended to evade the 
German armies by withdrawing westward. He rather reck- 
oned with certainty on being able to overtake the enemy the 
next day ; for he had to make quite a detour before reaching 
the protection of the Meuse line. In addition the French 
army was confined to a very few roads with its clumsy 
masses, which up to then had not proved they could march. 
These facts increased the difficulties of escaping. 

If the battle could be waged on August 18th, the lid 
Army Corps could be brought up for participation. 

Therefore the intentions of Prince Frederick Charles 
were not to attack the enemy before the 18th, to start on 
that day as early as possible so that the sun would still be 
high by the time a final decision was reached. However, 
prior to that the sanction of General Headquarters had to 
be obtained before army headquarters could issue its or- 
ders. This was done, and after General Headquarters had 
sent its approval, the Prince issued the following army 
orders : 

"On the Battlefield, Vionville, August 17, 1870, 1:00 
P.M. 

"The enemy appears to be withdrawing partly north- 
westward and partly towards Metz. 

"The Second Army, and the Vlllth and Vllth Army 
Corps, will tomorrow seek in a northerly direction the 
marching enemy and beat him. 

"Today the corps are bivouacking by corps on the bat- 
tlefield of Vionville, the IXth Corps on the right. Its 
outposts will seek connection in the woods in their front with 
the outposts of the Vlllth Corps which is bivouacking at 
Gorze, and they will extend their line to the left to the Metz 
— Verdun road in front of Flavigny. 

"The Hid Army Corps is camping at Vionville and Fla- 
vigny, its outposts, connecting with those of the IXth Corps 
will extend to the left to the west edge of the woods north 
of Vionville. 

"The Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps will today 
go into bivouac at Mars-la-Tour and place outposts as far as 

—397— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

the Yron brook, sending a cavalry detachment to beyond 
Hannonville to observe the road to Verdun. 

"The corps that are posting outposts, will so far as the 
enemy allows, have officers reconnoiter the terrain in their 
front as to its passibility for marching. 

"The Xth Army Corps remains in its camp at Tronville. 

"The Guard Corps goes into camp at Puxieux. 

"The lid Army Corps will leave Pont-a-Mousson at 4 :00 
A.M. tomorrow and march via Arnaville, Bayonville and 
Onville to Buxieres, will mass north of that place and cook 
meals. 

"Army headquarters today in Buxieres. 

Frederick Charles." 

The following was added to the orders for the IVth 
Army Corps : 

"On the right of the IVth Corps only the Guard Uhlan 
Brigade remains with directions to scout along the Meuse to 
St. Mihiel. 

"The IVth Army Corps takes position on the line Boucq 
— Sanzey — Jaillon." 

The orders of General Headquarters, though given ver- 
bally, were written down by General Moltke briefly, and 
read:* 

"The Second Army will fall in at 5 :00 A.M. tomorrow 
the 18th and advance in echelons between the Yron and the 
Gorze creeks (in general between Ville-sur-Yron and Rezon- 
ville). 

"The Vlllth Army Corps will join this movement on 
the right wing of the Second Army. At the start the Vllth 
Army Corps will have the task to protect the movements of 
the Second Army against possible operations from Metz. 

"Further orders from His Majesty the King will de- 
pend on the measures taken by the enemy. 

"Send reports for the present for His Majesty the King 
to hill south of Flavigny. 

VON Moltke." 
17 August 1870, 1:45 P.M. (dictated on the battlefield of Vionville). 



*See von Moltke's Correspondence, No. 174, page 261. 
—398— 



Operations Second German Army 

This gave the general instructions for the task of the 
Second Army for August 18th. Special orders could be is- 
sued — possibly changed — on the morning of the 18th of Au- 
gust based on the then existing situation. 

Prince Frederick Charles directed the commanding 
generals of the Guard, Xth and Xllth Army Corps to report 
to him at the bivouac of the Saxon Corps at Mars-la-Tour 
by 5 :00 A.M. ; and those of the Hid and IXth Corps at 5 :30 
A.M. at the bivouac of the Illd Corps west of Vionville, to 
receive verbal orders. 

As there was no reason to expect any engagement to- 
day and as His Majesty the King had returned to his head- 
quarters at Pont-a-Mousson, Prince Frederick Charles now 
left the battlefield and dismounted at the small village of 
Buxieres at 4:00 P.M. 

The orders from Army Headquarters had not been car- 
ried out in full. As the Guard Corps reported at about 1:00 
P.M. that it was resting at Puxieux, while at the same time 
the Xnth Army Corps was already approaching the village 
of Mars-la-Tour, army headquarters had thought it best to 
assign to the Guard Corps a bivouac at Puxieux, that is, 
in rear of the Saxons. This had been done in the orders 
just mentioned. 

However, the Guard Corps proceeded to its bivouac 
at Hannonville-au-Passage assigned to it by prior orders, 
which it had received during the night of August 16th, and 
reported that fact to army headquarters. This report crossed 
on its way with the army orders just then being sent to 
the Guard Corps. 

The Guard Corps, even after it had received the orders, 
remained in the bivouac it had taken so as not to again in- 
terrupt the rest of the greatly fatigued troops. 

THE 18th OF AUGUST 

On the morning of August 18th, the different parts 
of the Second Army were at the following points : 

1. The IXth Army Corps on the plateau west of Bois de 
Vionville. 

—399— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

2. The Hid Army Corps with the 6th Cavalry Division 
at Vionville — Flavigny ; a portion of the corps at Buxieres 
— Chambley.* 

3. The Xth Army Corps at Tronville, the 5th Cavalry 
Division in its rear. 

4. The Xllth Army Corps south of Mars-la-Tour and 
Puxieux.f 

5. The Guard Corps south of Hannonville-au-Passage. 

6. The lid Army Corps approaching Buxieres from 
Pont-a-Mousson where it had arrived on the 17th. 

7. The IVth Army Corps at Boucq (not far from Toul) . 
Shortly before 5:00 A.M. Prince Frederick Charles ar- 
rived at the bivouac of the Xllth Corps at Mars-la-Tour. 

The verbal orders issued to the corps commanders here 
and later to the corps commanders at Vionville could of 
course rest only on the knowledge of the situation of the 
enemy known at that time. 

Reports received by the army commander stated that 
the enemy had been on the march towards evening of the 
17th of August on both roads to the west in front of the 
Second Army. For that reason the estimate of the situa- 
tion remained the same as it had been the afternoon of the 
17th. 

The commander-in-chief personally believed it probable 
that the French bivouacs east of Gravelotte, observed the 
day before, would have disappeared by now. 

He believed, as stated, that it would be wrong to as- 
sume that the army under Bazaine would take a position 
and accept battle against a German superiority, with its 
rear against Metz and the steep Moselle valley. He far 



*To that place the 5th Infantry Division had moved on August 
17th, as there was no water in its bivouac on the plateau. 

fThe 12th Cavalry Division had passed the night at Parfon- 
drupt with outposts on the Metz — Conflans — Etain road. At St. 
Jean-les-Buzy on this road three persons (one of them a certain Mar- 
quis de Margerie, said to be a higher supply official) had been 
stopped the night of the 17th and had been sent by a staff officer 
as suspicious persons first to corps headquarters of tlie Xllth Corps, 
then to Army Headquarters. The latter sent them to General 
Headquarters. Patrols of the Xllth Army Corps had scouted up to 
Jarny on the 17th without seeing anything of the enemy. 

—400— , 



Operations Second German Army 

rather held it probable that on the 18th of August the 
Second Army would strike the enemy's left flank to the 
north of its front. Certainly this was only a hypothesis. 

Certainty would be attained about this matter by a 
short march to the front in the early morning hours. During 
the advance march however it had to be especially remem- 
bered that the enemy was doubtlessly very close and that 
a battle might ensue at any moment. This required that 
the march should not be in long march columns but with 
large masses ready for battle. According to conceptions of 
the terrain, which could be gleaned from maps, this appeared 
to offer no material difficulties. Army orders of August 17th 
had in addition, charged the corps in the first line to recon- 
noiter the foreground. For these reasons Prince Frederick 
Charles considered it proper to have the Saxon Army Corps 
start first and to have the Guard Corps follow it, though 
the march directions of both corps would cross in the vicin- 
ity of Mars-la-Tour. 

Therefore the verbal orders issued by Prince Frederick 
Charles contained the following: 

"The Second Army will this morning continue the 
march to the front. Its task remains as heretofore to 
push the enemy away from his route of retreat on Verdun 
— Chalons, and to beat him wherever found. 

"The Xllth Army Corps will start as leading echelon 
of the left wing at once ;* in its right rear the Guard Corps ; 
and the IXth Army Corps (at 6:00 A.M.) to the right rear 
of the Guard Corps. 

"The Xllth Army Corps will march on Jarny, the Guard 
Corps on Doncourt. The IXth Corps, after it has marched 
between Vionville and Rezonville, will advance, leaving St. 
Marcel close to its left. 

"In second line follow, opposite the intervals, on the 
right the Hid, and on the left the Xth Army Corps. The 6th 
Cavalry Division will be under the orders of the llld Corps, 
the 5th Cavalry Division under the orders of the Xth Corps, 



*These orders were issued at 5:00 A.M. 

—401— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

"The corps artillery of the Illd Corps remains at the 
disposition of Army Headquarters as army reserve artil- 
lery. 

"On the right of the Second Army the two corps of the 
First Army will advance, the Vlllth Corps in rear of the 
IXth Corps, the Vllth Corps farther toward Metz.* 

"The trains remain where they have passed the night, 
those of the IXth Army Corps between Vionville and Rezon- 
ville, where water can be found. 

"The advance will be made, not in long march columns, 
but by massed divisions, the corps artillery marching be- 
tween its two divisions. The question at the start is only 
one of an advance of less than four miles, so as to occupy 
the northern road to Verdun. Rest will be taken during 
the noon hour." 

In a few words the Prince finally explained to the corps 
commanders his estimate of the situation concerning the 
enemy, so as to assure thorough and correct cooperation be- 
tween all portions of the army. This same estimate was the 
basis for the instructions already issued which formed the 
entire Second Army into one unit, the several units of which 
were in close liaison. The Army was to push forward as 
a mass of brigades of enormous dimensions, and marching 
continually in such manner would be prepared to turn either 
to the right or to the left according as to how and where the 
left flank corps would be the first to become engaged. 

The Prince himself intended to keep with the leading 
elements of the Hid Army Corps at the start of the march. 

The corps that were to start the first at once made all 
preparations therefor. The leading elements of the Xllth 
Army Corpsf which defiled in march columns through the 
village of Mars-la-Tour, reached the main Metz — Harville 
— Verdun road with its first sections at 5 :40 A.M. 



*For the short march the cavalry then with the corps in the 
first line sufficed for reconnaissance; there were no large plains be- 
tween the Second Army and the enemy. Therefore the 5th and 6th 
Cavalry Divisions were kept back. The Saxon Cavalry Division was 
in front, the Cuirassier Brigade of the Guard Corps, the Grand Ducal 
Hessian Cavalry Brigade as well as the cavalry division regiments 
of the 5th Infantry Division were also out in front. 

tlOSth Rifle Regiment. 

—402— 



Operations Second German Army 

From the place west of Vionville, where the comman- 
der-in-chief had issued his orders to the commanding gen- 
erals of the Hid and IXth Corps, St. Marcel, Doncourt, Bru- 
ville, Jarny and their surroundings could plainly be seen. 
It was definitely ascertained by field glasses that the entire 
country around there was free of the enemy. 

When now Prince Frederick Charles sent his report of 
the commencement of the advance of the Second Army as 
indicated by the start of the Xllth Army Corps towards 
Jarny to General Headquarters on the hill at Flavigny, he 
added thereto : 

"No hostile troops whatever are marching on the road 
from St. Marcel to Doncourt. The camp at St. Marcel is 
empty. During the night troops did march on that road." 

The enemy, who had been north in front of the Second 
Army, had thus disappeared. The question, in addition, 
was what had become of those hostile fighting forces that 
had been observed yesterday to the east in front of the 
right wing of the Second Army. 

The first information which was sent in by a picket 
opposite Gravelotte, also appeared to indicate the departure 
of the French. The officer in charge of that picket re- 
ported: "I have been to within 400 paces of the hostile 
camp. The enemy has taken no security measures there. 
His strength is about 6 to 9 divisions of infantry.* 

"As far as can be seen the artillery has driven off ; cav- 
alry : one to 2 regiments in white tunics. The entire thing 
creates the impression of a hasty departure for Metz; at 
this time there are about 6 to 8000 infantry still east of 
Gravelotte.— August 18, 1870, 4:50 A.M." 

Very soon thereafter a report was received from the 
advanced troops of the 18th Division, as follows : 



* There is no doubt but what he meant French half -battalions, 
as otherwise the statement of the strength made below as 6 to 
8000 men infantry could not be explained. And the sight of 6 to 
8 infantry divisions would probably have caused that officer to re- 
port that he had seen the entire French army. In any case, he 
viewed entirely too small a space to be able to gain the impression 
that he had three army corps in his front. His statement also .indi- 
cated in connection with his statement in regard to cavalry and ar- 
tillery, that he meant weaker troop units. 

—403— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

1. Gravelotte unoccupied this morning.* 

2. According to a report from the dragoon picket the 
"general" was beaten in the camp, and that picket says it 
observed movements of the enemy toward the northwest. 

3. The two companies in Rezonville report hostile in- 
fantry patrols in the woods north of Rezonville. — August 18, 
1870; 5:15 A.M. 

Of the very great interest at that very time was the sen- 
tence in the first report: "the entire thing creates the im- 
pression of a hasty departure for Metz." 

According to the estimate of the situation the com- 
mander-in-chief had formed, this was not only not impos- 
sible but rather probable. If only a portion of the enemy's 
army was immediately west of Metz, it appeared correct 
if the enemy, in the face of the very great German numeri- 
cal superiority in readiness to advance, retreated to under 
the cannon of Metz. 

Furthermore the statement in the second report to the 
effect that the enemy was alarming his camp became of 
importance, also that movements were occurring toward the 
northwest. In order to gain rapid information of condi- 
tions on that flank, and as could not be seen from the place 
where the Prince was, Prince Frederick Charles sent an 
engineer officer of his staff to the vicinity of Gravelotte to 
gain more definite information. 

This oflicer first sent a message from the outposts 
in the north edge of the Bois des Ognons, which mentioned 
the marching off of the enemy in a northerly and northeas- 
terly direction and stated that this information was entirely 
reliable. But soon thereafter his personal observations 
led him to an entirely different opinion. The first message 
(dated 6:40 A.M.) was received at army headquarters at 
7 :30 A.M. Three-quarters of an hour later a second mes- 
sage followed, stating that the camp was still intact and 
that no troops had left it. These latter messages were results 
of personal reconnaissance, not statements of outposts. 

*As early as the 17th patrols had visited that place. Up to 
very early m the morning of the 18th however numerous French 
soldiers were seen around there carrying water. 

—404— 



Operations Second German Army 

Movements, the report continued, had been seen of course 
since 3 :00 A.M. 

The next report from that engineer officer (dated 8:45 
A.M.) confirmed the last report. It read: 

"Movements throughout the camp, it appears infan- 
try is being concentrated farther to the rear; the edge of 
the hills still occupied by artillery. 

"The movements in the camp during the night were 
caused by trains coming in ; new bivouac fires being lighted. 
At present hour but slight firing by outposts." 

The enemy still held his positions on the heights east 
of Gravelotte and made no attempt whatever to leave them. 
Of this fact there was now no doubt. 

There was no definite information as yet from the left 
wing of the army, no message of any importance had been 
received.* 

The first report from that flank came from the Guard 
Cavalry and reached the commander-in-chief at 8:30 A.M.: 

"Inhabitants of Bruville state that the French left 
Doncourt yesterday at 9:00 A.M. They do not know the 
direction in which they left. Some state to Verdun, others 
to Briey, and still others to Metz." 

Thus, nothing certain was gleaned from that report, it 
only proved that last night no column of importance marched 
on the road to Jarny. * * * * 

About this time — at 8:30 A.M. — General Headquarters 
held the view that the hostile main forces were in front of 
Metz and that their position reached to Amanvillers.f 



*Concerning the importance attached to the road from Verdun, 
the Xllth Army Corps received orders about 7:45 A.M.; "to direct the 
cavalry detachment scouting on its left flank to also send all reports 
direct to army headquarters." 

fAs is now known the French army occupied the following posi- 
tions on August 18: 

1. The 6th Corps: Roncourt — St. Privat to the small swamp 

east of St. Ail; 

2. The 4th Corps: Amanvillers — Montigny-la-Grange ; Cham- 

pen ois occupied in front; 

3. The 3d Corps: La Folie — Leipzig — Moscou towards Le 

Point du Jour, advanced troops in the Bois des Geni- 
vaux; 

—405— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

An officer of the general staff brought this information. 
It was still considered desirable that the Second Army 
continue its march in the direction heretofore held to. 
"Should the northern road to Verdun be free of the enemy, 
the Xllth and the Guard Corps ought not to be sent far to 
the left." If the assumption which had been made should be 
confirmed, then the First Army was designated to attack in 
front, the IXth Corps to envelop the hostile right wing, the 
Guard Corps to form the reserve. The rest of the corps 
were to halt for the present. 

The dispositions made by Prince Frederick Charles had 
already arranged for such a halt with a view to the neces- 
sity of preserving the strength of the troops. It only re- 
mained to issue special orders to the IXth Corps which was 
to receive a definite battle task. It therefore received the 
following orders : 

"VioNviLLE, 8:35 A.M., 18 August 1870. 

"As soon as its infantry of the main body reaches 
Caulre Farm, northeast of St. Marcel, the IXth Corps will 
halt, will send cavalry points towards Leipzig, St. Privat- 
la-Montagne and to connect with the Guard Corps which 
will also halt at Doncourt. Reports of the cavalry sent 
west will, in addition to being sent to me, be also sent to 
General von Moltke. 

■ Frederick Charles."* 

Corresponding orders were sent to the Guard Corps to 
halt at Doncourt, to the Xllth Corps to halt at Jarny. 

Other instructions could not be sent at this time to 
those two corps, as the strength of the enemy on our right 

4. The 2d Corps: Le Point du Jour, Rozerieulles ; Ste. Ruf- 

fine occupied on the left flank; 

5. The Cavalry Division of Forton at the mill of Longeau; 

6. The Cavalry Division of Barail (of w^hich two regiments 

had escorted the Emperor and were absent) in the po- 
sitions of the 6th Corps; 

7. The Guard in reserve on the heights of the Mont St. 

Quentin and near Plappeville. 

The right flank of this position could not be seen from the heights 
at Flavigny. 

* Copies of this order were sent to General Headquarters with 
the addition that the Xllth Corps would halt at Jarny, the Xth at 
Bruville. 

—406— 



Operations Second German Army- 
flank was not yet known, so that we could not form a clear 
judgment as to whether besides the IXth Corps, other por- 
tions of the Second Army could also be employed against 
him. 

The Xth Army Corps also received orders to remain 
near Bruville when it reached there.* The Hid Corps had 
not yet started its march. 

These were the measures taken by headquarters of the 
Second Army in consequence of the first information re- 
ceived from General Headquarters. Before it took further 
measures, more definite information and results of recon- 
naissances had to be awaited, which could not be very far 
off. 

First, at 8:50 A.M. came a report from the extreme 
left wing of the Army, the Xllth Corps, which had arrived 
at Jarny in the meantime, without encountering the enemy. 
It stated : 

"North of Labry, 8 :50 A.M.f 

"It appears hostile artillery is in position west of Val- 
leroy, also columns west of Valleroy, also columns north of 
Doncourt." 

This report corresponded to the assun^ption of Prince 
Frederick Charles that the enemy had separated his forces. 

On the right, on the heights of Point du Jour (the ene- 
my was in position, to the left, according to that report, 
he now also showed himself. It appeared that the Second 
Army was now in touch with the enemy also on its left 
wing, just as the right wing had hostile forces in its prox- 
imity. It remained to await detailed information which 
both flank corps were without doubt seeking. 

The report from the Crown Prince of Saxony was now 
shown to be erroneous by a second report arriving at head- 
quarters of the Second Army at about 9:30 A.M. It was 
stated that minute reconnaissance had shown that Valleroy 



*At this time the Xth Corps was still at its bivouac places, but 
this could not be seen from the place where army headquarters 
v/as. 

fThe fact that the date of this report was the same as the date 
of its arrival at army headquarters may be explained by difference 
in watches. 

—407— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

was not occupied by the enemy. It was added that the Xllth 
Corps would remain at Jarny awaiting further orders and 
that the Saxon cavalry would in the meantime reconnoiter 
the Briey road. 

Thus, there was no touch as yet with the enemy on the 
left flank of the army. 

As stated several times above, the commander-in-chief 
thought it very probable that the enemy would be found 
there, and he did not believe that the report was erroneous, 
he remained convinced that similar reports like the first, 
now contradicted, from the Xllth Army Corps would prob- 
ably be received in the further advance of that corps. It 
might be true that hostile troops had been at Valleroy, and 
had disappeared again.* 

To this came, that during the time between the arrival 
of the first and second report, the IXth Army Corps re- 
ported from Caulre : "Our patrols sent out north and north- 
eastward have seen nothing of the enemy."t This, like ear- 
lier reports, appsared to indicate that the deployment of 
troops by the enemy immediately west of Metz were not on 
an extensive scale. 

Prince Frederick Charles now more than ever believed 
that the further advance of the reconnoitering detach- 
ments on the extreme left of the army ought to be waited 
for, before finally deciding on the right turn of the army. 

Very soon thereafter a further order was received 
from General Headquarters: 

"An unimportant skirmish engagement on the right 
wing of the Vllth Corps. The troops visible on the heights 
towards Metz appear to move northward, probably towards 
Briey. It does not appear that the First Army requires 
much more support than can be rendered by the Illd Corps 
from Vionville or from St. Marcel. 

"Hill south of Flavigny, 9 :20 AM. 

VON MOLTKE." 



*In regard to this we may remark, getting ahead of our nar- 
rative, that as a matter of fact patrols of the enemey were later on 
chased away from the vicinity of Moineville and Valleroy. 

fThe report from General von Manstein concerning his arrival 
at Caulre contains that information. 

—408— 



Operations Second German Army 

The support by the Illd Army Corps here directed 
could be easily arranged as that corps was in readiness at 
Vionville. 

In the meantime, about 9:00 A.M., General von Man- 
stein (commanding the IXth Army Corps) reported under 
date of 8:30 A.M., Caulre Farm, that he had arrived with 
the IXth Army Corps at Caulre and would remain assembled 
there according to orders. 

This halt had been ordered by General von Manstein 
even prior to the receipt of the last orders from army head- 
quarters, based on the general march orders issued that 
morning. 

As has been stated, the IXth Army Corps had been des- 
ignated for the support of the First Army by Prince Fred- 
erick Charles. General Headquarters received information 
thereof later on, at 10:10 A.M. 

Three, and four respectively, of the corps present of 
the Second Army still remained at the disposal of army 
headquarters. 

They were in readiness to attack the enemy in his left 
flank, should he actually attempt to march off from his pres- 
ent positions at Metz. 

The interval between 9:30 and 10:00 A.M. had now 
passed without any further report coming from the Xllth 
Army Corps, while still the cavalry points of that division, 
as was known, scouted beyond Valleroy. This contradicted 
the assumptions held up to then that portions of Bazaine's 
army would have to be sought there ; and now the situation 
commenced to clear up. 

Before we will recount the further measures taken by 
army headquarters, which from now on had for their ob- 
jective the attack against the enemy in position immediately 
west of Metz, we must picture to ourselves how the situa- 
tion was perceived in those days. 

We are much inclined to picture today as having been 
actually known, things which were in fact then unknown. 
It is far better for understanding the events and far truer 
historically, so see only that what could be seen then. 

—409— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The French army extended from le Point du Jour as far 
as the heights of Roncourt and St. Privat in a prepared po- 
sition, waiting for the attack. 

But so far only the left wing of that position had ac- 
tually been located. On August 17th a French camp of 
several divisions, that is a portion of and not the entire army 
of Bazaine, had been seen immediately east of Gravelotte. 
The results of the reconnaissances early on the morning of 
August 18th brought no more than that. They confirmed 
the report that a few French divisions stood on the heights 
of le Point du Jour. The first report from General Head- 
quarters stated that it believed the hostile right extended as 
far as Amanvillers. The patrols sent from Caulre Farm 
northeastward had, as stated, found no enemy. Thus, it 
appeared that the French position did not reach far to the 
north. 

Therefore Headquarters of the Second Army believed 
it to be the most probable that the enemy's right was at La 
Folie. 

Thus, a French battle position on the ridge from le 
Point-du-Jour as far as La Folie now formed the objective 
for the measures to be taken. 

As stated, the lid Army Corps had orders to envelop the 
French right wing with its IXth Army Corps and to have 
the Guard serve as reserve. 

It therefore appeared to the point to send these two 
corps, to turn to the right, so far north as to come opposite 
the assumed right point of the French position. They were 
to march to Verneville. From there they could attack the 
French right, should that be at La Folie, in front and flank 
with superior forces. 

Of course arrangements had to be made in the move- 
ment about to commence for reconnaissance far towards 
the north. 

Therefore Prince Frederick Charles issued the follow- 
ing orders : 

1. To the IXth Army Corps, at 10:00 A.M.: 

—410— 



Operations Second German Army 

"The corps will start and advance in the direction of 
Verneville and La Folie. If the enemy has his right wing 
there, the battle will be opened at the start by deploying con- 
siderable artillery. 

Frederick Charles." 

2. To the Guard Corps, at 10:15 A.M.: 
"The Guard Corps will continue its march via Don- 
' court to Verneville and there take position for the support 
of the IXth Corps, which is advancing on La Folie against 
the hostile right. 

"Reconnaissance left via Amanvillers and St. Privat- 
la-Montagne; early reports desirable. 

Frederick Charles." 

Copies of these orders were sent to the Xllth Army 
Corps.* The Crown Prince of Saxony had added to his re- 
port in the morning, as stated above, that he would remain 
at Jarny until further orders. The corps could be held there 
for the present at the disposition of army headquarters, as 
there was no room on the plateau of La Folie for anything 
else besides the IXth and Guard Corps. At Jarny the Xllth 
Corps was in a good position in case that it became necessary 
to send detachments from the Second Army to the north or 
northwest. 

The IXth Corps, in addition, in regard to its conduct 
in battle, was restricted at first to opening the battle with 
an artillery fight; but this restriction was to be governed 
by the situation. The IXth Corps was closest to the ene- 
my; it formed the pivot of the movement about to com- 
mence. According to the nature of things it would come on 
the enemy not only alone, but also materially earli&r than 
the Guard Corps. It had to be consequently prevented 
from becoming engaged with a hostile superiority in a fron- 
tal battle before the hostile right wing could be enveloped. 

At this moment, when the Second Army enters on this 
day a new phase of activity, it is well to follow the events 
of the different corps during the early morning hours. 

*Copies also to General Headquarters, in which Prince Fred- 
erick Charles also requested permission to bring the Hid Army Corps 
which still was at Vionville tp Caulre Farm. 

—411— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The advance of the army during the early morning 
hours that day had not been made without difficulties and 
unforeseen obstacles. 

First, the Xllth Army Corps encountered such mater- 
ial obstacles in the terrain around Mars-la-Tour for deploy- 
ment of its divisions in masses, as to be forced to defile 
through Mars-la-Tour in march columns, and it was able to 
assume the formation directed by Prince Frederick Charles 
only when north of the village.* 

Only after the corps had passed through Mars-la-Tour 
could the Guard Corps commence its march. This corps, 
because of the difficult terrain which it had to pass on the 
route laid down for it in orders in going to Doncourt, re- 
mained in march columns. The Xth Army Corps followed 
at 10:00 A.M. and conducted its march in massed divisions. 

The army did not gain ground under these conditions 
as rapidly as was the intention of the commander-in-chief. 

At that time, about 10 :00 A.M., the corps were at the 
following points: 

1. The Xllth Army Corps at Jarny.f 

2. The Guard Corps on the march to Doncourt. 

, , 3. The IXth Army Corps at Caulre Farm, outposts to 
the line Bois des Genivaux — Verneville — Bois Doseuillons. 

4. The Xth Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division 
at Mars-la-Tour — Tronville. 

5. The Hid Army Corps and the 8th Cavalry Division 
at Vionville. 

6. The lid Army Corps on the march from Pont-a- 
Mousson to Buxieres. 

From these positions commenced the turn to the right 
of the army, executed for the present by the IXth and the 
Guard Corps. 

At the same time, knowledge of the situation and in- 
tentions of the enemy made rapid progress. 



*The Corps artillery had to go around west of Mars-la-Tour. 

fTTie advance guard on the march along both banks of the Orne, 
the cavalry division was on the march from Parfondrupt to Puxe, 
having left back one regiment to scout west and towards Verdun. 

—412— 



Operations Second German Army 

Slightly wounded of the 16th Infantry Regiment had 
arrived from Doncourt sent by the Xth Army Corps ; these 
wounded had been taken prisoner by the French on Au- 
gust 16th and brought to Doncourt. They stated that on 
the morning of August 17th the French had evacuated 
Doncourt in haste, leaving them behind, and had departed 
for Metz. Shortly thereafter another report arrived from 
the army headquarters officer observing the enemy at the 
Bois des Ognons, reading: 

"Point of forest opposite Gravelotte, 10 :20 A.M. The 
camp entirely changed by now. The largest portion of 
the troops has withdrawn towards both sides without my 
being able to determine the definite march directions. Half- 
way up the slope where headquarters was, a defensive 
position has been taken. The right wing of that position 
cannot be seen because covered by woods. At this time 
much troop movement toward the north and some fire by 
outposts." 

For better explanation a sketch of the French posi- 
tion on the heights of le Point-du-Jour was appended. 

Soon followed reports from the advancing corps, the 
first coming from the Guard Corps at Doncourt, dated 
10:20 A.M.: 

"The leading elements of the Guard Corps just now 
arrived at Doncourt; the corps will take position there and 
await further orders.* Our patrols sent out in direction 
of Ste. Marie on the road to Briey, have not reported any- 
thing of the enemy." 

Almost the same time a report came from the IXth 
Army Corps which had reached that corps from the ad- 
vanced troops of the 25th Infantry Division and read : 

"Hill near Batilly, 10 :25 A.M. Hostile patrols on the 
heights Ste. Marie — Amanvillers, troops marching on main 
road, camp at St. Privat — hostile patrols advancing at the 
trot." 

Headquarters of the IXth Army Corps sent this report 
to Caulre Farm at 11 :00 A.M. 



*In the meantime, as we know, at 10:15 A.M., orders had been 
sent to the corps to continue the march on Verneville. 

—413— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Almost simultaneously with these important messages 
came another order from General Headquarters, reading: 

"According to reports received we are justified in as- 
suming that the enemy intends to make a stand on the pla- 
teau between Le Point-du-Jour and Montigny-la-Grange. 

"4 hostile battalions advanced into the Genivaux woods. 

"His Majesty holds the view that it would be well to 
start the XHth and the Guard Corps in the direction of 
Batilly so as to strike the enemy at Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes 
in case he marches on Briey, and to attack him from Aman- 
villers if he remains on the heights. 

"The attack should be made simultaneously with the 
First Army from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte, by the 
IXth Corps against the Bois des Genivaux and Verneville, 
by the left wing of the Second Army from the north. — 
10:30 A.M. 

VON MOLTKE." 

The assumptions of General Headquarters in these 
orders concerning the enemy, were in complete consonance 
with the views held by army headquarters. The patrols 
sent out by the Guard Corps towards the main road from 
Briey had not found any enemy. The XHth Corps, which 
we knew still had its main body at Jarny, would undoubt- 
edly have detected, through its cavalry, those portions of 
the French forces that had marched off on the 17th to- 
wards the northwest or west and would have reported 
that fact. 

Now all the instructions concerning the Second Army 
could be carried out, even more decisively than those issued 
at 10:00 and 10:15 A.M., against one objective — the enemy 
on the heights immediately west of Metz — with all forces 
to beat that enemy decisively. All doubts had been dis- 
persed. It now also appeared no longer necessary to keep 
forces in readiness towards other directions as had been 
done heretofore. 

The general conception we now had of the French posi- 
tion, on which the new dispositions were based, was but 
little changed from the one previously held. 

—414— 



Operations Second German Army 

Orders from General Headquarters assumed Montigny- 
la-Grange to be the right wing of the French position. The 
possibility that the enemy would even now attempt to 
march from that position to Briey had been considered. 

The IXth Army Corps had reported that a hostile camp 
was also at St. Privat. Of course, this report had not 
yet been confirmed by other reports,* and it contained no 
intimation whether the troops discovered there formed a 
body of some tactical importance or were merely a detach- 
ment. 

Because of these conditions the commander-in-chief 
decided to send now the Xllth Corps, following the right 
turn of the Second Army, as far north on the Metz — 
Woippy — Briey road as practicable. He combined here- 
with his intention to extend the envelopment of the hostile 
right wing with detachments at least to within the Mo- 
selle valley. They lay at that time the last assured con- 
nection of Bazaine's army with France. 

Complying with orders from General Headquarters, 
the Guard Corps was to march with the XHth Army Corps 
toward Batilly. But as Prince Frederick Charles had, by 
his orders of 10:15 A.M., sent the corps in the meantime 
at first against Verneville, he now directed that it should 
march from there, by making a left turn while on the march, 
without delay to Amanvillers and to then execute in a south- 
erly direction its enveloping attack against the hostile flank. 
In order to support this attack if necessary, — for which 
there was little room left on the narrow plateau of Montigny 
— ^the Xllth Army Corps was near enough, even if it was 
assigned to the Metz — Briey road towards Ste. Marie.f 
*The IXth Corps reported between 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock: 

At Caulre Farm, 10:45 A.M. 

"A French laborer, living in Saargemiind and coming from Con- 
flans states: Last Monday and Tuesday some French cavalry regi- 
ments, some infantry and artillery coming from Metz reached Con- 
flans, and marched off Wednesday in direction of Briey. 

"Our patrols report: Jouaville is not occupied, according to state- 
ments of inhabitants; masses of troops are north thereof. Have sent 
reconnoitering patrols to St. Privat-la-Montagne and Ste. Marie-aux- 
Chenes. It has been further reported that cavalry and artillery is 
northeast of Verneville." 

fThe shortest distance from Ste. Marie to Amanvillers was 5500 
paces. 

—415— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

It now appeared high time to bring the corps of the 
second Hne, the Xth, Illd and lid nearer to the corps that 
were to make the attack and to so place them that they 
would be at hand to support the advance in front, the same 
as the Xllth Corps was available to support the flank at- 
tack. 

At 11 :30 o'clock Prince Frederick Charles then issued 
the following orders : 

1. To the Xllth Royal Saxon Army Corps : 

"The Xllth Army Corps is hereby directed to march 
on Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, to secure by cavalry against 
Briey and beyond Conflans, and to send cavalry into the 
Moselle valley to interrupt the telegraph and railroad lead- 
ing to Thionville. 

"The Vllth, Vlllth, IXth and Guard Corps will within 
2 hours attack the enemy, who is in position on the heights 
of Leipzig as far as the Bois de Vaux, rear towards Metz.* 

"The Hid, Xth and Xllth, and also the lid Corps will 
follow in second line in support." 

2. To the Guard Corps: 

"The enemy appears to be in position for battle on the 
ridge from the Bois de Vaux to beyond Leipzig. The Guard 
Corps will hasten its advance via Verneville, proceed as far 
as Amanvillers and from there make a serious attack against 
the hostile right wing. 

"The IXth Corps will simultaneously attack La Folie. 

"The Guard Corps may take the road via Habonville. 
The Xllth Corps proceeds to Ste. Marie." 

3. To the IXth Army Corps: 

"The Guard Corps has now been directed to march via 
Verneville to Amanvillers and from there eventually to 
attack the hostile right wing. A serious engagement of 
the IXth Corps, in case the hostile right wing extends far- 
ther north, should be delayed until the Guard Corps attacks 
from Amanvillers. The troops will probably have sufficient 
time to cook coffee." 



*At 9:30 A.M. the chief of staff of the First Army had arrived 
at the place where Prince Frederick Charles was and had oriented 
him concerning conditions of the First Army. 

—416— 



Operations Second German Army 

In addition, at 12 noon orders were issued to the Xth 
and lid Corps: 

4. To the Xth Army Corps : 

"The enemy is in position from Leipzic to the Bois de 
Vaux. He will be attacked there today — 

by the Guard Corps from Amanvillers, 

by the IXth Corps from La Folie, 

by the Vllth and Vlllth Corps in front. 

"In second line follow in support: 

the Xlllth Corps on Ste. Marie, 
the Xth Corps on St. Ail, 
the Hid Corps on Verneville, 
the lid Corps on Rezonville." 

5. To the lid Army Corps : 

"The lid Army Corps will march from Buxieres on 
Rezonville, as reserve for the right wing. The First and 
Second Army will today attack the enemy in his positions 
this side of Metz. 

"There will be time to cook meals, special haste to 
reach Rezonville is not necessary. The Saxon cavalry covers 
toward Verdun." 

Events took a rapid course shortly after these orders 
were issued. 

The first cannon shots were fired about noon in the 
vicinity of Verneville. There the IXth Army Corps en- 
tered the battle. It had started from Caulre Farm at about 
10 :30 A.M. Its advance guard, directed by way of Verne- 
ville towards La Folie, became engaged at Chantrenne. The 
mass of its artillery* deployed northeast of Verneville 
against advancing French infantry and troops camping on 
the heights of Amanvillers and Montigny-la-Grange ; the 
farjm buildings of Champenois, occupied by the enemy, 
was in front. The commanding general pushed the left 
wing of the fighting line almost to the foremost corner of 
the Bois de la Cusse. The German shells hit the French 
camp by surprise. However, the enemy soon replied to that 



*The artillery of the 18th Infantry Division and the corps 
artillery. The artillery of the 25th (Grand Ducal Hessian) Division 
soon thereafter entered the battle. 

—417— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

fire not only from the hills of Amanvillers — Montigny-la- 
Grange, but also from the line St. Privat — Amanvillers. A 
further extension of the hostile front via Amanvillers north- 
ward could then be seen. 

The French infantry opened fire simultaneously with 
guns and machine guns at long range and rained a hail 
of projectiles on the batteries of the IXth Army Corps. This 
corps, to protect its artillery, brought up its main body 
(infantry) which thus became engaged in the battle. 

Thus, the course of events took on a far more serious 
aspect than had originally been intended. 

After the opening of the battle — about 12 :30 noon — 
Prince Frederick Charles issued orders also to the Hid 
Army Corps to start and then proceed to the vicinity of 
Verneville, where he took his position at 1 :45 on the hill west 
of the village. Events with the IXth Army Corps became 
important to Second Army headquarters. 

Even before the receipt of the orders issued by Prince 
Frederick Charles at 11 :30 A.M., the Guard and the Xllth 
Army Corps had arrived at independent decisions that were 
entirely in consonance with those orders. Prince Fred- 
erick Charles received information thereof during his ride 
to Verneville. The Guard Corps reported: 

"Doncourt, 18 August 1870; 11:30 A.M. According 
to a report from the cavalry sent ahead, from the Hill at 
Batilly, 10:50 A.M., people just coming from Ste. Marie 
bring the information that French Infantry is there, and 
that many French troops are at St. Privat-la-Montagne. 
Consequently the Guard Corps will, according to orders 
received,* start immediately for Doncourt, but the corps 
commander believes, under these conditions, it is best to 
march not to Verneville, but to Habonville. 

"Notification hereof has been sent to the Xllth Army 
Corps." 

The report from the Xllth Corps read : 



*Which means, the orders issued by army headquarters at 10:15 
A.M., for the orders of 11:30 A.M. had not yet been received by the 
Guard Corps at the time this report was sent. 

—418— 



Operations Second German Army 

"Jarny, August 18, 1870, 11:45 A.M. The enemy is 
reported to be at Moineville and Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes. 
Therefore the Xllth Corps will proceed towards both points. 
Flank guard towards Valleroy." 

In the orders of 11 :30 A.M. the Guard Corps had been 
given discretion as to marching via Habonville*— and Ste. 
Marie had been assigned to the Xllth Army Corps. There- 
fore no new orders were required from army headquarters. 

The Guard Corps sent additional reports from Don- 
court at 12:00 noon as to its further observations of the 
enemy. It transmitted a report received from one of its 
cavalry patrols reading: 

"One Saxon cavalry patrol encountered French cavalry 
— 10 troopers — at St. Ail. Just now some shots were fired 
on the road from Amanvillers to Verneville.f It appears 
that cavalry is being sent forward from St. Privat, about 
two squadrons, and about 1^ companies of infantry in 
smaller detachments against Habonville and St. Ail 

"2 companies of French infantry are marching on Ste. 
Marie. A camp is between Ste. Marie and St. Privat which 
appears now to be taken down." 

This report was dated "Hill at Batilly, 11 :30 A.M." 

Through one of his staff officers, who rode around 
the village of Verneville, the commander-in-chief learned 
that French batteries were in action immediately north of 
Amanvillers but that a further view north towards St. Pri- 
vat was cut off by the Bois de la Cusse. Only a church 
steeple could be seen of Amanvillers which was behind a 
ridge. 



*The Guard Corps had marched on Habonville only with the 1st 
Guard Infantry Division and the corps artillery. The 2d Guard In- 
fantry Division, which debouched from the first northern march direc- 
tion at Bruville, marched from there via St. Marcel and Caulre Farm 
on Verneville. During this march the commander-in-chief saw it; he 
was just then riding to Verneville and he gave it the march direction 
to Habonville. 

fSaxon cavalry patrols had encountered weak hostile detach- 
ments at Batilly, Moineville and Valleroy, which departed in haste. 
Later, at 12:30 P.M. Ste. Marie was found unoccupied and it was 
observed from that place that strong hostile forces stood on the heights 
of St. Privat. Briey was found free of the enemy at 11:00 A.M. 

—419— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

In the meantime, at about 2:00 P.M. the commander- 
in-chief had sent orders to the Guard Corps artillery to ad- 
vance at the trot* and to go into position alongside of, but 
not in direct prolongation of, the artillery line of the IXth 
Army Corps. 

At 2 :05 P.M. the Xth Army Corps reported that it had 
arrived at Jouaville, and in reply thereto it received direc- 
tions to march on St. Privat, its artillery in front. 

Thus, sufficient forces could be deployed against the 
French wing extending to beyond Amanvillers. 

Three corps of the Second Army — the Guard, Xth and 
Xllth, were available therefor and were on the advance, 
while the entire Hid Army Corps was still available as re- 
serve for the IXth Corps — ^where the battle had increased 
in intensity by now. 

Shortly after 2 :00 P.M. Prince Frederick Charles pro- 
ceeded via Anoux-la-Grange to the vicinity west of Habon- 
ville, to be closer to the important, and not yet solved, ques- 
tion in regard to the location of the French right wing. 
From the hill at Habonville the strong French positions 
at St. Privat could be seen. The picture of the French 
battle position changed materially. 

At his second location Prince Frederick Charles re- 
ceived new orders from General Headquarters. These 
orders, dated on the hill south of Flavigny, 1 :45 P.M. con- 
tained the following directions: 

"The IXth Army Corps is already engaged in an artil- 
lery fight in front of the Bois Doseuillons. The actual gen- 
eral attack along the entire line will not be started until 
material fighting forces can advance from Amanvillers." 

It was clear that at that moment events at the IXth 
Army Corps had developed so far that that corps could 
no longer be instructed to maintain a waiting attitude. In 
that corps only, contact with the enemy could regulate 
the conduct of the troops. 



^The same orders were sent to that artillery by the Guard Corps. 



—420— 



Operations Second German Army 

On the other hand, the Guard Corps, which reached 
the vicinity of Habonville at 1:00 P.M.,* was completely 
free and not bound by any engagement. It now received 
orders: — "to conduct the fight only by artillery and to in- 
sert the infantry only when the Xllth Corps could par- 
ticipate in the action effectively." 

Now, when it was seen that the French position ex- 
tended to beyond St. Privatf and when its extraordinary 
strength was also noted, it appeared important that the 
attack of the Guard and the Xllth Corps, as well also as 
that of the Xth Army Corps if necessary, be made simul- 
taneously; there was room here therefor and large masses 
could be employed. 

Of course with the greater frontal extension of the ene- 
my, the instructions to the different corps changed. 

The Guard Corps, heretofore designated to envelop 
the hostile right wing, had nov\^ to prolong the German 
front opposite the French. Only the Xllth Corps remained 
for the enveloping movement. By inserting the Xth Corps 
between these two corps the movement of course could be 
made easier and supported. 

A meeting between Prince Frederick Charles and the 
commanding general of the Guard Corps gave an oppor- 
tunity to make the latter acquainted with the intentions 
of General Headquarters and those of army headquarters. 

Before we narrate the further course of events, it ap- 
pears well to briefly repeat in what situation the different 
corps found themselves between 2 and 3 o'clock. 

1. The IXth Army Corps was engaged in battle against 
the hostile center at Amanvillers — La Folie.J 

2. The Guard Corps assembled at St. Ail and Habon- 
ville (the 2d Guard Infantry Division there rejoined the 
corps by 2:45 P.M.). 



*The advance guard had arrived there between 12 and 1 o'clock. 

fAs is now known, that position extended even farther, to Don- 
court, but that fact could not be perceived from Habonville. 

Jin the front of the artillery line of that corps the enemy held 
out until about 3:00 P.M. at the Champenois Farm. That place was 
stormed at 3:00 P.M. 

—421— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

The mass of the artillery of that corps was in action 
southwest of St. Ail, its left wing at that village, and firing 
at effective range on the hostile positions at St. Privat, 
The hostile fighting line, clearly marked by powder smoke, 
had prolonged itself up to this point. 

St. Ail was held by the corps, and the advance guard 
of the 1st Guard Infantry Division turned against Ste. 
Marie-aux-Chenes to which point the enemy had pushed 
portions of his right wing at about 12 :00 noon. 

3. The Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps was on the 
march against the line Ste. Marie — Moineville. Its columns 
could be seen north of Batilly. 

4. The Illd Army Corps had arrived at Verneville. 

5. The Xth Army Corps commenced to arrive at Batilly 
at 2 : 00 P.M. and for the present halted there. 

6. Since the same hour the lid Corps was marching 
with the 3d Infantry Division and the corps artillery from 
Buxieres, with the 4th Infantry Division from Onville* 
towards Rezonville. 

Now, in the start, a fight ensued around the village of 
Ste. Marie, which the enemy, as just stated, held in his 
front. There the left wing of the Guard Corps was seen 
engaged; this could plainly be seen from the location of 
the commander-in-chief. In addition, Saxon batteries were 
seen firing on Ste. Marie from the edge of the ravine run- 
ning from Habonville down to Auboue.f 

Both corps reported the measures they were about 
to take. The Guard Corps reported: — "In rear of St. Ail, 
18 August 1870, 2:00 P.M.— The infantry of the advance 
guard of the Guard Corps is engaged in and around St. 



*The division had halted at Onville, as at Buxieres, as orders 
from Second Army Headquarters directed it, but there was no water 
for cooking. But the 4th Infantry Division was not able to cook at 
all, as it soon had to resume the march. 

fSince 2:30 P.M. the Saxon artillery had prepared the attack 
on Ste. Marie. West of the ravine stood nine, east thereof 4 bat- 
teries with the right wing on the St. Ail — Ste. Marie road. At 
Headquarters of the Second Army doubt reigned for a long time con- 
cerning the fire of those batteries and whether or not it would not 
endanger the Guard Corps, which appeared to have already entered 
the village. Officers sent out cleared up the situation. 

—422— 



Operations Second German Army 

Ail towards Ste. Marie, which is strongly held by French 
infantry. The corps artillery on the right is firing on St. 
Privat. The main body of the 1st Guard Division also 
advances on St. Ail. The 2d Guard Division, now arrived 
at Habonville, will advance. The Xllth Corps is approach- 
ing Ste. Marie, but is not yet close to it."* 
The report from the Xllth Corps read: 
"Batilly, 18 August 1870, 2:30 P.M.— The Saxon Army 
Corps is advancing with the 24th Infantry Division on Ste. 
Marie-aux-Chenes, and with the 23d Infantry Division en- 
velops the French right wing at Joinville and the woods sit- 
uated between there and Roncourt. 

Albert." 

The Crown Prince of Saxony, arrived at Batilly, had 
observed the extension of the hostile position north of St. 
Privat to Roncourt, and had also observed its strength in 
front, and he had consequently taken his measures indepen- 
dently. From the location of the commander-in-chief at 
Habonville only the French lines as far as St. Privat could 
be seen. There, as stated, it was believed the French right 
wing would be found. The measures taken by the Crown 
Prince of Saxony were the first intimation army head- 
quarters had that that wing extended farther to the north. 

The report from the Xllth Corps reached army head- 
quarters about 8:30 P.M. 

In the meantime the fight around Ste. Marie had taken 
a rapid course ; the village was soon taken by troops of both 
the corps engaged. f 

Army headquarters received the following short re- 
port thereof: 

"Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes has been taken, 3:30 P.M. 
Losses immaterial. 18-8-70. 

VON Pape.J 



*This had happened however by the time the report w^as re- 
ceived. 

t48th Infantry Brigade and advance guard of the Guard Corps. 

Jvon Pape was commander of the 1st Guard Infantry Division. 

—423— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

As soon as this report reached Army Headquarters, 
Prince Frederick Charles wrote to the Crpwn Prince of 
Saxony : 

"18 August, 3:45 P.M., at Habonville. I call the at- 
tention of Your Royal Highness to the fact that the only 
connection of the French field army with Paris lies in 
the Moselle valley on the left bank. 

"It is therefore of the utmost importance for the de- 
cision of the campaign that you send cavalry as soon as 
possible to thoroughly destroy the telegraph line and rail- 
road from Metz to Thionville and, if possible, occupy the 
Moselle valley. 

Frederick Charles." 

"P.S. Everything goes well so far, thanks to the Lord." 
The capture of Ste. Marie was a single phase, preced- 
ing the decision on the hostile right wing.* For the pres- 
ent the artillery continued the battle there. The Saxon 
batteries appeared in a second position north of Ste. Marie- 
aux-Chenes and reopened fire there. f 

The long artillery line of the Guard Corps, by that 
time reinforced to 72 pieces, J advanced at 4:00 P.M. from 
its position at Habonville — St. Ail towards St. Privat-la- 
Montagne. In a heavy cannonade the hostile batteries suc- 
cumbed after a short time. The French artillery was not 
able to hold its position either opposite the Guard or the 
IXth Corps. Between 4 :00 and 5 :00 P.M. the hostile artil- 
lery was silent along the entire line from St. Privat to Mon- 
tigny-la-Grange.§ 



*At 11:30 A.M. Ste. Marie had been found unoccupied by a staff 
officer from Xllth Army Corps headquarters. Shortly thereafter the 
6th French Corps sent the 94th Regiment of the line to that point. 

t66 guns went into position there, 6 others also participated in 
the action there temporarily. 

JFive batteries of the corps artillery, 4 of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division, 3 of the 2d Guard Infantry Division. 2 of the Guard 
Cavalry Division arrived later, so that then 84 pieces were in action. 

§As has been stated, the extreme right of the French artillery 
line that was then still in action at Roncourt could not be seen from 
the position of Second Army Headquarters. 



-42^ 



Operations Second German Army 

The decisive hours of the battle appeared to have 
arrived and a general attack seemed to be well prepared. 

Corresponding to the intentions of His Majesty the 
King, the commanding general of the Guard Corps, Prince 
August of Wiirttemberg, had halted with a further in- 
fantry attack after having taken Ste. Marie. The envelop- 
ment of the hostile right wing by the Xllth Army Corps 
was to first become eifective. Now, however, he changed his 
estimate of the situation very decidedly. 

The Xllth Army Corps had not only learned through 
its reconnaissance that the extension of the hostile position 
reached to north of Roncourt, but it had even been re- 
ported* that Montois-la-Montagne was also occupied by 
the French. Consequently the Crown Prince of Saxony 
reinforced the 23d Infantry Division which enveloped the 
French right wing with an infantry brigade and the avail- 
able cavalry. t If that envelopment was to be made as un- 
observed by the enemy as possible and with assured ex- 
pectation of success, it had to be made under protection of 
the steep ridge west of Montois, in the Orne valley, passing 
Joeuf . By this route, H.R.H. Prince George of Saxony pro- 
ceeded with the 23d Infantry Division, and the above men- 
tioned reenforcements. 

Thus, it of course took a longer time than had been 
assumed before the envelopment could become effective. 
About at 5:00 P.M., that is, after the fire of the hostile 
batteries between St. Privat and Amanvillers had already 
been silenced, the enveloping columns of the Xllth Army 
Corps found themselves with their leading elements in line 
with Hautmecourt.J 



*By cavalry patrols of the Guard Corps. 

fThe 48th Infantry Brigade and the 2d Cavalry Regiment of the 
24th Infantry Division, Guard and 3d Cavalry Regiment with the 
1st Horse Battery of the 12th Cavalry Division. The commander of 
the 23d Infantry Division (Prince George of Saxony) assigned that 
road to the reinforcements sent him. 

$The different units of the Xllth Army Corps were at 5:30 P.M. 
at the following points: 

1. The 47th Infantry Brigade, which formed the pivot of the 
movement, at Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes. After the capture of that 
place this brigade had pushed to beyond the place but had then to 
be taken back. 

—425— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Three hours could yet be counted on for the action until 
darkness set in. It therefore became questionable if it 
would still be possible to carry out the intended combined 
attack. Any attack commencing too late might eas- 
ily be without success. The approach of darkness would 
undoubtedly increase the defender's energy, and it precluded 
any pursuit. The silence of the hostile batteries appeared 
to indicate a most favorable opportunity for the attack; in 
an hour and a half to two hours the situation could easily be 
an entirely different one. The condition of the battle on 
the other portions of the battlefield made it very desirable 
to commence the attack against the hostile right wing. 
Troops could be seen moving on the heights of St. Privat. 
It appeared as if new masses were marching to the vicinity 
of Amanvillers — Montigny-la-Grange. And still the com- 
mander-in-chief had to send the 3d Guard Infantry Bri- 
gade* to the support of the IXth Army Corps, which bri- 
gade he had held at his disposal for special purposes. And 
the corps artillery of the Illd Corps was already supporting 
the battle there, by orders of the Prince. It had gone into 
position between Vemeville and the Bois des Genivaux. But 
in spite of all this the situation was precarious. 

But there was no doubt whatever that the interference 
of the Xllth Army Corps would become effective in the 
course of the attack against St. Privat, even if not at the 
opening of that attack. Therefore in executing an attack 
now all ready on St. Privat, participation of the Xllth Corps 
was assuredly reckoned with. 

2. The 45th Infantry Brigade was in the woods west of Roncourt, 
engaged against the French advance troops of the right wing, and 
also in rear of those woods. 

3. The 48th Infantry Brigade and the available cavalry (13 
squadrons) and four batteries on the march to Montois, at that time 
their leading elements were south of Hautmecourt. 

4. The 46th Infantry Brigade with one battery marching from 
Moineville to Coinville. 

5. The corps artillery, reinforced by the 2d Foot battalion (11 
batteries) under protection of one squadron north of Ste. Marie in 
action against Roncourt. 

6. 1 battalion, 10 squadrons detached on different duties. 
*1 battalions, 1 pioneer company, 1 battery. 



-426— 



Operations Second German Army 

The commanding general of the Guard Corps decided 
to attack St, Privat, and Prince Frederick Charles gave his 
consent. 

At that time the Prince could not see what forced the 
Xllth Army Corps to make such an extended turn. The Sax- 
on batteries Vv^ere in their positions north of Ste. Marie- 
aux-Chenes, without army headquarters being able to dis- 
cern the target they fired on.* It almost appeared as 
if the corps had become engaged with a new enemy ap- 
pearing on its left flank, who prevented it from getting to 
the enemy's right flank. 

However, His Royal Highness held the opinion that the 
battle would have to be decided in any case on August 18. 
It appeared impossible, after such enormous sacrifices, 
as had been bought, to delay the decision till the fol- 
lowing day. If we left the enemy in his positions this 
evening, he would have had it in his power to get to under- 
neath the guns of Metz by a very short march during the 
night. In that fortress was an army that was almost in- 
tact and that could greatly increase the difficulties of the 
German leadership. 

Regard of our own troops came also into the fore- 
ground. The series of bloody battles commenced on Au- 
gust 14th, simply had to come to an end. 

About 5:30 P.M. the Guard Corps started the attack 
on St. Privat-la-Montagne with the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division across the Ste. Marie — St. Privat road, with .the 
4th Guard Infantry Brigadef from the vicinity of Habon- 
ville. The village, situated on a bare hill and composed 
of large buildings, formed the attack objective for the ad- 
vancing masses. 



*These were the 66 Saxon guns which fired on Roncourt and 
from their right wing also on St. Privat. 

As a matter of fact the Saxon artillery (11 batteries) ad- 
vanced at that time by echelons toward Roncourt, a movement which, 
under continuous fire, could not be seen from Habonville. 5 bat- 
teries of the Xllth Army Corps participated in the envelopment. 

fThe 4th Guard Infantry Brigade started about fifteen min- 
utes earlier than the 1st Guard Infantry Division. 



—427— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Under a murderous fire the battalions ascended the 
gradual slope up the height, which fell like a glacis down 
toward the line Ste. Marie — St. Ail and Habonville. Only 
here and there a few depressions in the terrain offered some 
minor protection. 

The closer the position was approached the plainer its 
great strength was seen. In regard to utilizing the fire 
effect, the enemy was in a situation that could not have 
been more favorable in any campaign. He had arranged 
his position in haste and with the usual adeptness that he 
had showed throughout the last campaign. The walls were 
loop-holed and the ridge covered with trenches. And the 
defending troops were found to be far less shaken than 
had been assumed. The preparatory fire of the Guard bat- 
teries had taken the French batteries for their objective 
and that artillery duel had taken the entire attention of 
our batteries. The village of St. Privat itself and its de- 
fenders had suffered but little from that artillery fire. The 
garrison was still in its positions with fresh forces. 

The losses of the bravely attacking Guards soon be- 
came enormous. The roads the attackers took were marked 
by numerous dead and wounded. 

The attack became bloodier and more dangerous, until 
it finally came to a halt. But with the excellent discipline 
inherent in these troops, it became possible to hold them 
opposite the enemy. 

Thus the way was shortened for the next shock. 

During this bloody fighting the Xllth Army Corps con- 
tinued its route. After very heavy marching its left 
(the 48th Infantry Brigade) acended the ridge at Mon- 
tois-la-Montagne at about 6:00 P.M. This village was 
found to be free of the enemy.* Now started the envelop- 
ing attack on Roncourt. 

During the course of the envelopment the 4oth In- 
fantry Brigade, in the front line, had driven hostile ad- 



*One battalion of the 23d Infantry Division posted at the north- 
east corner of the woods between Auboue and Montois had conducted 
a firefight at long range with French troops in Montagne between 
5:00 and 6:00 P.M. 

__428— 



Operations Second German Army 

vanced troops from the woods between Auboue and Ron- 
court and awaited the appearance of the 48th Infantry 
Brigade at Montois. It now also marched out into the 
open and pushed back in a continuous advance the hostile 
skirmish lines that were in front of Roncourt. In the vil- 
lage itself, where the leading elements of both brigades 
met, no fighting ensued.* The fire of the artillery ad- 
vancing simultaneously with the infantry had already had 
such an effect on the enemy's troops as to cause them to 
leave the village. Shortly before 6:30 P.M. the village 
was occupied by the Xllth Corps which now deployed strong 
forces from the north against St. Privat.f The moment 
for the decision had arrived. 

Prince Frederick Charles had issued instructions to 
the Xth Army Corps, whose commanding general had ar- 
rived at Habonville between 4:45 and 5:00 P.M. to receive 
verbal orders, to support the advance of the Guard Corps. 

The Xth Army Corps now started from Batilly towards 
St. Ail and first sent the horse batteries of its corps artil- 
lery to the first support of the Guard Corps. The com- 
bined attack of portions of all three corps of the German 
left wing on St. Privat was now carried out, materially pre- 
pared by the earlier advance of the Guard Corps.$ 

The artillery of the Guard Corps, that had, as narrated, 
been entirely employed up to the first charge in fight- 
ing the hostile batteries, now directed its full activity 
against St. Privat. 

From the place where the commander-in-chief was 
it could be plainly seen that the 4th Guard Infantry Bri- 



*The 45th and 48th Infantry Brigades and the entire artillery 
approached the village to within 1200 paces. 

fEven before reaching the ridge of Roncourt, single infantry 
regiments had executed the turn to the right and as Roncourt was 
being attacked, advanced at the same time, independently against St. 
Privat. 

t'The attack of the Guard had simultaneously the effect on the 
attack of the Xllth Army Corps in that it induced the French 6th 
Corps, Canrobert, in position on the French right, to concentrate 
its forces at St. Privat for defense, and to thereby weaken its troops 
at Roncourt and thus it materially facilitated the attack of the 
Xllth Corps in its decisive charge against the enemy's flank. 

—429— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

gade had started another attack. On the ridge south of the 
village runs a road fringed on one side with a high hedge. 
Viewed from Habonville, and judging the terrain from 
the map, this hedge gives the impression as if we had the 
edge of the woods of the high left edge of the Moselle val- 
ley in our front. There the charging battalions now dis- 
appeared, while it was at the same time seen that the right 
wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Division also commenced 
to ascend the hill immediately at the village. Then a dense 
powder smoke hid the battle scene. But the fire of a strong 
artillery line between Roncourt and St. Privat shortly there- 
after indicated the arrival and interference of the Xllth 
Army Corps. 

The victory appeared to have been gained there. Prince 
Frederick Charles now again considered the extension of 
the envelopment of the hostile right wing as far as the Mo- 
selle valley. 

At 6:40 P.M. he wrote to the Crown Prince of Sax- 
ony from the Bois de la Cusse : 

"In spite of the separate charges of the hostile in- 
fantry* it appears the battle has been gained. It is of 
the utmost importance, in spite of the great fatigue of the 
troops, to still advance today with at least one infantry 
brigade of the Xllth Corps to Woippy and there thoroughly 
interrupt the telegraph and railroad line. 

Frederick Charles." 

If the occupation of Woippy could have been accom- 
plished it would have been of the greatest importance, as 
this would have greatly endangered the retreat of the 
French troops fighting on the heights of Amanvillers. The 
charge against and capture of one of the hills crowned by 
a hedge south of St. Privat had been an act preceding 
the capture of the village. 

The Crown Prince of Saxony reported to the comman- 
der-in-chief : 



*These charges took place especially at the Bois de la Cusse 
opposite the IXth Army Corps. 

—430— 



Operations Second German Army 

"Sent the 18th, 7:10 P.M. The cavalry already has 
received orders to 'interrupt the railroad at Hagondange and 
Richemont. In addition, cavalry and pioneers on wagons 
have been sent for that same purpose via Briey.* 

"As St. Privat has not yet been taken and as conse- 
quently the road is not yet clear, the brigade will be sent 
by way of Roncourt and Marange to Mezieres. 

Albert. 
Crown Prince, General of Infantry.''-^ 

In the meantime it had become dark and with darkness 
the moment for using the last reserves for the decision. 

Already toward 7:00 P.M. Prince Frederick Charles 
had offered one infantry brigade of the Hid Army Corps 
to General von Manstein as support. At 7:10 P.M. he per- 
mitted the commanding general of that corps, on his re- 
peated requests, to participate with the other three of his 
brigades in the battle on the right of the Bois de la Cusse. 

At 7:15 P.M. he sent orders to the commanding gen- 
eral of the Xth Army Corps to advance according to his 
own views, the Prince adding that he considered it best if 
one division went into action between the Guard and the 
Xllth Corps, the other proceeding as reserve to in rear of 
the left of the IXth Army Corps. 

The Xth Army Corps had in the meantime gotten 
ahead of these orders by participating in the fight around 
St. Privat. 



*At about 4:00 P.M. two squadrons of the 12th Cavalry Division 
started from Auboue, following the Orne valley, towards Richemont 
and the R.R. station at Uckange, about four miles south of Thionville, 
and there late in the evening destroyed the Metz — Thionville railroad 
without having seen anything of the enemy during the march. Many 
obstacles (felled trees) delayed the march and made the advance 
difficult; the troops having to dismount and walk in single file. The 
pioneer detachment sent between 4:00 and 5:00 P.M. to Mercy-le-Bas 
reached the Thionville — Longuyon railroad there at 2:30 in the morn- 
ing after a march of more than 17 miles. Destruction was has- 
tened as signals indicated the near approach of a military train. All 
villages passed on the march were free of the enemy. Details con- 
cerning these expeditions became known to army headquarters of 
course only on the next day. See farther below. 

fAs a matter of fact the Xllth Corps could not start that brigade 
till early in the morning of August 19th. 

—431— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

In addition, at 6:30 P.M., the lid Army Corps had re- 
ported that its 3d Infantry Division had been ready for par- 
ticipation since 4:00 P.M. and its 4th Division since 6:00 
P.M., and Prince Frederick Charles had directed the corps 
commander to report for orders direct to General Headquar- 
ters. Now, at 7 :20 P.M. the army commander left it to the 
discretion of the corps commander as to also participating 
in the attack according to his views, reporting the fact to 
General Headquarters. 

By this time events had started also in the lid Army 
Corps. 

By this time the army commander had turned his at- 
tention to the IXth Corps engaged in the center, where the 
battle raged variably, and had proceeded to the Bois de la 
Cusse. And at about the same time the last report from the 
Crown Prince of Saxony was dated, he returned to his prior 
standpoint at Habonville. The powder smoke still hid the 
hill of St. Privat. But the decisive victory was soon marked 
by the right turn of the long artillery line of the Guard 
Corps and of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, 
alongside which Saxon batteries then appeared between 
St. Privat and the woods. The flash of some shots gave 
a clear indication of the firing line which now ran almost 
at a right angle to the previous line of batteries. The fire 
was directed against the flank of the French center at Aman- 
villers. 

The French right wing had not been able to with- 
stand this concentric attack. After a bloody battle the 
Guard and the Xllth Corps entered St. Privat from the 
west, north and south sides. In addition to the corps artil- 
lery of the Xth Corps also the 20th Infantry Division of 
that corps had followed the Guard Corps in support and por- 
tions of that division participated in the fighting in the 
village. Between 7:30 and 8:00 P.M. the last resistance 
in the houses and yards was overcome. The columns of the 
enemy fled towards Metz pursued by the fire of the Ger- 



—432— 



Operations Second German Army 

man batteries.* The left of the Xllth Army Corpsf 
had in the meantime succeeded in taking the edge of the 
woods and also the quarry of Jaumont and pursued the 
enemy to Bronvaux. But the enemy held the edge of the 
forest square across the St. Privat — Saulny road with 
strong forces. French batteries fired from here long after 
dark. 

When Prince Frederick Charles was firmly convinced 
from the movements of the artillery that the envelopment 
and destruction of the hostile right wing was an accom- 
plished fact, he returned to the IXth Army Corps once 
more. 

If success could now be attained by overthrowing the 
center of the enemy at Amanvillers, the results of the day 
would be enormous in spite of the approaching darkness. 

The start of the Guard Corps against St. Privat had 
been the signal for the IXth Corps to start its offensive. At 
that time, as has been stated, the French artillery was al- 
most completely silenced, even opposite the IXth Army 
Corps. The corps commander reported this fact to the army 
commander and also reported that the battle was going well 
and that ground was being gained.$ In conjunction with the 
3d Guard Infantry Brigade attached to General von Man- 
stein's corps, the corps now started to charge the heights 
of Amanvillers. But the enemy offered a stubborn resis- 
tance there and even carried on counter-attacks. At the 
same time when Prince Frederick Charles returned for the 
second time to the battlefield of the IXth Corps, the rifle 
fire was very heavy. Only when it was completely dark 
were the folds in the terrain west of Amanvillers taken by 
a bloody charge. On the other hand, at the Bois de Geni- 
vaux the right wing of the IXth Corps did not succeed in 
completely defeating the enemy. There the fight raged at 



*The batteries of the 19th Infantry Division also found oppor- 
tunity here to participate in the fight. 

fBattalions of the 48th Infantry Brigade. 

{Delivered by a staff officer of army headquarters who just 
then was at IXth Corps headquarters. 



-433- 



Campaign of 1870-71 

a broad clearing in front of Chantrenne. Here also the 
enemy executed counter-attacks, but each one of them was 
defeated. 

As stated, the fight of the IXth Army Corps had been 
supported by the artillery of the Hid Army Corps.* 

After he had received permission to insert the infantry 
of his corps in support, General von Alvensleben was about 
to bring forward the rest of his corps, to bring the offen- 
sive to a decision with as strong forces as possible. But 
reports reaching him from his right flank caused him to 
change his mind. Farther to the right, in front of the 
First Army, the battle had increased in intensity. The 
reports received from there by the Hid Corps, showed that 
the enemy was making counter-attacks on his left wing, 
for instance at Moscou — Le Point du Jour, where he di- 
rected his attack also against the Bois des Genivaux. 
Therefore General von Alvensleben stopped the movement 
his corps was then starting in order to save his forces for 
the defense against that attack, if necessary. Before the 
situation cleared up, the short time remaining before dark- 
ness passed, and the battle ended also in the center. 

On the right wing of the German battle front, where 
the First Army fought since noon against the French 
positions at Le Point du Jour, Moscou and Leipzic, the lid 
Corps had now also entered the battle. 

As it had reported, this corps reached Rezonville in 
the afternoon after a march of twenty miles and had there 
received orders direct from General Headquarters to push 
forward as far as Gravelotte and there support the First 
Army. At the start a portion of its artillery became en- 
gaged there; at the fall of dusk the corps started its in- 
fantry attack against the heights of Point du Jour, after 
having received permission from General Headquarters. 
Thus, the action of this corps falls within the domain of 
events of the First Army. 



*The corps artillery of the Hid Corps, first brought forward, had 
been increased in the course of the battle to ten batteries. 



-434- 



AMONTAGNE. 
rigade at 700P.M. 




BATTLE AT GRAVELOTTE- ST PWVAT LAMONTAGNE 

on Au3ust 18,1870. 
Situation of the IX Corps ond the 3^*^ Guard Infantry Brigade at 7- 00 P.M. 



LEGEND: 

^ 3rd Cuard Inrantry Brigade 

^ ;X Corps 
Cb /// Corps 
j_; Front. French Line 




Operations Second German Army 

The participation of the lid Army Corps had given 
the battle there increased intensity in the last moments, 
which was perceived by the Hid Army Corps, and which 
increased in that corps the expectation of a hostile offen- 
sive and consequently led to the change of decision arrived 
at. 

The battle died down in the Second Army by 8 : 30 P.M., 
only a few shots were fired here and there. Dense dark- 
ness, pierced only by the glare of burning villages, reigned 
over the battlefield. 

Prince Frederick Charles now issued the following 
orders : 

"On the battlefield, 8 :30 P.M., 18 August 1870. 

"The army corps will bivouac on the terrain they were 
at at the conclusion of the battle ; they will send out infantry 
outposts which will connect with neighboring corps, and 
must expect that a desperate enemy may attempt to break 
through. 

"Tomorrow morning at 5 o'clock, the chiefs of staff of 
all five corps will be in Caulre on the road to report to the 
commander-in-chief where their corps are and to receive 
further orders. 

"The attention of the Xllth Corps is again called to the 
importance of reaching Woippy. 

"Army headquarters goes to Doncourt for the night. 

Frederick Charles." 

After having issued these orders, Prince Frederick 
Charles and his staff rode to Doncourt. 

The losses of the Second Army in the battle of Au- 
gust 18th amounted to 818 oflficers and 19,759 men killed, 
wounded and missing (1 officer, 939 men). Only a small 
portion of the latter had been taken prisoners. Of this 
loss the Second Army had 617 officers and 15,711 men — 
the lid Army Corps included, whose losses on the battle- 
field of the First Army were 45 oflficers and 1311 men. The 
Guard lost about one-half of the total, 288 oflficers and 7831 
men. 2 guns of the IXth Army Corps had fallen into the 

—435— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

hands of the enemy when the artillery made its advance 
on the Bois de la Cusse. 

But a great success had been attained with these sac- 
rifices, which could be judged as early as the evening of 
August 18th from the unfavorable strategical situation in 
which the hostile army found itself when it was beaten. 
Concerning the estimate of the importance which this vic- 
tory possessed, we shall discuss this matter later. 



The Situation as to Supplies and Communications 
IN Rear of the Second Army at the Be- 
ginning OF THE Investment of Metz 

More and more did considerations of sanitary con- 
ditions and the material well-being of the investing troops 
come into the foreground. Care had to be taken that the 
favorable tactical situation would not be endangered by any 
epidemic. That chances thereof were good, has already 
been mentioned. In the orders issued on the 2d, the com- 
mander-in-chief touched on this matter in his special orders. 
It was directed first of all that all corps within their dis- 
tricts, employ all men off duty to throw earth on the very 
numerous graves. This matter appeared to be specially 
important as since the 21st a change in the weather 
had set in, which became worse and worse by continuous 
rain, which washed away the earth covering the corpses. 
The use of disinfectants, especially within the villages, was 
directed and arrangements made for a sufficient supply. 
The autumn was very cold and steps had to be taken to 
protect the troops from the influence of the cold weather 
by suitable rations and clothing. Generous subsistence 
supplies are always the best means against the spread of 
typhus and similar diseases ; but it is clear that at this time, 
immediately after the battles, the supplies from home could 
be brought up only in small quantities. A single railroad 
line was at the disposition of the army, all roads were 
completely filled with transports of wounded, all available 
vehicles had to be used for that purpose. The supplies in 

—436— 



Operations Second German Army 

the columns did not reach far; the system of requisition 
had to help out and the investment measures had started to 
regulate this matter. Definite districts were assigned the 
different corps. However, the results attained soon proved 
very unfavorable, as can easily be imagined, if we consider 
that since August 14th probably more than 400,000 men of 
both armies had operated in the vicinity of Metz. In addi- 
tion the lack of drinking water was sorely felt, especially 
on the plateau on the left bank of the Moselle. Orders had 
been placed for 300 Abissynian pumps, but the arrival of 
these could not be counted on with certainty.* The troops 
still saw themselves forced to bring their drinking water 
from far off. That the quality of the water suffered ma- 
terially thereby is self-evident and extensive police regula- 
tions had to resorted to to avoid blockades and collisions. 
Just as important as subsistence became the matter 
of arrangements for shelter. The tents captured from the 
French came in very handy in many cases, but still that 
was only an exception. Huts constructed from branches 
and straw were insufficient during the raw weather and 
there was no construction material to build regular bar- 
racks; there was an especial lack of roofing material. The 
small supplies of cut boards found in the village were soon 
used up.f Thus many difficulties were encountered here 
though the troops tried to make makeshifts out of sod and 
stones bound with slats. The nature of the ground was very 
unfavorable. The rocky sub-soil in the vicinity of Metz did 
not permit water to seep through and the water remained 
in the upper layer of earth. The crust then, during the 
continuous rains, soon turned into morass in the camps 
which, after good weather set in again, held the dampness 

*September 23d the army had 170 Abissynian punxps; dis- 
tributed as follows: 

lid Army Corps : 45 

Illd Army Corps 42 

Xth Army Corps 8 

IXth Army Corps 75 

fLater on army headquarters attempted to help out in this mat- 
ter by requisitioning on the Lorraine Government. 



—437- 



Campaign of 1870-71 

for a considerable time. As far as room was found in the 
villages, the troops were of course sheltered there. Vil- 
lages and farm buildings, however, were still crowded with 
wounded. Shelter was consequently very scant there. 

The evacuation of the provisional field hospitals in the 
district of the battlefields had been energetically started 
immediately. For this purpose also separate districts were 
designated under special authorities and each district re- 
ceived its own route of evacuation. Special places of as- 
sembly were assigned the wagon parks for transportation 
to the evacuation points, Pont-a-Mousson and Remilly, at 
which places they were instructed to hold a certain number 
of vehicles. Considering the difficulties of connection, especi- 
ally down into the Moselle valley and from down there up, 
considering the shortage and insufficiency of the wagon 
material assembled in all haste at the opening of the cam- 
paign, and considering the extraordinarily large number of 
wounded, all these measures could become eifective only 
after a longer lapse of time. 

The influence of the passivity, to which the troops 
were relegated in a certain way, was also far from favor- 
able. Employing the men by labor and fatigue became a 
material requirement for maintaining health. Shifting of 
investing troops from large distances, on the other hand, 
had to be avoided. Due regard to the economic measures 
demanded that troops be left as long as possible within a 
district once assigned them. If we interfered with their 
arrangements once commenced, it could be foreseen that 
these arrangements would never be completed. In the re- 
lief of one unit by another, difference in strengths certainly 
required new detailed dispositions. Frequent changes also 
always weakens the men's interest in the proper arrange- 
ment of shelter in the different localities. 

After the very material losses sustained in the battles 
around Metz, the bringing up and replenishment of supplies 
became of the utmost importance. The difficuties of com- 
munication with home, as existing at that time, were of 
great disadvantage. 

—438— 



Operations Second German Army 

Information had been received from General Head- 
quarters that steps were being taken on a large scale to re- 
plenish the loss in officers. 

Army headquarters independently took the necessary 
steps without delay to arrange for the replenishment of 
animals from home. In order to also make use in future 
of the temporarily disabled animals, a depot was constructed 
in Pont-a-Mousson and one in Blenod, in which horses 
could be delivered for rest and cure and recuperation from 
the entire army. 

To properly estimate all these conditions it appears 
•well to show what shape the communications to the rear 
of the army had taken since August 15th and in what con- 
ditions these were at the commencement of the investment 
of Metz. Though we can consider here only the condi- 
tions of the Second Army from the time of August 15th 
to 19th, during which time the First and Second armies 
were separated, it must nevertheless be assumed that those 
conditions were just about the same in the First Army. 
The armies had the same difficulties and had to overcome 
the same difficulties. 

Much of course had been gained by opening the Saar- 
briicken — Remilly railroad. But, as the Rhine — Nahe rail- 
road connecting in rear is a single-track road (from Bin- 
gerbriick to Neunkirchen), the army profited on the whole 
only from a single track road, which, besides complicating 
conditions, possessed but small capacity. The difficulties 
of connection between the army and that railroad line are 
easily seen, when considering that each and every road was 
covered with the marching columns of the army. And now, 
in addition, commenced the transportation of the wounded, 
which completely took up all available means. As early 
as August 15th, foreseeing such conditions, it had been di- 
rected that all requisitioned vehicles that became available 
on the arrival of the wagon parks and trains at the 
troops, were to be sent under guard to Remilly. There 
they were to be placed at the disposal of the Lines of Com- 
munications authorities, to augment their means of trans- 

—439— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

portation. However, it is self evident that under condi- 
tions existing in those days even among the troops, this 
measure could become effective only gradually. To this 
came, that the construction of the connecting line from 
Remilly to Pont-a-Mousson, commenced simultaneously 
(on August 14th) and which was to be carried on energeti- 
cally, fully required all available vehicles and labor forces, 
as had been directed by General Headquarters. 

Into the midst of these increasing demands now stepped 
the matter of creating the Army of the Meuse, the lines of 
communications conditions of which had to be completely 
separated from those of the Second Army. As early as 
August 20th a start was made in creating a provisional 
but completely independent Line of Communications 
Headquarters of the Army of the Meuse, for which four 
battalions, 2 squadrons of the Line of Communications 
troops were detached, so that Headquarters of the Lines of 
Communications of the Second Army kept only four bat- 
talions and two squadrons of L. of C. troops. Of course, 
four Saxon Landwehr battalions had been promised the 
Second Army in their stead. 

The orders for the investment of Metz in addition pro- 
vided for a detachment of 1 Landwehr battalion and 1 
squadron of Nummer's Division to Pont-a-Mousson as a 
Line of Communications garrison. 

The wagon parks were divided between the two Lines 
of Communications Headquarters and thus the necessary 
and consequent decrease of means of transportation coin- 
cided momentarily with the increase in the demand made 
on the same. As only a very small number of troops were 
then at the disposal of the Lines of Communications head- 
quarters, it was deprived thereby of the possibility of gain- 
ing sufficient means of transportation by requisitions. 
Though the supply of the army was not seriously endan- 
gered by these conditions, this was entirely due to the ex- 
traordinary activity of all officials. 

The troops, on their part, did everything possible to 
help out these bad conditions, by forming, from vehicles 

—440— 



Operations Second German Army 

that had become superfluous and from army corps parks, 
sections which travelled regularly between the army and 
the principal depot established on the railroad. Those por- 
tions of the First Army that were east of Metz in many 
instances arranged direct communication with Saarlouis. 
They had the longer road to go there, but that road was not 
then taken up by other troops. With the separation of 
the new operations starting westward and against the army 
invested in Metz, it resulted that the First and the Second 
Army were confined completely to the Saarbriicken — Cour- 
celles railroad, and the Third Army and the Army of the 
Meuse to the Weissembourg — Vendenheim — Luneville — 
— Nancy — Frouard railroad,* which made it necessary 
to transfer the location of the General Headquarters of 
the Lines of Communications to Remilly. It had of course 
been ascertained that the railroad depot there was less 
suited for that purpose, because in Remilly, which was a 
minor railroad station without importance, there were but 
few buildings near the station suitable for depots and be- 
cause there was a lack of sidings. But no change could 
be made, as the Courcelles station had to be left to the 
First Army and as Faulquemont, where conditions were 
far more favorable, was too far from the investing army. 
As a line of communications within the district in which 
both armies in front of Metz found themselves, the Cour- 
celles — Ars-sur-Moselle road was first assigned to the First 
Army and the road between Remilly, Corny and Gorze to 
the Second Army. Subsequently all cotps stationed on 
the north side of Metz utilized the bridge at Hauconcourt 
and the road via Ennery, Vigy and Colligny for traffic with 
Remilly. 

The formation of the Army of the Meuse also was felt 
in the matter of telegraphic communication, as the detach- 
ment up to then attached to army headquarters was now as- 
signed to the Army of the Meuse. 



*The opening of this railroad as a matter of fact occurred 
on August 23d. 



—441— 



Campaign of 1870-71 

Until the arrival of the newly organized 5th Telegraph 
detachment (battalion) only the telegraph battalion of the 
First Army remained in front of Metz, But, as stated, 
this fact did not interfere with the rapid construction of 
necessary lines. 



-442- 



^firtcra/ Map ^/ Op^ra/zons 







Military Monographs 

BY THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 
No. 18 



The Command of the Third Army Corps at Spich- 
eren and Vionville 

Berlin, 1895 



Translated by 

Harry Bell, 

Master Signal Electrician, 
Army Service Schools 



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
March, 1912 



EXTRACT 

Headquarters, Third Army Corps, at the 
Battle of Vionville— Mars-la-Tour 

At Noon, August 15th, Prince Frederick Charles 

Seeks Permission of Royal Headquarters for 

Crossing the Moselle With the Larger 

Part of His Forces on August 16th 

The following information had been received at Sec- 
ond Army Headquarters by noon, August 15th: 

1. A report of the 2d Dragoon Regiment (belonging to the 6th 
Infantry Division) to the effect that the enemy had drawn his forces 
in part from Metz and that for the past two days strong move- 
ments of troops were taking place toward Paris. 

2. Report of the 6th Cavalry Division: "The field fortifications 
south of Metz have been abandoned by the enemy; a hostile camp 
at Longville and Moulins-les-Metz (southwest of Metz on the left 
bank of the river — the 6th Cavalry Division still being on the right 
bank) was bombarded with 40 shells, upon which the enemy fled 
from the camp in all haste." 

3. From the 5th Cavalry Division: "Early this morning one 
squadron went from Chambley to Mars-la-Tour, received infantry 
fire from Rezonville, and detached one platoon toward Bruville. On 
its return it found Mars-la-Tour occupied, which had not been the 
case on its advance. Hostile infantry detachments, covered by cav- 
alry, were perceived still on the Metz-Etain road. Corny found oc- 
cupied early this morning. Our patrols encountered hostile outposts 
at Gravelotte; much noise of moving wagons on the road to Verdun, 
especially at night." 

This report led Prince Frederick Charles to the con- 
viction that the hostile army was evacuating Metz, and he 
therefore asked permission by wire from Royal Headquar- 
ters to have the Hid, Xllth, Guard and IVth Army Corps 
cross the Moselle on the 16th, the IXth and lid Army Corps 
to close up on them. 

This request crossed on its way an order from Royal 
Headquarters, in which order dispositions were made en- 
tirely in accordance with Prince Frederick William's inten- 
tions. 



-445— 



Military Monographs 

Early on August 15th His Majesty the King had pro- 
ceeded with his staff to the battlefields of the 14th. The im- 
pression was soon gained that no hostile troops were in 
force east of Metz. Large clouds of dust were seen rising 
at different points beyond the fortress, which indicated, or 
seemed to indicate, that the French were marching off 
toward the west. In consequence of this a wire was sent 
from the hill at Flavigny at 11:00 a.m. to Headquarters 
Second Army that it was very probable that the French 
were marching in full retreat toward Verdun. All three 
army corps of the right wing (lid, IXth and Xllth) were 
now placed at the complete disposition of the Second Army. 

The IIId Army Corps Receives Permission to Con- 
tinue THE March and Crosses the Moselle Dur- 
ing THE Night of August 15-16th. 

Based on the above mentioned information and on the 
urgent request of the lid Army Corps, Prince Frederick 
Charles issued orders at 2:00 p.m. in Pont-a-Mousson di- 
recting that army corps to resume its advance. 

The army corps was to start on the 15th in order 
to locate and prepare a crossing over the Moselle, in order 
to reach the main Metz-Verdun road at Mars-la-Tour on 
the following day via the road through Gorze. 

Concerning the Xth Army Corps, the orders contained 
a note that that corps, with its headquarters and one in- 
fantry division, was now in Thiaucourt and would advance 
on the 16th toward Saint Hilaire, that the 5th Cavalry 
corps commander to have the 6th Cavalry Division now 
march behind the llld Army Corps, and the corps comman- 
der finally was informed that Prince Frederick Charles 
would visit the corps between 5 :30 and 7 :00 p.m. that night. 

Thus General v. Alvensleben received a free hand and 
he issued orders at 3:25 p.m., in Sillegny for the army 
corps to resume its march across the Moselle immediately. 
The 5th Infantry Division was to march via Corny and 
across the bridge at Noveant and reach Gorze and Dornot 
with its leading elements on the 15th. The 6th Infantry 

—446— 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

Division was assigned to the crossings at Champey and 
Pont-a-Mousson and was told to reach Pagny, Preny, Ar- 
naville and Bayonville. The 6th Cavalry Division received 
orders to proceed to Pournoy-la-Chetive and vicinity; the 
corps artillery was to cross the Moselle after the 6th In- 
fantry Division and remain at Vandieres. Pagny was de- 
signated as corps headquarters. 

Pursuant to these orders the army corps, without hav- 
ing fully completed cooking, started towards 6:00 p.m. The 
5th Infantry Division crossed the Moselle on the bridge at 
Noveant which had not been destroyed by the French, 
where it encountered the detachment of the Xth Army 
Corps under Colonel v. Lyncker (2 battalions, 2 squadrons, 
1 battery) . The infantry of the 6th Infantry Division used 
the foot bridge at Champey, which had been repaired, while 
the 2d Dragoon Regiment, the artillery and all vehicles had 
to cross at Pont-a-Mousson. 

In accordance with his promise Prince Frederick 
Charles had sought out his old Brandenburg corps and, 
greeted with cheers by the troops, had arrived at the 6th 
Infantry Division just when it crossed the bridge at Cham- 
pey. At this opportunity his Royal Highness directed the 
division commander Lieut-General v. Ruddenbrock to start 
in good time the next day via Gorze, so as to reach the 
trains of the fleeing enemy. The commander in chief of 
the Second Army gave the enemy greater credit for activity 
than the enemy actually displayed and, as no messages 
were received from the Xth Ar'my Corps or from the 
5th Cavalry Division in the course of the day, which might 
have divulged the actual situation, he arrived at the not 
entirely unjustified belief that the Army of the Rhine was 
engaged in a hurried retreat from Metz toward the Meuse. 

Orders of Headquarters Second Army for 
August 16th 

In consequence of this estimate the orders issued in 
Pont-a-Mousson at 7:00 p.m., governing the movements 
for the 16th of August directed the movements of the Second 
Army toward the Meuse. It was hoped that, considering 

—447— 



Military Monographs 

the achievements in marching by the German troops, the 
enemy would be encountered on that stream. 

It is stated in those orders: "The Illd Army Corps, 
as has been heretofore arranged, will cross the Moselle 
below Pont-a-Mousson and, marching via Noveant and 
Gorze, will tomorrow reach the main Metz-Verdun road 
at Mars-la-Tour, or Vionville respectively. If possible, its 
headquarters will be established in Mars-la-Tour. The 6th 
Cavalry Division may be sent ahead from Pagny via Preny 
and Thiaucourt to that road." 

In addition the Xth Army Corps was directed to con- 
tinue its march to the front on the road toward Verdun 
about as far as St. Hilaire-Maizeray and to bring up those 
parts of the corps which were still in the valley of the 
Moselle. 

The remaining army corps, which had arrived at their 
designated march objectives on the 15th, received orders 
to start on the 16th as follows: The IXth Army Corps was 
to reach Sillegny, the Xllth Rezonville-en-Haye, the Guard 
Corps Rambucourt and Vernecourt, the IVth Les Saizer- 
ais, the lid Buchy. 

Measures Taken by the Xth Army Corps 

In pursuance of the above directions the Xth Army 
Corps issued the following orders: 

"Headquarters Thiaucourt, 15th August, 1870; 11:30 p.m. 

"The hostile army is marching towards the Meuse. 

"The Xth Army Corps will continue its march toward Verdun. 

"Lieut-General v. Rheinbaben, in front of whom a hostile cav- 
alry division retreated today toward Metz and opposite whom a hos- 
tile camp of all arms is at Rezonville, will advance against the camp 
early tomorrow morning and will at the same time attempt to gain 
a view of the Metz-Conflans road. He will utilize every opportunity 
to attack the enemy 

"Colonel Lehmann will march at 4:30 a.m. tomorrow from Thiau- 
court via Dommartin to Chambley, thereafter into a bivouac at Don- 
court; Colonel V. Lyncker will start at 4:30 a.m. from Noveant via 
Gorze to the vicinity of Chambley 

"Lieut-General v. Schwartzkoppen will start from Thiaucourt 
at 5 a.m. with the Dragoon Brigade of the Guards and the rest of 
this division and march via Benoit to St. Hilaire 

"Major General v. Kraatz will start at 4:30 a.m. with the 20th 
Division and the corps artillery, will cross the Moselle on both bridges 
and will go into a bivouac between Beney and Thiaucourt " 

—448— 



f 



III Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 



General Alvensleben's Orders for August 16th 

General v. Alvensleben, who in his impetuosity had 
acted ahead of orders by conducting his entire corps across 
the Moselle on the evening of the 15th, had sent his ad- 
vance guard during the night to opposite Gorze and On- 
ville. 

Though the last troops, in consequence of the difficul- 
ties encountered in crossing the Moselle, had only gotten to 
rest at 2:00 A.M., and though great fatigue stared them 
in the face for the succeeding day. General v. Alvensleben 
fixed the time of start on the 16th at 5:00 A.M., and even 
earlier for the cavalry division. It is true that no more 
detailed information of the enemy had been received at 
headquarters Hid Army Corps up to the evening, still that 
headquarters entertained the hope that the French army 
would arrive west of Metz, and therefore reckoned in its 
orders for the 16th with an encounter with the enemy. 

Should the enemy be just west of Metz, he could be 
opposed straight across the Metz- Verdun road; should he 
be on the march to Verdun, he could be attacked in flank; 
should he, against all expectation, have made unusual pro- 
gress in the direction of the last named place, he could be 
engaged in battle and contained until the other army corps 
of the Second Army could come up. 

In order to be able to march in two columns. General 
v. Alvensleben on his own responsibility selected the addi- 
tional difficult mountain roads from Onville to Les Bara- 
ques and through these obtained increased facility for de- 
ployment, as well as the possibility of getting ahead faster. 
His orders for the 16th read : 

Pagny, 15 August, 1870; 10:30 p.m. 

"Pursuant to orders from higher headquarters the lid Army 
Corps will start at daybreak for both sides of the Metz-Verdun road. 
For this purpose the start will be: 

"The 6th Infantry at 5:00 A.M., marching via Arnaville-Onville 
toward Mars-la-Tour. The division will orient itself in good time 
through officers sent ahead to observe the roads of which nothing is 
known except through the maps. 

"The corps artillery follows the division at 7:00 A.M. 

"The 6th Cavalry Division must have cleared the bridge at Nov- 
eant by 5:30 A.M., without fail, and will then continue the march via 
Gorze toward Vionville. 

—449— 



Military Monographs 

"The 5th Infantry Division will follow the 6th Cavalry Division. 
All troops arriving on the Metz-Verdun road will for the present 
face toward the fortress. " 

Additional Orders from Royal Headquarters are 

Received at Headquarters Second Army, 

Evening of August 15th 

In the meantime additional orders from Royal Head- 
quarters relating to the 16th had been received at Head- 
quarters Second Army in Pont-a-Mousson about 10:30 
P.M., August 15th, which stated that the fruits of the vic- 
tory of the 14th of August could be fully gathered only by 
an advance in force by the Second Army towards the roads 
from Metz via Fresnes and Etain to Verdun. 

It was left to the discretion of that headquarters to act, 
with the means at its disposal. 

As no reports had been received at that headquarters 
from the 5th Cavalry Division, which might have cleared up 
the actual situation, it was justifiable to assume that the 
wishes of Royal Headquarters would be fully met by send- 
ing out two army corps and two cavalry divisions in the 
designated direction. 

The following orders were therefore sent at 8 :00 A.M. 
on the 16th to the Xth and IXth Army Corps. . 

1) To the Xth Army Corps: "His Majesty will transfer his 
headquarters today to Pont-a-Mousson. According to information 
received the enemy is mainly retreating on the road leading from 
Metz via Etain to Verdun. Therefore your Excellency will send the 
cavalry toward that road." 

2) To the IXth Army Corps: "It is necessary that the IXth 
Army Corps cross the Moselle in connection with the Illd Army Corps 
on the bridge thrown by that corps in the vicinity of Pagny-sur-Mo- 
selle. You will remain on the march with the IXth Corps and bring 
that corps close to the Moselle, as well as . . 

"If possible, the corps will cross the Moselle with parts of its 
forces today and will tomorrow follow up the Illd Corps toward Mars- 
la-Tour " 

Headquarters Illd Army Corps received no additional 
orders. 

Movements of the French August 15th 

The marching off of the French was carried out but 
slowly on account of the battle of the 14th of August. 

—450— 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

The troops which had crossed the river were closely 
crowded together as far as the fork of the road at Grave- 
lotte. Rations were to be drawn en route, in addition. The 
roads west of Gravelotte had not been clearly enough as- 
signed to the different corps; there had been no consulta- 
tion between the different generals as to what roads they 
would take ; delays in the march occurred everywhere. 

In consequence of all this, by the evening of the 15th 
only the Guard and the 6th Army Corps had reached their 
assigned positions at Gravelotte and Rezonville respective- 
ly; the 2d Army Corps was still at Rezonville instead of 
being at Vionville. 

The 3d Army Corps, which had been directed to St. 
Marcel, encountered unusual difficulties in the defiles and 
reached that vicinity with three divisions only during the 
night of the 15-16th. On account of finding the roads 
blocked the 4th Corps had been forced to halt most of its 
troops at Woippy and Devant-les-Ponts and could resume 
its march to Doncourt only on the 16th. 

Decision of General v. Alvensleben to Engage in 

Battle — Introductory Movements and Course 

OF THE Battle up to 12:30 P.M. 

Advance of the 6th Infantry Division 

The 6th Infantry Division, followed by the corps ar- 
tillery, started at 5:00 A.M.; but the 5th Infantry Divis- 
ion started only at 7:30 A.M., because the 6th Cavalry Di- 
vision, contrary to the wording of the orders, had not 
cleared the bridge at Noveant before then. 

Very soon after 5:00 A.M. the chief of staff of the 
Illd Army Corps, Colonel v. Voigts-Rhetz, met in the 
streets of Pagny an officer coming from headquarters of 
the Second Army, who informed him that Prince Freder- 
ick Charles desired to review the 6th Cavalry Division on 
that day. The colonel thereupon sent the following letter 
to army headquarters at 5:30 A.M.: 

"Lieutenant v. Ardenne, whom I saw here just now, 
informs me that His Royal Highness intends to inspect the 

—451— 



Military Monographs 

6th Cavalry Division today. In consideration of orders 
issued to that division to gain the Metz- Verdun road today 
and to attack detachments leaving Metz, it has become 
necessary to start the Cavalry Division in such manner that 
it will reach the road simultaneously with the infantry. It 
has therefore been forced to clear the bridge at Noveant 
with its last troops by 5 :30 A.M., and is now about between 
Noveant and Gorze. If His Royal Highness desires to still 
see that division today, it can probably be done after 10:00 
A.M. at Vionville or vicinity." 

General v. Alvensleben left Pagny at 6:30 A.M. to 
take his place at the head of the main body of the 6th In- 
fantry Division, whose march had to be made first in a 
close valley and then along rather steep roads and was con- 
nected with great difficulties. In spite of having had but 
a very short rest during the preceding night the troops 
marched with spirit. Had not the Prince said to the troops 
yesterday in the bivouac at Buxieres : "If you march 
bravely today and tomorrow, you may still be able to catch 
the French." 

The first reliable reports concerning the presence of 
strong hostile forces west of Metz were received at 6:30 
A.M. by General v. Buddenbrock, commanding the 6th In- 
fantry Division. Lieutenant v. Czettritz Neuhaus, of the 
1st Brandenburg Dragoon Regiment No. 2, reported from 
Tronville (5:15 A.M.) that hostile outposts — infantry and 
cavalry — were on the line Tronville- Vionville, toward the 
woods of Vionville. This report was at once transmitted 
to the commanding general, who was then farther behind, 
and was received with joy by those headquarters, being an 
indication that a decisive success would be attained if the 
march be kept up with energy. 

As the main thing appeared to be to hold the reported 
hostile troops in their places. General v. Alvensleben de- 
cided to attack the enemy, but to hold the attack until 
the 6th Cavalry Division and the 5th Infantry Division 
which were marching on Gorze, had left the woods (moun- 
tains). He therefore sent the following written orders to 
the 6th Infantry Division: 

—452— 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

"On the march, near Pagny, 16 August 1870, 7:15 A.M. 
"Because of a report received that hostile outposts are in posi- 
tion at Vionville, I order that the 6th Infantry Division does not 
allow itself to become engaged and that it not show itself before the 
6th Cavalry Division has reached the plateau and is ready to inter- 
vene in the battle." 

The 6th Infantry Division had commenced to deploy at 
Les Baraques, where the commanding general himself ar- 
rived very soon, and the deployment was thereupon con- 
tinued. 

Preliminary Estimate of the Situation by Gen- 
eral Alvensleben and Decision to Continue 
THE March in a Northerly Direction 

The extent of the hostile camp, in the meantime re- 
ported to be at Rezonville, could not be seen from the 
heights of Les Baraques. After two squadrons of the 2d 
Dragoons had been sent ahead for further reconnaissance, 
General v. Alvensleben, accompanied by his staff, rode to- 
ward the statue of Ste. Marie for a personal reconnaissance. 

"Two hills and bushes," he wrote in his notes, "obstructed the view 
from Les Baraques toward Rezonville and the terrain lying be- 
tween. I thereforei rode with corps headquarters through the woods 
on the right to the hills in front of the Statue Ste. Marie. From those 
hills I then saw in my front a terrain in the shape of a flat depression 
with green edges. I gained two impressions, as I clearly recollect. 
First, that the terrain was entirely devoid of any marked feature 
(in a tactical sense), and second, that I could see no trace of a 
camp of troops, or anything else of military interest, except a col- 
umn of cavalry riding in the direction of St. Marcel through a clearing 
in the woods (without doubt a detachment of Gramont's Brigade) ." 

In the meantime a report sent by Headquarters 5th 
Infantry Division at 8 :35 A.M., had arrived at corps head- 
quarters stating: "Hostile columns marching from Rezon- 
ville toward Verdun; a detachment of all arms has taken 
a position about half a mile southeast of Tronville, pro- 
bably to cover the retreat; this division remains on the 
march and will attack the enemy." 

The hostile cavalry column, observed by the command- 
ing general himself as marching toward St. Marcel, as well 
as the above report from the 5th Infantry Division ap- 
peared proof positive to Corps Headquarters that the enemy 

—453— 



Military Monographs 

intended to march off. In order to prevent the enemy's 
marching off on the northern roads and to block the road 
for him toward the west, at 9 :30 A.M., General v. Alvensle- 
ben directed that the 6th Infantry Division — which had de- 
ployed in the meantime — advance northward via Mars-la- 
Tour toward Jarny. 

In the meantime, toward 9:00 A.M., the 5th Cavalry 
Division, in carrying out its task of reconnoitering in 
force the camp observed on the evening of the 15th, had 
become engaged in an action. The activity of that divis- 
ion however confined itself to firing suddenly on the hostile 
camp with the four batteries accompanying the division (un- 
der command of Major Korber) ; these four batteries first 
went into position northeast of Tronville, later west and 
south of Vionville. 

General v. Rheinbaben did not attack the surprised 
enemy and when the enemy occupied Vionville toward 10 
o'clock he led his division back to between the Tronville 
woods and Tronville. 

General v. Alvensleben has written about that fight 
as follows: "I learned of the reconnaissance in force by 
the 5th Cavalry Division through the thunder of its can- 
nons. These cannons alarmed the enemy. What he had 
not learned through his patrols he learned through the 
measures we took. Unfortunately." 

The General then points out the serious consequences 
of that bombardment, which was threatening the advancing 
5th Infantry Division, considering the very strong occupa- 
tion of Vionville — Flavigny and a probable offensive ad- 
vance of that force. 

Simultaneously with the fire of the 5th Cavalry Di- 
vision thunder of cannon was heard from the 6th Cavalry 
Division, which latter division had encountered hostile 
troops of all arms in its advance from Gorze on Vionville, 
north of the first named place. Touch with the enemy 
had been gained. 

In his subsequent ride forward General v. Alvensleben, 
from the top of the ridge in front of the Statue Ste. Marie, 

—454— 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

and looking over the depression running toward Flavigny, 
perceived the tents of the hostile camp. There was not the 
least possibility of even approximately judging the strength 
of the enemy at that moment. It has been stated before 
this that corps headquarters had been of the opinion since 
the 15th of August that the main body of the enemy was 
still in Metz and on the plateau to the west thereof. But 
certainty of this assumption was brought only later by the 
different phases of the battle. 

The principal thing now was not to be deceived as to 
the actual state of affairs. Reports so far received indi- 
cated that the enemy was marching off. It appeared very 
improbable that the enemy, supposing he had decided on 
and actually commenced his retreat, would accept battle 
after the defeats already suffered and with inverted front; 
it was far rather to be assumed that he would try to con- 
tinue his march and make a defensive stand with but a 
minor part of his force. To pierce that defense, to force 
the departing enemy to make a stand and fight, appeared 
to be the main task of the Illd Army Corps, for the accom- 
plishment of which every unit had to be utilized. 

The first question was to gain time for the 6th Infan- 
try Division to get ahead and to cover its flank march. 
Therefore the commanding general, at about 9:45 A.M., 
brought the artillery (5th, 6th light; 5th, 6th heavy bat- 
teries) of that division under the guard of its cavalry regi- 
ment (1st Brandenburg Dragoon Regiment No. 2) as rap- 
idly as possible from its flank. At the same time orders 
were sent to the corps artillery farther in rear to trot 
ahead. This use of the artillery was the first hazardous, 
but necessary, decision arrived at by General Alvensleben. 

The commander of the artillery. General v. Bulow, 
personally rode to the front to reconnoiter suitable posi- 
tions. Toward 10 :00 A.M., the first batteries went into 
action, partly in connection with the position of Major 
Korber, and partly on the hill north of the Statue Ste. 
Marie, and so the battle opened. 

Based on the impression so far gained the following 
report was sent to Headquarters Second Army: 

—455— 



Military Monographs 

"Vicinity south Vionville, 16 August 1870, 10:30 A.M. 
"Hostile camp at Vionville and Rezonville. The Illd Army 
Corps advances en masse, left wing toward Jarny, to eventually 
cross at Conflans. 5th Cavalry Division at Mars-la-Tour. 6th Cav- 
alry Division at Rezonville. Enemy falling back on Thionville." 

The last sentence of this report was based on the re- 
trograde movements of the enemy observed by corps head- 
quarters itself, as well as on the report of the 5th Infantry 
Division of 8:35 A.M. As a matter of fact the measures 
taken by the enemy were entirely different, as General v. 
Alvensleben very soon thereafter found. 

Events on the French Side 

In consequence of the bombardment of the camp — the 
troops were just then proceeding to water the horses, great 
confusion ensued in the French Cavalry Division of Forton, 
especially in Murat's Brigade. The infantry of the 2d Corps, 
on the other hand, very quickly prepared for battle. (The 2d 
Army Corps had but two divisions present, the Division of 
Laveaucoupet having remained in Metz.) By orders of 
General Frossard General Bataille advanced at about 9 :45 
A.M. with Pouget's Brigade, commanded on that day by 
General Mangin, to occupy Vionville and Flavigny, while the 
Brigade of Fauvart Bastoul was for the present kept back 
east of Flavigny. South and ahead of the latter, the Divi- 
sion of Verge had advanced against the heights northwest 
of Gorze and against the Bois de Vionville and Lapasset's 
Brigade of the 5th Corps, which had joined the 2d Corps 
at Saarbriicken on August 7th, proceeded to the front 
through the Bois de St. Arnould. The French 6th Corps 
also deployed with great rapidity. 

Marshal Canrobert caused the Division of Villiers to 
take a position in readiness northeast of Vionville, east of 
the Flavigny — St. Marcel road. This division was joined 
on the north and extending as far as the Roman road by 
the 9th Regiment of the Line, the only regiment of Bisson's 
Division which had gotten to Metz. The Divisions of Sorval 
and Tixier remained for the present at east of Rezonville 
and St. Marcel, respectively. 



-456— 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

The batteries of the 2d and 6th French Corps went in- 
to position afid opened fire. In the meantime Marshal 
Bazaine had proceeded to the hill southwest of Rezonville 
and assumed command. 

After he had approved the means taken by the leaders 
of the 2d and 6th Corps, he also posted, in addition to Sor- 
val's Division east of Rezonville, the Guard Corps at Grave- 
lotte and Malmaison facing south; this under the belief, 
which appears to have guided all of his dispositions that 
day, that the hostile attack was being directed against his 
left and that the intention was to force him away from 
Metz. 

He sent orders to the 3d Corps, camping in the vicin- 
ity between Verneville and St. Marcel, to direct its offen- 
sive attention against the hostile left; the Marshal hoping 
that General Ladmirault would hasten to the battlefield on 
his own initiative. 

It should be definitely mentioned that only the Bri- 
gade of Puget occupied Vionville and Flavigny and that 
with the 12th Chasseur Battalion and parts of the 23d Line 
Regiment. The first line of the 8th Line Regiment deployed 
along the slope southeast of Vionville. At this time, about 
10:00 A.M., no parts of the French 6th Corps were up to 
occupy the above named positions. The second lines of 
the above mentioned regiments were in readiness west of the 
group of trees and in the hollow south thereof toward Fla- 
vigny. 

French accounts and reports differ greatly as to the 
first position of Villiers' Division. But there appears no 
doubt but that the brigade of de Sonnay, in the first line 
of the division, was with its left closer to the main High- 
road than is indicated in the plan of the battle furnished 
in the General Staff Account (Plan 5Q). Behind it, in 
second line, the Colin's Brigade had taken position with the 
93d Line Regiment north, and the 94th Line Regiment south 
of the main highroad. 

Thus, at the start, only the infantry of the French 2d 
Army Corps came into conflict with the approaching Ger- 
man Hid Corps. 

—457— 



Military Monographs 

General von Alvensleben Decides to Attack in 
Spite of the Hostile Superiority 

Without having any knowledge of the French move- 
ments and after having sent off the orders to the artillery 
of the 6th Infantry Division, General v. Alvensleben con- 
tinued his ride in the direction of Tronville and about half- 
ways between that place and the Statue of Ste. Marie he met 
General v. Rheinbaben, commander of the 5th Cavalry Di- 
vision. The report of the latter made it clear that very 
material French forces, possibly the entire French army, 
were still west of Metz. Concerning this meeting. Gen- 
eral V. Alvensleben writes : 

"Returning from the above mentioned hill (Statue Ste. Marie), 
I rode slowly in the direction of Tronville, i.e., in the same march direc- 
tion as that of the 6th Infantry Division on Jarny. At the foot of the 
hill, halfways between the Statue and Tronville the task for the day 
was decided. There I met General v. Rheinbaben, commander of the 5th 
Cavalry Division, who was, I believe, accompanied only by an adju- 
tant. He approached me with the words: 'I do not know if I am 
more stupid than other people, but I have always maintained 
that we still have the entire hostile army in our front, and now 1 
know that for certain.' The general could know this for certain, 
for since the 14th and throughout the 15th he had been on the roads 
which the enemy must have taken had he marched off. Under such 
conditions we think faster than at any other time. Even if the 
entire army were not there, strong forces were in my front, this was 
proved by Rheinbaben's words and also by the hot artillery fight which 
had now taken place along the entire line. 

"As on the 15th, so now again the entire strategical aspect of 
the campaign came before my eyes with full clearness and I was cer- 
tain that the situation justified me in engaging my entire army corps. 
Of the Xth Corps I thought only in so far as offering me a support- 
ing point to fall back on, if I hazarded a battle with superior hostile 
forces and that with an inverted front. I did not know if the Xth 
Corps could or would give me any support, but I knew that, • consid- 
ering the direction of the French retreat, it was immaterial to us if 
our object should be attained eight miles farther to the front or to 
the rear; and I also knew that with each step backward I' gained 
the time and power the enemy lost. The hazard, viewed in more 
detail, was consequently not too large or too dangerous. It would 
have been very, very unfortunate and bitter, to have left the battle- 
field with our wounded to the enemy, but this was of no influence at 
all on the objective of our day's task. 

"The 6th Infantry Division received orders to abandon its march 
on Jarny and to turn against Vionville, not because my views had 
changed concerning the position I desired to reach and which even 
to-day I consider as the only strategically and tactically correct one 
— i.e., the ridge from Mars-la-Tour to Conflans — but because I did 
not dare to spread out my forces under existing circumstances so 
far, for the 5th Infantry Division had in the meantime become 
engaged in the battle and all maneuvering was at an end. I had 

—458— 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

to accept the battlefield forced on me rcolens volens and had to make 
the most of it. The latter phase required in order to offset the physical 
disproportion of the forces the moral force of the offensive (attack). 
For that the troops under my command were exactly the right ones, 
and in addition I had 18 cavalry regiments, as General v. Rhein- 
baben had placed his division at my disposal. This gave me great 
freedom of action. But still a 'but' had to reckoned with. I had 
the disposal of about 9,000 troopers of first quality, but no correspond- 
ing cavalry organizations. 

"I now took the road to Vionville." 

Occupation of Vionville and Flavigny, Bois de 
Vionville and Bois de St. Arnould 

Colonel V. Voi^s-Rhetz personally carried order to Gen- 
eral V. Buddenbrock for the advance on Vionville; he met 
that general at 10 :15 A.M. at Tronville and oriented him con- 
cerning the changed situation. 

The general, a very tranquil and decisive man, made 
his dispositions at once, but demanded the return of his 
batteries which were at this time in action on another part 
of the battlefield. This justified demand, again made 
through an adjutant some time later, made it necessary 
to draw the batteries from their position — not an easy 
matter by any means, as they had by then lost quite a num- 
ber of horses. Only after these losses had been replaced 
could the batteries be sent off. Only the 6th light battery 
was retained permanently south of Vionville. 

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 20th Regiment (the 2d 
battalion having but 3 companies, as the 6th company was 
guarding trains) were kept for the present at Tronville by 
corps headquarters. 

Corps headquarters now took position on the ridge 
southwest of Vionville, adhering to that place almost dur- 
ing the entire battle. This ridge is southwest of hill 938 ; 
from there General v. Alvensleben rode from time to time 
to hills 923 and 901 for better observation and for over- 
seeing the execution of his directions. 

Arrived on the ridge southwest of Vionville, General 
v. Alvensleben observed that the enemy had occupied Vion- 
ville and Flavigny and that he was seriously engaged with 
the 5th Infantry Division. 

—459— 



Military Monographs 

Toward 11:00 a.m. while the 6th Infantry Division 
was still marching from Tronville, the French Brigade of 
Valaze started an attack against the left wing of the 5th 
Infantry Division. The danger threatening General v. 
Stulpnagel was at once perceived by corps headquarters. In 
haste the following written orders were sent to the ap- 
proaching 6th Infantry Division. 

"The enemy appears to be attacking General v. Stulpnagel in 
great force. General v. Buddenbrock will advance with all of his 
forces along the entire line." 

In the meantime the three battalions of the 52d Regi- 
ment of the 5th Infantry Division, later supported by 
the 2d Battalion, 12th Regiment, had not only defeated 
that attack, but had also taken possession of the ridge 
southeast of Flavigny (Ridge 998 on map). Through this 
the artillery of the 5th Infantry Division in position on the 
hill west of the Bois de Vionville and the artillery in posi- 
tion in the Bois de Vionville and Bois de St. Arnould (the 
batteries of the 9th Infantry Brigade) were relieved from 
the pressure on their left flank and secured from danger. 
The 2d Battalion, 52d Regiment, on the left wing, pursued 
the retreating enemy in the direction of Flavigny; the Fu- 
silier Battalion, 12th Regiment, also turned in that direc- 
tion, it having previously advanced farther to the west and 
through the northern part of the Bois de Gaumont. Both 
battalions eagerly pressed forward and soon after 11 :00 A.M. 
entered a hot and costly fight south of Flavigny with the 
retreating Brigade of Valaze and the columns of Bastoul's 
Brigade coming up to the support of the former. 

In the meantime the 6th Infantry Division had made 
all haste forward and had attacked Vionville. During its 
advance the three horse batteries of the 5th Cavalry Divi- 
sion, which had returned, had again trotted to the hill west 
of Vionville from where they effectively enfiladed the bri- 
gade at Bastoul. 

As also the 6th light battery of the Hid Army Corps 
from its position farther south, as well as the batteries at 
the Statue Ste. Marie directed their fire across the open field 

—460— 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

on the oncoming brigade, that brigade had to fall back 
under heavy losses. Parts of that brigade threw them- 
selves into Flavigny. But as that place offered less and 
less security under the increasing fire of our batteries, the 
French hastily evacuated the village in the face of the 
charging 12th and 52d Regiments. The 9th, 10th and 11th 
Companies, 12th Regiment and the 5th and 8th Companies 
52d Regiment, entered Flavigny about 11 :45 A.M. This 
was the first capture of the village. 

These troops remained within the place but a short 
time, because they had to procure drinking water and be- 
cause the houses were in flames and our artillery was still 
firing on it. 

Captain Hildebrand, who had taken command of the 
2d battalion after Major Bunau was wounded, and his half 
battalion, 6th and 7th companies, 52d Regiment and the 12th 
Company, 12th Regiment, did not participate in the attack 
on Flavigny. When he saw that the enemy evacuated the 
place he immediately turned off in the direction of Rezon- 
ville and pursued the fleeing enemy with effective fire. There- 
after he pressed after the enemy with the 6th and 7th Com- 
pany in the first, the 5th and 8th Company (just coming 
out of Flavigny) in the second line to within the hollow lead- 
ing toward Rezonville. 

Lieutenant v. Zawadsky with the rest of the Fusilier 
Battalion, 12th Regiment, joined this intrepid advance. 
This was at about 12 :00 noon. 

During these events at Flavigny the 6th Infantry Divi- 
sion had succeeded, after a very bitter fight, in taking 
Vionville and driving back the 2d line of Pouget's Brigade 
in position east of that place. 

The French 6th Corps Inserts Its First Line 

As now the 94th Line Regiment of Colin's Brigade 
was sent to Flavigny to support the left of Pouget's Bri- 
gade and as in addition parts of the Brigade of Becquet de 
Sonnay attacked the flank of the Prussian troops emerging 
from Vionville along the road and advancing toward the 

—461— 



Military Monographs 

group of trees, the forward movement of the Germans came 
to a halt for the present and a bloody battle ensued east and 
southeast of Vionville. After being effectively supported by 
the constantly reinforced artillery line south of the church- 
yard and at Statue Ste. Marie, the 11th Infantry Brigade, 
entirely engaged (5 battalions) and the 64th Regiment suc- 
ceeded at 12 :30 p.m. in capturing the hostile position, group 
of trees — Flavigny. This was the second capture of Flav- 
igny, succeeding the first capture by about 45 minutes. 

In the meantime, the 24th Regiment, in conjunction 
with the 2d Battalion, 20th Regiment, and well supported 
by our batteries in position on the main road west of Vion- 
ville, had driven back the French 9th and 75th Line Regi- 
ments opposing it north of Vionville and had gained a firm 
foothold east of the hollow leadiiig from Vionville to St. 
Marcel. 



During the fights of the 6th Infantry Division at Vion- 
ville and Flavigny the 9th Infantry Brigade had captured 
by about noon, the northern edges of the forest of Vion- 
ville and the forest' of St. Arnould but was unable to ad- 
vance beyond against the plateau occupied by the French 
Brigades of Jolivet and Lapasset. 

To the northwest of the artillery of the 5th Infantry 
Division General v. Schwerin assembled the nucleus of his 
brigade, the two battalions of the 52d Regiment which had 
suffered severely, near the 2d Battalion, 12th Regiment, 
which up to then had suffered but little, and held the cap- 
tured hill. 

General v. Stulpnagel, to whom Colonel v. Lyncker 
with his 2 battalions, 78th Regiment, 2 squadrons 9th 
Dragoons, and 1st light Battery, had reported, directed the 
battle of his division from the right wing of the artillery; 
this battle now had to be confined to holding the line cap- 
tured. Major V. Lewinski, chief of staff of the 5th Infantry 
Division, had been sent to the commanding general to re- 
port what had happened up to then and from the command- 

—462— 



Battle, of Vionville-Mars la tour 

August 16. 1870, between 4.00 and 5.00 P.M. 



\ 




tmak^ X Corps hh^ 

^^mm III. VIII and IX Carps. 

The follofin^ Ltni'h of iht X Corpi wir^- absent 

19 th Divisian : 20th Division 

H/sj at St HiloiVi I[/9Z m P'nf o/^O'Jlson, <«yo»V , 

Ttie S fh Cavolrt/ Division o^ ^u^. 16, to /Irmtf Headquarters. 

/S70 W03 atfacfnd to ifit XOirps. t and *f/$l at Th> ' 

Guard Oro^oon Briytde m'ffi In 6 of Guard Cor/>t. 
7ht atfachtd Troops arc underf/hed. 



Scale 1:25000. 



Ill Corps at Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

ing general received the following orders : "I have seen 
everything; tell General v. Stulpnagel to hold what he has 
gained, but not to advance farther under any considera- 
tion." 

As already stated, General v. Alvensleben remained 
on the left wing throughout the battle. Asked why he had 
not joined the 5th Infantry Division, he replied: "You 
knew what you had to do and I could rely on your doing it. 
The physician's place is at the bedside of the patient and the 
patient in this case was the Vionville — Mars-la-Tour road." 



—463— 



Extract From Personal Memoirs 
P. H. Sheridan 



At 4 o'clock the next morning, the 18th, I repaired to 
the Chancellor's quarters. The carriage was at the door, 
also the saddlehorse, but as no spare mount could be pro- 
cured for General Forsyth he had to seek other means to 
reach the battle-field. The carriage was an open one with 
two double seats, and in front a single one for a messenger ; 
it had also a hand-brake attached. Count Bismarck and I 
occupied the rear seat, and Count Bismarck-Bohlen — the 
nephew and aide-de-camp to the Chancellor — and Doctor 
Busch were seated facing us. The conveyance was strong, 
serviceable, and comfortable, but not specially preposess- 
ing, and hitched to it were four stout horses — logy, un- 
gainly animals, whose clumsy harness indicated that the 
whole equipment was meant for heavy work. Two postil- 
ions in uniform, in high military saddles on the nigh horse 
of each span, completed the establishment. 

All being ready, we took one of the roads from Pont- 
a-Mousson to Rezonville, which is on the direct road from 
Metz to Chalons, and near the central point of the field 
where, on the 16th of August, the battle of Mars-la-Tour 
had been fought. It was by this road that the Pomeran- 
ians, numbering about 30,000 men, had been ordered to 
march to Gravelotte, and after proceeding a short dis- 
tance we overtook the column. As this contingent came 
from Count Bismarck's own section of Germany, there 
greeted us as we passed along, first in the dim light of the 
morning, and later in the glow of the rising sun, continu- 
ous and most enthusiastic cheering for the German Chan- 
cellor. 

On the way Count Bismarck again recurred to the 
state of public opinion in America with reference to the 
war. He also talked much about our form of government, 

—465— 



Extract 

and said that in early life his tendencies were all toward re- 
publicanism, but that family influence had overcome his 
preferences, and intimated that, after adopting a political 
career, he found that Germany was not sufficiently ad- 
vanced for republicanism. He said, further, that he had 
been reluctant to enter upon this public career, that he had 
always longed to be a soldier, but that here again family 
opposition had turned him, from the field of his choice into 
the sphere of diplomacy. 

Not far from Mars-la-Tour we alighted, and in a little 
while an aide-de-camp was introduced, who informed me 
that he was there to conduct and present me to his Majesty, 
the King of Prussia. As we were walking along together, 
I inquired whether at the meeting I should remove my cap, 
and he said no; that in an out-of-door presentation it was 
not etiquette to uncover if in uniform. We were soon in 
the presence of the King, where, under the shade of a 
clump of second-growth poplar-trees, with which nearly all 
the farms in the north of France are here and there dot- 
ted — the presentation was made in the simplest and most 
agreeable manner. 

His majesty, taking my hand in both of his gave me a 
thorough welcome, expressing, like Count Bismarck, though 
through an interpreter, much interest as to the sentiment 
in my own country about the war. At this time William 
the First of Prussia was seventy-three years of age, and, 
dressed in the uniform of the Guards, he seemed to be the 
very ideal soldier, and graced with most gentle and cour- 
teous manners. The conversation, which was brief, as 
neither of us spoke the other's native tongue, concluded 
by his Majesty's requesting me in the most cordial way to 
accompany his headquarters during the campaign. Thank- 
ing him for his kindness, I rejoined Count Bismarck's 
party, and our horses having arrived meantime, we 
mounted and moved off to the position selected for the King 
to witness the opening of the battle. 

This place was on some high ground overlooking the 
villages of Rezonville and Gravelotte, about the centre of 
the battle-field of Mars-la-Tour, and from it most of the 

—466— 



Memoirs P. H. Sheridan 

country to the east toward Metz could also be seen. The 
point chosen was an excellent one for the purpose, though 
in one respect disagreeable, since the dead bodies of many 
poor fellows killed there two days before were yet unburied. 
In a little while the King's escort began to remove these 
dead, however, bearing them away on stretchers impro- 
vised with their rifles, and the spot thus cleared was much 
more acceptable. Then, when such unexploded shells as 
were lying around loose had been cautiously carried away, 
the King, his brother, Prince Frederick Charles Alexander, 
the chief -of-staff. General von Moltke, the Minister of War, 
General von Roon, and Count von Bismarck assembled on 
the highest point, and I being asked to join the group was 
there presented to General von Moltke. He spoke our lan- 
guage fluently, and Bismarck having left the party for a 
time to go to a neighboring house to see his son, who had 
been wounded at Mars-la-Tour, and about whom he was 
naturally very anxious. General von Moltke entertained 
me by explaining the position of the different corps, the 
nature and object of their movements then taking place, 
and so on. 

Before us, and covering Metz, lay the French army, 
posted on the crest of a ridge extending north, and about 
its centre curving slightly westward toward the German 
forces. The left of the French position was but a short 
distance from the Moselle, and this part of the line was 
separated from the Germans by a ravine, the slopes, fairly 
well wooded, rising quite sharply; farther north, near the 
centre, this depression disappeared, merged in the general 
swell of the ground, and thence on toward the right the 
ground over which an approach to the French line must 
be made was essentially a natural open, glacis, that could 
be thoroughly swept by the fire of the defenders. 

The line extended some seven or eight miles. To at- 
tack this position, formidable everywhere, except perhaps 
on the right flank, the Germans were bringing up the com- 
bined forces of the First and Second armies, troops that 
within the past fortnight had already successfully met the 
French in three pitched battles. On the right was the 

—467— 



Extract 

First Army, under command of General Von Steinmetz, 
the victors, August 6, of Spicheren, near Saar, and, eight 
days later, of Colombey, to the east of Metz ; while the cen- 
tre and left were composed of the several corps of the 
Second Army, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles 
of Prussia, a part of whose troops had just been engaged 
in the sanguinary battle of Mars-la-Tour, by which Ba- 
zaine was cut off from the Verdun road, and forced back 
toward Metz. 

At first the German plan was simply to threaten with 
their right, while the corps of the Second Army advanced 
toward the north, to prevent the French, of whose inten- 
tions there was much doubt, from escaping toward Chalons ; 
then, as the purposes of the French might be developed, 
these corps were to change direction toward the enemy 
successively, and seek to turn his right flank. But the 
location of this vital turning-point was very uncertain, and 
until it was ascertained and carried, late in the afternoon, 
the action raged with more or less intensity along the en- 
tire line. 

But as it is not my purpose to describe in detail the 
battle of Gravelotte, nor any other, I will speak of some 
of its incidents merely. About noon, after many prelimin- 
ary skirmishes, the action was begun according to the plan 
I have already outlined, the Germans advancing their left 
while holding on strongly with their right, and it was this 
wing (the First Army) that came under my observation 
from the place where the King's headquarters were located. 
From here we could see, as I have said, the village of Grave- 
lotte. Before it lay the German troops, concealed to some 
extent, especially to the left, by clumps of timber here and 
there. Immediately in front of us, however, the ground 
was open, and the day being clear and sunny, with a fresh 
breeze blowing (else the smoke from a battle between four 
hundred thousand men would have obstructed the view 
altogether), the spectacle presented was of unsurpassed 
magnificence and sublimity. The German artillery opened 
the battle, and while the air was filled with shot and 
shell from hundreds of guns along their entire line, the 

—468— 



Memoirs P. H. Sheridan 

German centre and left, in rather open order, moved out 
to the attack, and as they went forward the reserves, in 
close column, took up positions within supporting distances, 
yet far enough back to be out of range. 

The French artillery and mitrailleuses responded vig- 
orously to the Krupps, and with deadly effect, but as far 
as we could see the German left continued its advance, and 
staff -officers came up frequently to report that all was go- 
ing on well at points hidden from our view. These reports 
were always made to the King first, and whenever any- 
body arrived with tidings of the fight we clustered around 
to hear the news, General Von Moltke unfolding a map 
meanwhile, and explaining the situation. This done, the 
chief of the staff, while awaiting the next report, would 
either return to a seat that had been made for him with 
some knapsacks, or would occupy the time walking about, 
kicking clods of dirt or small stones here and there, his 
hands clasped behind his back, his face pale and thoughtful. 
He was then nearly seventy years old, but because of his 
emaciated figure, the deep wrinkles in his face, and the 
crow's-feet about his eyes, he looked even older, his ap- 
pearance being suggestive of the practice of church asce- 
ticisms rather than of his well-known ardent devotion to 
the military profession. 

By the middle of the afternoon the steady progress of 
the German left and centre had driven the French from 
their more advanced positions from behind stone walls and 
hedges, through valleys and hamlets, in the direction of 
Metz, but as yet the German right had accomplished little 
except to get possession of the village of Gravelotte, forc- 
ing the French across the deep ravine I have mentioned, 
which runs north and south a little distance east of the 
town. 

But it was now time for the German right to move in 
earnest to carry the Rozerieulles ridge, on which crest the 
French had evidently decided to make an obstinate fight 
to cover their withdrawal to Metz. As the Germans moved 
to the attack here, the French fire became heavy and de- 
structive, so much so, indeed, as to cause General Von 

—469— 



Extract 

Steinmetz to order some cavalry belonging to the right 
wing to make a charge. Crossing the ravine before des- 
cribed, this body of horse swept up the slope beyond, the 
front ranks urged forward by the momentum from behind. 
The French were posted along a sunken road, behind stone 
walls and houses, and as the German cavalry neared these 
obstructions it received a dreadful fire without the least 
chance of returning to it, though still pushed on till the front 
ranks were crowded into the deep cut of the road. Here 
the slaughter was terrible, for the horsemen could make 
no further headway; and because of the blockade behind, 
of dead and wounded men and animals, an orderly retreat 
was impossible, and disaster inevitable. 

About the time the charge was ordered, the phase of 
the battle was such that the King concluded to move his 
headquarters into the village of Gravelotte; and just after 
getting there, we first learned fully of the disastrous re- 
sult of the charge which had been entered upon with such 
spirit; and so much indignation was expressed against 
Steinmetz, who, it was claimed, had made an unnecessary 
sacrifice of his cavalry, that I thought he would be relieved 
on the spot; though this was not done. 

Followed by a large staff. General Steinmetz appeared 
in the village presently, and approached the King. When 
near, he bowed with great respect, and I then saw that he 
was a very old man, though his soldierly figure, bronzed 
face, and short-cropped hair gave some evidence of vigor 
still. When the King spoke to him I was not close enough 
to learn what was said; but his Majesty's manner was ex- 
pressive of kindly feeling, and the fact that in a few mo- 
ments the veteran general returned to the command of his 
troops, indicated that, for the present at least, his fault 
had been overlooked. 

The King then moved out of the village, and just a 
little to the east and north of it the headquarters were lo- 
cated on high open ground, whence we could observe the 
right of the German infantry advancing up the eastern face 
of the ravine. The advance, though slow and irregular, 
resulted in gradually gaining ground, the French resisting 

—470— 



Memoirs P. H. Sheridan 

stoutly with a stubborn musketry fire all along the slopes. 
Their artillery was silent, however; and from this fact the 
German artillery officers grew jubilant, confidently assert- 
ing that their Krupp guns had dismounted the French bat- 
teries and knocked their machine guns to pieces. I did not 
indulge in this confidence, however; for, with the excellent 
field-glass I had, I could distinctly see long columns of 
French troops moving to their right, for the apparent pur- 
pose of making a vigorous fight on that flank; and I 
thought it more than likely that their artillery would be 
heard from before the Germans could gain the coveted 
ridge. 

The Germans labored up the glacis slowly at the most 
exposed places ; now crawling on their bellies, now creeping 
on hands and knees, but, in the main, moving with erect 
and steady bearing. As they approached within short 
range, they suddenly found that the French artillery and 
machine guns had by no means been silenced — about two 
hundred pieces opening on them with fearful effect, while 
at the same time the whole crest blazed with a deadly fire 
from the Chassepot rifles. Resistance like this was so un- 
expected by the Germans that it dismayed them, and first 
wavering a moment, then becoming panic-stricken, they 
broke and fled, infantry, cavalry, and artillery coming down 
the slope without any pretence of formation, the French 
hotly following and pouring in a heavy and constant fire 
as the fugitives fled back across the ravine toward Grave- 
lotte. With this the battle on the right had now assumed 
a most serious aspect, and the indications were that the 
French would attack the heights of Gravelotte; but the 
Pomeranian corps coming on the field at this crisis, was 
led into action by Von Moltke himself, and shortly after 
the day was decided in favor of the Germans. 

When the French guns opened fire, it was discovered 
that the King's position was within easy range, many of 
the shells falling near enough to make the place extremely 
uncomfortable; so it was suggested that he go to a less 
exposed point. At first he refused to listen to this wise 
counsel, but yielded finally — leaving the ground with reluc- 

—471— 



Extract 

tance, however — and went back toward Rezonville. I 
waited for Count Bismarck, who did not go immediately 
with the King, but remained at Gravelotte, looking after 
some of the escort who had been wounded. When he had 
arranged for their care, we set out to rejoin the King, and 
before going far, overtook his Majesty, who had stopped 
on the Chalons road, and was surrounded by a throng of 
fugitives, whom he was berating in German so energetic 
as to remind me forcibly of the "Dutch" swearing that I 
used to hear in my boyhood in Ohio. The dressing down 
finished to his satisfaction, the King resumed his course 
toward Rezonville, halting, however, to rebuke in the same 
emphatic style every group of runaways he overtook. 

Passing through Rezonville, we halted just beyond 
the village ; there a fire was built, and the King, his brother, 
Prince Frederick Charles, and Von Roon were provided 
with rather uncomfortable seats about it, made by resting 
the ends of a short ladder on a couple of boxes. With much 
anxiety and not a little depression of spirits news from 
the battle-field was now awaited, but the suspense did not 
last long, for presently came the cheering intelligence that 
the French were retiring, being forced back by the Pom- 
eranian corps, and some of the lately broken right wing 
organizations, that had been rallied on the heights of 
Gravelotte. The lost ground being thus regained, and the 
French having been beaten on their right, it was not long 
before word came that Bazaine's army was falling back to 
Metz, leaving the entire battle-field in possession of the 
Germans. 



-472- 



/ 



■J 



Battle at Gravelotte-StPrivatlamontagne 

Aususi 16 , 1870. 
Positions of the Infaniry and Arfillery.VTlondVniCorpsatSooPM 




French Line 



Scale 1:25000 



GERMAN ORDERS 
AND 

MESSAGES 



From 

August lU to 16, 1870. 



Translated By 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, 

Field Artillery. 



Message Colombey, 5:30 P.M. 

{August lUth) 

The enemy has attacked the 1st Corps outposts with superior 
forces. 

Zastrow. 



Second Army 
Orders: 6:30 P.M. August lith. 

The Xth Corps will assemble on the left bank of the Mosel, and 
will provide for the security of the Mosel valley in the direction of 
Metz. 

The Guard will assemble at Dieulouard pushing its advance guard 
as far as Quatre- Vents (on the left bank of the Mosel) ; its cavalry, 
now at Rogeville, will advance still further, maintaining liaison with 
the 5th Cavalry Division. 

The IVth Corps will march to Custines, pushing its advance 
guard and cavalry to Marbache, maintaining connection on the left 
with the Third Army. 

On the right flank of the army, the Hid Corps, with the 6th 
Cavalry Division will march on the 15th to Cheminot (on the Seille), 
in so far as this has not already been done on the 14th. 

The IXth Corps will remain at Buchy, so as to be also at the 
disposition of the C in C* on the 15th in case of a battle on this 
side of the Mosel. 

The Hid Corps will have its head as far as Han-sur-Nied. 

The Xllth Corps (Royal Saxon) will have its head reach Nomeny 
(on the Seille) and its tail near the high ground near Soigne. 



*Note: The C-in-C referred to is the Army Commander — C, H. L. 



—473— 



German Orders and Messages 

Message Near Tronville 

To IId Army. 1 :00 P.M., August 15th. 

Having arrived at Tronville at noon today I encountered superior 
hostile cavalry and artillery, who are now retiring towards Metz. 
Our light cavalry is moving still closer to Metz. Bredow's brigade 
will according to all information follow me. I intend to remain at 
Tronville, or beyond it towards Metz. I have no connection yet with 
the First Army. 

Rheinbaben. 



Second Army 
Orders: 7:00 P.M., August 15th. 

Yesterday evening, part of the First Army and the 18th In- 
fantry Division attacked the enemy before Metz, and threw him 
back on that place. 

The French Army has commenced its retreat towards the Meuse. 
The Second Army will consequently follow the enemy without delay 
towards that river. 

The Illd Corps, in compliance with instructions already given 
will cross the Mosel below Pont-a-Mousson, so as to reach tomorrow, 
via Noveant-sur-Mosel either Mars-la-Tour or Vionville. Its head- 
quarters will be at Mars-la-Tour. The 6th Cavalry Division will 
proceed from Pagny via Pregny and Thiaucourt towards the road 
in question. If the Trains can not cross over the suspension bridge*, 
they are authorized to cross over the stone bridge at Pont-a-Mousson 
until 7:00 A.M. tomorrow but no later, and then proceed down the 
Mosel by the river road. The Illd Corps ponton bridge is reserved 
until further orders, and with the usual security measures, to the 
IXth Corps, so as to enclose Metz. 

The Xth Corps, which preceded by the 5th Cavalry Division has 
today in part reached Thiaucourt, will tomorrow continue its march 
by the Verdun road, to about Saint Hilaire; Maizeray, and will recall 
as promptly as possible its detachments in rear at Pont-a-Mousson 
and in the Mosel valley. Its headquarters will if possible be at Saint 
Hilaire. The cavalry will reconnoiter beyond Haudiomont and 
Vigneulles. 

The Xllth Corps (Royal Saxon) will march tomorrow from 
Nomeny to Pont-a-Mousson, pushing its advance guard as far as 
Regnieville-en-Haye, its tail closing up to Pont-a-Mousson, where 
the corps will be billeted in mass, and where its headquarters will be. 
The cavalry division will advance toward the Meuse towards Vig- 
neulles and to the south as far as Buxerulles; it will connect on the 
right with the 5th Cavalry Division, and on the left with the Guard 
Cavalry Division. 

The Xllth Corps may cross the Mosel at Pont-a-Mousson after 
7:00 A.M. using the stone bridge, and earlier than this hour over the 
military bridge. 

The Guard Corps will push its advance guard tomorrow as far 
as Hambucourt; main body and headquarters (which will follow^ the 
route Villers-en-Haye and Rogeville — will be billeted in the vicinity 
of Bernecourt. The cavalry which will be pushed in advance will 
connect on the right through Buxerulles with the Royal Saxon Cav- 
alry Division. 



*This bridge unites Corny and Noveant. — C. H. L. 

—474— 



August 14 to 16, 1870 

The IVth Corps will push its advance guard from Marbache to 
Jaillon, via Saizerais. The tail of the corps will close up on Mar- 
bache; headquarters will be billeted at Saizerais. Effort will be made 
to obtain communication towards Nancy with the right of the Third 
Army. 

The IXth Corps will proceed tomorrow to the vicinity of Sillegny 
where its headquarters will be; it will cross the Mosel the day after 
tomorrow at Noveant on the Illd Corps ponton bridge,* and follow 
this corps towards Gorze. 

The lid Corps will have tomorrow the head of its column near 
Soigne; and will close up its infantry as much as possible, except 
that Soigne will be occupied by G.H.Q. of His Majesty the King, 
which at present is at Henry, with a view to crossing the Mosel at 
Pont-a-Mousson on the following day. Headquarters: Buchy. 

Cavalry divisions preceding the army should reconnoiter as 
they advance the approaches and exits of the Meuse. The 5th Cav- 
alry Division will reconnoiter for the Xth, Hid and IXth Corps the 
crossings at Dieu-sur-Meuse and at Genicourt; the Royal Saxon Cav- 
alry Division will reconnoiter for the Xllth Corps the crossing at Ban- 
oncourt; finally the Guard Cavalry Division will reconnoiter for the 
Guard Corps the crossings at Saint Mihiel; Pont-sur-Meuse and 
Commercy. Reports will be sent to me as soon as possible. 

My headquarters will remain tomorrow at Pont-a-Mousson. 

On account of the long marches required by the military situa- 
tion, I recommend to the Corps to form provisional companies out of 
the men incapable of marching further, adding thereto such officers 
and non-commissioned officers as are necessary, and to leave these in 
rear to garrison the principal points on the line of march, reporting 
to the commander of the Line of Communications — who is at present 
at Delme, and will be from the 17th instant at Pont-a-Mousson. 

The commander Line of Communications will be directed to 
relieve these garrison troops and order them to rejoin. Horses unfit 
to march will also be left with these garrisons, with such men to take 
care of them as may be necessary. 

Frederick-Charles. 
General of Cavalry. 



Illd Corps 
Orders: August 15, 1870. 

1. The 6th Division will march at 5:00 a.m., via Onville to Mars- 
la-Tour, and will be followed by the Corps Artillery (Left Column). 

2. The 6th Cavalry Division will clear the bridge at Noveant by 
5:30 A.M. and will march via Gorze on Vionville; it will be followed 
by the 5th Division (Right Column). 

Von Alvensleben. 

Note: The 6th Cavalry Division having found it necessary 
to cross the Noveant bridge in column of troopers, dismounted, failed 
to clear the bridge until 7:30 A.M. — C.H.L. 



*Note: There was also a permanent bridge available at Noveant. 
Army headquarters appears to have erroneously assumed that this 
bridge was interrupted. — C. H. L. 



-475— 



German Orders and Messages 

Message South of Vionville, 

To IlD Army: 10:00 A.M., August 15, 1870. 

Hostile camps are at Vionville and at Rezonville; the left of the 
Hid Corps is advancing on Jarny, with a view to proceeding to Con- 
flans. The 5th Cavalry Division is at Mars-la-Tour; the 6th at 
Rezonville. The enemy is in full retreat to the north. 

Von Alvensleben. 

Note: The above message was carried by an aide, who upon 
delivering it at the lid Army PC, dictated the following memorandum: 

"As the enemy is retreating in front of the Hid Corps, the corps 
will pursue rapidly, engaging its left wing first. It will maintain 
liaison with the Xth Corps. 

"The Xth Corps, which at noon tomorrow will be at Mars-la-Tour 
should cover our right flank towards Metz, and in a general way 
assist where necessary troops engaged." 



Message PC lid Army 

To C. G. IXth Corps. August 16, 1870. 

The Hid Corps since 10:00 A.M. is pursuing the enemy, who ap- 
pears to be retreating towards the north. Important that the IXth 
Corps occupy Mars-la-Tour early, and from today cover the right 
flank of the Hid Corps towards Metz, and be in a general way 
ready to support that corps. 

Frederick-Charles. 



—476— 



EXTRACT FROM 



The Siege Operations m the Campaign 
Against France 1 870-7 1 



By 

B. von Tiedemann 



Translated by 

Major Tyler, R.E. 



London, 1877. 

Strasburg 

(Plate VII) 

Strasburg, the capital of Alsace, with 85,000 inhabi- 
tants, lies about half a league from the Rhine on the River 
111, which has abundance of water, is navigable, and divides 
itself into five streams. It is a fortress of the highest 
military importance. It commands the passage over the 
Rhine into Germany, and has on that account been connected 
with Metz and Paris on the one side, and with Lyons on 
the other side, by railways, roads and canals. It is, more- 
over, an important cavalry depot and contains a gun-fac- 
tory, and an arsenal for the manufacture of carriages and 
artillery stores. 

The nucleus of the defences is the citadel, with its five 
bastioned fronts, built by Marshal Vauban in 1685 ; and this 
is further strengthened by two advanced hornworks, and 
a number of smaller works down to the Rhine, which is 
here 500 yards in width. These command the enceinte. On 
the north and south the town is enclosed by an enceinte 

—477— 



Siege Operations 

with long curtain and spacious bastions, on the system of 
Specie, which terminate on the parade-ground outside the 
citadel. At the places where the National gate and the 
Stone gate are situated, the defences project further out into 
the country, so as to cover the roads from Wasselonne and 
Mclsheim, and particularly that from Weissenburg, by means 
of advanced earthworks among which are the lunettes 52 
and 53, often mentioned in the siege. The main enceinte of 
the west front is of the same character as the line already 
described, except that bastions Nos. 10, 11, and 12, at the 
north-west angle, have counterguards for additional secur- 
ity. Two spacious hornworks are placed outside the west 
front so as to give it greater defensive strength. These 
and the two lunettes 52 and 53 are connected by a glacis 
common to both, which encloses the north and south fronts 
in a suitable manner. The profiles are designed with regard 
to the objects of the works. The escarps are 18 to 30 feet 
in height, according to the importance of the work. On 
this account, and as the ditches are provided with cunettes, 
and can be filled with suflflcient water, the fortress is to be 
accounted everywhere proof against assault. The greater 
number of the traverses required are in existence, but the 
quantity of bombproof cover for troops, warlike stores, and 
provisions is insufficient. There are no detached forts. 

Strasburg possesses an additional means of defence in 
the power of making use of the 111 for partial but effective 
inundation. For this purpose, at the spot where the 111 
enters the town, a large sluice is fixed. This, and the num- 
erous other works for the proper management and control 
of the water, are in good condition, and in situations so well 
covered, that they cannot easily be destroyed by distant 
fire. The ground in front of the south side of the fortress 
consists for the most part of low-lying meadows intersected 
by numerous watercourses. It can be placed under water 
for a considerable distance beyond the road, and the artil- 
lery practice ground. This is also practicable with the low 
ground along the foot of the glacis of the north front, and 
with the glacis of the enceinte of the north-west front. 



-478- 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

The ground in front of the fortress is flat, and here 
and there the view is interrupted by numerous buildings, 
and by plantations. 

On the west front, however, the ground rises, at a 
slope scarcely perceptible, to the spurs of the Vosges moun- 
tains, about a league and a half from the town. 

The railway which encircles the town on the south 
and west has two stations — a terminus inside the town, and 
a stopping place outside, at the Austerlitz gate. There is 
a third station outside the town to the westward. Fre- 
quent mention will be made of it during the siege. The rail- 
way crosses several streams running into the Rhine and 
passes over the river itself by a lattice-bridge, 309 metres 
(338 yards) long, built in 1858-61. The two banks are also 
connected by a bridge of boats. 

The interior of the town shows plainly its German orig- 
in and past history. Both are as evident in its architecture 
as in the manners and customs, both public and private, 
of its inhabitants. The magnificent cathedral is especially 
interesting, and is famous as one of the most remarkable 
monuments of German architecture. It was founded in 510 
by Clovis, destroyed by lightning in 1007, restored upon 
the plans of Erwin von Steinbach, and completed in 1439 
by Hans Hultz, of Cologne. 

Commerce is flourishing, owing to the advantages of 
the situation of the place. The junction of four lines of 
railway, and of the roads from Paris, Lyons, and Basle, the 
water-carriage by the Rhone, Rhine and Marne canal and 
the proximity of the Rhine, are of great value for com- 
mercial intercourse. 

Immediately after the sudden and groundless declara- 
tion of war with Prussia by France, it seemed as if Stras- 
burg was to be left untouched by the war, for it was evi- 
dent that the French invasion of Germany and attack on 
Cologne must be begun with the right flank turned towards 
Rhenish Bavaria. But when Southern Germany ranged it- 
self on the Prussian side, the situation of affairs was changed. 
It became necessary for the French armies to march 
off hastily in a new direction, and it became more probable 

—479— 



Siege Operations 

that Strasburg might be seriously threatened. All the ac- 
counts state that before the battle of Worth, the 6th Corps, 
under the command of Marshal Canrobert, was in and around 
Strasburg. After the battle was lost the corps marched 
off in the direction of Metz, and the garrison of Strasburg 
was thus so reduced that the place was left in a bad plight. 
Not even one company of engineers was left in the now- 
threatened fortress, and its garrison consisted chiefly of 
national guards. A great number of stragglers from the 
battle of Worth found accordingly a welcome reception at 
Strasburg, and its gates also opened for the reception of 
many thousands of fugitive country-people. The bridge 
of boats was broken up, and on the 22nd of July the railway 
lattice-bridge was blown up, and on the Baden side of the 
river. On the French side they only brought the swing- 
bridge on to the landward piers, and, in addition, destroyed 
several railway-bridges over the Little Rhine, at Neuhof 
and elsewhere. The preparations for putting the works and 
armaments in a state of siege were just commenced, when 
the enemy appeared in the vicinity of the fortress. 

After the battle fought by the Hid Army on the 6th 
August, at Worth, the pursuit of the retreating French was 
the first object. The division of the Grand Duchy of Ba- 
den, which stood on the extreme left of the army, and had 
not been actually engaged in the fight, received orders to 
advance into Alsace, and in the first instance in the direc- 
tion of Strasburg. 

On the 8th August the head of the division arrived be- 
fore Strasburg, It was believed that the fortress was oc- 
cupied almost exclusively by national guards, and it was 
well known that the preparation of the works for a siege 
was incomplete. Lieutenant-General von Beyer, command- 
ing the division, remained with the main body of the ad- 
vance guard a league and a half from Strasburg, and sent 
Major von Amerongen into the fortress, in order to repre- 
sent to the commandant the serious disasters of the French 
army in the field, and to demand the surrender of the place. 
The commandant, however, roughly refused the demand, 
and after this the advance guard employed upon this re- 

—480— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

connaissance withdrew to Brumath. The garrison permit- 
ted the enemy to advance undisturbed up to the glacis, and 
made no attempt to destroy the railways or telegraphs to 
Muhlhaus and Lyons, and this was now effected by us. A 
cavalry detachment of the Grand Duchy of Baden, under 
the command of Lieutenant Winsloe, on the 10th August 
destroyed the railway at Geispoldsheim, three-quarters of 
a mile [three-and-a-half English miles] south of Strasburg. 
Meanwhile the main body of the division approached, so that 
on the 12th August the troops had taken up their positions 
for the investment. These extended round the whole of 
the ground outside the fortress, except on the south side, 
where the work was done by some bodies of troops from 
Rastatt, who had crossed the Rhine to the south of Stras- 
burg. Kehl was occupied, and the communication with Col- 
mar broken. The French did not allow themselves to be dis- 
turbed in their preparations for a siege, on the glacis and 
the ground beyond. They worked on at the construction 
of traverses, the preparation of the ramparts for defense, 
and the removal of the plantations on the glacis, as well 
as at palisades and barricades for the approaches. For the 
purpose of interrupting these works three slight engage- 
ments took place on the 13th August. 

In the course of the afternoon some selected marksmen 
were sent up to the glacis, and materially interrupted the 
works there, without being disturbed by the heavy fire of 
artillery from the ramparts. About 1 a. m., a company of 
the 2nd Baden grenadiers (the King of Prussia's) advanced 
in the same direction, in order to drive back some parties 
of infantry, who had meanwhile come out from the fortress 
to the foot of the glacis. A musketry fight commenced, and 
by this means the object was successfully accomplished. 
The company, after the performances of their duty, were, 
in returning, followed by a heavy fire of case and musketry, 
and had three killed and eleven wounded — among the latter 
one officer. 

In another direction two small detachments of the body 
guard grenadiers of the Grand Duchy of Baden each led 
by a lieutenant, and provided with combustibles, advanced 

—481— 



Siege Operations 

at 9 o'clock in the evening against the railway-station out- 
side the western gate, and set fire to a loaded railway-train 
that was standing there. Two sections of infantry followed 
quickly up to the counterscarp of the ditch, delivered their 
fire at the troops who appeared on the ramparts and at the 
guns standing there, and quickly retired again. A field- 
battery meanwhile was brought up to 2,500 paces from the 
fortress, and fired upon the works which were lighted up by 
the flaming railway-trucks. The enemy upon this com- 
menced a persistent but perfectly useless fire. At a third 
place, as early as 11 o'clock in the forenoon, a company of 
the 5th (Baden) regiment had been for an hour under fire 
employed in the demolition of the enemy's works without 
experiencing any loss. 

On the 14th August intelligence was received of the 
issue, on the 10th of that month, of the following procla- 
mation by the Commandant-in-Chief, Divisional-General 
Uhrich : — 

"To the Inhabitants of Strasburg! 

"Disquieting rumors, and fearful reports, have been, intention- 
ally or unintentionally, spread through our brave city. Some people 
have even ventured to assert that it will surrender without resis- 
tance. 

"We therefore protest, in the name of the courageous French 
population, against such cowardly and criminal weakness. The ram- 
parts are furnished with 400 guns; the garrison counts 11,000 men, 
besides national guards. If Strasburg be attacked, Strasburg will be 
defended so long as it contains a soldier, a loaf, and a cartridge. 
Let the well-disposed be calm; let the others go where they will. 

"Strasburg, August 10, 1870. 
"The Divisional General and Commander-in-chief, 

"Ehrich. 

"The Prefect of the Lower Rhine, 

Baron Pron." 

On the 14th August, at 5 o'clock in the morning, a 
company of the 5th (Baden) regiment attacked the railway- 
station, and opened fire from the railway embankment up- 
on the workmen on the glacis. The fire was answered by 
some of the guns of the place, and the company suffered a 
loss of three severely and two slightly wounded. 

In the course of the day General von Beyer gave over 
the command of the (Baden) division to General the Baron 

—482— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

von La Roche, commanding the cavalry brigade. The di- 
vision was placed under the orders of Lieutenant-General 
von Werder, of the Prussian Army, Commander-in-Chief of 
the army corps about to be formed for the siege. 

In the evening the garrison attempted a sortie in the 
neighbourhood of the English country-house near Hohn- 
heim. 

On the 15th August, at 4 a. m., the Baden pioneers 
blew up the iron bridge which leads over the Rhine-Marne 
canal to Robertsaue, below the orangery. Field artillery 
fired from covered positions at the works of defence that 
had been thrown up, in order to destroy them, while under 
cover of the darkness riflemen swarmed close up to the 
ramparts, causing frequent alarms to the garrison. Lingolf- 
sheim, Wolfsheim, Schiltigheim, and Robertsaue were al- 
ready occupied by the besiegers, so that the place was 
closely invested on the west and north, and on the south 
as far as to Ostwald. In their possession were the railway 
stations of Brumath (to Nancy and Metz), Mutzig, and 
Colmar, and the highroads to Sels, Hagenau, Zabern, Barre, 
Colmar, and Basle. The communications of Strasburg with 
the country were as good as cut off. It was suspected that 
an underground telegraph line existed to Schlettstadt, 7i 
miles (35 English miles) distant. 

August 16. — Headquarters transferred to Mundols- 
heim. 

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the French attempted 
a sortie in greater force, with about 1,500 men, in order to 
drive back the enemy near Illkirch, a league southeast of 
Strasburg. The 8th company of the 3rd (Baden) regiment, 
under Captain Kappler, had pushed forward a picket from 
Illkirch over the bridge of the Rhone canal at that place. 
About 2 p. m. a French squadron attacked them but were 
repulsed. Immediately the enemy's infantry showed them- 
selves, while a heavy fire was opened against the bridge over 
the canal ; and a detachment of the enemy's artillery shelled 
Illkirch from a position in rear, and set fire to some of the 
buildings there. At the commencement of this attack Cap- 
tain Kappler had posted his whole company on the bridge 

—483— 



Siege Operations 

of the canal, and sent forward two strong non-commissioned 
officers' patrols by Grafensteden, and by the locks to the 
northward at Ostwald respectively, to take the enemy in 
flank. Major Steinwachs, commanding the battalion, sent 
immediately out of Ostwald the 5th and 6th companies, 
under Captains Nagel and Selteneck, as well as Gobel's 
battery. Kappler's company had for half-an-hour answered 
the enemy's fire with great coolness and steadiness, when 
the enemy's artillery advanced to within 250 paces of the 
bridge over the canal, and came into action. The comman- 
der of the company then caused a short and rapid, but ef- 
fective, fire to be delivered, and, as the supports had by this 
time come up, attacked with the bayonet. The enemy did 
not stand to receive this attack, but took to flight, leaving 
behind 3 guns, 8 wounded and 3 unwounded prisoners, and 
20 killed, as well as several articles of their equipment. 
This brilliant success cost the brave company but 2 wound- 
ed. A subdivision of Gobel's battery now crossed the bridge 
over the canal and shelled Weghausel, in which place the 
enemy had rallied on his retreat. The 5th and 6th com- 
panies, who then undertook the pursuit could not again 
come up with the enemy, who were estimated to amount to 
about 1,500 men — zouaves, turcos, chasseurs, and artillery. 

August 17. — The French attempted a second sortie 
against the Robertsaue, but were beaten back. On the Ger- 
man side the most exposed parts of the besiegers' positions 
were prepared for defense in a proper and suitable manner, 
and the approaches were barricaded. Field-hospitals were 
established in Brumath, Vendenheim, Oberhausbergen, and 
Hohnheim. Prussian railway and Baden telegraph officials 
took over the duties of their respective branches. The neigh- 
bourhood was requisitioned for labourers and intrenching 
tools, and in some places resistance was made and illwill 
was shown. This was the case in the rich towns of Ernstein 
and Morstein, which had in consequence to pay a contribu- 
tion, first of 150,000 francs (£6,000), and in the end of 
300,000 francs (£12,000). 

In the forenoon fire was opened from the Baden field- 
batteries, which had taken up a position in a line with Kehl. 

—484— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

The fire continued all day, and was briskly answered by the 
garrison. During the previous night a sharp action of 
artillery and infantry took place between Konigshof en and 
Strasburg, and outside the west front. Several houses were 
set on fire there by the shells. 

August 18. — Konigshofen was consequently brought 
within the line of investment, after a short action of ar- 
tillery. The fire from Kehl was continued. On the night of 
the 18th-19th August the Baden artillery took up a posi- 
tion close to the road from Lingolfsheim to Strasburg 
and set on fire some of the houses at Strasburg at the first 
shot, and the flames spread rapidly. The enemy answered 
with 24-pounder solid shot. 

August 19. — The fire was kept up from 16 field-guns, 
chiefly against the citadel and the adjoining fronts. It was 
opened at 7 a. m., stopped from 12 till 2 o'clock, and con- 
tinued again till evening. 

The fire was of course answered by the artillery of the 
garrison, who however, shelled not only the batteries, but 
also the town of Kehl, which lay exposed, beyond the line of 
fire. Lieutenant-General von Werder, commanding the 
siege corps, remonstrated against this conduct in a letter, 
in which he said: "Such a mode of warfare, which is un- 
heard of among civilized nations, compels me to make you 
personally responsible for the consequences of this action. 
I shall, moveover, cause the damage to be estimated, and 
obtain compensation by a contribution levied in Alsace." 

These valuations were, in fact, made in Kehl, and Gen- 
eral Uhrich is said to have replied that he regarded the bom- 
bardment of the city of Kehl as reprisals, on account of the 
city of Strasburg having been shelled by the besiegers' ar- 
tillery without the usual notice being sent beforehand. Ac- 
cording to other accounts, however (and this should be 
noted), Lieutenant-General von Werder, on the contrary, 
threatened to bombard the place fourteen days beforehand, 
and caused the proper notice to be sent 24 hours before the 
firing began. It was clearly, therefore, the business of the 
French authorities to pass this notice on to the citizens, and 
it was their fault that the inhabitants had not sufl^icient time 

—485— 



Siege Operations 

to prepare for the bombardment, and were therefore taken 
by surprise. 

It should, moreover, be observed, that in the absence of 
any detached forts round Strasburg, the besieger was able 
to place his batteries comparatively close to the fortress, 
and that, if he wanted to fire upon the works at all, it was 
quite inevitable that the town should also be struck, and 
should suffer terribly. 

On the 19th of August fourteen houses were burnt down 
in the city of Kehl (Stadt Kehl) , and the fire did still greater 
damage, comparatively, in the adjoining village of Kehl 
(Dorf Kehl). In the former place the church was turned 
into a hospital. Several shells fell close to the Baden tem- 
porary hospital constructed in Dorf Kehl. 

In the part of Kehl near the Rhine, especially in the 
neighborhood of the Fingach brewery, the brewery itself, 
the Palmen brewery, and several houses of the inhabitants 
of the upper classes, were destroyed. The Manner-Hilfs- 
verein (Humane Society) of Kehl worked with great self- 
sacrifice at extinguishing the flames, and those of the in- 
habitants who could sought refuge in the neighboring vil- 
lages. 

The bombardment of Strasburg from the left bank of 
the Rhine continued, and the result was that a more serious 
fire broke out in the Weisse Thurstrasse (White Tower 
street) . The desire, on this account, of the inhabitants for 
a surrender was brought to the notice of the commandant, 
but without effect. As it had become necessary to obtain 
French surgeons for the French wounded, a flag of truce 
with a trumpeter was sent into the fortress ; but as they were 
both fired at, and the latter wounded, the design had to be 
abandoned. 

A company of the 2nd Baden grenadiers, under the 
command of Captain Hilpert, had prepared for defence the 
outskirts of the village of Schiltigheim, on the side next 
the fortress. 

Towards evening the French made a sortie with two 
companies against the outskirts of the village, but were re- 
pulsed. The enemy lost three men killed and eight wounded, 

—486— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

and Ruth's company of the 4th Baden regiment, posted in 
reserve on tj^e Kirch-platz, pursued them as far as the 
glacis. The bursting of one of the sluices in the place caused 
temporary damage to the inundation-works of the fortress, 
but it was soon repaired. 

August 20. — ^The investing force began to make more 
extended arrangements for defence at Schiltigheim, as be- 
ing a point d'appui lying close to the fortress, and of great 
importance to the investment, having regard to the later 
operations of the siege. The approaches to the village in 
the direction of the fortress were barricaded. Shelter- 
trenches and covered positions for outposts were laid out. 
On the side of the enemy the works were masked by the 
plantations, which had been unaccountably left standing, in 
consequence of the hasty manner in which preparations for 
the siege had been made. The brewery in Schiltigheim and 
the glue manufactory in front of the Spital gate had al- 
ready been set on fire from the fortress, in order not to 
afford cover to the besiegers. 

Fire was kept up against the fortress from, both banks 
of the Rhine. 

August 21. — The head of the siege-train reached Ven- 
denheim. The train consisted of 200 guns rifled on the 
Prussian system, and 100 smoothbore mortars ; 40 of these 
guns were at once brought into action against the fortress. 
Lieutenant-General von Werder asked the commandant, in 
vain, to remove the observatory erected on tne tower of the 
cathedral, in order that it might be possible to save this 
magnificent work of architecture from destruction. With 
similar results he endeavored to have the military hospital 
moved out of the line of fire. 

The commandant sent out of the fortress, in detach- 
ments of ten men each, 100 Germans, who belonged to the 
foreign legion. Upon this, great dissatisfaction against the 
Germans showed itself among the population who broke out 
into many acts of violence against them. 

August 22. — The commandant asked to send the wo- 
men and children out of the besieged place. As this pro- 

—487— 



Siege Operations 

posal would have led to a great demand for transport and 
other inconvenient results, it had to be refus^. 

August 23. — The Kehl batteries, which had been armed 
since the 18th August with garrison guns from Rastatt, 
kept up an effective fire day and night against the citadel, 
and produced a conflagration there. 

On the left bank of the Rhine the town and fortress 
of Strasburg were fired into from all sides. The cannonade 
became heavier towards evening. The infantry kept con- 
tinually drawing nearer to the fortress. The pickets and 
outposts were obliged to entrench themselves in shelter- 
trenches and rifle-pits, to get cover from the fire of the 
enemy. 

August 24.— On the night of the 23d-24th August the 
Baden infantry advanced against the railway-station on the 
west front, and thus approached within 1000 paces of the 
fortress. The station was taken without any loss. 

In the evening the bombardment of the west front with 
siege artillery was begun. For this purpose the Prussian 
siege artillery had built 13 siege batteries (Nos. 1-13) dur- 
ing the preceding night, and had armed them partly with 
rifled 24-pounders, and partly with heavy mortars. The 
result was that two large fires broke out in the town, and 
a third in the citadel ; and the arsenal, containing the work- 
shops for the manufacture of artillery stores, carriages etc., 
was destroyed. The explosion of a small powder-magazine 
was also observed. One of the two mortar-batteries erected 
by the French on the island of Sporen was silenced by 
the Baden artillery. 

The same day there were twenty houses burnt in Kehl, 
and others were very much damaged. 

August 25. — On the night of the 24th-25th an exceed- 
ingly heavy fire was directed on the town and fortress from 
the whole of the batteries; ten rounds were fired per min- 
ute. 

It was determined to destroy a mortar-battery which 
was placed above the Rhine baths on the other side of the 
railway embankment, and had seriously injured the Kehl 
batteries. For this purpose, on the night above mentioned 

—488— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

one officer and forty-five men of the 6th Baden regiment, 
and three gunners crossed the Rhine in perfect silence, but 
were unable to effect their object, because the French had 
already withdrawn the pieces of ordnance to the fortress. 
The detachment accordingly set the bath-house in flames, 
and they were, in retreating, exposed to a heavy fire. 

The greater part of the inhabitants fled from Kehl. In 
order to diminish the danger from the falling shells the 
streets of the town were strewn with litter. Workmen were 
brought in from the neighbourhood, for three or four 
leagues round, to work at the batteries. 

The bishop of Strasburg appeared at the headquarters 
of the beseigers to beg for a cessation of the fire. There 
was the less chance of his wish being granted, since it ap- 
peared to be uttered more as a matter of form than as a 
serious request. 

About 11 a. m., the garrison made a sortie from the 
White Tower gate, with a small detachment and two guns, 
against the 7th and 8th companies of the 3rd Baden regi- 
ment. 

August 26. — Eight additional 24-pounder garrison guns 
arrived at Kehl from Rastatt, and were immediately placed 
in battery, and fired during the day and the night until 
4 o'clock in the morning. 

The bombardment against Strasburg was continued, 
chiefly from the battery of the Robertsaue, after a pause 
from 4 a. m. till 12 noon, for the purpose of awaiting the 
result of the efforts of the bishop to influence the inhabi- 
tants. Four several great conflagrations were observed, 
including the magazines and other buildings in the citadel, 
which were in flames. The fire from the fortress became 
comparatively weak. It had, however, destroyed utterly 
the greater part of the town of Kehl between the railway- 
station and the Rathhaus (town-hall), while the village of 
Kehl, south of the town of that name, had suffered but lit- 
tle. 

August 27.— On the night of the 26th-27th the num- 
ber of batteries on the Kehl side was increased by a mor- 

—489— 



Siege Operations 

tar-battery, which was armed with eight 50-pounder mor- 
tars. 

During the past night five Baden pioneers succeeded in 
destroying some dams which were intended to raise the level 
of the water in the ditches of the fortress. On account of 
the importance of the object and the danger of the opera- 
tion they were awarded a gratuity of 1000 thalers (about 
£150). 

Today, again, the fire was but slack from the fortress, 
while that of the besiegers was maintained with unabated 
vigour. A flag of truce was sent to the besiegers to ask for 
some surgical appliances for the citizens. This showed the 
great effect of the batteries of the attack, but also the lit- 
tle foresight that had been displayed in the town in prepar- 
ing for the event of a siege. The surgical appliances were 
given most willingly, and in return some ice was obtained, 
which was required in the hospitals. The mayor of Stras- 
burg in vain represented to the governor the desirability 
of surrendering the fortress. In consequence many persons 
began to abandon the city ; the greater part betaking them- 
selves to Switzerland. 

On the previous night the advanced posts had been 
pushed forward to within 400 paces of the fortress, and 
had there entrenched themselves. The object of this was 
to cover and conceal the construction of the first parallel. 
The artillery at the same time built ten batteries, which 
were numbered 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25. 

August 28. — The bishop of Strasburg made proposals 
for mediation. He came out to Schiltigheim where Lieuten- 
ant-General von Lescinsky the chief of the staff of the 
Baden army, conferred with him on behalf of Lieutenant- 
General von Werder., The bishop considered the bombard- 
ment was contrary to international law. His views were 
refuted. He begged permission for the inhabitants to de- 
part, and this request was refused. The request of the 
bishop for an armistice of twenty-four hours was granted, 
on condition that an assurance should be received within an 
hour that the governor would commence negotiations. He 
was also invited to come out and make himself acquainted 

—490— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

with the preparations for the attack or to do this by depu- 
ty. On his return a regular platoon-fire was commenced up- 
on Lieutenant-Colonel von Lescinsky, although he bore the 
flag of truce in his own hand. The flag was riddled with 
bullets. The attempt at mediation was thus quite useless. 

Meanwhile the bombardment on both sides was con- 
tinued. Captain von Faber, of the Baden garrison artil- 
lery, sank under his severe wounds at Korck. 

Both towards evening and during the night a brisk fire 
was kept up between the outposts on our side and the rifle- 
men of the garrison, who were posted in the covered way. 

August 29.— In the night of the 28th-29th, the shelter- 
trenches of the advanced posts of the besiegers between 
Konigshof en and the fortress were pushed on to within 500 
or 600 paces of the town ; a small sortie in that quarter was 
repulsed, and the fire of the guns continued as before. At 
noon a sortie took place, which was repulsed by detachments 
of the 34th Prussian regiment. 

It may be well to mention here that the bombardment 
proper began on the 24th August, and lasted, with some 
intervals, three days. On the Strasburg side the bombard- 
ing batteries, thirteen in number, were all situated on the 
front that was subsequently attacked, and fire was opened 
from 26 rifled 24-pounders and 28 heavy mortars. On the 
side of Kehl there were six batteries in action, armed with 
32 heavy rifled guns and heavy mortars. The other side 
of the town and fortress was cannonaded with field-guns. 

The effect of the artillery of the defence was not in- 
considerable ; the villages of Konigshof en and Schiltigheim, 
which were within range of the guns, were completely de- 
stroyed; the Galgenschzl had suffered severely, and the 
railway-station at Kehl was set on fire by shells and com- 
pletely burnt down, after the inhabitants of that part had 
succeeded with difficulty in saving it from a fire that broke 
out only a few days before. Of the destruction caused in 
Strasburg by the bombardment only the most important 
instances will be noticed here. The Krothenaue, the street 
leading to the gate of Austerlitz, the quarters De Pierre and 
of the national gate, the railway-station, the corn-exchange, 

—491— 



Siege Operations 

the artillery school, the cannon-foundry, the large building 
of the garrison staff on the Kleberplatz, the neighbourhood 
of the cathedral, all suffered severely and many treasures 
of art and science were destroyed : for example, the ancient 
and famous library, with its 400,000 volumes, and valuable 
documents and manuscripts, the museum of art, the col- 
lection of pictures, and the Neukirche, with its famous fres- 
co paintings. The damage done to the cathedral, that mem- 
orial of early German architecture, was happily not very 
great. Although the upper part of the roof above the arch 
was burnt, the interior was uninjured, with the exception 
of one glass window. The celebrated astronomical clock re- 
mained unharmed. 

The siege artillery were directed to spare the cathedral, 
and previous notice was given of the few shots that were 
fired, chiefly against the tower, in consequence of the ene- 
my having erected an observatory there, with telegraphic 
communication, whence the besiegers' works were com- 
pletely seen into. 

Serious injury had been done to the private property 
of the citizens by the inundation around the fortress, which 
was, however, a most efficient measure of defence. The in- 
undation placed the surrounding low ground and many of 
the cellars in the town under water. In the greater num- 
ber of the latter no provision had been made for such an 
event, and the entry of the water, therefore, caused great 
inconvenience, and prevented the buildings from being used, 
either as shelter for the people, or as stores for provisions. 
An attempt had, indeed, been made at Erstein, about 2^ 
miles [11| English miles] south of Strasburg, between the 
road leading to Schlettstadt and the Rhine canal, to divert 
the waters of the 111, which there flows through low ground 
intersected by many watercourses, and is connected by 
channels with the Rhine. An attempt had been also made 
to lead off the water at the discharging sluices of the inun- 
dation close to the fortress on the south front, at the point 
where the Aar, a branch of the 111, the 111 itself, and the 
Rhine-Marne canal, are united; and the destruction of the 
sluices Nos. 87 and 88 in the Rhine-Ill canal had been under- 

—492— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

taken, and had resulted in a perceptible reduction of the 
level of the water in the inundation and in the ditches. 

The opinion of the inhabitants, headed by the clergy, 
was decidedly against a vigorous defence of the fortress; 
several unavailing memorials were sent by them to the 
commandant, to induce him to surrender the place. The 
prices of most kinds of provisions for the inhabitants were 
raised to exorbitant amounts, and as the supply of beef was 
long since exhausted, people ate horse-flesh. A hundred- 
weight of potatoes cost 12 francs; and in this populous 
town there was neither butter nor fresh vegetables. 

The strength and composition of the garrison were 
ascertained. It consisted chiefly of fugitives from the bat- 
tle of Worth of the 21st, 23d, 28th, 33d, and 74th regiments, 
besides turcos, zouaves, spahis, and cavalry of every de- 
scription, and this peculiarity of composition rendered the 
maintenance of discipline difficult. There was among them 
none of that steadiness which belongs to well-disciplined 
troops, as might be seen from the way in which attacks 
were executed. By the burning of the military establish- 
ments great quantities of warlike stores had been destroyed, 
and by the vigorous bombardment the defensibility of the 
place had been very materially reduced. 

Although it was well known that General Barral, of 
the artillery who succeeded in entering the fortress in dis- 
guise during the investment, must have, in fact, had the 
actual direction of the defence, still the Governor (General 
of Division Uhrich) was acknowledged to be a man of hon- 
our; and it was not probable that this meritorious officer 
would be brought to capitulate easily, after having repeat- 
edly refused the summons to surrender. 

In this state of affairs it became certain, by the 26th 
of August, that the object in view was only to be attained 
by a regular siege, and that thus also the sufferings of the 
unhappy city would be abbreviated as much as possible. The 
preparatory measures, to which attention had prudently 
been paid at the very commencement of the campaign, were 
now rapidly carried into effect. 

—493— 



Siege Operations 

Accordingly, in order to be prepared for all events, the 
siege-train was despatched from Magdeburg, Coblenz, and 
Wesel. Its composition and the numbers of guns of each 
description were in every respect carefully considered. Ex- 
periments had been made by the Prussian Artillery Experi- 
mental committee with rifled siege artillery, especially with 
15-centimetre (6-inch) guns, and 21-centimetre (8.27-inch) 
mortars both of which fire an elongated shell. The results 
of these trials, and the use of demolition batteries (demoli- 
tions batterien), by which, with suitable guns fired at ap- 
propriate elevations, hidden escarps can be breached at 
great distances, were to be tested in actual warfare for the 
first time at Strasburg. 

In deciding upon the place for the artillery attack, it 
was contemplated that the batteries already existing on 
the front attacked would be maintained for the purposes of 
the bombardment, and especially that, from the Kehl bat- 
teries, which came into play about this time, fire would be 
kept up, because they were best adapted for operating 
against the citadel, and for rendering it impossible to de- 
fend the fortress in that quarter. 

For the engineer attack an engineer siege-park, which 
had recently been formed for the first time, was brought up 
before the place. 

Lieutenant-General von Werder, of the Prussian Army, 
was appointed to the command of the siege corps, with Lieu- 
tenant Colonel von Lescinski of the general staff of the 
Grand Duchy of Baden, as chief of the staff. Lieutenant- 
General von Decker was appointed to command the siege 
artillery, and Major General von Mertens was appointed 
Engineer-in-Chief. 

The siege corps was composed as follows : 

1. Infantry: — 

(a) The Landwehr Division of the Guard. 

(b) First reserve division, to vs^hich were attached the 30th 

regiment from Mainz, and the 34th (Pomeranian) Fus- 
iliers, vi^hich latter regiment, immediately after the 
declaration of war, had been brought up from Frank- 
fort to Rastatt, and had already been employed during 
the investment before Strasburg. 

— 49^1— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

(c) The Baden Division. 

2. Cavalry: — The 2nd reserve regiment of Prussian dragoons; 
the 2nd reserve regiment of Prussian ulans; and the Baden cavalry, 
consisting of three regiments of dragoons. 

3. The Siege Artillery, altogether 6,000 or 7,000 strong, was 
composed of 29 companies of garrison artillery belonging to the 
guard, and to the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 10th regiments, 4 Bavarian 
garrison batteries, 4 Wurtemberg garrison batteries, and 2 Baden 
garrison companies. 

4. Pioneers, (Engineers), altogether 2,200 strong, two com- 
bined battalions of garrison pioneers, which were composed of 12 com- 
panies of garrison pioneers from the districts of the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 
6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th army corps, in addition to two com- 
panies of Baden field pioneers, and a company of Bavarian garrison 
pioneers, which, however, only arrived towards the end of the siege. 
Colonel Klotz, of the royal Prussian engineers, was in command of 
the whole of the pioneers. 

When the formation of the corps was completed, the staffs for 
the siege artillery and engineers were appointed. Lieutenant-Colonel 
von Scheliha, of the general staff, formerly of the artillery, acted as 
chief of the staff for the former; and Lieutenant-Colonel von Wau- 
genheim, from the War Office, for the latter. Six field officers of the 
artillery were appointed commanders of sections, and 20 engineer 
officers were told off for duty in their own department before Stras- 
burg. 

The siege army was, altogether, nearly 60,000 strong. 
The headquarters ( Lieutenant-General von Werder) were 
fixed in Mundolsheim for the siege artillery, and for the 
business of the engineers. The division of the Grand Duchy 
of Baden had its headquarters in Obershaffelsheim and in 
Lampertsheim, where was the residence of H.R.H. the 
Grand Duke of Baden, who followed the progress of the 
siege with great interest. 

From the accurate knowledge the besiegers possessed 
of the whole of the fortress, the selection of the front of 
attack was not difficult. The north-west angle of the en- 
ciente was decided upon for the purpose. Its position was 
so salient that a comparatively narrow front of attack was 
admissible, and this front could be developed on ground al- 
most entirely clear of inundations. The parks were placed 
near excellent roads and other means of communication with 
the depots in rear. Thus all movements of the siege stores 
to a flank, which would have caused waste of time, were 
avoided. The citadel had already been terribly injured, dur- 
ing the investment and bombardment, by the batteries at 
Kehl, and, moreover, was of little use on the front selected 

—495— 



Siege Operations 

for attack, so that enfilade-fire on the attack from thence, 
or from the adjoining works, was little to be dreaded. The 
difficulties to be met with in gaining possession of the ram- 
parts, or in entering the fortress, on the front in question, 
would also have been experienced in a greater or less de- 
gree on all the other fronts. 

The siege park was situated on the right, the powder 
magazine on the left, of the highroad, north of Mundols- 
heim ; the engineer park was in Suff elsweierheim. 

On the night of the 29th-30th August, the first parallel 
was opened, and at the same time the approaches to it from 
the rear were made. 

The working party was furnished by the 1st and 2nd 
landwehr regiments of the guard and the pioneer battalions, 
so far as the latter were not required for supervision and 
other technical duties. 

The parallel rested with its left flank on the 111, crossed 
the road leading from Strasburg to Schiltigheim and Weis- 
senburg, and the railways to Paris and Basle — the latter 
line, as it happened, by the over-bridge to Wasselonne — and 
was thence continued to the south-western outlet of Konigs- 
hofen. It extended, therefore, beyond the ground covered 
by the attack, by almost half its total length, which amount- 
ed to 5,700 paces.* 

The distance of the parallel from the fortress was, on 
the average, 800 paces ; and this was a very favourable cir- 
cumstance, in comparison with the siege of Sebastopol, 
where the besiegers were obliged to execute the same work 
at a distance of over 1,600 paces from the works. 

The communications in rear, from the principal depot, 
were constructed in a zigzag form, with five returns, and 
occupied the ground between the highroad to Weissenburg 
and the railway to Paris. They were nearly in the centre 
of the attack. 

Some short trenches of communication were also made 
on the left flank, to connect with the village of Schiltigheim, 
which was very conveniently situated for the approach on 
this side. 



About 4,700 yards. 

—496- 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

The covering troops were posted, and the working par- 
ties marched to and fro, in accordance with instructions 
given for these purposs so far as local circumstances did 
not require a departure from the instructions. 

During the first night the parallel and the communica- 
tions from the rear were excavated to a depth of 4 feet and 
a breadth of 3 feet at the battom, and this section was wid- 
ened, in the course of the 30th August, to 8 or 9 feet at the 
bottom. Thus the breadth required for the trenches, as 
communications, was obtained, and sufficient thickness was 
also given to the parapet. The parallel was in many places 
cut into steps for offensive movements. 

Three engineer depots were also formed, one for the 
centre and one for each flank, as shown in the plan. 

The enemy permitted all the works to be executed with- 
out interruption. It was not till 6 a.m. on the morning of 
the 30th August, that some unusual movements were ob- 
served on the ramparts, but at this time there were already 
ten new batteries, with 46 additional siege-guns in action. 
These were batteries Nos. 14 to 17, Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
and 25. The bombarding batteries Nos. 1 to 13 also contin- 
ued in action, so that there were firing at this time 

30 long rifled 24-pounders, 
42 rifled 12-pounders, 
28 heavy mortars, 

altogether 100 pieces of siege ordnance. 

The enemy was evidently taken by surprise at the exe- 
cution of the siege-works mentioned, and was unprepared 
for them. This was apparent from the batteries of the at- 
tack being slackly answered. These were, however, in a 
position to enfilade and counter-batter the principal lines 
of the front attacked and of the adjoining fronts, and to do 
serious damage to the enemy in the temporary works thrown 
up before the siege. 

By their united efforts the batteries of the besiegers 
succeeded in silencing the artillery of the garrison in a very 
short time. On account of their great distance from the 
works, however, some of the bombarding batteries con- 

—497— 



Siege Operations 

structed early in the siege (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, ,12) 
ceased fire in the course of the day. 

During the fore and afternoon of the 30th August, the 
artillery of the garrison, after completing the armament of 
the front of attack, were able to renew the fight for a cou- 
ple of hours. Both times, however, they were quickly si- 
lenced. 

On this day and on the 31st August, the parallels and 
approaches were first brought to the section necessary for 
efficiency, and were completed. It became necessary, on this 
and on the following days, to drive out the French posted 
in some rifle-pits on Wacken, an island covered with bushes 
formed by the Aar, a branch of the 111, and by the 111. 

September 1. — During the night between the 31st Au- 
gust and the 1st September, the approaches to the second 
parallel were commenced. They consisted of only a simple 
trench on the left wing, and three zigzags directed on the 
capitals of the bastions attacked. In consequence of this 
the outposts were proportionately advanced. At the same 
time batteries Nos. 27 and 28 were built and armed. The 
enemy displayed great activity during the night, and to- 
wards morning commenced a vigorous fire of artillery. The 
fire was particularly heavy on the north front. 

The engineer headquarters were transferred from 
Mundelsheim to Schiltigheim. The batteries of attack, we 
may here mention, were placed partly inside and partly out- 
side the parallels and communications. In both cases, how- 
ever, they were so covered that they were either not at all, 
or only slightly, visible from the fortress itself. Those for 
guns were provided for the most part with flat or trough- 
shaped embrasures. 

September 2. — During the night of September lst-2nd, 
the zigzag approaches to the second parallel were executed, 
and were made in two separate parts, because it was de- 
sired to spare the churchyard of St. Helene, with its monu- 
ments. Lieutenant-Colonel von Gayl and Captain Hertz- 
berg, both of the engineers, were killed as they were in the 
act of endeavouring to improve the defective position of a 
part of the second parallel, which was too close to the ene- 

—498— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

my's works. The former was on duty as major of the 
trenches. The work was not quite completed when, on the 
night of September 2nd-3rd, about 12 o'clock, a brisk fire 
of artillery and infantry commenced from the fortress, and 
was followed immediately by two sorties against both flanks 
of the parallel. The French advanced with three columns 
against the right wing in the direction of Vendenheim, and 
attacked the company of the 2nd Baden Grenadiers (King 
of Prussia's), who were holding the outer buildings of the 
railway-station. A severe engagement ensued, so that the 
commandant of the trenches. Colonel von Renz, had to 
bring up the 1st Battalion of the regiment above named, 
who were on trench-duty, and drive back the enemy, who 
was superior in numbers, into the fortress. Captain Graeff 
was killed, and the troops lost 50 killed and wounded, chiefly 
in retreating into the trenches. The 2nd company distin- 
guished itself very much in this engagement. 

In the sortie delivered against the left flank of the par- 
allel at half-past 3 in the morning, the French sent three 
columns over the islands of Jars and Wacken, where out- 
houses and plantations afforded much cover, and then fell 
upon the 2nd battalion of the 30th Prussian regiment, by 
whom they were repulsed. The loss of the Prussians 
amounted to one oiflcer (Lieutenant von Versen) wounded 
and taken prisoner, and thirty men. A French officer and 
four chasseurs were taken prisoners. In these sorties the 
want of a greater number of steps over the parapet for 
counter-attacks was experienced. Rain coming on made the 
work in the trenches exceedingly heavy. The besiegers 
had now got so near the fortress that wall-pieces could be 
used with advantage, for which purpose wall piece detach- 
ments were formed of both Prussian and Baden troops, and 
were employed to keep up a fire on the enemy's gunners. 
The French fired for a similar purpose with wall-pieces, 
chasse-pots, and minie-rifles. 

September 3. — Extension of parallels, and construction 
and completion of batteries, 16 A, 17 A, 19 A, 21 A, 29, and 
30. In the early morning there was a slight engagement 
at the outposts, in which the besiegers lost eight wounded. 

—499— 



Siege Operations 

In the forenoon there was a cessation of hostihties for an 
hour, for burying the dead in the fortress. 

At Schiltigheim the castle-like monastery was con- 
verted into a hospital. Two new kinds of siege ordnance 
arrived at the park — namely, twelve short-rifled 24-pound- 
ers, and two rifled 25-pounder mortars. They threw pro- 
jectiles of enormous power with great accuracy. 

September 4. — The engineer headquarters were trans- 
ferred back again to Mundolsheim for official reasons. In- 
telligence arrived of the capitulation of Sedan, which was 
communicated to the governor of the fortress, in order to 
make him aware of the military and political condition of 
France resulting from that event. A thanksgiving service 
was held by the siege corps, and three saluting rounds per 
gun were fired by the artillery, in honor of the occasion. 

September 5. — The siege continued its course without 
any events worthy of remark. During the previous night, 
as well as in the course of the day, the enemy attacked 
with small detachments, to interrupt the progress of battery 
No. 33, the mortar batteries 31 and 32, and the other trench 
works. 

September 6. — At Schiltigheim a line of telegraph, 
serving apparently for communication with Metz, was dis- 
covered and destroyed. Subsequently, however, it was be- 
lieved that it had served for private and local uses. The 
batteries of the attack kept up a very heavy fire, and the 
fine Tinkmatt' barracks, behind the bastion of the same 
name, where Napoleon III. had made an attempt at insur- 
rection in 1839, were set on fire by shells. In Bischheim, 
also a conflagration was caused by the fire of the artillery 
of the garrison. The Kehl batteries kept up a heavy fire 
on the citadel and destroyed the city gate there, and by this 
means communication with the town and with its defenses 
was rendered exceedingly difficult. 

September 7. — In the morning there was an engage- 
ment of the patrols on the Rhine, in which a detachment 
of the 3rd (Baden) regiment took part. Another detach- 
ment captured at Machern, one-and-a-half leagues above 
Kehl, two vessels coming from Neu-Breisach with stores 

—500— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

for the supply of the artillery, including 30,000 fuzes. The 
boatmen in charge of the vessels were compelled to discharge 
their cargoes, on account of the low level of the water in the 
Rhine, and had set to work to do this without precaution. 

September 8. — During the past night, battery No. 35 
had been armed with two 21-centimetre (8.27-inch) mortars, 
which was a work of much . difficulty, as they weighed 150 
cwt. — namely, the piece itself about 66 cwt., and the plat- 
form about 84 cwt. These experimental mortars throw a 
shell weighing 160 pounds, shaped like a sugarloaf, and 20 
inches in length, with a 15-pound bursting charge, which 
forms by its explosion a crater 6 feet deep and 20 feet across. 
They are, therefore, very effective against bombproof case- 
mates. They were used in combination with battery No. 
5 against the redoubt in lunette No. 44, which work was in 
consequence soon abandoned by the enemy. At the same 
time batteries 39 and 38, and two emplacements for field- 
guns to fire over the ground in front, were built ; and a bat- 
tery (No. 40), for firing at high angles near the churchyard 
of St. Helene, was constructed, and armed with six 25- 
pounder mortars. 

September 9. — The birthday of H.R.H. the Grand Duke 
of Baden, kept in time of peace with a grand reveille, 
thanksgiving, and tattoo, was celebrated by an unusually 
heavy cannonade, on the part of the besiegers, from both 
sides of the Rhine. Besides the 32 rifled guns and 8 mortars 
in the Kehl batteries, there were in the principal attack 98 
rifled guns and 40 mortars in action. By the admirable 
arrangement of the artillery attack, for the mutual sup- 
port and concentration of fire the various batteries, that of 
the enemy was almost silenced. It slackened perceptibly, 
and on the fronts and lines directly attacked, a rapid mortar- 
fire only was maintained. 

In Paris a despatch was published, ostensibly from the 
governor of the fortress, according to which the condition 
of the place had in the last few days become very seriously 
worse, owing to the incessant bombardment; it has not 
transpired how the despatch in question found its way to 
Paris under the circumstances then existing. 

—501— 



Siege Operations 

September 10. — During the night of the 9th-10th, work 
was begun in three places at the communications to the 
third parallel, and a sortie of the French from the porte Na- 
tionale was repulsed by the 2nd (Baden) regiment. The use 
of the Stein Thor (porte de la Pierre) , which lay so close to 
the attack, was rendered altogether unavailable for making 
sorties, because it, as well as. the bridges at that place, 
had been entirely destroyed by the fire of the artillery. In 
the town several large conflagrations were observed. 

September 11. — During the preceding night the ap- 
proaches to the third parallel, on the three openings that 
had been made, were pushed forward about 300 paces. The 
artillery fire on both sides was heavy. There was a fire 
at the artillery school, and also in Konigshofen. Breaching 
battery No. 8 was constructed against lunette No. 53, and 
was armed with four short 24-pounders. 

September 12. — During the previous night the third 
parallel was added, 700 paces in length, which was executed 
by means of the common sap,* without using gabions, as 
had been all the earlier works of this description. It de- 
serves to be prominently noticed that the establishment of 
the third parallel and the communications between the sec- 
ond and third parallels by the common sap, instead of the 
full sap prescribed for their execution in the regulations, 
shortened the attack by many days ; and this arrangement, 
previously unrecorded in military history, was due entirely 
to the Engineer-in-Chief, General von Mertens. The gar- 
rison attempted a sortie, which produced no effect, and was 
of no importance. At the same time battery 8A was con- 
structed, and armed with four 50-pounder mortars, against 
bastion No. 11, on the front of the attack which was also 
shelled by battery 35. At break of day the fire of the ar- 
tillery was resumed, and kept up most vigorously. The 
position of the third parallel was such that it skirted the 
foot of the glacis of lunette 53, while it was some 60 paces 
distant from the foot of lunette 52. A kind of demi-paral- 



*The 'common sap' is not what is so called in the English Ser- 
vice, but the mode of execution adopted by us for the first paraUel. 

—502— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

lei was required to connect the two glacis, at their feet, for 
which purpose a sap had to be driven forward from the 
third parallel towards lunette 52. Further approaches 
could no longer be made by zigzags. The double sap (Tra- 
ersensappe) was necessary to give the additional cover re- 
quired on both sides. 

Breaching battery No. 42 was erected, for six short 24- 
pounders, against the right face of bastion No. 11. 

The Swiss, with the consent of the governor of the 
fortress, and of the commander of the siege corps, made ar- 
rangements for the departure of distressed families. Nearly 
800 persons left the fortress, with the greatest goodwill on 
the part of the besiegers. 

September 13. — During the previous bright moonlight 
night, the work at the double sap was continued with sap- 
rollers (Erdwalze) . The fire of the fortress reached as far 
as Mittelhausbergen, more than a league (about 4,600 
yards) from the place, and set that village on fire. In the 
course of the day an exchange was effected of an unwounded 
French officer, who was a prisoner, for a wounded Prus- 
sian officer, who was also a prisoner — ^^Lieutenant von Ver- 
sen, of the 30th regiment. Detachments of Baden infantry 
occupied the island of Sporen, at the south-east of the for- 
tress ; they made rifle-pits there, and endeavoured to estab- 
lish communication with the Prussian troops posted at 
their right on the Roberstaue, for which purpose a bridge 
was thrown over the branch of the Rhine. 

September 14. — On the night of September 13th-14th 
the demiparallel was completed, and was broken through 
for a return to the front ; this could only be made by a dou- 
ble sap, executed by means of sap-rollers. At the same 
time batteries 41 and 43 were built, and manned by the 
Wurtemberg artillery. The former was armed with four 
12-pounders, and the latter with eight 24-pounders, for 
firing against the adjoining fronts. Then followed the es- 
tablishment of mortar-emplacements Nos. 45 and 46, against 
the outworks lying near them, as well as the construction 
of 'dismounting battery' No. 44. An indirect breaching bat- 
tery, No. 42, was built to operate against the right face of 

—508— 



Siege Operations 

bastion 11, and armed with four short 24-pounders. A de- 
tachment of Baden troops, consisting of 4 battalions, 8 
squadrons, and 3 batteries, under the command of General 
Keller, was sent from the siege corps to Upper Alsace. It 
marched by Colmar to Muhlhausen, was attacked by the gar- 
rison of Neu-Breisach and some gardes mobiles, and, in 
compliance with orders, effected the disarmament of the 
district, in which signs of a popular rising had appeared. 

September 15. — During the previous night the glacis 
was crowned by the flying sap for 50 paces along each face 
of lunette No. 53. A second time the French made an at- 
tempt to occupy the island of Sporen in force. This day 
they endeavoured to effect this object by a sortie in force, 
apparently with 1,600 men, accompanied by artillery, who, 
after a combat of some duration, were driven back. 

At first there were only two Baden companies opposed 
to the French, but these, during the fight, were reinforced 
by Prussian detachments, and drove back the enemy, who 
left behind them killed, wounded, and prisoners. 

In Strasburg the want of provisions, especially among 
the poorer classes of the population, began to be felt seri- 
ously, and arrangements were made for sheltering those 
whose houses had been burnt in sheds built for horses. At 
the pressing instance of the clergy of both persuasions there 
was an armistice from 9 until 12 in the forenoon, to allow 
500 or 600 women and children to depart from the be- 
sieged city. 

September 16. — On the night of the 15th-16th the 
crowning of the glacis by flying sap, in front of lunette 52, 
was begun. At Appenweier, a railway-station, 2 miles (9^ 
English miles) from Kehl, preparations were made for the 
repair of the lattice-bridge over the Rhine, which had been 
destroyed, restoring it, in the first instance, for one line 
only. The flying-bridge at Ichenheim, about 2^ leagues 
above Kehl, was also kept ready to be brought down to that 
place. 

September 17. — On this night the crownings in front 
of lunettes 52 and 53 were prepared for action, and the ar- 
tillery displayed, on this occasion, extraordinary activity. 

—504— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

Batteries 17A, 19A, 21A were made in front of the second 
parallel, and Nos. 17B, 19B, 21B were made in connection 
with them. Batteries Nos. 46, 47, 48, %5A (all batteries 
for firing at high angles) were built, and armed with light 
and heavy mortars. Captain Dedebur, of the Engineers, 
with two resolute pioneers (sappers), had on the night of 
the 8th-9th September reconnoitered lunette 53. Letting 
themselves down by ropes into the ditch, they discovered 
three mining-galleries of the enemy, of which the entrances 
were just above the surface of the water in the ditch. One 
principal! gallery was found on the centre line of the work, 
and one gallery on each side of it. All three were connected by 
parallel galleries, and formed in the customary manner. 
This system of mines being discovered, was given up by the 
enemy. Only one mine had been loaded, and that was now 
unloaded. The gallery, on the right of the capital, was 
converted by working from the third parallel into an under- 
ground communication with the ditch of the work, and by 
the 14th September was made use of as a secure place of 
observation for watching the effect of the indirect breach- 
ing batteries on the right face. Information was thus ob- 
tained that the breach was quite practicable on the 16th 
September. This was not the only application of indirect 
fire to the formation of a breach, for it had, as we have 
seen, been attended by the best results from battery 33, 
against the redoubt of lunette 44, and against a covered dam 
at the Fischerthor, between bastion 15 and ravelin 63. 

In the evening detachments of the 3rd and 6th regi- 
ments of Baden infantry repulsed an attack attempted by 
the French on the island of Sporen. 

September 18. — On the previous night the fortress was 
bombarded with increased vigour. An advance was made 
into the covered way of lunette 52, and the redoubt in the 
place d'armes was found to be abandoned by the enemy. The 
descent into the ditch in front of lunette 53 was excavated 
during the night, and at intervals by day, and the timber- 
work was then commenced. The field telegraph was brought 
up to the third parallel, and the whole of the siege-works 



-505— 



Siege Operations 

put in connection with it. This was its first application in 
siege operations. 

September 19. — In the night progress was made with 
the construction of the descent into the ditch in front of 
lunette 52. 

Lieutenant Kirchgessner, of the engineers of the 
Grand Duchy of Baden, was killed. The theatre in Stras- 
burg became a prey to the flames. The bombardment 
reached all parts of the city, and destroyed a timber-yard 
in the citadel, and two of the largest and finest houses on 
the Steinstrasse, by fire. Immediately on completion of 
the crownings in front of the two lunettes, the artillery 
went on with the construction of counter-batteries, Nos. 
51, 53, 54, and armed them each with two 6-pounder guns. 

September 20. — In front of lunette 53 the descent of 
the ditch was finished, and the foot of the counterscarp was 
blown in by a mine. The breach thus caused was widened 
to 12 feet, and made practicable. The debris of the wall, 
however, only filled up part of the ditch, and about 3 rods 
(36 feet) of its breadth remained to be filled up to complete 
the passage of the ditch. This was done by throwing in 
filled sandbags and earth, and fascines and gabions loaded 
with stones. Towards 5 p.m. this task was completed, and 
a passage to the work was made practicable, about 60 feet 
long, 18 feet wide, and 4 feet to 8 feet deep in water. Ac- 
cordingly, the guard of the trenches that happened to be at 
hand consisting of some men of the Cottbus landwehr bat- 
talion of the guard, under Lieutenant von Muller, of the fus- 
iliers of the guard, advanced, ascended the breach that had 
been made in the 18-foot escarp, and effected a lodgment on 
it. The work was abandoned by the enemy, but the interior 
was seen from the works lying behind it. Lieutenant Fro- 
benius, of the engineers, reconnoitered the interior of the 
lunette. He found the gorge open, a great traverse, with 
two vaulted passages, erected on the centre line or capital 
of the work, and some guns. The abandoned guns were 
spiked by the artillery; and the pioneers (engineers) hav- 
ing found nowhere any mines for its demolition, the interior 
of the lunette was occupied. The enemy hereupon opened 

—506— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

a brisk musketry fire, from which the new garrison endeav- 
oured to cover themselves as best they could. At night the 
3rd company of the 34th fusiliers formed the garrison. A 
pioneer company, under the command of Captain Ledebur, 
effectually closed in the work by the construction of covered 
communications to the lodgment in the gorge, with a para- 
pet facing the enceinte. Mortar-batteries 49 and 50, against 
the adjoining works, as well as gun-battery 55, were built. 
In the captured lunette, No. 53 a 7-pounder mortar-battery. 
No. 56, was erected. 

September 21. — General Keller's detachment, that had 
been sent to Upper Alsace, rejoined the siege corps before 
Strasburg. Night and day work was carried on at the de- 
scent of the ditch in front of lunette 52, from the entrance 
down to the bottom, and many reliefs were employed so as 
to finish the work as quickly as possible. The slopes were 
revetted with gabions, and iron rails, properly supported at 
the ends, were used in its construction. The breach through 
the earthen counterscarp to the wet ditch was filled up dur- 
ing the day with gabions, sandbags, etc. At 8 o'clock in the 
evening preparations were commenced for the passage of 
the ditch. This was to be effected by means of a bridge ot 
casks, 120 feet long, constructed under the charge of Cap- 
tain Andraie, of the engineers. To prevent noise the bridge 
was covered with straw, and its construction was completed 
about half-past 10 o'clock. A working party of 100 men, 
under the command of First-Lieutenant von Keiser I., of 
the engineers, followed by two companies of the 34th fusil- 
iers, crossed over, and found the lunette armed with some 
guns, but unoccupied. Fire was opened upon them, however, 
from the line of works in rear, namely, the counter-guard, 
and the hornwork 47-49; but, though they suffered much 
loss, the work was pushed on with great energy, and the 
contemplated lodgment in the works was effected. Major 
von Quitzow, of the staff of the engineers (major of the 
trenches on duty), was killed. Captain Roese, of the engi- 
neers, had charge of the works for closing the lunette, which 
consisted of a lodgment behind the palisades at the gorge, 
and a communication leading into it. Inside the lunette 

—507— 



Siege Operations 

four 7-pounder mortars were subsequently placed, and it 
was called battery 57. The loss amounted on this night to 
10 killed and 38 wounded. During the day the bombard- 
ment was extended to all parts of the town. The prefec- 
ture was burnt down, and the fire in the Steinstrasse con- 
tinued its ravages. 

September 22. — During the past night the cannonade 
never stopped, and the bursting of shells in the city was in- 
cessant, causing much loss of life, and making everywhere 
sad havoc. 

Lunette 52 was captured; with it six 12-pounders, 
with their proportion of ammunition, fell into the hands of 
the besiegers. On the crowning a 6-pounder was placed op- 
posite the left face of the work. The losses of the last few 
days had made it necessary to advance the field hospitals 
(Verband platze). They were made bombproof by the use 
of railway metals, and for some of them Abyssinian wells 
were sunk. 

September 23. — During the past night the besiegers, 
making use of a dam that happened to be there, debouched 
from the gorge of lunette 52, by means of the double sap, 
towards the summit of the glacis of counterguard 51. At 
this point Captain Ledebur, of the Prussian Engineers, was 
wounded; he died of this wound some weeks later. All 
honour and respect is due to this officer for his gallant con- 
duct. He it was who, by a bold advance, discovered the 
mines in front of lunette 53, and who swam through the 
ditch in front of lunette 52 to reconnoitre the gorge of that 
work. 

On the same night a powder-magazine, which had been 
struck simultaneously by two French shells, blew up in 
battery No. 35. In another battery (No. 32), the roof of 
the magazine was broken through. In the former case 5 
cwt. of powder went off, and blew to pieces the gunner who 
was employed in the magazine. It was evident from this, 
that the bridge of casks leading to lunette 52, built on the 
night of the 21st and 22nd, would not last long. In the 
course of the day it was disabled by the shells of the enemy. 
It was accordingly sunk on the following night to the bottom 

—508— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

of the ditch, filled up with fascines, sandbags, and gabions, 
and remained thus a secure means of crossing the ditch. As 
it was exposed to an uninterrupted flanking fire from lun- 
ettes 54 and 55, a parapet was made on the left side, of 
gabions in two rows, one above the other, filled with sand- 
bags. Breaching battery No. 42 commenced firing against 
the right face of bastion 11. 

September 24. — During the previous night, breaching 
batter No. 58, for four short 24-pounders, was built oppo- 
site the left face of bastion 12, and opened fire in the morn- 
ing. The double sap, which had been commenced inside the 
dam leading to lunette 52 from the rear, was pushed for- 
ward as far as the crest of the glacis of bastion 11, where 
it terminated in a traverse that was met with, and which 
was prepared for defense by infantry, by cutting a ban- 
quette in it. Destruction by fire and ruin of every descrip- 
tion continually increased in the city; the citizens we're 
wounded and killed, by shrapnel and shells, in the streets, 
in their houses, at any business they undertook. One of 
the 21-centimetre (8.27) shells passed through three storys 
into the cellar of a house, destroying everything in its way. 

September 25. — In lunette 53, battery No. 60 was 
erected, for three rifled 6-pounders. A complete breach was 
formed in bastion 11. 

September 26. — A complete breach was formed in bas- 
tion No. 12. Bastions 11 and 12 were reduced to shapeless 
ruins by the fire directed on them, and at the salient of the 
later bastion an arched gun-casemate was entirely destroyed. 
The arch of the Steinthor was shot to pieces. The con- 
struction of the crowning in front of the counter-guard of 
bastion 11 was continued by the engineers. 

So remarkable were the exertions of the artillery, that 
it is only right to make special mention of the energy and 
endurance which these troops this day displayed before 
Strasburg, and to which alone it is due, not only that the 
artillery of the defenders was so held in check, that at last 
they only ventured to come out at night, but also that the 
engineer attack, conducted with measures as well considered 

—509— 



Siege Operations 

as they were excellent and vigourous, attained its object in 
so short a time. 

The various descriptions of guns which the artillery had 
in use before Strasburg were long 24-pounder, short 24- 
pounder, 12-pounder and 6-pounder guns; 21-centimetre, 
50-pounder, 25-pounder, and 7-pounder mortars. Altogether 
193,722 shot and shell were fired, of which 162,600 were fired 
from 197 Prussian pieces of artillery, and 31,112 from Ba- 
den artillery. Every day a train of thirty-two wagons was 
required to bring up ammunition. During the bombardment 
and siege, on the average 1,200 cwt. of metal (iron and lead) 
was thrown into the fortress daily. At the time that most 
of the artillery were in action — that is to say, approximately, 
during the last three weeks of the siege — the fortress re- 
ceived, at the ordinary rate of fire, some 6,000 projectiles 
during the 24 hours, and of these each one exploded separ- 
ately. Wall-pieces, served by some particularly good marks- 
men of the Baden division were made use of from the be- 
ginning of the siege. Wall-piece detachments were formed, 
and posted in the most advanced trenches, in order that they 
might operate against particular guns of the enemy. 

September 27. — On this day the defence was almost 
entirely silent, and only now and then gave signs of life. 
But, though this was the case, all were surprised and aston- 
ished when, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, white flags were 
seen to wave on the cathedral, and on bastions 11 and 12. 
At the same time, a flag of truce announced that the gover- 
nor wished to treat for the surrender of the fortress. 

September 28. — At 2 a.m. the terms of capitulation 
were agreed upon at Konigshofen, and the principal points 
were as follows : 

"Article 1.— At 8 a.m. on the 28th September, 1870, 
Lieutenant General Uhrich evacuates the citadel, the Aus- 
terlitz, Fischer, and National gates. At the same time the 
German troops occupy these places. 

''Article 2. — At 11 o'clock on the same day the French 
garrison including mobiles and national guards, evacuate 
the fortress and lay down their arms. 

—510— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

"Article 3. — The troops of the line and gardes mobiles 
become prisoners of war, and march off with their baggage. 
The national guards and the franc-tireurs are free on speci- 
fied conditions, and give up their arms at the mayoralty. 

"Article 4. — The officers and officials ranking as non- 
commissioned officers depart to such residences as they may 
select, on a written engagement 'upon honour.' Those who 
do not do so, go with the garrison as prisoners of war to 
Germany. 

"Article 5. — Lieutenant-General Uhrich undertakes, im- 
mediately after the arms are laid down, to hand over all mil- 
itary property, and the public chest." 

This capitulation was signed, on the part of the Ger- 
mans, by Lieutenant-Colonel von Lescinsky, chief of the 
general staff, and Captain and Adjutant Count Henckel von 
Donnersmarck ; and on the part of the French by the com- 
mandant of Strasburg, Colonel Ducasse, and by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Mangin, sub-director of artillery. It was ratified by 
Lt. Gen. von Werder. 

The Germans received into their hands, in consequence 
of this capitulation, 451 officers, 17,111 men (including 
7,000 national guards), and some 2,000 sick, 1,843 horses, 
more than 1,200 pieces of bronze ordnance, 3,000 cwt. of pow- 
der, 12,000 chassepot rifles, 50 locomotives, and great quan- 
tities of other warlike stores. The prisoners of war were 
sent to Rastatt. 

In accordance with Article 2 of the capitulation, de- 
tachments of the siege corps of all arms were posted during 
the morning between the roads leading to Zabern and to 
Konigshofen, while the French marched out between lunette 
44 and redoubt 37. The march-past of the latter was com- 
menced by Lieutenant-General Uhrich, followed by General 
Barral, of the artillery, and Admiral Exelmann, who was 
to have commanded the Rhine flotilla. The troops marched 
at first in their ranks, but afterwards in disorder. They de- 
filed past Lieutenant-General von Werder, in the presence 
of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Baden. 



—511— 



Siege Operations 

In Strasburg both Lieutenant-General Uhrich and the 
prefect had issued proclamations to the citizens, in which 
they expressed their sympathy with the hard lot of the 
inhabitants during the siege, and their confidence that they 
would accept the new state of affairs worthily and peace- 
ably. 

September 29. — The taking over of the property, bar- 
racks, etc., continued. The communications destroyed were 
repaired and opened, especially the bridges and gateways 
of the fortress. 

September 30. — Being the birthday of Her Majesty the 
Queen, and a day to be remembered after the occupation of 
Strasburg for 200 years by the French troops — the entry 
of the siege army corps took place, with Lieutenant-General 
von Werder at its head. This event was celebrated by a 
thanksgiving service in the church of St. Thomas. The siege 
cost the garrison some 2,000 men killed and wounded, the 
civil population some 400 or 500 persons, and the besieging 
army 43 officers and 863 men killed and wounded. 

Without making any imputation on the military honour 
of the brave and worthy governor, but looking at the mat- 
ter in a purely military aspect, it is a fact that the time for 
capitulation had not arrived. More light will probably 
be thrown on this point hereafter. The want of discipline 
was no doubt one cause of disaster for the defence, but it 
is nevertheless certain that even a better garrison could not 
have held out much longer. For to remain on the ramparts 
under the incessant cannonade was almost impossible; a 
breach had been effected, the citadel was almost destroyed, 
the entrance gateway of the city was shot to pieces. Under 
these circumstances, and as there was no flanking fire along 
the bottom of the ditches, an attempt to storm the fortress 
was almost sure of success. The capitulation, at all events, 
had the effect of preventing one or more assaults, which 
would have entailed more bloodshed and serious loss of life. 
The capture of Strasburg was of decided military importance 
for the prosecution of the war, but it was of far greater mo- 
ment politically. The German city of Strasburg had sur- 
rendered to us, had again become German, and would, it 

—512— 




J'rifLyn^^fU: S. M.t 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

was hoped, long remain so. In a few years the city, heavily 
though it suffered by the war — for its losses have been pub- 
licly estimated to amount to 50,800,000 francs (£2,032,000) 
will flourish again, and its wounds, which we inflicted with 
heavy hearts will be healed. 



Sedan 

(See map) 

Sedan is situated on the railway from Thionville to 
Mezieres, at the place where it crosses the road leading out 
of Belgium by Bouillon. It has 16,000 inhabitants and is 
an important manufacturing town. In the low-lying 
meadow-land to the westward there are many water-courses 
running into the Meuse, which flows through the fortress. 
A mile (4.68 English miles) above Sedan, at Remilly, the 
river receives the waters of the Chiers. On the east the 
ground rises to some steep wooded heights which make 
the approach from that quarter difficult. The fortress of 
Sedan lies on the right bank of the Meuse, opposite the sub- 
urb of Torcy, which is enclosed by fortifications consisting 
of four bastioned fronts. This bridge-head is united with 
the main work by connecting lines of a similar character. 
The citadel with its high profile, and the castle, in which 
Marshal Turenne was born in 1622, form the kernel of the 
whole. Several hornworks with ravelins cover the citadel 
on the east, and in front of them a spacious entrenchment 
has been thrown out, in order to bring under fire the ground, 
which is much cut up, and also the road to Luttich. The 
ditches are wet only on the south front, which lies low, and 
here, as in other parts of the fortifications, they have re- 
taining walls in good repair. The fortress may, therefore, 
be considerd as perfctly secure from assault, and an attack 
is not practicable without regular engineering preliminaries. 
However, the masonry is not everywhere sufficiently cov- 
ered, considering the present ranges of artillery, for a long 
resistance. Nor does the place possess sufficient bombproof 
casements for the garrison and the provisions. Moreover 

—513— 



Siege Operations 

the spacious and extended works on the right bank of the 
Meuse are not such as to receive the numbers of troops nec- 
essary for counter-attacks on a large scale. This is a most 
essential point if a fortress is to be of use in modern warfare. 
The stock of provisions on hand was in no case sufficient to 
maintain even for a few days, the great masses of French 
troops who were compelled to fall back upon the fortress ; so 
that, immediately after the battle, it became necessary to 
have recourse, by agreement, to the resources of the neigh- 
boring fortress of Mezieres. 

The fortress cannot be looked upon as having in itself 
any great strategical importance. Nevertheless, in its im- 
mediate neighborhood, owing to the unexpected course of 
the events of war, was fought one of the most important 
battles of the campaign of 1870, having results of the wid- 
est influence on its further progress. 

It will be remembered that immediately after the bat- 
tles round Metz, the movements and strength of MacMa- 
hon's army remained for some time unknown. Meanwhile 
that army had reached Chalons, and the Marshal had to 
march thence to the northward by the positive command of 
Count Palikao, the War Minister, with the object of divid- 
ing the German forces and relieving Marshal Bazaine, who 
was shut up in Metz. But the German Army, on the con- 
trary, which was advancing on Paris, closed up to the north- 
ward, covered its right flank with the Thionville-Montmedy- 
Sedan railroad and thus drove the enemy's forces from the 
line Stenay-Varennes, into the narrow space between the 
Mezieres and Sedan railway and the boundary of the neu- 
tral country of Belgium. 

In consequence of the victory won at Beaumont on the 
30th of August by the 1st Bavarian, the IVth Prussian and 
the Xllth corps, the situation of the French Army in that 
position became precarious, and they were compelled to 
concentrate immediately around Sedan. The march to 
Metz must be considered as completely abandoned at this 
time. 

On the 31st of August the German army undertook 
such movements as were necessary for surrounding the 

. —514— 



4 
I 



Campaign Against Fiance 1870-71 

enemy. They kept in contact with him, and the artillery 
of the 1st Bavarian army corps had an opportunity of 
shelling the French columns as they were retreating at 
first in some order, but at last in complete rout, upon Sedan. 

It was not impossible that the French corps in and 
round Sedan, threatened as they were by the German army, 
but still concentrated, might nevertheless endeavour, by 
a rapid march to the west or east, to set themselves free 
from their position. For this reason the German army had 
to draw more closely round them an unbroken girdle of 
investment. 

Accordingly, on the evening of the 31st of August and 
during the following night, the German armies were posted 
as follows: — 

IVth Army. — Right Wing. 

The Guard Corps at Carignan on the right bank of the Chiers. 

The Xllth Saxon Corps at Mairy. 

The IVth Corps on the left bank of the Meuse at Sedan. 

Ilird Army. — Left Wing. 

The 1st Bavarian Corps at Remilly. 
The Ilnd Bavarian Corps at Raucourt. 
The Vth Prussian Corps at Chehery. 
The Xlth Prussian Corps at Donchery. 
The Royal Wurtemberg Division at Boutaucourt. 
The Vlth Army Corps in Reserve at Attigny and Semuy, ready 
to stop the enemy if he should break out to the westward. 

Opposite to the position of the Germans the French 
on the same night stood thus: — 

1. Right Wing — 12th corps, General Leburn, at La Moncelle, 

Platiniere, and Petite Moncelle. 

2. In the Centre, on the heights of Daigny and between La 

Moncelle and Givonne, the 1st Corps, General Ducrot. The 
5th Corps, General Wimpffen, on the heights which com- 
mand the Givonne valley, rested its right on the 1st and its 
left on the 3rd corps. 

3. Left Wing. — The 3rd Corps, General Douay, from Floing as 

far as the hill of Illy. 

The position described an arc of a circle round Sedan from south- 
west to north-west, and extended over a line of 5 kilometres 
(31/10 miles) in length, about 4 kilometres (25 miles from 
the fortress). 

There was thus a gap on the east through which the 
French army, even if in disorder, might reach the Belgian 

—515— 



Siege Operations 

frontier. They accepted battle, however, and that opening 
was practically closed for the first time in the course of 
the afternoon of the 1st September, at Illy, by the Guard 
and the Vth Corps. 

On the morning of the 1st September the fight began 
with a general advance of the German corps towards the 
French position. His Majesty the Emperor and King 
halted on the hill at Frenois. In what follows we will only 
mention the critical events of this day of hard fighting 
in the order in which they occurred. 

The fight began at 4 o'clock in the morning at 
Bazeilles. This place was taken after several sanguinary 
attacks, and the enemy was driven back beyond Balan by 
the 1st Bavarian corps and Walther's division of the Ilnd 
Bavarian corps. The Emperor Napoleon was present, close 
to the fight round Bazeilles. 

From half -past 6 till half -past 9 o'clock the fight was 
pivoted on the position of La Moncelle-Daigny. The Xllth 
corps with its 23rd division took Moncelle ; about 12 o'clock 
Daigny fell into the hands of the same corps aided by the 
2nd guard division. The 23rd division pursued the advan- 
tage they had gained and the guards got round the flank 
of the enemy at Illy. All the batteries went up the cap- 
tured heights, and nearly 100 guns were in action on the 
right wing. As already mentioned, the connection of the 
guard corps with the Vth corps at Illy was completed about 
3 o'clock. 

On the left wing of the combined German armies the 
Xlth corps took Monges and thrust back the enemy on to 
his strong position between Floing and Illy. Here they 
came under a reverse fire from the Bavarian batteries 
which were posted on the left bank of the Meuse, north 
and north-east of Frenois. 

The corps-artillery of the Xlth and Vth corps came 
into action most effectively at Fleigneux. The Xlth corps 
and the 19th infantry brigade took Floing about 1 o'clock 
in the afternoon. The enemy made some vigorous, but 
unavailing, attacks with his cavalry. 

—516— 



Battle at sedan 

September 1,1870. 
Positions of the German Troops about noon 




■b IV Corps (]h7~^ 

— -^ ^^^^ ^ oavarians 

^^^ Front French infonhy Une 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

About 3 o'clock the enemy was in full retreat from 
different sides on Sedan, after Illy had been captured and 
he had lost the Bois de la Garenne. 

During the fight nearly 25,000 prisoners were made, 
partly by the IVth army; partly by the Bavarian troops, 
the Xlth, and the Vth corps, and 25 guns, 7 machine guns, 2 
flags, and 1 eagle were captured. 

On the French side Marshal MacMahon was wounded 
at the beginning of the battle, and, in the course of the 
action on the German side. General von Gersdorf, com- 
manding temporarily the Xlth army corps, was also 
wounded. At first General Ducrot became Commander-in- 
Chief of the French Army ; but subsequently, in consequence 
of an order from the Ministry, General Wimpffen, being 
senior in the service, took the command. The former, act- 
ing on instructions received from the Marshal, made ar- 
rangements for a retreat on Meziers, but the latter can- 
celled the orders. It was, in fact, plain from the move- 
ments of the French during the fight that they first intended 
to break through to the west, and then to the eastward. 
Round Sedan there were at the last 400 to 500 German 
guns in action. The fortress itself was only shelled by 
some Bavarian batteries during the later hours of the 
afternoon, and a forage store was set on fire. The Emperor 
Napoleon was taken prisoner; and the French army, com- 
pletely shut in by a force of twice their strength, unable 
to break through or to prolong their resistance after a 
council of war had been held under the presidency of Gen- 
eral Wimpffen, were compelled to surrender. The nego- 
tiations were carried on in the chateau of Bellevue at 
Frenois and concluded at midday on the 2nd September. 

Besides the prisoners made on the previous day, there 
fell thus into the hands of the victors 83,000 men, 14,000 
French wounded, 400 field guns, including 70 mitrailleurs, 
many horses, and military stores, besides the fortress of 
Sedan with 184 garrison guns. 

As a proof of the communication that existed between 
the generals of the French armies at Sedan and at Metz, 



-517- 



Siege Operations 

we may here add, for the sake of completeness, that on the 
3 1st August and the 1st September a severe action took 
place at the latter fortress also, Bazaine's army attempting 
to force its way out. 

As the Convention of Sedan was taken as a model on 
several other similar occasions in the course of the cam- 
paign its text is here given : — 

"Between the undersigned, the Chief of the General Staff of 
King William of Prussia, Commander-in-Chief of the German armies, 
and the General-in-Chief of the French armies, both provided with 
full powers from their Majesties King William and the Emperor 
Napoleon, the following convention has been concluded: 

"Art. 1. The French army, under the command of General 
Wimpffen, being now surrounded by superior forces at Sedan, give 
themselves up as prisoners of war. 

"Art. 2. In consideration of the courageous defence made by 
the French army, all the generals, officers, and officials ranking 
with officers are to receive their freedom as soon as they shall have 
given their words of honour in writing not to take up arms again 
during the present war, nor to act in any way contrary to the 
interests of Germany. The officers and officials who accept these 
conditions are to retain their arms and the personal property belong- 
ing to them. 

"Art. 3. All arms and warlike stores, consisting of flags, eagles, 
guns, ammunition, &c., will be given over in Sedan to a military 
commission appointed by the French General, who will hand them 
over forthwith to a German commission. 

"Art. 4. The fortress of Sedan will be placed at the disposal of 
his Majesty the King of Prussia, in its present condition, by the 
2nd September at the latest. 

"Art. 5. The officers who do not enter into the engagement 
mentioned in the 2nd article, as well as the troops, will be surrendered, 
without their arms, and drawn up by regiments and corps in military 
order. This proceeding will commence on the 2nd September and 
be ended on the 3rd. The bodies of troops will be marched on to 
the ground which is bounded by the Meuse and Iges, in order to be 
given over to the German commissioners by the officers, who will 
then hand over their command to the non-commissioned officers. The 
staff surgeons shall, without exceptions, remain behind to attend the 
wounded. Given at Fresnois on the 2nd September, 1870. 

"Von Moltke. 
"Graf Wimpffen." 

Metz 

(See map) 

Metz has 50,000 inhabitants, and is one of the strong- 
est fortresses of Europe, and, as a fortification, much more 
considerable than Paris. It has, during centuries past, 
been often besieged, but never taken. 

—518— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

The fortress is situated on both sides of the Moselle, 
which forms on the south the islands of St. Symphorien 
and Sauiey, and on the north the island of Chambiere. The 
river is navigable at Metz, is 200 to 250 paces wide above 
the fortress, but only 100 to 180 paces below it, and is 4 
feet deep; but often, after heavy storms of rain, or when 
the snow is thawing, becomes as much as 8 or 10 feet. The 
principal part of the town lies on the right bank of the 
Moselle, and is enclosed by a girdle of fortifications. The 
lines commence at the island of Sauley, cross from the 
left to the right bank of the river, and continue on that 
side until they reach the island of Chambiere. Here there 
are two advanced works, the lunettes Chambiere and 
Miellis, whose fire is directed upon the two arms of the 
river. Between the Sauley defences and the Chambiere 
lunette, on the left bank of the Moselle, lies the large fort 
La Moselle, consisting of two whole and two half bastions. 
This work commands the roads to Thionville and Verdun 
(Paris) as well as the railway from Thionville to Metz, for 
which the temporary railway station (Devant-les-ponts) 
is situated close to the foot of the glacis. 

The connected lines of the place turn to the east on 
the island of Chambiere, and from the eastern and southern 
defences of the town, consisting of eleven irregular bas- 
tioned fronts, with ravelines outside. The ditches are partly 
dry and partly wet, but in time of war can all be placed 
under water. This is effected by sluices connected with 
the small right arm of the Moselle. The enceinte of the 
city is covered by several advanced works close in front. 
Among these are, on the south, the citadel, consisting of 
a crown-work with a ravelin, and the advanced lunettes 
d'Arcon and Rogniat. These command the island of St. 
Symphorien and the ground to the south, with the railway 
works, as well as the road to Nancy. The redoubt du Pate 
lies to the east of the citadel to command the low ground 
of the Seylle, which can be made use of for an extensive 
inundation. The stream flows between the redoubt and the 
advanced work, Fort Gisors, into the town. The latter fort 

—519— 



Siege Operations 

commands the road to Strasburg and the valley of the 
Chenan rivulet, which also can be turned to account to 
flood the hollow ground. 

On the northeast of the town, between the roads lead- 
ing to Saarlouis and Bouzonville, and guarding those roads, 
lies the great Fort Bellecroix, consisting of three bastioned 
fronts, with ravelins. The left demi-bastion and the adjoin- 
ing bastion flank also the island of Chambiere, and the 
left bank of the Moselle in the direction of St. Eloy. 

In front of these inner works, which serve for the 
immediate defence of the town, at a distance of 3,000 to 
5,000 paces from the enceinte, are a number of detached 
forts, pushed forward on the surrounding heights and points 
of defensive importance. These guard most effectively, 
and at greater distances from the place, the roads leading 
to Metz. The traces of these works are exceedingly well 
laid out, and they have strong profiles, and the forts 
possess, therefore, almost without exception, great capa- 
bilities of defence. Their development of front is consid- 
erable. Some of their garrisons amount to 3,000 men, and 
the armaments in some of them to upwards of 100 guns. 
These detached forts are as follows : Fort St. Julien, on the 
north-west of the town, on a height about 770 feet above 
the Moselle, to command the valley of the lower Noseele 
and the road leading to Bouzonville; Fort Queleu, at an 
elevation of 693 feet, between the road to Strasburg and 
Seylle; Fort St. Quentin and Fort Plappeville, the latter 
named also Des Carrieres, covering Fort Moselle, and fir- 
ing over an elevated plateau 1,000 feet high, across which 
passes the road to Verdun and Paris. 

Between these four older forts a number of additional 
detached works have been inserted more recently, particu- 
larly since the Luxemburg affair in 1867, namely. Forts 
Embarcadere and St. Privat on the south, Les Bottes on the 
east of the fortress, on the road to Saarlouis, St. Eloy, 
between the Moselle and the road to Thionville, and two 
smaller works north of Fort St. Julien, on the road to 
Bouzonville. 

—520— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

All the forts, though their construction was not quite 
completed, were connected by lines of telegraph with the 
main work, and to some extent with one another. 

In the protection afforded by these detached forts 
lies the real strength of Metz, for they render it difficult 
completely to surround the fortress, and, owing to the great 
circumference of the works, make it necessary to employ a 
very large investing force. They secure the main work 
from bombardment, and the attack upon the enceinte cannot 
even be commenced until one or more of them have fallen. 
Finally, they give the main work the character of an 
entrenched camp, and allow of the concentration under their 
shelter of vast masses of troops and of rapid offensive 
operations. 

Metz possesses enormous military stores of every 
description, and was most amply provided with powder 
and with guns. As regards military establishments, it 
contains a military clothing factory, a depot for the equip- 
ment of cavalry, a laboratory-school, a school of fortifica- 
tion, and a powder factory. The manufacture of powder 
is a monopoly in France. The arsenal for the engineers, 
almost the only one in France, and two arsenals for the 
artillery, are situated in the Guisen entrenchment, which 
adjoins the citadel. These depots contained arms and equip- 
ment complete for an army of 150,000 men. 

The barracks of the engineers, the only ones in the 
fortress that are bombproof, are on the Konigsplatz, those 
of the artillery at the Chambiere gate, and those of the 
infantry in Fort Moselle, where also is situated the hospital 
prepared for the reception of 1,900 men. 

The drinking-water in Metz is bad, and tends to produce 
fevers ; during the last few years, therefore, an underground 
conduit has been made, which draws its supply from Gorze, 
two miles (9.4 English miles) to the west of the fortress, 
and brings daily to the place 10,000 cubic metres of whole- 
some water. Another, but a secondary conduit, brings 
water to the place from a collecting reservoir near Grave- 
lotte. 

—521— 



Siege Operations 

Metz was originally a German city. Under the secret 
influence of the priests, as at Strasburg, it was transferred 
by treachery into the hands of France, whose King, Henry 
II., in the year 1552, caused the city and fortress to be 
occupied by the Constable Montmorency. A fruitless siege 
was undertaken by the Emperor Charles V., and conducted 
by the Duke of Alva for a period of sixty-five days, against 
the fortress, which was even then of great strength. The 
place was first formally handed over to France by the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 

Nothwithstanding the great strategical importance of 
Metz in a war with Germany, and in spite of its important 
position on the actual theatre of war, the fortress was at 
the outbreak of the campaign in an unprepared condition. 
Serious preparations for a siege, as regards both the forti- 
fications and the artillery were first undertaken after the 
battle of Forbach, and for this purpose nearly 15,000 
peasants were summoned from the country to the fortress, 
who later on were unable to get out again, and consequently 
had to be subsisted. 

Under these circumstances it would not have been 
absolutely impossible for the Prussians, at the expense, 
perhaps, of heavy losses, to have established themselves 
in Fort Bellecroix, after the battle of the 14th August, 
It is another question whether it would have been possible to 
hold this position, situated immediately in front of the 
main work, when the French, after three days' disorder of 
their closely massed forces, had fallen back upon the 
fortress, some 160,000 strong, on the night of the 18th-19th 
August. The consequences of the battles of the 14th, 16th, 
and 18th of August were not known until after the capitula- 
tion of Metz, on the 27th October. In the French army, 
which had been beaten four times in succession, discipline 
was relaxed, the power of taking the offensive, always 
considered a special attribute of the French, was wanting, 
and the army required, before everything, a thorough re- 
organization. This was a circumstance that stood us in 
good stead, and prevented the French from making use of 

— g22— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

the advantages offered to them by the strength of the 
fortress. 

After the investment of the fortress by the 1st and II 
armies the preparation of the fortifications and the arma- 
ments for the defence were continued. The works in 
progress were in great measure masked from the investing 
force, owing to the extent of the circle round which the 
French field-army was posted. The garrison and the na- 
tional guards, together amounting to 30,000 men, were in the 
fortress during the investment. 

Fort Plappeville, as well as all the other detached 
forts, was strengtheend by the construction of traverses, 
expense magazines, and stockades, and brought into com- 
munication with the adjoining Fort St. Quentin by a covered 
road. This road was flanked by a lunette placed in the 
centre. The chief object was to complete as speedily as 
possible the works in course of construction, and to put 
the place in a defensive condition by completing the parapets 
and the gorges of the works, by constructing temporary 
bombproofs, and by clearing the zone of fire. In the main 
work only were the preparations complete for resisting a 
sudden attack, the gates and bridges properly guarded, 
the flank defences put in a condition to sweep the ditches 
effectively, the ramparts prepared for defence by infantry 
and artillery, and the glacis cleared. The field army out- 
side the fortress had in their possession about 25 or 30 
farms and villages. They secured themselves in these by 
barricading the entrances and provided for eventually 
placing the outposts in security by shelter-trenches covered 
from the view of the enemy outside. Ground that afforded 
natural or artificial cover was arranged for defence as, 
for example, the railway embankment at Montigny on the 
south of the fortress, and the park and chateau of Ladon- 
champ on the north. Communications were stopped up, 
where necessary, by abattis; new routes for troops were 
made through the copses, and pontoon bridges, as, for in- 
stance, at Moulines, were thrown across the Moselle to 
connect the two sides of the river. As sorties might have 



Siege Operations 

to be made on a large scale, the number of communications 
over the river was increased, and for this purpose some 
bridge-trains, that had opportunely come within the limits 
of the fortress in the general retreat of the Army, afforded 
the means. 

As the hills around the fortress were occupied by 'the 
forts, and afforded excellent sites from which to observe 
the Prussian position, special observatories were not 
erected. The highest traverses in the works were used for 
this purpose. 

Lodging of the Troops. — While the field army was 
accommodated in camps and in the strongly occupied farms 
and villages that lay around, the barracks were occupied by 
the war garrison in Metz and in the forts in the manner 
customary in time of war. But even with great crowding 
the total accommodation available in them was insufficient, 
and it was necessary to convert to this use the magnificent 
cathedral of St. Stephan, celebrated for its fine stained 
glass and its tower 350 feet high, and the churches of St. 
Eucaire and St. Segolene. The most important camps were 
on the north-east slope of Mount St. Quentin, south of the 
fortress near Fort Embarcadere and St. Queleu, and north- 
east of Metz, between Forts St. Julien and Les Bottes. The 
ground used for these camps was, however, hilly, and as 
it was the wet season, this caused the water to accumulate 
and made swamps of the camping-grounds, thus rendering 
the sleeping-places unhealthy. 

All authorities agree that the fortress was amply pro- 
visioned for its ow^n war garrison of 30,000 men for three 
months, and received further supplies from a number of 
provision trains, that were orignally destined for the 
French army that marched out to the west of Metz, but 
after the first battles on the German frontier, were stopped 
on their road and retained in the fortress. From Paris, 
particularly at this time, immense convoys arrived for the 
fortress was intended to form the base of operations for 
the army on the Rhine. The position of affairs was changed 
after the battles around Metz, when the fortress was 

—524— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

blockaded and all communication with the outside was 
cut off. The great masses of cavalry enclosed in the 
blockade, having a strength of some 24,000 horses, must 
have suffered most. Their evil plight first became apparent 
in the early part of September. Subsequently, lean horses 
were driven beyond the outposts, and the slaughter 
of the better ones began about this time. The rations for 
the men became scarcer by degrees, and by the end of 
August engagements of the outposts took place with the 
object of obtaining all the provisions out of the villages and 
digging up potatoes in the country round. In Nouilly, three- 
quarters of a mile (3^ miles English) eastward from Metz, 
large stores of provisions intended for the French were 
discovered by the Prussians. The French, it is true, kept 
up for a long time their communication with the country, 
which ended, when discovered by the Prussians in the 
destruction of the villages concerned. Thus the Prussians 
burnt the village of Peltre, and blew up with dynamite a 
farm there called Le Grange aux Bois because it was evi- 
dently useful to the French in their foraging expeditions. 
The beef was generally reserved for the hospitals. The 
water for drinking in Metz had to be filtered after the 
destruction of the' conduit near Gorze, in order to render 
it at all drinkable; but, on the other hand, the wine was 
not all 8*one, and there was some left up to the time of the 
surrender. 

In the second half of September the soldiers received 
half rations of horseflesh. The want of salt, however, pre- 
vented the meat from being pickled in the regular manner, 
and preserved in this way it did not answer their expecta- 
tions because they had neglected to slaughter the horses at 
the right time for this purpose. There was great scarcity 
of straw for bedding, the supply being barely sufficient 
for the sick and wounded. 

In the beginning of October, for want of forage, the 
field batteries were reduced from 6 to 4 guns, and a kind 
of influenza carried off many horses, Who fell victims to 
disease partly owing to the length of time they were in 

—525— 



Siege Operations 

bivouac in very bad weather and to want of care, and 
partly owing to change of diet, as they had barley and corn 
in their food. The rinderpest coming on carried off all 
that were left of the cattle. 

The distress became worse as the investment was pro- 
longed. At first 400, then 300 grammes (about three- 
fifths of a pound of horseflesh and bread were served out to 
each man as his daily ration. The field army was, in this 
respect, much worse off than the garrison of the fortress, 
of whom none during the investment suffered actual hunger. 
At the end of October the commandant established a sys- 
tem of rations for the inhabitants, and fixed the price of 
provisions for them, and they shared the sufferings of the 
garrison with a praiseworthy spirit and endurance. At 
this time in Metz butter was 14 francs the pound, meat 
and bacon 8 francs the pound, potatoes 20 sous, horseflesh 
20 sous, an egg 15 sous, a schoppen (pint) of milk 14 
sous, and lastly a pound of salt 20 francs. The fourteen 
corn mills in Metz remained at work to within two days 
of the capitulation. It may be assumed that during the in- 
vestment nearly 20,000 horses were slaughtered. 

Hospitals. — Owing to the great numbers of sick and 
wounded, which daily increased during the investment, and 
at the capitulation amounted to 20,000 men, the energies 
of the medical branch were taxed to the uttermost; and, 
particularly, a great want of hospital attendants was ex- 
perienced. The military hospitals for 1,900 sick soon proved 
insufficient, and, as early as the beginning of September, 
it became necessary also to quarter the sick and wounded 
in the barracks of the engineers, the artillery barracks of 
the Chambieres gate, the civil hospitals, the churches of 
St. Martin, St. Maximin, and St. Vincent, and in many 
private houses. In front of the Palais de Justice, close to 
the Porte Serpenoise, 336 tents were pitched for the sick; 
and, on the parade near the artillery barracks, there were 
collected 288 railway goods wagons, in which 3,500 sick 
were lodged. In particular diarrhoea, dysentery, typhus, 
and scurvy made their appearance, the last in consequence 

—526— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

of not having salt, and owing to the want of variety in the 
diet; but, it should be observed that the dreaded and dan- 
gerous miasmi from the neighboring battle-fields and the 
numbers of unburied carcases of horses turned out to have 
less effect on health than was naturally anticipated; a 
blessing for which apparently thanks were due to the cold 
weather in September and October. The result in this 
respect was different with regard to the stagnant inunda- 
tions of the Seylle on the south of the town. As 
early as the first half of September, Marshal Bazaine 
requested Prince Frederick Charles to allow the sick and 
wounded in Metz to be sent away to the interior of France, 
which request was naturally refused. A similar reply was 
given to his request at the beginning of September that 
surgeons with medical appliances might be sent into Metz. 
The inhabitants of Metz endeavoured to alleviate the suffer- 
ings of the French sick and wounded soldiers with all their 
power, and the troops had to thank the wives- and daugh- 
ters of the inhabitants that it was found possible to distrib- 
uate large stores of winter clothing to the army. 

Intelligence Department. — Owing to the large military 
traffic by rail to and from the theatre of war, the postal 
service during the first half of August got into the greatest 
confusion, and with the commencement of the investment 
all communication of the French army with Paris, the 
neighbouring French fortresses and the adjoining country, 
was cut off. Nevertheless various expedients were adopted 
to keep up the communication with the government in Paris 
and with the military headquarters of France. Carrier- 
pigeons and spies were made use of. One of the latter, 
disguised as a Franciscan monk, fell into the hands of the 
1st Prussian army on the 4th August, and with him a cor- 
respondence between Marshals Bazaine, Palikao, Trochu, 
and MacMahon. The French tried to send news on wood- 
floats, and concealed in pigs' bladders, down the Moselle to 
Thionville. Many gas-balloons were sent up, of which one 
came into the hands of the Prussians in the neighborhood 
of Paully, 2 miles (9^ English miles) north-east of Metz. 

—527— 



Siege Operations 

By this means, however, no serviceable intelligence of a 
trustworthy character was obtained of the French army. 
Generally, this post was sent up at night, so as the better 
and more securely to cross the investing lines of the Prus- 
sians. 

The works of fortification of the blockading army had 
for their object to prevent surprise by an advance of the 
enemy in force, and to detain them long enough to permit 
of the troops being concentrated in sufficient numbers. The 
French had the advantage, that they could choose what 
point they liked in the circle of investment, and there make 
a sortie. The Prussians, on the other hand, besides being 
fewer in number, were at a disadvantage in having to be 
ready to receive an attack from the French throughout the 
whole circle of the investment. It became necessary, there- 
fore, that the Prussians should be able to concentrate on 
any point in the shortest possible time. For this purpose 
bridges were thrown over the Moselle above and below the 
fortress, for instance, at Argency, Hauconcourt, and sev- 
eral other places; roads for troops were traced or cut, and 
all the special arrangements suitable for the attainment of 
this object were made. After the battles of the 16th and 
18th August, notwithstanding that movements to the rear 
had again become necessary in some cases, the complete 
investment of the positions held by the enemy was accom- 
plished rapidly and with the accustomed precision. The 
headquarters of the army corps were placed in communica- 
tion with one another, and with the headquarters of the 
arlmy by means of lines of field telegraph, and the technical 
troops charged with this duty had thus a very wide field 
of activity, and one that was intimately associated with 
the military operations. The existing French telegraph 
lines and railways leading to Thionville and Paris and to 
Strasburg were destroyed, and their materials were used 
for the purposes of the investment. The intercourse with 
the fortress by means of the flag of truce was reduced to 
a minimum after the French, contrary to every custom of 
war, had fired upon some of the bearers. This happened 

—528— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

on the 19th August to Lieutenant-Colonel von Ver — and 
Captain von Winterf ield, on the 24th August to First Lieu- 
tenant von Kurowsky, and on the 1st October to Lieutenants 
von Roder and Manegold. 

Observatories were set up on the highest points of the 
ground, and two artillery officers provided with good tele- 
scopes did duty in each. Each army corps had its own; 
such was, for instance, that on the hill of Le Horimont south 
of the village of Feves, If miles (8.2 miles English), 
north-west of Metz, whence a complete view was obtained 
over the broad plain of the valley to the north of the fortress 
and the French bivouacs there, and which was of eminent 
service. 

As it was expected that the blockaded army of the 
French intended to break out in a northerly direction 
towards Thionville, the main point was to watch the for- 
tress, and therefore its investment was completed before 
any idea was entertained of following up this operation 
immediately with a bombardment. 

As long as the French held Metz, the railway com- 
munication by the lines Saarbruck to Metz and Nancy on 
the one hand, and Metz to Thionville on the other, was 
interrupted. The construction was, therefore, commenced 
of a railway from Remilly to Pont-a-Mousson, so as to work 
round the railway junction at Metz. Accordingly on the 
9th August Captain Golz of the general staff received 
orders, in conjunction with field railway detachments No. 
1, under Commissioner Dircksen, and No. 4, under Super- 
intending Engineer Menen to restore the communication 
with Saarbruck out of the partly destroyed line from 
Saarbruck to Remilly, and next to construct a new railroad 
passing to the south of Metz from Remilly to Pont-a-Mous- 
son. The first portion of this order being executed by the 
13th August, the preparations for, and the setting out of the 
new junction line, about 5 miles (23^ miles English) in 
length, were commenced on the 14th. The actual comple- 
tion of the united lines took place on the 23rd September, 
or in round numbers after 5 weeks work. The road was a 

—529— 



Siege Operations 

single line with a formation-width of 12 feet. Among the 
larger works were two viaducts near Remilly, of which the 
largest was about 350 feet long and 22 feet high, besides 
two bridges over the Moselle and its affluent the Seylle. 
All these works were made of timber. 

Immediately after the battle of Gravelotte, on the 
18th August, the positions of the outposts on either side 
were not finally determined. Backward and forward move- 
ments of the opposing forces took place. On the night of 
the 19th-20th August the French for the first time took up 
in force the positions which they held, with few exceptions 
apparently unaltered, during the whole of the investment. 
The length of the circumference occupied by the Prussian 
outposts was nearly 6 miles (28 English miles), and that 
occupied by the main body, consequently, 8 miles (37| 
English miles). Without telegraphic communication the 
success of a sudden attempt of the French in force to break 
through would not have been improbable under the circum- 
stances above mentioned. 

The troops were at first quartered in open bivouacs 
and in huts of brushwood ; but, by the middle of September, 
they were, as far as practicable, lodged in conveniently 
situated close contonments. For the outposts and pickets 
weather-screens and huts of brushwood and other materials 
were erected, and houses and stables conveniently situated 
were also made use of; but, in spite of all, the troops suf- 
fered terribly from the inclemency of the weather. As 
Gorze lay within the lines of investment, the waterworks 
there could not remain unnoticed or concealed. By the end 
of August they were destroyed. 

The arrangements for defence which were undertaken 
on the part of the besiegers consisted in the formation of 
the ground in various ways so as to adapt it to the tactical 
conditions mentioned in the beginning of this section. The 
limits of this book would be far exceeded, if we were to 
enter upon the details. Some general observations will 
suffice. 

—530— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

Outposts and pickets lay in shelter-trenches, or in 
hollows in the ground provided with banquettes for this 
purpose, according as hollow roads, gravel-pits, or the 
ditches of high roads presented themselves. By a singular 
accident, the shelter-trenches which were constructed by 
the enemy, on their retreat during the battle of Gravelotte 
towards evening on the 18th August, were used for a long 
time by the Prussian outposts. The French are very ready 
at making such trenches in a short time. A similar thing 
happened with regard to a battery between St. Privat and 
Amanvillers, which on the same day had been of great 
service to the French, but was now turned towards the 
fortress. In front of all was formed a sort of line of 
obstructions. 

The Prussian outposts were partly armed with chasse- 
pot rifles, on account of their great range. Routes for 
columns of troops were made where necessary, roads were im- 
proved, and the edges of woods were obstructed by abattis 
and rendered impassable. Farms situated in important 
places, especially those from which fire could be directed 
on the roads by which the enemy would advance, as at Ortly, 
Tournebide, Frescati — both the latter on the south of the 
fortress — were prepared for defence; that is to say, loop- 
holes were cut in the masonry, the entrances were barricaded 
and they were made secure with palisades. Favourable 
situations for artillery were made use of for the erection 
of the larger batteries, or were prepared by excavation for 
the reception of the guns, as it was confidently anticipated 
that their practice would be fatal to the enemy's operations 
especially by checking the advance of his attacking columns. 
Such batteries were situated, among other places, on the 
heights at Chieulles, Vany, Failly, and Servigny, to the 
north-east of the fortress, where, in spite of the ground 
being much broken, a good and wide view of the scene of 
action was obtained, and also at Saulny, Nocroy, Bellevue, 
Feves, Semecourt, and elsewhere. All the defiles which 
could be possibly used by the French for breaking out were, 
in the course of time, fortified as formidably as circum- 

—531— 



Siege Operations 

stances permitted; and, in places where the enemy was 
actually expected to appear, the besiegers had, moreover, 
taken the trouble to construct independent field redoubts 
in the line of defence. 

The continuance of bad weather and the extremely ar- 
duous duty of the investing force had undoubtedly at times 
a bad effect on their state of health. Diarrhoea and typhus 
carried off some victims, but these diseases would have had 
very far more serious results and a wider range had it not 
been that every possible care was bestowed upon the hos- 
pital establishments and upon the nursing and subsistence. 
In the latter respect there was no failure, and the continual 
supplies and issues of pease-sausage* of fresh and of pre- 
served meat, produced the best effects. A difficulty 
seemed likely to occur in the supply of meat when the 
rinderpest broke out in Lorraine and Alsace, but mutton 
was issued instead of beef, and steps were taken to bring 
up herds of cattle from Belgium and Holland for the supply 
of the troops. 

Sorties. — Having described the position of the oppos- 
ing armies in and before the fortress in their chief features, 
we turn now to the most important sorties on a large scale 
which took place from the 19th August to the 28th October. 

The idea of a regular siege of the great fortress was, 
with accurate knowledge of the circumstances, renounced 
from the very first. The large forces shut in, both in and 
round the fortress, would have rendered it unusually diffi- 
cult to establish parks, and conduct the attacks against 
the detached forts, which were well situated and amply 
supplied with guns and stores, and these forces might, in 
the end, have produced a very critical state of affairs. 
It was determined, therefore, only to invest Metz, and for 
this duty there were allotted the 1st, Ilnd, Ilird, Vllth, 
Vlllth and Xth army corps, the 18th division, the division 
of the Grand Duchy of Hesse, and the landwehr reserve 
division von Kummer. The 1st army was thus amalga- 
mated with the Ilnd army, and placed under the sole com- 



*Erbswurst. 

—532— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

mand of Prince Frederick Charles. This army, amounting 
to about 230,000 men, being thus detained, however, it 
became impossible to employ them even partially in opera- 
tions in the open field elsewhere. 

Under these circumstances, after their terrible exer- 
tions in the battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte, both 
friend and foe required some days of rest, in order that 
they might both settle themselves down to the new condi- 
tion of affairs. Towards the end of the month, however, 
on the 26th August, movements of troops were observed in 
the French camps, from the left to the right bank of the 
Moselle, which might be preparatory to an attempt to break 
through the Prussian lines. The enemy confined himself, 
however, to skirmishing with the outposts, as he found the 
Prussians ready to fight. Meanwhile, news was received 
of the advance of MacMahon's army from Chalons and its 
encounter with the IVth army at Beaumont. In the invest- 
ing lines, therefore, preparations were made for the 
expected junction of Marshals MacMahon and Bazaine. 

Then came, on the 31st August and the 1st September, 
the battle of Noisseville. The Prussian troops engaged 
were posted on the 30th August as follows : — 

1. The 1st Landwehr Division von Kummer, with a brigade of 
the line, behind the line Malroy-Charly, the landwehr in reserve. 

2. The 1st Infantry Division — the 1st Brigade of infantry in 
and behind the line Failly-Servigny, the 2nd Brigade of infantry in 
reserve. 

3. The 2nd Infantry Division — the 4th Brigade of infantry at 
Ars-Laquenexy with their front on the line Mercy-le-Haut-Aubigny- 
Colombey, the 3rd Brigade of infantry in reserve. 

4. The divisional cavalry — the 1st and 10th regiments of 
dragoons between Noisseville and Colombey. 

5. The 3rd Cavalry Division and the 28th brigade of infantry 
guarding the ground between the 2nd infantry division and the 
Moselle. 

On the 31st August, at half -past 7 in the morning, 
the French had taken up a position south of Fort St. 
Julien on the line Metz-Bellecroix. The following move- 
ments consequently took place. 

1. The 3rd Brigade of infantry of the 2nd Division, with two 
batteries, marched to the high road to Saarbruck on the heights of 
Puche. 

—533— 



Siege Operations 

2. The 1st Brigade of cavalry of the 3rd Cavalry Division marched 
to Retorfay to cover the ground between the high roads to Saarbruck 
and Saarlouis. By command of General Steinmetz the whole of the 
cavalry division was moved to that place. 

3. A cavalry regiment and a battery of the Kummer division 
marched to St. Barbe. The division of the Grand-Duchy of Hesse 
crossed the Moselle to the support of the Kummer division. The 
centre stood fast, while the wings alone were at first engaged. 

About 9 o'clock the French attacked the Prussian left 
wings ; Colombey was lost to us, but Aubigny and Mercy-le- 
Haut were held. The 28th brigade of infantry was brought 
on the battle-field, as a reinforcement, and took up a posi- 
tion at Laquenexy without coming into the action, which 
was fought by the 2nd division alone. The former marched 
to the bivouac at Courcelles. 

The Prussian right wing was attacked by a French 
cavalry regiment, with artillery, who were, however, 
beaten back by the artillery of General von Kummer. Fort 
St. Julien opened fire and covered the retreat of the enemy. 
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy commenced a 
heavy fire from Fort St. Julien, and from several batteries 
that were drawn up there to the southward, and were 
answered from seven Prussian field-batteries, in whose 
favour the engagement was decided about 5 o'clock. 

Meantime Leboeufs whole corps advanced by Nouilly 
to Noisseville ; the 3rd brigade of infantry retired from the 
field after a severe engagement round the village and the 
brewery there, and fell back in good order on Servigny. 
Batteries of the enemy debouched towards evening from 
Nouilly and fired on the Prussian artillery at Servigny. 
Noisseville was finally taken by Memerty's brigade, the 
whole position was held, and the fight terminated appar- 
ently about 9 o'clock. Unexpectedly, however, the enemy 
recommenced the action, took possession of Flanville, 
Coincy, and Noisseville, and captured a portion of Retonfay 
which nevertheless they had to give up again. At the same 
time attacks were made upon Servigny, Poixe, and Failly. 
In expectation of its renewal on the following day, the 
infantry and cavalry brigade of the Grand Duchy of Hesse 
and the corps artillery of the 9th army corps were directed 

—534— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

during the night to cross the Moselle to the scene of action 
at St. Barbe. Accordingly, on the following morning, the 
positions were as follows : Kummer's landwehr division 
and the 1st army corps on the field of battle during the whole 
night; the 25th and 28th divisions at Antilly and advancing 
on Charly; the Ilird and Vlllth army corps, as on the pre- 
vious day; the Ilnd, Ilird, and Xth army corps on the left 
bank of the Moselle, near Montmedy, only 1^ mile (7 Eng- 
lish miles) from Metz. 

On the 1st September, at 4 in the morning, the battle 
was renewed, and turned first upon the possession of the 
thrice-captured Noisseville. It was not possible, however, 
in spite of the great bravery of the troops, to keep our 
hold of it, so that we contented ourselves for the time 
with preventing the enemy from debouching from it. As 
soon as it was ascertained that strong reinforcements were 
about to arrive, a heavy fire of artillery was commenced 
from 50 guns against the place and Noisseville was taken. 

On the left wing the village of Flanville was captured 
about 9 o'clock in the morning by the 28th brigade of in- 
fantry, particularly by detachments of the 53rd regiment. 
The 28th infantry brigade thereupon took Coincy, and were 
subsequently employed to cover the Saarbruck road. 

At the same time unsuccessful attempts were made by 
the French on the right wing to take Failly and Rupigny. 
They were beaten back and pursued as far as the Bois de 
Grimont by the brigades of Below and Blankensee. 

In the centre the French advanced about half-past 10 
to the attack of Poixe and Servigny, but their movements 
appeared hesitating and wanting in vigour. The Prussian 
artillery beat them back at both places. This failure was 
the signal for the French to retire into their original posi- 
tions, while ours were held, though with great losses. These 
amounted altogether to 151 officers and 2,848 men. The 
French lost 141 officers and 2,664 men. 

On the 2nd September the Xlllth army corps arrived 
before Metz, and in consequence the German army was 
distributed for the investment as follows: Rummer's land- 

—535— 



Siege Operations 

wehr division on the line Malroy-Charly ; to its left, the 
1st army corps as far as the Saarbruck road; and then 
came the Xlllth corps as far as Poully. The Vllth corps 
was placed on the south of Metz on both sides of the Moselle, 
covering also the passages over the Seylle. On the left 
bank were the Vlllth corps from Jussy to Chatel, the Ilird 
corps from Chatel to Saulny, the Xth corps from Saulny 
to Marange. In reserve, on the natural line of communi- 
cation of the enemy with the interior of France, was the 
IXth corps extended on the line from Roncourt to Pierr,e- 
villiers. 

The battle of Noisseville was the last great attempt 
made by Marshal Bazaine to break through the investing 
army, aijd was followed by three weeks of apparent rest. 
The next engagements brought on by the French were for 
the purpose of covering their foraging expeditions in search 
of hay, straw, and provisions, especially potatoes, a sure 
preventive of scurvy, which appeared in the fortress owing 
to the want of salt. Eventually the French used generally 
to advance with strong columns against our outposts, who 
thereupon fell back upon the positions previously fortified. 
If such an attack succeeded, they retired with their booty 
under cover of the forts, and the Prussian outposts in the 
evening were back again in their old positions. In this 
way villages and farms were burnt and much damage of 
other kinds was done. Such was the character of the 
engagements at Peltre on the 22nd and 23rd September, and 
at Mercy-le-Haut on the 26th September. Perhaps also in 
these engagements the French had some idea of making an 
attempt to break through in the direction of Strasburg. 
The Vllth and 1st army corps were engaged in both the 
first mentioned fights, which did not assume large propor- 
tions. Of a more serious character, however, was the fight 
on the 27th September, which was at first directed against 
these same troops, but subsequently also against detach- 
ments of the Xth corps at La Maxe on the left bank of the 
Moselle. On this occasion the French troops were brought 
immediately on to the battle-field by the railway, which had 

—536— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

been reconstructed within the line of their outposts. These 
battles had no particular consequences, although the loss 
was considerable on both sides. 

After the fall of Strasburg Marshal Bazaine seemed 
to have an idea of breaking through to the northward, in 
the first instance to Thionville, in order to occupy that 
place or to pass over with his army to neutral territory. 
Consequently, the distribution of the investing force had 
to be altered. For the execution of his plan Marshal 
Bazaine chose the moment when Rummer's landwehr divi- 
sion came on to the line of outposts in the place of the 
Xth army corps. The most advanced outposts consisted of 
two landwehr battalions in patches of wood north of the 
Bois de Woippy, and pushed forward to Bellevue, St. Remy, 
Les Petites and Les Grandes Tapes, with pickets at St. 
Agathe and Ladonchamps. 

On the night of the 2nd October the enemy attacked, 
threw the outposts above mentioned back upon the pickets at 
St. Remy, which they assailed in vain, and of which the 
garrison, consisting of two companies of the Neutomischl 
landwehr battalion, was at once reinforced by two com- 
panies of the Kosten landwehr battalion. 

About 5 o'clock the enemy made a fruitless attack on 
St. Remy, whose garrison had been meanwhile strengthened 
by four more companies, and also on Bellevue, which was 
defended by the Freistadt landwehr battalion. The six 
companies of the last named battalion retook St. Agathe, 
two Prussian batteries fired on Ladonchamps from Seme- 
court, and from 9 o'clock A.M. a third Prussian battery 
which had taken up a position at Les Tapes, joined in the 
cannonade. Upon these was directed the concentrated fire 
of several French batteries placed at St. Eloy, and they had 
in consequence to retire. Whilst the landwehr division 
held their ground against a vastly superior enemy, the 
artillery fire on both sides was kept up until the evening, 
and by it St. Remy and Franclochamps were set in flames. 

On the 7th October the French made a second attack 
on the field of battle, on which they had already learnt by 

—537— 



Siege Operations 

experience the bravery of Kummer's landwehr division, and 
an engagement lasting nine hours took place at Woippy. 
At 1 o'clock in that afternoon our outposts of Kummer's 
landwehr division were attacked at Bellevue and St. Remy, 
as well as at Les Petites and Les Grande Tapes, by French 
columns greatly superior in numbers, about 30,000 or 40,- 
000 men, and after a brave resistance beat them back. The 
Prussian landwehr fought here with the greatest obstinacy, 
the most stubborn endurance, and the most brilliant cour- 
age, so that the enemy was unable to gain ground. Sim- 
ultaneously with the commencement of this attack on the 
left bank of the Moselle, the French made a demonstration 
on the right bank, against the position of the 1st army corps 
at Servigny and Noisseville, and against the Xth army corps 
at Malroy and Charly. The fight here was only with 
artillery and musketry, which the French thought suffi- 
cient to prevent these troops from crossing the Moselle. 
In spite of this, Wedell's brigade of the Xth corps, the 16th 
and 57th regiments, crossed the Moselle at Argency. Here 
they formed to attack on the flank of the left wing of 
Kummer's division, while at the same time, on the right 
wing, Conta's brigade of the 48th and 4th regiments of 
infantry, advanced and occupied the Bois de Woippy and a 
farm close by. The French being vigorously attacked both 
in front and on their left wing, had to give up again the 
positions they had taken earlier in the day, and to fall back 
upon the fortress, whilst the Prussians remained masters 
of the same ground as at the beginning of the fight. They 
took Bellevue, St. Remy, and the two Tapes by storm. On 
the other hand they failed in an attempt made late in the 
evening to take the Chateau Ladonchamps, which was 
strongly occupied by the French and fortified. The loss on 
the Prussian side amounted to 65 officers and 1,665 men. 

Capitulation. — Marshal Bazaine, after the failure of 
all his sorties, could not but be aware that further enter- 
prises of the same description would only be attended by 
similar results. His honour as a soldier was saved, and 
his duty to his country was done, in detaining 230,000 men 

—538— 



Plate XI 







Campaign Against France 1870-71 

before Metz, But if he had succeeded in breaking out — 
if the Marshal had marched towards Paris, he would but 
have come between two fires; and as regarded any other 
objects of his march, without cavalry or horses for trans- 
port, with his guns wretchedly horsed, with no safe com- 
munication to the rear, without the means of supporting 
his army, he would have been exposed to the most harassing 
pursuit. The consideration of these circumstances clears 
the Marshal of blame, considering the question from a 
military point of view, and the more so, as although cut 
off from all communication by either land, water, or tele- 
graph, he had held out in a place, which, having been orig- 
inally provisioned for 15,000 or 20,000 men for three months 
had already maintained eight times that number of troops 
for nine weeks. Whether the Marshal had any ulterior 
political reason for his conduct, we know just as little as 
we know the motive of the mysterious journey of General 
Bourbaki from Metz to the Empress Eugenie. In no way 
had the capitulation been of use to M. Gambetta, whose plan 
was to -raise the siege of Paris by armies newly formed in 
the North and South. This plan was frustrated now that 
the 1st and Ilnd Prussian armies before Metz had become 
available. 

The time for negotiations for a surrender had come, 
and to delay was to starve. Marshal Bazaine wished to sur- 
render himself and the army, but to keep the fortress for 
France. On the side of the Prussians, however, this could 
not be agreed to, because the place, if excluded from the 
capitulation, was in a condition to hold out for many months. 
Nothing came, therefore, of the negotiations to this effect, 
which General Boyer was engaged in from the 13th to the 
15th October, at the German headquarters at Versailles. 

On the 21st October General Coffnieres, the comman- 
dant of the fortress, informed General Bazaine that he had 
no provisions for the troops quartered outside the fortress. 
In consequence of this, desertions were tacticly allowed, but 
the deserters were turned back by the Prussian outposts in 
great numbers. It was also thought that the Prussians 

—539— 



Siege Operations 

might be compelled to take the army prisoners, by bringing 
on a battle with this intention. At last they thought to 
sally out by Gravelotte, on the night of the 24th-25th Octo- 
ber, but this plan was not executed. 

On the 25th October, General Changarnier entered upon 
fresh negotiations with Prince Frederick Charles. The terms 
of the capitulation of Sedan were taken as a basis, and the 
officers who chose imprisonment were permitted to carry 
their arms away with them. 

On the morning of the 27th October the fortress fell 
into our hands, perfectly uninjured, together with its mili- 
tary establishments, with its 3 marshals, 50 generals, 6,000 
officers, 173,000 men, 53 eagles, 300,000 stand of arms, 66 
mitrailleurs, 541 field guns, 800 garrison guns, the stores of 
85 field batteries, and 2,000 military vehicles. On the same 
day the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles were 
made Field Marshals. Thanks are due also, however, to 
the brave investing army, who for ten weeks bore all the 
hardships with a stedfast endurance peculiarly their own; 
who, by steady vigilance and unequalled courage, brought 
about a result without example in military history, and had 
compelled the army of the enemy to lay down their arms in 
Metz, which had been called by them with proud confidence 
an impregnable fortress. 

Already, eight days before the capitulation, railway 
wagons, with provisions for the garrison and inhabitants 
of Metz, were standing in the railway station of Courcelles. 

On the day of the capitulation an artillery and an 
engineer officer from each Prussian army corps, with non- 
commissioned officers, were told off, in the first instance, 
to take over the powder magazines and destroy any mines 
that might exist. Next the forts were occupied, each by 
two battalions of infantry, a company of garrison artillery, 
and a detachment of pioneers (engineers) ; then the gates 
of the town, and finally the town itself, were taken posses- 
sion of. Steps were immediately taken for restoring the 10 
kilometres (6 English miles) of railway from Metz to Cour- 
celles, and the very first train that ran into Metz brought, 
to the great delight of the inhabitants, 1,000 sheep into the 

—540— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

fortress. At the same time German forethought was 
brought into action for the benefit of the town and fortress, 
by the immediate appointment of an extraordinary sanitary 
commission to prevent the seeds of epidemic disease from 
being sown. It is to be hoped that they may also succeed, 
by suitable measures and arrangements with regard to the 
inhabitants, both as citizens and as Christians, in bringing 
universal contentment to the hearts of this originally Ger- 
man Population. 



Paris 

(See map opposite page 608) 

Paris, with its 1,850,000 inhabitants, is the centre of 
the business, the manufactures, and the finance of France, 
and even on these grounds is the capital of the country. 
Eight railways, numerous high roads, water communication 
of every description, form its means of intercourse with the 
other chief business towns. The circumference of the city 
is six or seven leagues, and the total length of its streets 
a hundred miles (468 English miles). 

The Seine, 200 to 300 paces broad, and spanned by 21 
bridges, divides the town into two unequal parts. The forti- 
fications consist of the enceinte, which comprises 98 bas- 
tions, generally very spacious, with revetted ditches 35 
paces wide, but without ravelins. In this rampart there are 
47 gates, 14 sally-ports, 10 openings, for railways, 4 for wa- 
ter-communications. The terreplein, or military road pass- 
ing along and within the line of the bastions, is paved ; near 
and in some parts parallel to it runs the circular railway 
which connects the railway stations with one another, and 
was of great use for the armament and defence of the for- 
tress. 

Round this inner line of works, at a distance of 2,500 
to 3,500 paces, runs the outer line, the circumference of 
which amounts to 12 leagues. It consists of a circle of 15 
detached forts, whose distance apart is on the average 3,500 



—541- 



Siege Operations 

paces ; they cover by their fire a space about 18 leagues 
round. The north and north-east fronts are the strongest. 

The north front commences with St. Denis, the key of 
the outer line, around which are the forts De la Briche, Dou- 
ble Couronne du Nord, and De TEst ; these three works are 
connected by a wall and ditch and are moreover especially 
strengthened by an inundation, controlled by sluices on the 
swift-running stream of Rouillon, and which again is covered 
by the redoubt of Stains. Railway and road embank- 
ments, lines of canals, many villages built solidly and easily 
adapted for defense, wooded heights, and the inundation 
above mentioned, which may be positively relied upon, give 
to this tract of ground great capabilities of defense. South 
of the railway leading to Soissons, and east of the canal of 
St. Denis, lies Fort D'Aubervilliers. The parts of the canal 
from St. Denis, and Ourcq lying in rear of this fort are pro- 
vided with parapets and small flanking earthworks. 

South of the canal of Ourcq and the road to Metz, on 
the heights of Belleville and Pantin, lies the important fort 
of Romainville, which is connected with the canal by lines 
en cremaillere, along the slope of the hill. The crest of the 
plateau of Romainville is crowned by the three forts Noisy, 
Rosny, and Nogent, in the intervals between which the re- 
doubts Noisy, Montreuil, Boissiere and Fontenay, are judi- 
ciously placed. 

At this point terminates a section of the defences 
formed by the Marne, a river of the width of 100 paces, and 
this section is in addition protected at the southeast angle 
by a line of fortifications 2,800 paces long ; the redoubts De 
la Gravelle and De la Faisanderie, placed on its flanks, im- 
part to it considerable powers of resistance. The well-known 
fortified castle of Vincennes serves as a keep to. this work, 
and is surrounded by a park of the same name ; there is also 
here the great arsenal and the artillery practice ground, 
which extends to the Marne. Fort Charenton, in the angle 
formed by the Marne and the Seine, forms the southern ter- 
mination of the defenses of the north-east front. 

The southern front of the outer line of defenses com- 
mences on the left bank of the Seine, opposite Fort Charen- 

—542— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

ton, with Fort Ivry, and thence is continued on a hilly, wooded 
plateau, intersected by ravines, by forts Bicetre, Montrouge, 
Vanvres, and Issy, the last commanding the Seine; 
in front of the last three lie the heights of Bagneux, Cla- 
mart, Meudon, and Chatillon, which became of such impor- 
tance during the siege. The forts command the railways 
to Sceaux and to Versailles. 

The west front is bounded by the Seine and the Bois de 
Boulogne, and is defended by the fortress of Mont Valer- 
ien, which stands at a height of 415 feet above the river. 
This work is at distances of 1^ miles (7 English miles) and 
1 mile (4|- English miles) respectively, from the forts on 
either side, namely, St. Denis and Fort d'Issy. The course 
of the Seine from Fort Issy to the fortifications of St. Denis 
confers upon this portion of the city of Paris great defen- 
sive strength. 

As the forts were built almost all at the same time, 
they have on the whole been treated almost alike as regards 
their defensive details ; they have a bastioned trace, revetted 
ditches, similar arrangements of the communications within 
and without and ramparts of almost the same very substan- 
tial profile. They are all rendered quite proof against as- 
sault, and furnished with the requisite powder magazines. 
Bombproof cover for the garrisons is provided partly in 
casements under the ramparts, in the curtains and flanks, 
and partly in keeps and barracks apart; where necessary, 
cavaliers are added to obtain a better view of the ground in 
front. There are no ravelins ; for this reason the more im- 
portant forts have hornworks in front of them, for the 
greater security of the front of attack. The interior space 
and extent of the forts vary according to the importance of 
the work they are designated to perform, and the size of the 
garrisons allotted to them; the largest is the fortress of 
Mont Valerien, which has a base of some 500 paces, and 
the least has a base of about 300. Some of the prominent 
features of the fortifications of Paris, with reference to their 
general arrangement and to the various points of attack, are 
mentioned further on in their proper places. 

—543— 



Siege Operations 

Excitement and agitation spread through Paris on the 
receipt of the news of the retreat of the French armies, 
which became necessary after the engagements at Spich- 
eren, Wiessembourg, Worth. The order was given to call 
out the national guard and the garde mobile. In the former 
were placed all citizens between 30 and 40 years of age, and 
in the latter those under 30. The populace of Paris showed 
signs of a disposition to revolt. The issue of bank notes 
rose to a total of 2,400 million francs. The governor. Gen- 
eral Baraguay d'Hilliers, declared the town in a state of 
siege, in order that he might be aided by the rigour of mar- 
tial law in putting the fortress in a state of defense. This 
entailed serious interference with the daily avocations of the 
citizens, but was recognized as necessary, as no preparations 
had been made during the long peace, either in the place 
itself or in the detached forts. Attention was first bestowed 
upon the safety of the town itself. There was indeed a re- 
vetted enceinte with a ditch in existence, but the protection 
of the gates and entrances of the openings for railways and 
canals had in great part to be provided for. The ditches 
were, for the sake of the traffic of the city, crossed in some 
places by bridges, in others by embankments. These com- 
munications, as well as in some places the profile of the 
ditch, required radical reconstruction to put them in a secure 
state of defense. The gateways were reduced to the smallest 
number the traffic would allow, the drawbridges were hung 
and made passable, the number of railway openings was re- 
duced as far as practicable, and they were covered by tra- 
verses. Barricades were prepared, as far as the traffic per- 
mitted, in the avenues De la Grande Armee, Du Roule and 
other places, and openings that could be closed were left for 
the passage of the traffic. The openings of the underground 
canals and aqueducts at Asnieres and at the aqueduct d'Huys 
were covered with gratings or closed, and dams were pre- 
pared at suitable points on the Seine, as well as at the 
Viaduct, d'Auteuil and at the Port Napoleon, in order to 
supply the ditches of the fortifications with water. Earth- 
works, constructed for the purpose, protected these dams 
from destruction by distant artillery fire. On the west, north 

—544— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

and east fronts ten bomb-proof powder magazines were 
formed with walls six feet thick, with coverings of strong 
timbers, and completely covered up with earth. At the same 
time, that this was done, the spaces around the fortresses 
were cleared, a measure which, in spite of the strict law on 
the subject existing in France, was necessary, and was re- 
morselessly executed. Buildings and hedges were demol- 
ished, and ditches, banks, etc., affording cover to the enemy, 
were so sloped off as to be grazed by the line of fire from the 
ramparts. Where necessary, the entrances into the fortifi- 
cations were protected by earthworks thrown up in front 
against the fire of the enemy, so as to render them more thor- 
oughly defensible. The communications from the fortress 
were made impassable for a long distance, by tearing up the 
causeways, by destroying bridges, and erecting barricades. 
A part of the iron-plated gunboats, armed each with one 
heavy gun, originally intended for the Rhine, was allotted 
to the defence of Paris and for operations on the Seine; 
they were commanded by naval officers, and manned by ma- 
rines, and special districts and stations, well protected, were 
assigned to them. Thus some were in the upper Seine under 
the fire of forts Ivry and Charenton ; others between Mau- 
don, Sevres, and the island of Bellevue, at St. Cloud and Sur- 
esnes ; and others on the lower Seine under the guns of the 
defenses of St. Denis. 

The maneuvering of the gunboats was much interferred 
with, in spite of their small draught, by the shallowness of 
the water, and subsequently by the breaking up of the ice on 
the Seine. Excepting steamboats of some use in the defense, 
all the boats available for ferrying purposes were sunk in 
the Seine or the Marne. 

The inundation of the east front of the defenses of St. 
Denis was forthwith carried out, because it was always be- 
lieved in Paris that an enemy would only have to choose 
between the front of St. Denis-Pantin and the front Romain- 
ville-Charenton. French military writers were disputed only 
on this point, whether the one of the other was the key of 
Paris ; no thought was bestowed on any other front of at- 
tack but these two. Great importance was attached to 

—545— 



Siege Operations 

strengthening the ground in front, the sole point in dispute 
among French military writers ; let us accordingly commence 
our description on the south. In front of the line of defense 
in that part, between Fort d'Issy and Fort Bicetre, there 
runs a range of woody heights, over which are scattered 
villages, parks and country houses. As the defences were 
designed in 1840, these heights were beyond the range of 
the guns of the period, and this was the reason that they 
were not considered. Since the introduction of long-range 
rifled ordnance, however, detached elevated spots, which look 
into the forts and hollows, have become dangerous. At the 
same time therefore, that the place was put into a state of 
defense, as above mentioned, the erection of detached works 
was undertaken, of which we name only the most impor- 
tant : 

1. A group of field-works on the ground in advance and to the 

west and south of Mont Valerien, namely, the Muhlen and 
• Wolfsgruben redoubts, and the lunette of Suresnes. 

2. A work at Montretout, immediately above the railway station 

of St. Cloud. 

3. A work between forts Issy and Vanvres. 

4. A redoubt by the side of the porcelain manufactory at Sevres, 

afterwards called the Kronprinzen-Schanze. 

5. A work to the southward of Sevres, afterwards called the 

Jagerschanze. 

6. A redoubt in the park of Meudon. 

7. A work at Notre Dame de Clamart. 

8. A work at Moulin de la Tour, afterwards called the Bauern- 

schanze. 

The last two entrenchments were situated upon spots 
commanding forts Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge. The ram- 
parts of these forts were raised about 2 metres to prevent 
the enemy seeing into them. 

9. A smaller work at the hamlet L'Hay for the defense of the 

ground in front of Villejuif and the Fontainbleau road. 

10. The works of Chatillon and Clamart, and of Villejuif with a 

defensible communication to Fort Bicetre. 

11. A work 1,000 paces to the west of Villejuiff, and south-west 

of Fort Bicetre; this was originally open at the gorge and 
was afterwards converted into a redoubt. The technical exe- 
cution and arrangement of this work was praised as being 
a model, and we give, therefore, some details of its construc- 
tion. The entrenchment was traced as a five-sided redoubt, 
with a ditch and parapet of a strong profile, and with a bas- 
tioned forge. The casemates for the accommodation of the 
soldiers were placed under the ramparts and constructed of 

—546— 



Campaign Against Fiance 1870-71 

wood, and their roofs were formed of railway iron. All the 
ramparts were arranged for artillery defense, and they had 
, numerous hollow traverses, which served for cover for var- 
ious purposes. The ditch was flanked partly by caponiers 
built of timber, partly by a loopholed wall, which ran along 
the foot of the counterscarp and likewise served as a palisad- 
ing. 

12. A terraced work in tiers at Cashan for eight guns to fire 

upon the valley of Bievre. 

13. The defences of Vitry, with a communication attached lead- 

ing to Villejuif, and communications to the rear to Fort Ivry, 
and as far as the Seine. 

14. Works of defense at Bercy, where the Seine passes into the 
fortress, and at Point du Jour, where it passes out of the for- 
tifications. 

15. Works to strengthen the position in front of Fort Vincennes, 

and the advanced position on the Marne peninsula. 

16. Defenses of Mont Avron, consisting of batteries, rows of 

musketry trenches, and arrangements for the defense of the 
network of buildings; the object was to take in flank the posi- 
tion of the blockading force on the east. 

17. The defenses of the position of La Courneuve, Le Bourget, 

and Drancy, where the roads had been made defensible; the 
places named had been fortified, and an independent earth- 
work Jiad been constructed to serve as a keep to the whole. 

18. A redoubt at Pierrefitte, northvi^ard from St. Denis to fire 

upon the roads to Calais and Amiens and the railway to Creil. 

19. A redoubt at Colombes, to command the peninsula of the 

Seine at that place. 

20. An entrenchment between Billancourt and the Seine, for the 

defense of the passage of the river there in case it should 
be attempted. 

21. Barricades in Billancourt, and the reconstruction of a cov- 

ered trench to Fort Issy, in connection with which it was 
necessary to establish a means of communication over the 
Seine; a similar means of communication existed from Fort 
Charenton over the Marne to the Champ des Maneuvers. 

A great number of batteries were also constructed and 
secured by special means, such as musketry trenches and de- 
fensible communications, of which here only the principal 
ones will be enumerated. 

22. Batteries at St. Quen, westward of Courbevoye, for the de- 
fense of the Nanterre peninsula; these were intended, in con- 
junction with the work of Colombes, to fill up the great gap 
in the defenses between the fortifications of Mont Valerien 
and St. Denis. 

23. Batteries on .the heights of Argenteuil. 

24. Batteries on the flank of Villejuif, and at the mill of Saquot. 

25. Batteries on the Marne peninsula, which in conjunction with 

forts Charenton and Nogent fired over the ground round 
Champigny and Champignolles. 

26. Batteries at Drancy and Courneuve; these were to fire over 

the flat ground in front on both sides of the road to Lille. 



—547— 



Siege Operations 

The greater part of the works mentioned were executed 
during, or at the end of the defense, according as it became 
practicable at various periods to complete the circle of the 
French fortifications; for there was no other opportunity 
of producing much real effect on the defense. 

Much astonishment was occasioned by the abandonment 
of the defense of Fort Vincennes from the very beginning; 
as the reason for this remarkable course, the unsatisfactory 
structural condition of the buildings there for defensive pur- 
poses was assigned and also the necessity for retaining the 
work in use as a prison. 

The ground in front of Paris is extraordinary favoura- 
ble in general for the construction of fortifications, and was 
taken advantage of for defensive works of every descrip- 
tion; for musketry trenches — sometimes in a simple form, 
sometimes in successive tiers — for defensive communica- 
tions between the several points important for the defense, 
for the conversion into defensible posts of walls and enclos- 
ures, of which a detailed list would here occupy us too long. 
The French understood thoroughly how to bring such worKS 
into connection both with the older and with the more re- 
cently constructed systems of defenses, and thereby to pre- 
pare to the best advantage the defensible positions on the 
ground in the front for a step-by-step defense, and for an 
astonishing increase in the number of guns in position. The 
gangs of men employed in the execution of these works could 
not be engineer-soldiers; men of the civil population of 
suitable trades were employed for this purpose, and nu arms 
were given them since, as is well-known, there were none to 
spare especially at the beginning of the siege. 

Abundant and extensive use was made of obstacles for 
preventing the approach of the enemy, such as abattis, trous. 
de-loup, wire fences, land and water torpedoes, etc., in every 
place where they could be applied, in front of all trenches, 
batteries and minor defenses. A peculiar description of 
ground torpedoes was discovered in the captured forts ; they 
were exploded by friction, caused by the pressure of the 
foot driving in a hammer ; they must have been intended for 



-548— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

use against columns of assault and for the defence of the 
breach. 

It is not to be denied that General Trochu — ^whose 
headquarters were at the hotel of the President of the Coun- 
cil — arranged for the construction of the defences and for 
the other dispositions for the defence with great ability and 
energy. His Chief of Staff was General Schmidt, with Gen- 
eral Foy as assistant. General Trochu is the more deserving 
of credit for this, since he must have been actively and use- 
fully employed on a multitude of internal arrangements, 
which equally demanded prudence and thought. The meas- 
ure, not recognized by international law, for the ruthless 
banishment of all Germans settled in Paris or in France 
emanated from him. He ordered the removal of the boards 
of railway directors, and other civil authorities unnecessary 
in a siege, as well as the transfer of the art treasures in the 
museum of the Loucre to provincial towns. The seat of gov- 
ernment had been previously moved to Tours. All who 
could not show that they had means of existence, or who dis- 
turbed the public order, or who in any way endangered the 
safety of persons and property were compelled to leave 
Paris. General Trochu instituted a committee of defense, 
which consisted, with himself as chairman, of Marshal Vail- 
lant. Admiral Rignault de Genoully, Jerome David, the Min- 
ister of Public Works, and the Generals of Divisions, Chab- 
uad la Tour, Guiod, D'Autemarre, D'Erville, and Soumaine. 
The plan of defense which the governor intended to follow in 
case of a siege, was in the main as follows : 

First Circle of Defence — Marshal Vinoy, with his corps 
and the survivors of MacMahon's army assembled at Laon, 
defended the position at Argenteuil ; General Mellinet occu- 
pied the position at Sceaux-Bourg with some regiments of 
the line and newly formed troops ; the provincial garde mo- 
bile, with some line regiments, were at Noissy-Villiers. A 
cavalry corps was placed at Bourget, eastward of St. Denis. 

Second Circle of Defence — This included the defence 
of the forts which were occupied by gardes mobiles and by 
marine artillery. 

—549— 



Siege Operations 

Third Circle of Defence — This comprised the defence 
of the enceinte, which was strengthened in rear by prepar- 
ing the streets and buildings lying near for defence. Much 
assistance was derived from the circular railway, which was 
very advantageous for military purposes. It should be ob- 
served that this railway rendered most remarkable service 
in preparation of works and armaments in the conveyance 
of great quantities of materials, such as timber, and earth, 
for increasing the thickness of parts of the ramparts, and 
the construction of numerous traverses and bombproofs as 
well as in transporting troops at a subsequent period. 

Fourth Circle of Defence — To this belonged the in- 
terior defence by means of barricades, dividing the streets 
into sections, and by the system of street defence, projected 
and executed by the Emperor Napoleon for street-fighting. 
It cannot be denied that the fundamental idea of this sys- 
tem of defence was well considered, and it would perhaps 
have fulfilled the expectations entertained of it, if the 
course of events had been such as to require a step-by-step 
defence, and if they had had well disciplined troops available 
in Paris. 

On this point it remains to be stated that the particu- 
lars of the strength and composition of the army of Paris 
have varied, and no approximation to accuracy has been at- 
tained. The original garrison of Paris was in part rein- 
forced by the addition of the 4th battalions of the field regi- 
ments. After the battle of Sedan there came from the 
north, from the neighborhood of Mezieres, Vinoy's corps, 
strengthened by the survivors of MacMahon's army and 
the garrison of the camp of Lyons. Moreover, 20,000 labour- 
ers were formed into battalions. In the middle of Septem- 
ber, some time before the investment, the strength of the 
army amounted to — 

Regulars 80,000 men 

Parisian Garde Mobile and Garde 

Nationale 100,000 men 

Free Corps 10,000 men 

Garde Mobile from other places 60,000 men 

TOTAL 250,000 men 

—550— 



Campaign Against Fiance 1870-71 

Further levies from classes whose age did not exempt 
them from service, however, brought the army up to nearly 
double this strength, or 500,000 men. A Polish legion, com- 
posed of men belonging to that nationality, though not ac- 
tually under that title, and an English-North- American le- 
gion placed themselves at the disposal of the committee of 
defence. The Polytechnic school furnished skirmishers, and 
the artillery for regular duty in the garrisons of bastions 86 
and 87 of the enceinte. 

The Paris garde mobile and garde nationale were divid- 
ed into four divisions, whose head-quarters were situated 
in the Palais Royal, the Conservatoire, the Elysee, and the 
Luxembourg Palace. The hap-hazard formation of this army 
and lack of good military training and discipline, their ignor- 
ance of the mode of handling their arms above all, the want 
of capable officers and non-commissioned officers made the 
army of Paris unfit for great enterprises, so that their num- 
erical , superiority over the comparatively weak German 
army of investment could not give rise to any difficulty. 
General Trochu made proposals to recall the army of Ba- 
zaine for the defence of the capital, which were at first ap- 
proved, but could not afterwards be carried out, because the 
Marshal was shut up in Metz; General Trochu protested 
against the marching away of MacMahon's army to the 
north, but without result. 

During the progress of the siege, however, the condi- 
tion of the garrison improved, since to their numerical 
strength they added internal cohesion and tactical skill. The 
garde nationale and garde mobile were obliged to drill thor- 
oughly, and were made acquainted with the duties of the 
defences, which required daily 70,000 men. In the middle 
of October we find the "ordre de bataille" as follows : Com- 
mander-in-Chief, General Trochu ; Chief of the General Staff 
General Schmitz ; of the artillery, General Goyo ; of the en- 
gineers, General Chabaud la Tour; Intendant General Wolf. 

First Army — General Clement Thomas, Commanding; Chief of 
the Staff, Colonel Montagut; 226 battalions of sedentary National 
Guard. 

Second Army — General Ducrot, Commanding; Chief of the Staff, 
General Oppert. 

—551— 



Siege Operations 

1st Corps — Three divisions, General Blanchard; Chief of the 
Staff, Colonel Filippi. 

2nd Corps — Three divisions. General Renault; Chief of the Staff, 
General Forri Pisani. 

3rd Corps — Two divisions of infantry, a division of cavalry, Gen- 
eral d'Exea; Chief of the Staff, Colonel de Belgarde, 

Third Army — General Vinoy, commanding. Six infantry divis- 
ions, including the marines and two cavalry brigades. 

The defence of the enceinte was. divided into nine sec- 
tions named after the suburbs in front of them ; each was 
placed under the command of a general of division, or vice- 
admiral, whose staff was complete in all arms and branches. 
The garrison of these sections consisted of national guards 
— generally 25 to 40 battalions to each, according to the 
number of bastions included in it. Strict instructions and 
regulations were issued for the guards at the gateways and 
sally ports, and for the duty on the ramparts of the bas- 
tions. 

Neither the casemates in the town of Paris, nor the 
bomb proofs in the bastions could accommodate the whole 
of this numerous garrison. A great part of them went un- 
der canvas at Meaux, in the Bois de Vincennes, and in the 
Bois de Boulogne, as well as in other places, or were shel- 
tered in tents and close cantonments in the villages lying 
between the enceinte and the forts. These arrangements 
were constantly changed. Line troops, as far as possible, 
did duty in the forts. 

When the enormous circumference of the works to be 
prepared for defence is considered, every credit must be 
given to the engineer authorities concerned, at whose head 
was General Chabaud la Tour. This officer was a highly 
accomplished engineer, and under his direction the east 
front of the place, which is excellently defiladed, was exe- 
cuted in 1842-44 ; he called in the aid of civil engineers who 
were fit for the work, of whom it has, however, been re- 
corded, that owing to their ignorance of military matters, 
a great number of demolitions were undertaken, which did 
not obstruct the approach of the enemy. Numerous bridges 
and roads were demolished, waymarks were removed, many 
tunnels and railways were destroyed, where no real neces- 
sity existed on any reasonable grounds. The principal de- 

-.552— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

molitions undertaken in the immediate neighbourhood of 
Paris were as follows : the destruction of about 60 bridges, 
viz., those at Sevres, St. Cloud, Suresnes, Bougival, Marly, 
St. Germain, Ouen, Le Pecq, Meaux, Esbly, Lagny, Illes de 
Villenoy, Villeneuve, etc., and the blowing up of the railway 
tunnels at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Nanteuil, and of the via- 
duct of Chantilly. 

It is well known that Trochu issued an order for the 
burning of the forests and woods round Paris in order that 
the investing army might be deprived both of firewood for 
their bivouacs and also of timber for the construction of 
their works. Thus the woods of Bondy Montmorency, and 
St. Gratien, and the park of Monceaux were actually burnt 
down. The appearance of our troops on the south front, 
who there, and all round Paris, took up their positions, with 
the rapidity and precision for which they are remarkable, 
prevented in great part the execution of this act of vandal- 
ism. Thus the large and magnificient parks of St. Cloud, 
St. Germain, and Meudon were saved. 

The artillery in the works was under the orders of Gen- 
eral Goyo. 

The armament of Paris with artillery was pressed on 
most energetically, simultaneously with the preparation of 
the fortifications. We give the particulars of the armaments 
as they have been made known, to us in the report of the 
Cardinal von Wideren, and observe that they must be ac- 
cepted only as a general statement, as continual changes 
took place during the progress of the siege. 

The armament was made up partly of heavy and partly 
of light naval guns ; in this way many smooth-bore pieces 
were brought upon the ramparts. 

1. The 98 bastions of the enceinte, each with 400 me- 
tres (438 yards) development of front, were each to receive 
8 to 10 twelve-pounders. The gateways and sally-ports 
were defended by guns of a greater calibre. The carriages 
were of cast iron. Total 1,226 pieces. 

2. The armament of the detached forts is given as 
follows : Charenton, 70 ; Vincennes, 117 ; Nogent, 53 ; Rosny, 
56 ; Noisy-le-Est Sec, 57 ; Romainville, 49 ; Aubervillers, 66 : 

—553— 



Siege Operations 

Fort de I'Est de Saint Denis, 52 ; La Briche, 61 ; Mont Valer- 
ien, 79 ; Issy, 64 ; Vanvres, 45 ; Montrouge, 43 ; Bicetre, 40 : 
Ivry 70. 

It is to be understood that the numbers of guns men- 
tioned include not only the armaments of the detached forts 
but also of the detached outworks in connection with them, 
and the auxiliary redoubts and other defensible posts, as 
well as a suitable artillery reserve. After the occupation 
of the works by the Germans, it became evident, moreover ; 
that the above estimates were right as regarded the total 
numbers; we should not be far wrong in placing the total 
number of guns in barbe at about 2,000 pieces. An artil- 
lery park was formed in the gardens of the Tuileries. 

From these facts it is clear that the proportion of ar- 
tillery in Paris, as in other French fortresses was every-^ 
where ample, although the nature of the pieces, the variety 
of their construction, and the description of carriages may 
not have been altogether suitable to the requirements of 
the present time. In this respect they were not in France, 
and least of all in Paris, so far advanced, nor so well pre- 
pared for the attack and defence of fortresses, as in Prus- 
sia. Anyone who knows the arrangements of an artillery 
depot, or the peace preparations for the artillery defence 
of a Prussian fortress, will be best able to judge what was 
wanted in such a case at Paris. Meanwhile, an endeavour 
was made with creditable activity, and with much judg- 
ment, to supply the deficiencies. As early as the middle of 
August 6,800 men (later on also women, to some extent) 
were employed in the manufacture of cartridges and case- 
shot. Considerable supplies of ammunition of all sorts were 
brought up from Toulon and Montpellier, where there are 
great cartridge factories. The large foundries and iron 
works in Paris were exclusively employed in preparing shot 
and shell, and were in some measure converted into arsenals. 
During the siege 251,572 projectiles from cannon and 1,000,- 
000 bullets from mitrailleurs were made in Paris. In the 
engine works of Call locomotives were built, with iron plated 
trucks, in which guns were placed. Subsequently, goods 
wagons were converted to this use, and they had plating A^ 

—554— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

inches thick. The works to resist assault were armed with 
guns of every description and this was hurried on princi- 
pally at Point de Jour, Auteuil, and Vaugirard, and at the 
detached forts. 

To supply in some measure the want of trained, expert 
gunners, marine artillery were ordered to Paris in great 
numbers, and to their soldierlike bearing and steadiness 
under fire all praise is due. 

The fire of the batteries on the works was however, 
kept up with an inexcusable waste of ammunition, appar- 
ently according to no pre-arranged plan, and without skillful 
supervision. The cost of this waste of ammunition on the 
night of the 28th to 29th November alone has been esti- 
mated at 120,000 thalers (£18,000) . Frequently costly pro- 
jectiles were aimed at in other cases without any good rea- 
son that could be assigned. We refer to the destruction of 
the magnificient palaces of St. Cloud and Malmaison, to the 
laying in ashes of the towns and numerous villas there, 
acts that were done by the French themselves in the most 
reckless manner. 

The garrison artillery paid not the least attention to 
watching their fire for the purpose of fixing its elevation 
and direction; similarly they appeared to profit but little 
by the great advantage they had on their side of being able 
to ascertain the distances accurately. Under these circum- 
stances the possession of the best material was of no use to 
them. Nevertheless, the pertinacity and bravery of the gar- 
rison artillery in the working their guns was not to be de- 
nied, and they understood how to take advantage of the 
want of cover of their opponents on every occasion. The artil- 
lery fire of the forts derived substantial assistance from the 
guns which were mounted in the field redoubts in front of, 
between, and in rear of them, and in separate emplace- 
ments. Most of the forts were in fact connected with one 
another by a military road constructed for the purpose; 
from these roads trenches branched out to important points, 
which afforded a favourable opportunity for bringing an un- 
expected fire to bear on the ground in front. 

—555— 



Siege Operations 

During the siege particular attention was attracted to 
a new long-ranging gun, which fired from the fortress of 
Mont Valerian and strewed the batteries erected against 
the south front with its ponderous projectiles, as far as 
9,000 paces to the westward. The French named it Sanite 
Valerie. The bore had a calihre of 36 centimetres (14^ 
inches). The projectiles weighed 80 lbs., (82^ lbs. Eng- 
lish) . The breech closing gear was removed when the fort 
was given up, so that the gun was unserviceable; it is now 
among the captured artillery at Berlin. 

Provisioning — The chief in this department was the 
Intendant-General of the army of Paris, Wolf. With regard 
to the provisioning of Paris, the defence committee had to 
solve a very serious problem, and they performed their task 
so as to elicit general approval. So early as about the mid- 
dle of August convoys of provisions ceased to be sent to the 
French army of the Rhine, since it was very well known, 
among those who were concerned, that their arrival at their 
destination was doubtful. Resort was then had to England, 
and shortly after, twenty-eight ships, laden with flour, left 
Liverpool under sail for Havre. The defence committee 
originally contemplated the provision of food for two mil- 
lion inhabitants for two months, and arranged that all the 
stocks of grain should be sent to Paris from the depart- 
ments of the Seine and Marne, where corn is abundant, and 
which are also in other respects fertile and wealthy. This 
measure was proved to be of practical utility and it was 
made more stringently operative by a decree to the effect 
that all stores, which were in the line of advance of the 
Prussians into the country, should be, without exception, 
destroyed. The issue of the provisions took place according 
to a plan, of which the preparation and execution were un- 
dertaken by a special commission. 

The herds of cattle and sheep brought up by the Gov- 
ernment were placed in the Bois de Vincennes, in the Jardin 
des Plantes, in the outer Boulevards, and in the Bois de 
Boulogne ; for the want of fodder, and from the unfavoura- 
ble weather, which early became very cold, the cattle suf- 
fered extremely, and succumbed in great numbers, and lat- 

—556— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

terly cows were only maintained to supply milk for the 
hospitals and for children. The Government, moreover, 
took all the care that circumstances permitted ; for the cat- 
tle were bought on their account, and sold, either to the 
butcher or the public, at a fixed price. Naturally, in the 
course of the siege, a great advance took place in the prices 
of all provisions, and the want of butter, salt, and of vege- 
tables, eggs and milk was much felt ; the flour and wine were 
not exhausted even in the last days of the siege. That people 
were driven to killing dogs, cats, and even rats, need not 
much astonish us with so large a population, which included 
a considerable number of the poorer classes ; but the inhab- 
itants, as a whole must have suffered much, and it is not sur- 
prising that among the aged and the children a greater mor- 
'tality took place than under ordinary circumstances; this 
was, moreover, increased by hunger and the cold of winter. 
The subsistence of the soldiers was naturally a great source 
of anxiety; an actual failure of provisions for the troops 
were not experienced during the whole siege, although at the 
last they were reduced to the consumption of horseflesh, 
salt meat, bread and wine, and a reduction of the rations 
took place to 150 grammes (one-third of a pound). Pris- 
oners and wounded, who fell into our hands in the sorties of 
December, had their rations for four or five days with them ; 
as the prisoners, however, if it was proposed to send them 
back to the fortress, preferred to remain with us, it may be 
concluded that the subsistence and service in the army of 
Paris was not much to their taste. 

The want of coals for fuel and for the manufacture of 
gas was much felt; and wood also, in the later periods of 
the siege, was scarcely to be found ; severe measures must 
have been adopted to secure the timber-yards and the tim- 
ber in the defences from plunder and depredation. 

As vv^as the case at Metz, the means of existence in 
Paris lasted soma weeks longer than one was at first in- 
clined to expect. What amount of provisions were actually 
in the town on the 19th September will never be known with 
any accuracy ; at that time the authorities concerned appar- 
ently did not believe in the possibility of holding out 131 

—557— 



Siege Operations 

days, to the 28th January. In this respect the report is at 
length gaining credit that the stores originally existing in 
Paris, exclusive of the special provision made for the siege, 
had been seriously underestimated ; for the quantity of provi- 
sions that could have been conveyed subsequently into the be- 
sieged place in spite of the blockade, is not worth taking 
into account. 

The imminent failure of provisions — the actual pres- 
sure of hunger in the city — was, at any rate, one of the chief 
causes of the commencement of negotiations for surrender; 
at the time of the three weeks' truce, moreover, it was at 
its height. The stocks of flour and horseflesh were suffi- 
cient only for eight and fourteen days respectively; and 
with regard to this, it must not be overlooked that the get- 
ting in of fresh supplies, which was much facilitated by the 
German army of investment handing over 3,000,000 rations, 
and throwing open the roads for traffic, took fourteen days 
longer, during which time the want of provisions in Paris 
continued. It should be added finally, that at the capitula- 
tion the provisions of the garrison were not exhausted, so 
that a portion of them were available for the use of the civil 
population. 

Intelligence. — Very soon after the appearance of the in- 
vesting army before Paris all further communication with 
the country outside was cut off ; the last post was despatched 
on the 18th September. Subsequently an underground tele- 
graph to Tours was discovered and also another line which 
was led along the bed of the river Seine to Havre ; the latter 
was fished up accidentally at Bougival during the pontoon- 
ing operations of the Prussians for the military bridge at 
that place, and it, as well as the former, was destroyed. A 
like fate befell the floating hollow balls and diving machines ;* 
the Prussians had nets spread across the stream and caught 
them. Letter-carriers, disguised as sellers of vegetables 
endeavoured to slip through the outposts ; this also was im- 
practicable; only five out of eighty-five returned. The only 



*Taucher-boten — probably some apparatus arranged to float 
down with the stream below the surface of the water. 

—558— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

road not suspected was that through the catacombs of 
Paris, but the foolhardy people who ventured by it perished 
there ; even bloodhounds undertook the conveyance of letters, 
but they also did not come back. 

The chief part in the transmission of news was played 
by air-balloons, and for their manufacture and filling special 
factories with hundreds of workmen were established at the 
Northern and Eastern railway stations ; they were under the 
management of the well-known aeronaut Godard. A school 
of aeronauts was established; a committee of professional 
and scientific persons devoted themselves to this business. 
The first voyage through the air, that was of any use, was 
made by the aeronaut Duruof on the 23d September ; on the 
8th October M. Gambetta, followed him, and probably also 
officers, with special commissions to arrange for combined 
action with the generals commanding the masses of the ene- 
my who were operating in the open field. During the period 
from 23d September 1870 to the 23d January 1871, fifty- 
four balloons were sent off from Paris ; they conveyed some 
persons who took charge of the balloons, and several hun- 
dred-weights of letters. The use of this contrivance by the 
public was regulated by special orders, and letters conveyed 
by balloon were not allowed to exceed 4* grammes in 
weight. Altogether, 2,500,000 letters, weighing about 10,- 
OOOf kilogrammes, we're forwarded. The ascents were 
made from the railway stations of the Orleans, Northern 
and Eastern railways from Montmartre, the Tuileries gar- 
dens, etc. Some balloons, moreover, strayed away to Roth- 
enburg, to Hesse, to Holland, and to Norway ; of the fate of 
many others nothing was heard. Besides these larger air- 
balloons, there were smaller ones six to sevenj metras in 
diameter, called ballons libres, by which letters only were 
sent to the care of "the esteemed finder." Captive balloons 
with cords and ropes, hanging over Paris, served for observ- 
ing the positions of the enemy, and for watching the sorties 
from the fortress. 



*About l/7th part of an oz., avoirdupois, 
t About 9 tons 16 cwt. 
J20 to 23 feet. 

—559— 



Siege Operations 

Great numbers of carrier pigeons had been brought 
from Belgium and the prefect of Lille sent 900 of these birds 
to Paris just before the investment. They were generally 
sent out with the air-balloons — of course enclosed in cages 
— were intended to bring back the answer to the balloon let- 
lers. These carriers, however, during the latter part of the 
siege, frequently failed to come in, and proved untrustwor- 
thy. Some were prevented from returning by the foggy 
weather, and some sought their Flemish homes. Of 200 
carrier-pigeons let go from Paris only 73 got back. The des- 
patches tied to them contained 70,000 words, which were 
reduced in size by photography. The management of the 
air-balloons and carrier-pigeons was entrusted to the ingen- 
ious post-master, Ramport de Chin. 

Observatories were establisshed on Morntmatre, the 
Pantheon, and the towers of Notre Dame, which were chiefly 
employed in watching the flat country on the west and 
north-east sides. The forts were connected by underground 
telegraph with the several head-quarters particularly with 
the Place Vendome, and also with one another. Besides all 
this, visual signals — in part also arranged for use at night 
— were used for enabling the commandants of forts to com- 
municate with one another. 

From the fortress of Mont Valerien, which afforded the 
most extensive view, pre-arranged flag-signals, were made; 
on the side of the Germans it was believed that there was 
a certain warning if a sortie was contemplated, and the at- 
tention of the besiegers was always doubly increased by 
these signals. 

By electrical light-apparatus, which was directed on the 
positions of the enemy before the town, they endeavoured to 
observe the works undertaken there at night. An ample 
supply of the requisite material, and excellent apparatus 
worked by skillful operators, were abundant in Paris, and 
rendered easy this mode of illumination. 

On the German side there were told off for the invest- 
ment of Paris the Illd Army, under the command of the 
Crown Prince of Prussia, consisting of the Vth, Vlth, and 
Xlth Prussian corps, the two Bavarian corps, and the Wur- 

—560— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

temberg division, about 140,000 strong ; and the IVth Army 
under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, com- 
posed of the Prussian guard and IVth Corps and of the 
Xllth (Saxon) corps, about 80,000 strong. The German 
army of investment was thus of the total strength of only 
220,000 men, for the reinforcement sent from Germany had 
not at that time arrived. 

As early as the 16th September, the advanced guard 
of the German cavalry division, which had been pushed for- 
ward one or two marches in front of the attacking armies, 
appeared at Curteil, Nouilly, Corbeille, and Clamart. Their 
task was to destroy the telegraphs, as well as to intercept the 
supplies for Paris, and they were intended on the other 
hand, to save the railways and prevent the demolition of 
the bridges ; under these circumstances there occurred some 
minor engagements with the French detachments, sent out 
of the forts to reconnoitre. 

September 17.— Nevertheless, the advanced guards of 
the Hid army found the permanent bridges over the Seine at 
Corbeille and Villeneuve-St. George destroyed. It became 
necessary, therefore, at once to establish a new means of 
crossing the Seine. For this purpose, the 5th pioneer bat- 
talion formed a pontoon bridge above Villeneuve-St. George 
at half -past 3 o'clock in the afternoon, which was immedi- 
ately crossed by the 2nd division of cavalry. 

To cover the formation of the bridge the 17th brigade 
of infantry, with two squadrons and two batteries, had 
taken up a position on the heights at Limeuil, in the direc- 
tion of Boissy St. Legere. This detachment was attacked 
at 2 p.m., by six French battalions and two batteries. After 
a severe engagement in the woods of Valenton the enemy 
fell back on Creteil, and the passage of the German forces 
over the pontoon-bridge, which had been formed in the 
meantime, was not further interfered with. 

On the 18th of September the Vth army corps com- 
menced their march on Palaiseau and Bievre. At Dame Rose 
there was a slight engagement between detachments of the 
9th division and French out-posts, but this did not at all 
delay the further advance on Versailles. 

—561— 



Siege Operations 

On the 19th of September, a more serious encounter 
took place on the plateau of Petit Bicetre, and Plessis-Pi- 
quet, which had been carefully prepared for defence. The 
Royal Bavarian army had also in great part crossed the 
Seine at Corbeille on pontoon-bridges and was on the 18th 
brought forward as far as the neighbourhood of Longju- 
meau and Palaiseau ; their lid corps on the 19th, followed the 
Prussian Vth corps on the road to Versailles, to which place 
the headquarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia were to be 
transferred on the 20th September. On the French side, 
General Ducrot, with the 13th corps, had advanced to the 
road from Fontainebleau and Orleans, in order to prevent the 
occupation of the plateaus Clamart-Chatillon and Plessis- 
Piquet, which were of the greatest military importance. As 
a point d'appui he occupied the intrenchment of Moulin de 
la Tour, previously mentioned, which was not yet finished. 
On the left the French had occupied Sceaux; their right 
rested on the park of Meudon. 

By 6 a.m., the advanced guard of the Vth Prussian 
corps (King's grenadiers, and 47th Regiment) had attacked 
the enemy, who was six times stronger than themselves. 
At Petit-Bicetre, a brisk engagement began, and was main- 
tained with equal obstinacy on both sides for several hours. 
It did not cease until a brigade of the 1st Bavarian Divis- 
ion, under Colonel Diehl, was sent forward in support. Later 
on the 10th division was directed on Villa Coublay, and the 
corps artillery was advanced. About 11 o'clock, the enemy 
beat a retreat on the entrenchments of Moulin de la Tour. 
While a Bavarian brigade was directed on Sceaux the 8th 
Brigade of the 4th Bavarian division was sent to Croix de 
Bernis, the 7th towards Bourg; with these movements the 
enemy was to be outflanked. In the meanwhile, about a 
quarter to 12, the enemy again made a stand, and attacked 
Fontenay and Plessis vigorously. The fight thickened, and 
the artillery took a large share in it. The French fired with 
six batteries from the entrenchment of Moulin de la Tour, 
and other strongly fortified positions in front of and beside 
it, the Germans from well-covered positions opposite. About 
half-past 1 o'clock, the French ventured an attack on the 

• • —562— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

Bavarian position, and then, failing of success, fell back 
about half-past two. The 3rd Bavarian Division pursued 
them with the 3rd battalion of jagers, detachments of the 
14th regiment, two batteries, and a regiment of light horse 
occupied the abandoned entrenchment of Moulin de la Tour, 
and captured there seven 12-pounder field-pieces. The 
French continued their retreat uninterrupted to Paris. The 
Vth corps had, in the forenoon, when the enemy fell back 
at Petit-Bicetre, resumed their advance on Versailles. They 
arrived there towards evening, took 2,000 of the garde mo- 
bile prisoners, and occupied at once the entrenchments 
thrown up by the French at Montretout and Sevres. The 
captured works at Sevres, and Moulin de la Tour, were hence- 
forth named by the Germans, the Kronprinz, the Jager, 
and the Bavarian entrenchments. The Vlth Prussian corps 
crossed the Seine at Villeneuve, the advanced guard by the 
bridge made by the Vth corps, the rest by one they had made 
themselves in the meantime, and went on to Orly. Its fur- 
ther advance was prevented by the fire from the lately-con- 
structed but unfinished French entrenchment at Villejuif. 
Towards evening this redoubt was reoccupied by the Prus- 
sians, but unfortunately was given up again, because it was 
no longer tenable in the face of the heavy fire from the re- 
tired positions of the French. The army corps placed their 
outposts on the line Chevilly to Choisy. 

On the evening of the 19th September, the outposts of 
the Ilird army stood on the line Bougival, Sevres, Meddon, 
Bourg, L'Hay, Chevilly, Thiais, Choisy-le-Roi, Bonneville, 
Creteil, Champigny, Brie ; in corresponding positions in rear 
were the Vth Corps, the 1st and Ilnd Bavarian Corps, the 
Vlth and Xllth Corps and the Wurtemberg division. 

At Les Tanneries, and in the neighbourhood of Bougival 
and Tournay, communication was established over the Seine 
and Marne respectively, by means of Pontoon-bridges, with 
the IVth army. This army performed their march on Paris 
without meeting with any resistance; except that, between 
Pierrefitte and Montmagny, a slight engagement took place, 
which resulted in the capture, by detachments, of the IVth 
corps, of the fortified positions occupied by the French. Le 

—563— 



Siege Operations 

Bourget and Erancy remained in the occupation of the ene- 
my, who did not fall back here till the 20th of September. 
The outposts of the IVth Army stood generally on the line 
Neuilly, Villemomble, Le Bourget, Dugny, Stains, Pierre- 
fitte, Epinay, Argenteuil, Besons. The headquarters of the 
IVth army were in Grand Tremblay; those of the King in 
Ferriers, the chateau of the Rothschilds, on the left bank 
of the Marne and not far from Lagny; from this point he 
overlooked the positions of the two investing armies. 

The machinery of government, organized and central- 
ized in Paris for the whole of France, was thus thrown out 
of gear, and all communication between the army in Paris 
and the armies in the field, either investing or in process 
of formation, was cut off. 

The leader of the German army had, with unerring 
glance, selected the south as generally the weakest front 
for the principal attack; and this on a close examination 
was seen to have, also defensively, a special cause of weak- 
ness which we will mention here. 

The fortress of Mont Valerien protects the west side 
of Paris. This work is intended not only to prevent any 
approach on the peninsula of Nanterre to the gorge of the 
works of St. Denis, but also to defend effectively the ground 
towards St. Cloud and Sevres. The guns of the adjoining 
work. Fort Issy, cover the bend of the Seine at Billancourt. 
But in order to strengthen the position protected by Mont 
Valerien in the direction of St. Cloud and Sevres, where the 
effective action of the fort was weakened, not only by the 
distance of 4,000 to 4,500 metres, but also by the formation 
of the ground, the work already mentioned was constructed 
at Montretout, as soon as Paris was put into a state of 
defense. The work fell into the hands of the Prussians 
when half-finished. Under these circumstances the fort 
of Mont Valerien had to protect the ground as far as St, 
Cloud, where the duty was taken up by Fort Issy. Reckon- 
ing the effective range of the guns of the two works at 
8,500 metres, there would remain at Sevres, and Bellevue a 
dead space, which was of great advantage to us. These 

—564— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

circumstances were favourable for an approach, as secure 
as possible, to Fort Issy, and also to Point du Jour. The 
exit of the Seine, moreover, weakens the latter point, which 
we should probably have selected in case of need, for an 
advance on Paris. 

Viewed in this light, as the result showed, the deter- 
mination to take up a position and on the south of the for- 
tress and direct the principal attack on that side was most 
fortunate, and the immediate capture of the works, which 
had been just thrown up by the French in preparation for 
the siege had the most important results on the progress 
of the attack. 

The next step was for the investing army to establish 
itself firmly in the positions which it occupied, that not 
only should all communications be cut off between the cap- 
ital and the people of the country, but it should also become 
impossible for the garrison, in spite of its superiority of 
numbers, to break through and establish communication 
with the French armies of the north and south, which were 
in process of formation or in the field; that in fact the 
French, at every point of the girdle around them, might be 
so long held at bay as to allow the German troops to arrive 
in sufficient force to drive them back into the fortress. Each 
army corps had its own well-defined position of the circle of 
investment which it had to occupy and strengthen by suit- 
able works, of fortification. The redoubts captured at the 
first onset of the German army afforded a strong point 
of support, for which purpose they were turned about 
towards the enemy, the original gorge being converted into 
the front of the work, and entrance made upon our side. 
At a greater distance points of support were also found in 
the numerous villages, which from their very massive con- 
struction were well adapted for the purposes of defence. 
The approaches to the villages were, therefore, barricaded, 
the communications of every kind repaired, walls favourably 
situated were provided with loopholes and banquettes, alarm 
posts were established, and huts built to shelter those troops 
who were held in constant readiness. 

—565— 



Siege Operations 

The principal objects during the whole of the operations 
of the investment were the construction of works for the 
security of the troops at a greater or less distance from the 
forts, and the establishment of a line of obstacles to be 
defended by musketry. This was intended to compel the 
enemy to deploy his forces as slowly as possible, and to 
give our troops time to occupy the line of work in rear. 
In the line of obstacles openings were left in case of our 
being able to take the offensive, ' The obstacles consisted 
of abattis, and the existing walls and buildings, which 
were made capable of defence. The line of defences behind 
these obstacles, and prepared in a similar manner, was prin- 
cipally occupied by infantry, owing to the ground in front 
not being generally exposed to view. According to the 
nature of the ground, greater or smaller entrenchments 
were formed in this line of defences, and partly in front, 
partly in flank or rear, artillery emplacements were made 
and strongly secured by works to resist the sorties in force, 
which were to be expected subsequently. 

It would take too long to enumerate the several works 
of this kind in the circle of investment ; we will take, there- 
fore, only one section of the ground, and select that which 
the Vth and Vlth corps had to occupy and arrange for 
defence. 

The Vth corps had the ground between Meudon and 
Bougival to defend. The line of obstacles in that quarter 
comprised the northern boundary fence of Meudon, was 
continued by rifle-pits, etc., round Bellevue to the Crown 
Prince battery, and followed thence the steep slope to St. 
Cloud, as far as the Montretout redoubt, where a gap 
occurred for the attack of the ground in front of Mont 
Valerien. Abattis and rifle-pits crowned the heights of 
Garches, and led on to the eastern boundary of Bougival, 
ending here on the Seine. The line of obstacles was flanked 
along its length by being broken back in some places, by 
blockhouses on it and annexed to it, and by the Crown Prince 
and Montretout redoubts. The line of works in rear began 
in the east with the parks of Chalais, Meudon, and St. 

—566— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

Cloud, which were arranged for defence; a series of en- 
trenchments led over the plateau of Garches to the stud 
enclosure, which, as the centre of the position, was secured 
by abattis, a number of batteries and self -defensible earth- 
works, and so on in the same manner to Bougival. In rear 
of this line, on the edge of the plateau towards the villages 
Ville d'Avray, Marnes, and Vaucresson, emplacements were 
arranged for batteries and strongly defended with works. 

The Vlth corps had to cover the ground between the 
Seine and Bievre, beginning at Villeneuve-St, George, the 
same place where subsequently were the two bridges allotted 
for the use of the siege-train. Next was the northern 
boundary of Choisy, particularly the churchyard, which was 
fortified in the most formidable manner, barricaded, and 
rendered completely secure against the assault of infantry. 
Opposite, lay the village of Vitry, also fortified by the 
French, and close at hand were some gunboats on the Seine. 
Further to the westward, and within our position came the 
villages of Thiais and Choisy, both fortified; opposite, but 
in the possession of the French, were Ville juif, which was 
also fortified, and a redoubt at the same place, both covered 
by Fort Bicetre. At the junction of the high roads to 
Versailles and Fontainebleau and inside the German posi- 
tion lay the strongly entrenched farm of La Belle Epine, the 
central point of an artillery position containing 84 field 
guns, strengthened and covered by shelter trenches for six 
battalions; and next to it, pushed forward on the slope of 
the right bank of the Bievre, was the village of L'Hay with 
the wall skirting its edge arranged for a determined resist- 
ance, being the point of support for a brigade. 

Opposite lay the enemy's redoubt of Haute Bruyeres 
(Cachan) covered by Fort Bicetre. The outposts of the 
Prussian position at this point were also protected by a line 
of obstacles with shelter trenches and other arrangements 
for defence, whilst the section of ground to be held was 
rendered secure by formidable fortified posts and entrenched 
emplacements for the employment of masses of artillery. 



—567- 



Siege Operations 

In the low country eastward of St. Denis, where the 
French positions were protected by inundations, the Guard 
Corps had in a similar manner rendered the section from 
Seoran to Dugny impassable by damming up the Moree 
stream, so that only two narrow defiles were available, 
namely, at Port Iblon on the embanked high road of Lille, 
and at Aulnay. This inundation was defended by the 
strongly fortified villages of Dugny, Le Blanc-Mesnil, and 
Aulnay, which were somewhat retired, Le Blanc-Mesnil, 
being the centre of the defense. Shelter trenches and posi- 
tions for artillery were formed on the undulating ground 
in rear of the inundation, and gave a great power of resist- 
ance to the section of the ground. Opposed was the French 
position as described, and, from a consideration of their 
mutual position, it is easy to understand why the village 
of Le Bourget became the object of constant attacks from 
both sides. The intended inundation of the Moree by the Ger- 
mans would hardly have succeeded on account of the small 
supply of water, had it not received a considerable contribu- 
tion by damming up the Ourq canal at Sevran. This arrange- 
ment proved further disadvantageous to the enemy by 
reducing the supply to the St. Denis inundation and with- 
drawing a certain quantity of drinking water from the 
inhabitants of Paris. The execution of this interesting 
work was entrusted to Captain von Krause of the Engineers. 
When the inundation froze during the winter it had to 
be taken up in a number of places. 

The establishment of communications by constructing 
roads for the supply and transport columns, and providing 
them all with guide posts for the information of troops, 
caused considerable labor, as did also the erection of bar- 
ricades of all sorts and the buildings of bridges and roads 
for the communications between the corps; of this kind 
were the bridges built at Le Pecq, Bougival, Les Tanneries, 
Triel, Villeneuve, St. Georges, at Gournaz over the Marne, 
at Chatout, two at Corbeille, without counting many other 
foot-bridges over brooks and hollow roads. In places where 



-568— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

it was necessary, these structures were secured against a 
coup-de-main by an entrenchment. 

Later, when the winter set in, it required great care 
to preserve them, or some at least, from the floating masses 
of ice on the Seine ; a few had to be removed and the per- 
manent bridges lying far in rear of the investing army to 
\)e utilized. 

With regard to the tactical considerations of the besieg- 
ing army, it was above all things necessary to adapt the 
defence in the best manner to the peculiarities of the ground, 
^ach division had above one-fifth to one-sixth of its strength 
on outpost duty. These, together with the picquets (some- 
times with guns attached) and the supports, had fortified 
the particular point indicated to them where a stand was to 
be made, and had instructions to receive the enemy in that 
position. The woods and undulations of the ground, which 
limited the field of view towards the enemy, made the erec- 
tion of observations a necessity for the investing army ; one 
was on the Marly aqueduct which carries water for the 
fountains at Versailles over the Seine on 36 arches at a 
height of 643 metres above the Seine; this was often used 
by the Emperor-King on account of the distant view it 
commanded; besides this there were others, viz., in the 
redoubt of Moulin de la Tour at Malmaison, at Bougival, 
at the Lantern of Diogenes, in the Villa du Barry, at Sevres, 
at Le Blanc-Mesnil and other places. Semaphores also were 
erected for signalling by day and night. 

At the principal commands intelligence-bureaux were 
established and a service for the transmission of important 
orders by mounted orderlies, organized in relays, posted 
partly at the picquets, and partly at cross roads. Independ- 
ently of this, all divisional staffs were connected with the 
corps and headquarter staff, by means of the field telegraph. 

As occurred before many other French fortresses, so 
at Paris the bearers of flags of truce were fired upon, con- 
trary to all the customs of war ; this happened, for example, 
on the 1st of October to Lieutenant v. Kissing, and on the 
23d December to 1st Lieutenant v. Uslar. 

—569— 



Siege Operations 

The destruction of the tunnel at Nanteuil to which 
allusion has already been made, did not particularly increase 
the difficulties of the advance of the Hid Army, but it was 
a serious obstacle in the formation of the siege parks. 
During its restoration, when the temporary wooden sup- 
ports were nearly completed, the whole gave-way in con- 
sequence of the pressure of the superincumbent chalk, so 
that recourse had to be made to a branch line to turn the 
obstacle, which was finished in the latter part of November. 
With the fall of Soissons, a second line of rail became avail- 
able for the besiegers on the east side, but on the west and 
north-west front the line of communication to the rear by 
Laon and Compiegne was only opened after the fall of La 
Fere. 

At the beginning of the siege, in consequence of the 
want of railway communication with the provision maga- 
zines in rear, the supply of the armies was a very difficult 
task; it required the greatest activity and foresight on the 
part of the commissariat officials to carry on the duty in 
a satisfactory manner. In addition, to the regular service 
of supplies of all kinds from Germany, which were accum- 
ulated in the magazines in rear of the investing army, neces- 
sity soon required the levy of requisitions in the districts 
beyond the immediate neighbourhood, which had been al- 
ready exhausted by the French. Opinions have been expressed 
very strongly against this mode of requisitioning, without 
recognizing the laws of war by which an army has to sup- 
port itself in an enemy's country. Requisitions of this 
sort required convoys, as not only was the populace hostile, 
but collisions with the f rancs-tireurs were of constant occur- 
rence. The escorts for them were provided by detachments 
of cavalry accompanied by infantry on wagons. When, 
during December and January, the railway by Amiens and 
Laon, and the lines to Rouen and Orleans became available, 
the supply of provisions was an easier task; as an illustra- 
tion of the requirements, we may add, that the daily provi- 
sion and forage transport for a single army corps was about 
5 trains of 32 wagons each. The daily provision and forage 

—570— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

supply for the armies before Paris was about the following : 
148,000 three-pound loaves, 1,020 cwt. of rice or grain, 595 
bullocks or 1,020 cwt. of bacon, 144 cwt. of salt, 9,600 cwt. 
of oats, 2,400 cwt. of hay, 28,000 quarts of brandy. 

After this description of the circumstances of the in- 
vestment we shall notice next the principal sorties, and 
after them, the artillery attacks which led to the fall of 
the capital. 

The object of the smaller sorties was to molest and 
alarm our outposts, as well as to make demonstrations for 
special purposes; they never caused any important inter- 
ruption in the works of the investment or siege, and did 
not appear to have that purpose in view; it was only in 
the last days of the siege, about the middle of January, that 
small sorties were made against the batteries of the attack 
on the south front. The sorties en masse, however, played, 
an important part, having no less an object than to pierce 
the investing line, and form a junction with the French 
armies operating in the north, south and west. 

Such sorties were preconcerted with the commanders of 
the armies in the field, who were probably informed of the 
intended operations by means of the balloon post. We re- 
ceived information of these undertakings, days and weeks 
beforehand, partly by means of prisoners or deserters, partly 
also by the visible stir on the other side, so that we were 
always found prepared. These lengthened preparations 
.were probably necessitated by political reasons, such as to 
tranquilize the Parisian populace, who, in ignorance of the 
true state of things were pressing for sorties which could 
have no good result. The march of large bodies of troops 
towards the locality of the inteiided sortie, which took place 
generally by means of the circular railway, conspicuous on 
its embankment, as well as on those sections of rail leading 
beyond the works and the movement of the troops between 
the enceinte and the outer forts, could not escape the notice 
of those in the observatories, or in the German outposts. 



—571— 



Siege Operations 

It was in consequence of the movement of troops out of 
Paris on the 19th of September, that St. Cloud was occu- 
pied on the 21st of that month, 

September 23. The French undertook small recon- 
naissances directed from St. Denis against Pierrefitte from 
Aubervilliers towards Le Bourget, and from Fort Bicetre 
against Villejuif. 

September 24. The outposts at Sevres and St. Cloud 
were engaged with some gunboats stationed at Suresnes. 

On September 30 there was a more considerable sortie,, 
which the enemy had announced the 27th and 28th by 
changes in the positions of the troops outside the fortress. 
General Vinoy attacked the 12th Division with six battal- 
ions between Choisy le Roi and La Bel Epine, supported by 
Forts Montrouge and Bicetre, whilst he made demonstra- 
tions on his left wing with a brigade against the Xlth corps, 
and on his right wing with three battalions against the Vth 
corps at Sevres, and Meudon. At Bas Meudon he threw a 
bridge over the Seine. The fighting began at 6 o'clock in 
the morning and turned on the possession of L'Hay which 
was bravely defended by the 23d regiment but had eventu- 
ally to be evacuated. It was soon perceived that the attacks 
on the wings were only demonstrations ; the Vlth corps 
therefore concentrated its reserves and supported by some 
Bavarian detachments, drove the enemy again out of L'Hay 
behind his intrenchments. General Guilhelm fell here and 
his body was handed over to the French next day. These es- 
timated their loss at 1,200 men; on the German side there 
were 80 killed and 300 wounded — but 300 unwounded 
French prisoners were taken. 

It was not known whether the French intended to pierce 
our lines on this occasion, or only to destroy the passages of 
the Seine; or perhaps to retaliate for the check they had 
received on the 19th September. 

On the 3d of October the headquarters of the King were 
removed from the Chateau of Ferrieres to Versailles. 

After frequent alarms on both sides, and much useless 
cannonading from the forts, the next sortie took place on 

—572— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

the 7th of October; on this occasion also there were great 
movements of troops on the preceding day to the entrench- 
ments in rear of d' Ivry and Bicetre. Probably this was 
only a demonstration. But, in the afternoon, a French force 
of all arms marched out of Fort Mont Valerien towards 
Rueil, returning towards the evening, having covered the 
destruction of part of our line of defence at Malmaison. 

On the 13th October the palace of St. Cloud was set on 
fire by the guns of Mont Valerien, without any apparent 
reason; the 5th jager battalion, and the 58th Regiment at- 
tempted to save as much as possible from the flames. The 
same day 10 French battalions of Blanchards division, with 
cavalry and field guns, advanced in three columns against 
the position of the Ilnd Bavarian corps, and drove their 
outposts out of Chatillon and Bagneux; the enemy had his 
reserves in readiness behind Fort Montrouge, in case the 
capture of the heights of Chatillon and the Bavarian re- 
doubt should succeed. After a combat of six hours duration, 
in which first the 8th, then the 7th Bavarian brigade took 
part, the enemy was driven back with considerable loss. 
In this sortie, which in the French reports is described as 
an "offensive reconnaissance," the guns from the French re- 
doubt, constructed on the height between L'Hay and Ville- 
juif, gave a good support, and annoyed the Bavarian right 
flank considerably; their loss was 10 officers and 380 men. 

October 14th. A sortie of several French battalions was 
repulsed by the piquets and some guns of the Xllth corps. 

At this period the 22nd Division under General von 
Wittich, and the 1st Bavarian corps under General von 
Tann were withdrawn from the investing force, in order to 
operate against the French army which had been formed in 
the south. On the other hand the guard landwehr divisions 
had arrived before Paris, and numerous changes were made 
in the positions of the troops. 

In the night of the 19th-20th, of October, a lively fire 
was kept up by the forts and repeated night attacks by 
strong infantry detachments were made against our outposts 
at Chevilly, that is to say, in the direction of Orleans, but 
without any result whatever. 

—573— 



Siege Operations 

October 21st. The sortie made on this day against the 
Vth corps was preceded by a heavy fire from Fort Mont 
Valerien, which was continued later from the gunboats sta- 
tioned on the Seine ; the latter fired principally against St. 
Cloud and Sevres. The following troops were drawn up 
under the command of General Ducrot: General Berthaut, 
with 3,400 men, 20 guns, and one squadron between the 
railroad to St. Germain and Rueil ; General Noel with 1,350 
men and 10 guns to operate against Bougival and the park 
of Malmaison ; Colonel Colleton with 1,000 men and 28 guns 
to keep up the communication between the two first-men- 
tioned columns, and also to join in the attack on Bougival. 
Besides there were two main columns of reserve, one under 
General Martenot with 2,000 men and 18 guns the other 
under General Paturel, consisting of 2,000 men, 28 guns and 
two squadrons. The whole, roundly speaking, 10,000 men, 
94 guns, and three squadrons, under the supreme command 
of General Ducrot, were in position an hour after mid-day, 
supported by the fortress of Mont Valerien. The attack was 
directed against the 10th Division on the line Bougival, Mal- 
maison, Garches. The 19th brigade formed the outposts, 
with the 46th regiment as the left wing and the 6th regiment 
as the right; the 20th brigade in reserve. Towards 3 o'clock 
in the afternoon four of the enemy's battalions attacked the 
park of Malmaison ; after an obstinate fight they were re- 
pulsed by the 46th Regiment, two battalions of the 6th Regi- 
ment, and detachments of the 1st guard landwehr regiment ; 
whilst this attack was in progress, the enemy directed an- 
other against La Celle, which was beaten back by portions 
of the 50th Regiment; the 5th and 6th companies of which 
assisted by some men of the 6th regiment, captured two guns 
and brought them safely away, notwithstanding the heavy 
firing of the enemy. On the right wing the advanced troops 
of the 9th division were engaged. The batteries of the IVth 
corps at Chatou and Besons, on the right bank of the Seine, 
cooperated with good effect towards the end of the fight, 
which terminated at 5 o'clock in a general retreat of the 
enemy towards Neuilly and to Fort Mont Valerien, under 
cover of the guns of the latter place. The troops which had 

-^574— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

taken part in the sortie retreated very slowly to the 
fortress, so that the Prussian detachments had to remain 
under arms until late in the evening. In Versailles the 
troops had taken up their defensive positions. Our losses in 
this combat are given as 15 officers and 297 men killed and 
wounded, whilst those of the enemy were 28 officers and 
232 men, exclusive of 300 prisoners. 

A small sortie took place at the same time against the 
Wurtemberg division ; three battalions, supported by the 
Faisandrie redoubt, crossed the Marne at Joinville and ad- 
vanced against Champigny, but were repulsed by the 2nd 
jager battalion and part of the 7th regiment with a loss of 
3 killed and 30 wounded. 

The fight on the 30th October at La Bouget, which was 
occupied by only one company of the guard was of more im- 
portance ; the village had been attacked on the 28th by su- 
perior French forces from Fort d'Aubervilliers, and the 
garrison driven out. The place lay under a cross-fire from 
the forts at St. Denis, d'Aubervilliers, and Romainville, and 
the French made every effort to secure this advantageous 
position and fortify it. An attempt was made on the 29th 
to drive the enemy out of Le Bourget by the fire from the 
batteries in rear, but it failed. 

The re-capture of this post of such importance to the 
Prussians was, therefore, ordered for the 30th of October; 
the 2d division of foot guards, under the command of Lieut.- 
General v. Budritzky, was told off for this service. It was 
arranged that a right column consisting of two battalions of 
the Franz regiment, a centre column composed of the 3d 
grenadiers of the guard, and one battalion of the Queen's 
(Konigin) regiment and a left column of two battalions of 
the Alexander's regiment, with three companies of the bat- 
talion of sharpshooters of the guard, the whole supported 
by artillery and engineers as well as the necessary reserves, 
should attack Le Bourget simultaneously, and, if possible, 
cut off the retreat of the enemy on St. Denis. Preparations 
had also been made for the attack to be supported on both 
flanks by other troops of the investing force. 

—575— 



Siege Operations 

Le Bourget was occupied by 6,000 men, besides a re- 
serve of several battalions on the Paris road. 

The combat was opened at 8 o'clock in the morning by 
a fire from retired artillery positions in the lines Garges- 
Aulnay; the left column was immediately set in motion, 
crossed the Moleret stream without much resistance, and 
reached the road south of Le Bourget, drove the enemy out 
of his entrenched position and forced the reserve into a 
hurried retreat. In the meantime the other columns had ad- 
vanced to storm Le Bourget, where a most obstinate hand- 
to-hand fight took place in the streets and houses. The brave 
General von Budritzky led his troops in person, flag in hand, 
against the barricades at the northern entrance to Le Bour- 
get, followed by Colonel Count Kanitz and Von Zaluskowsky, 
the latter of whom was killed in the street of the village. 

On the other side the Augusta regiment had pushed 
into the village ; its colonel. Count Waldersee, who had only 
just rejoined after recovery from a severe wound at Grave- 
lotte, fell here, with another officer, by French treachery, 
having been shot from a house, the defenders of which had 
lured him on by the waving of handkerchiefs. 

In consequence of this the fight was continued with the 
greatest bitterness by the Prussians ; Le Bourget was in their 
possession by halfpast 12 o'clock. The Prussians lost 35 of- 
ficers and 449 men killed and wounded. The French 30 ofl[i- 
cers, 1,250 unwounded prisoners. 

According to the statements of the prisoners and judg- 
ing by the large supply of provisions captured at Le Bourget, 
the enemy seem to have intended to include this place in the 
line of their fortified outposts and to construct large works 
round it. However, the result was different from what they 
had proposed, for the 2d pioneer company of the guard, 
under command of Captain v. Spanckeren of the engineers, 
which had particularly distinguished itself in the battle- 
field, immediately prepared to construct the defenses of the 
place. 

The failure of the French sorties caused great dissatis- 
faction in Paris, and led to a rising in the night of the 30th- 

—576— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

31st of October, in which, however, the mob was crushed by 
the troops at the disposal of Government. In the first days 
of November, there were negotiations which extended over 
a period of five days for the conclusion of an armistive, but 
without result. The Ilnd Prussian corps, which arrived 
before Paris in the latter half of November, was attached to 
the Ilird Army, and went into cantonments, in rear of the 
Vlth Prussian and Ilnd Bavarian corps, from Longjumeau 
to the Seine. At the same time the Xllth (Saxon) corps 
moved its left wing across the Marne, and the Wurtemberg 
Division closed towards the Vlth corps. The latter was 
transferred to the IVth army after the sortie of Le Bourget, 
with instructions to operate against the bands of franc-tireurs 
that were making their appearance in rear of the position, 
and especially at Meaux and Lagny on the line of communi- 
cation. For this purpose a battalion, accompanied by one 
squadron and two guns, was despatched as a flying column 
to Nangis, and succeeded in capturing with small loss, 5 
officers, 597 men, and two guns. 

Although after the fight at Le Bourget the conflicts be- 
tween the outposts were of less importance, and the extrava- 
gant waste of ammunition from the forts was diminished on 
the whole, yet, towards November, there were indications 
of an imporant sortie, probably in the south or south-east; 
in which direction General Trochu hoped to effect a junc- 
tion with the army which had been organized in feverish 
haste by Gambettta, and was pushing forward to the relief 
by way of Beaune under the command of General de Pala- 
dines. 

On the 29th of November, a sortie was made against 
the position of the Vlth Corps at L'Hay, Chevilly, Thiais, 
and Choisy le Roi. It began with heavy cannonade during 
the night of the 28th-29th November from some of the 
southern forts apparently for the purpose of fatiguing our 
troops, who had, in consequence, to be under arms during 
half of the night. Some works of fortification, which were 
in progress at the time, had, therefore, to be given up for 
the moment; among them the construction of a redoubt, at 
Villa Conblay, for the defense of the siege parks. The at- 

—577— 



Siege Operations 

tacking columns of the enemy were launched from Arcueil 
and Vitry against L'Hay, whilst the two wings were di- 
rected on the villages of Thiais and Chevilly, lying on either 
side of the Fontaineblau road. The enemy's strength was 
about 3,000 men, but he found the Vlth corps in a strong 
position to receive him. 

After a hard fight of three hours, without any result, 
the French were thrown back, leaving 2 officers and 200 
men in the hands of the Germans; the latter, sheltered be- 
hind their strongly entrenched position, never permitted the 
French to develop their forces, and caused them great losses 
both in killed and wounded ; on our side the loss was 200, of 
whom 3 officers and 32 men were killed. 

On the 30th of November, the battle was renewed with 
increased forces, under the personal command of General 
Trochu ; an attempt was made to penetrate the lines of the 
Wurtemberg division, on the ground in front of the penin- 
sula of St. Maur. The enemy commanded the ground where 
the Marne bends to the south, the villages of La Varenne, 
Pont Mesnil, and the district behind St. Maur, including the 
wood of les Fosses, by means of Forts Charenton, and 
Nogent, and the works thrown up in advance. Near Creteil 
is Mont Mesly, which is high enough to be regarded as the 
commanding point of the surrounding country. 

The concentration of the enemy's forces took place near 
Fort Charenton, in the camp of St. Maur (Forest of Vin- 
cennes), and between Forts Rosny and Nogent. 

The first offensive movement was from Fort Charenton 
against the hill of Mesly ; the second from Joinville towards 
Champigny; and the third from Nogent, directed against 
Brie and Villiers. The three companies of Wurtembergers, 
forming the garrison of Mesly, were unable to resist the 
overwhelming attack made against their position at day- 
break, and fell back on their supports whilst the enemy took 
possession of the Mesly heights and brought two batteries in 
action on them. An artillery fight now developed itself, 
whilst the division of Wurtembergers formed up and ad- 
vanced against the heights with the 2d and 3rd brigades, 
and re-captured them, after heavy fighting, about mid-day. 

-^78— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

They were supported by the 7th brigade of the Ilnd corps, 
which was in position with one battery at Villeneuve St. 
Georges, and joined in the attack from the side of Valenton, 
thus taking the enemy in flank, and preventing the action 
of reserves, who were forced in consequence to retreat from 
the wood of Creteil, to the village of that name, and Fort 
Charenton. 

How gallantly the Wurtembergers fought may be gath- 
ered from the fact that their losses were 40 oflftcers and 700 
men, whilst according to General Trochu's report those of 
the French amounted to nearly 2,000 killed and wounded. 

At Champigny, and Brie, the Wurtembergers had been 
relieved just before daybreak by the Saxons ; six companies 
of the latter occupied these places, but they were obliged to 
give way before the advancing French columns, who im- 
mediately took possession of the village of Villiers, lying 
more to the north. The French did not attempt a further 
advance against the German main position. In the mean- 
time, the reserves had come up. The Germans, namely, 
the 48th Infantry brigade (Saxons), and the 1st Wurtem- 
berg brigade, drove the enemy with great bravery out of 
Villiers, though Champigny and Brie remained in the hands 
of the latter. In the afternoon the fight raged with the 
greatest bitterness between Neuilly and Coeuilly; the in- 
fantry fighting for the possession of the villages, whilst the 
artillery were posted in the intervals; between Noisy and 
Villiers alone, there were 42 guns of the Xllth corps in ac- 
tion. The fight which had been carried on with the greatest 
determination on both sides, was only brought to a close by 
the approaching darkness. 

This sanguinary day, which cost the Saxons 29 officers 
and 879 men, and the Wurtembergers 1,500 whilst they cap- 
tured 940 prisoners, gave the impression that the French 
had made every effort to break through the German lines; 
for not only had all the preparations been carefully planned 
for this purpose, five bridges constructed over the Marne, 
and a supply of fresh troops always at hand, but offensive 
movements had been directed against other points of the 
investing army. A continuous cannonade was kept up from 

—579— 



Siege Operations 

all the forts, and even iron-plated railway wagons and gun 
boats, the latter on the Seine and Marne, had been set in 
motion to flank the battlefield. Sorties were made on both 
flanks of the battlefield, namely, against the Xllth corps in 
the direction of Chelles, and a second time against the Vlth 
Corps at Chevilly. At the latter place the entrenchments 
were held; and the enemy advancing from his fortified po- 
sition, was thrown back as early as 11 o'clock, so that the 
Vlth corps was able to detach 6 battalions, 2^ squadrons, 
and 2 batteries of horse artillery through Villeneuve St. 
Georges, to the assistance of the hard-pressed Wurtemberg- 
ers. At 3 o'clock the French renewed their attack, which 
was repulsed with comparative ease. 

Simultaneously, with these sorties to the south and 
southeast of the fortress, others were undertaken from St. 
Denis against the positions of the IVth and guard corps, as 
well as from St. Cloud against the Vth corps, but without 
result; the enemy brought about a brigade into the field 
at these points. All round the city there were therefore en- 
gagements with the enemy. General Trochu had made a 
great noise in Paris about his victories at Champigny and 
Brie, nevertheless he found it necessary to maintain himself 
quietly next day in the positions which he had occupied. 

On the 1st of December, the troops did not come into 
collision, but the French demanded an armistice until 4 
o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose of burying their 
dead. 

In consequence of an order, to be prepared under any 
circumstances for a renewal of the attack, the whole Ilnd 
corps was brought over to the right flank of the Seine, and 
on the night of the lst-2nd December took up a position be- 
tween Coeuilly and Chennevieres as reserve in rear of the 
Wurtembergers ; a measure which proved to be most useful. 
The portion of the Xllth corps on the left bank of the Marne, 
the Ilnd corps, a brigade of the Vlth corps, and the Wurtem- 
berg division were placed under the command of General 
von Franseky, commander of the Ilnd corps. At dawn on 
the 2nd of December, at 7 o'clock, the 1st Wurtemberg bri- 
gade, in company with the Saxons, renewed the attack on 

—580— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

Champigny. They succeeded after a short time in taking 
the village, but the Germans could not maintain themselves 
there, on account of the defences in the place, and the con- 
stant arrival of fresh troops on the field, v^hich w^ere brought 
by the railroad passing close to Fort Nogent. The 7th 
Prussian brigade, under the command of General du Trossel, 
advanced to the attack from Chennevieres at an opportune 
moment, but, as the lower part of the village of Champigny 
was under effective fire of the heavy guns, the Germans were 
only enabled to keep their hold in the upper part of the vil- 
lage. The 3rd infantry division, and the whole of the corps 
artillery had been in action in Champigny and on the line 
Champigny-Villiers since 9 o'clock in the morning; whilst 
the 8th brigade and a brigade of the Vlth corps remained 
in reserve at Chennevieres. 

After 10 hours hard fighting, the firing ceased here 
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The 24th (Saxon) di- 
vision had been ordered to re-capture Brie; about 8 o'clock 
in the morning, the place was attacked and the enemy driven 
into the lower part of the village, where he made a stand 
covered by good artillery positions. The fight in and round 
Brie came to a standstill. As the enemy in his well en- 
trenched position, was constantly receiving reinforcements, 
it was impossible to get possession of the whole of the vil- 
lage, notwithstanding the devoted bravery of the 1st and 
2nd Battalions of the sharpshooters, of the 107th regiment, 
and a battalion of the 104th regiment. Although the Ger- 
mans had a numerous artillery at their disposal, the ground 
was so unfavourable that it could not come fully into action. 
Round Villiers, and especially in the park, which was 
bravely defended, first, by the V/urtembergers, and after- 
wards by the Saxons, the fighting continued with great cour- 
age on both sides. At nightfall the enemy retired. The 
-losses of the Saxons on this day amounted to 55 officers and 
1,096 men, those of the Wurtembergers were 48 officers 
and 700 men. The troops went into cantonments in the 
villages on the battlefield, in order to occupy on the morning 
of the 3rd of December the positions previously held by them. 
The French repeated on this day some offensive movements 

—581— 



Siege Operations 

against Champigny, but without any energy; they main- 
tained themselves however at Brie. The Ilnd Corps lost, 
on the 30th November, and the 2d and 3rd December, 89 
officers and 1,517 men. 

The concentrated position taken up by the Germans on 
this day behind Champigny and Brie, induced the French to 
retire from the places remaining in their possession; they 
retreated from all points across the Marne, removing the 
bridges of boats after crossing the river. The necessity for 
strengthening this position with additional fortifications 
was now recognized, and strong detachments of pioneers 
were ordered to the spot from the south front. 

Thus these great efforts of the French to break out, 
for which purpose 70,000 of their best troops had been 
brought into action on the 30th of November, and the 2d 
of December, were repulsed without their having been of 
the slightest advantage to them; they failed as on former 
occasions from not following up with resolution the ad- 
vantages which had been gained by a vigorous attack. Gen- 
eral Ducrot who commanded on the 2d and 3d December, 
and had five horses shot under him on the first day, paid a 
tribute to the bravery of the German troops in his general 
orders. The occupation and fortifying of Mont Avron by 
the French, on the 28th of November, was highly disadvain- 
tageous to us. 

Nearly three weeks passed without any sorties fro\n 
Paris ; in the meantime, an attempt was made on the French 
side to form a junction of the army of Paris with that of 
General Faidherbe, commander of the northern army, and 
at the same time, to threaten our north-easterly line of 
communication. The enemy had also in view the molestation 
of our works in progress for the bombardment of Mont 
Avron. This led to a sortie "en masse" on the 21st of De- 
cember, of three divisions under the command of General 
Ducrot, directed against the north-easterly portion of the 
investing line in two simultaneous attacks, each on two 
roads. One attack was covered by Forts St. Denis and 
d'Aubervilliers, the other by Forts Romainville, Rosny, and 
Nogent. The advance was made against four points : Stains 

—582— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

and Le Bourget defended by the guards corps, and Sevraii 
and Chelles which were held by the Xllth Corps. 

On the afternoon of the 20th of December, the move- 
ment of large bodies of the enemy's troops out of St. Denis 
was noticed ; the guard corps therefore made the necessary 
dispositions. It was not possible on the morning of the 21st 
December to make out at what point the enemy intended to 
attack. Suddenly Le Bourget, which was garrisoned by one 
battalion of the 3rd regiment of guards, and one company of 
sharpshooters, was unexpectedly assailed from the northern 
edge, the churchyard was captured and 125 men taken, but 
the southern edge of the village was bravely held. With 
the assistance of three companies of the 3rd grenadiers of 
the guard, and two companies of the sharpshooters of the 
guards, who were sent to the succor of the hardly-pressed 
garrison, they succeeded after a hard fight in driving the 
French out of the village at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Three 
officers and 356 men were taken prisoners. 

Almost at the same time Stains, which was garrisoned 
by the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of guards, one com- 
pany of the 3d regiment of guards, and the fusilier bat- 
talion of the 1st regiment of guards, the latter in reserve, 
was attacked, under support from the guns of St. Denis; 
but the enemy failed to penetrate into the village and had 
to retire. The forts bearing on the field of battle kept up a 
heavy fire during the entire day, supported by a numerous 
field artillery, against which only six batteries of the guard 
corps were in action ; towards evening the firing ceased, and 
the Prussian troops were enabled to take up their old posi- 
tions. Three officers and 356 unwounded prisoners fell into 
the hands of the Prussians ; our loss was 14 officers and 400 
men, that of the French considerable; they had 40,000 men 
under fire. 

On the 19th and 20th of December, demonstrations 
had been made from Mont Avron towards the Maison 
Blanche and Ville Evrart, against the Xllth corps. In the 
afternoon of the 20th December, the enemy, concentrated 
about two divisions and 11 batteries at Noisy-le-Sec, under 
the command of Generals Malroi and Blaise ; this force was 

—683— 



Siege Operations . 

further strengthened during the night by mean of the rail- 
road. Fresh batteries were unmasked on Mont Avroni 
About mid-day the enemy attacked from Neuilly; Maison 
Blanche and Ville-Evrart, which were only held by our out- 
posts were lost. A further advance against the very strong 
position of the 24th division at Chelles was prevented by 
the flanking fire of the Wurtemberg Batteries Nos. 7, 8, and 
9 at Noisy-le-Grand, and by the overflowing of the Marne. 
As soon as the 24th division was completed by the arrival 
of the five battalions of the 101st and 107th regiments, the 
13th jager battalion, all of which had been detached to sup- 
port the guard corps, and also nine batteries which had 
taken up a position at Livry, it advanced against Maison 
Blanche and Ville-Evrart. The former was immediately 
taken by storm, but the fighting round Ville-Evrart was most 
obstinate and only ceased at midnight, when 500 French 
were made prisoners; the place had to be evacuated on ac- 
count of the rising of the river. The Saxons lost on this 
day 1 officer and 40 men, most of them slightly wounded. 

On the 21st December, the 4th infantry division was 
placed in reserve behind the Xllth corps, and the 8th bri- 
gade, together with four batteries, was advanced as far as 
the bridge over the Marne at Voires, but there was no colli- 
sion with the enemy. 

Whilst these sorties were in progress, the French made 
demonstrations at several points, for instance, from Fort 
Mont Valerien towards Montretout and Buzenval; the out- 
posts of the 5th Jager battalion sufllced to repel them. Be- 
sides this, a heavy and useless shell fire was kept up from 
the forts against the corps not attacked. 

On the 22nd of December, two French brigades ad- 
vanced along the Marne against the left wing of the Xllth 
corps, but two Wurtemberg batteries placed at Noisy soon 
compelled them to retreat. 

On the 15th of January, there were more sorties of 
the Paris garrison against the position of the guard and 
Xllth Corps in the direction of Le Bourget, Digny, and Mont 
Avron, which were repulsed by the German troops. It is 
not impossible that the larger sorties on this front were in 

—584— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

connection with the operations of General Faidherbe in the 
north ; though they may only have been intended to disturb 
our preparations for the attack on Mont Avron. - 

In the last days of December and during January, 
whilst the artillery attack was being developed, the political 
and social condition of the beleagued city was becoming 
more serious. All hopes were based on the success of a 
sortie "en masse". General Trochu yielded eventually to 
pressure, and on the 19th of January an attempt was made 
from Mont Valerien with 100,000 men to pierce the posi- 
tion occupied by the Vth army corps and the guard land- 
wehr division. In the event of a success, a further advance 
was to be made on Versailles, the seat of Royal headquarters. 

At 8 o'clock in the morning, three columns were seen 
debouching from the immediate neighbourhood of Mont Val- 
erien ; the right column, under command of General Ducrot, 
was to operate along the Seine towards Rueil; the center 
column, under General Bellemare, was to reach the plateau 
of La Bergerie (the heights of Garches), and the left col- 
umn, commanded by General Vinoy, was to capture the re- 
doubt of Montretout in order to support the attack in the 
centre. 

The Prussians had occupied the heights of Garches as 
well as the chateau and park of La Bergerie, as a point of 
support to the position. The French attack, carried out 
with superior forces and great energy, only caused the Prus- 
sian outposts to retire on their supports, but they did not 
succeed in taking either La Bergerie, which was bravely 
defended by one battalion of the 39th regiment and a com- 
pany of jagers, or the village of Garches; General Ducrot 
arrived on the battlefield too late to cooperate with good ef- 
fect at the right moment. Meanwhile, the Prussian re- 
serves had come up, and a hard fight ensued for the posses- 
sion o:^ the heights of Garches. They were stormed about 2 
o'clock in the afternoon by two battalions of the King's 
grenadiers, with detachments of the 59th regiment and the 
5th jager battalion supported on the flank by a battalion of 
the 47th regiment. 

—585— 



Siege Operations 

Although, towards the end of the battle, the head of 
General Ducrot's column was able to join in the fight, still 
as the darkness came on, the French were repulsed and had 
to retire under cover of the guns of Fort Mont Valerien. 
These had been engaged with the Prussian artillery during 
the day in order to draw off the fire from the infantry. The 
5th light battery of the Vth corps in action at Brezin suffered 
most; it was at this spot that the Crown Prince of Prussia 
took up a position during the battle. Towards evening our 
outposts occupied the same ground as in the morning. 

In the attack on Montretout the French were more 
fortunate the weak garrison of 60 men had to evacuate it 
and fight their way out. The enemy soon made a lodgment 
there, and brought guns into action on the right, so that it 
was not retaken till after dark. This was effected at 11 
o'clock in the evening by detachments of the 47th, 58th and 
82nd regiments. It was observed in the afternoon and ev- 
ening, that a large force of the French were bivouacking 
outside the fortress, and it was necessary, therefore, for the 
Prussians to make preparations to meet a renewal of the at- 
tack ; consequently a Bavarian brigade of the I Corps, which 
had arrived before Paris a few days previously from the 
southern army, and some guard landwehr were moved to 
Versailles. 

Our loss was 39 officers and 616 men, that of the enemy 
was very considerable, it amounted to 7,000 men, of whom 
1,000 were left dead on the battlefield. There was also a 
small fight this day on the eastern side of the investing line ; 
a company of the 100th regiment together with one of the 
101st surprised the enemj^'s outposts on the farm of Groslay 
and took 5 officers and 150 men prisoners. 

On the 20th of January detachments of the 58th regi- 
ment, and the 5th jager battalion surrounded and captured 
18 officers and 322 men in St. Cloud, to which place they had 
retired in the expectation that the battle would be renewed 
there. 

Although the investing army was constantly engaged 
in its front by these repeated sorties, they did not remain 
unmolested in their rear, where franc-tireur bands, more 

—586— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

or less organized, threatened the railways and telegraphs, 
and carried off transport, patrols and officials; it became 
necessary therefore up to the last days of the siege to des- 
patch large columns against them and as late as the 27th of 
January a force consisting of 2 infantry and 2 cavalry regi- 
ments with 8 guns marched from the southern post of the 
investing circle towards Auxerre. 



From the beginning of the investment the internal con- 
dition of Paris had been anxiously watched at headquarters, 
and the fall of the capital would have been a mere matter of 
time, as the provisions decreased daily whilst the political 
difficulties increased. 

The capitulation of Metz and the destruction of the 
newly formed armies in the south and north, seemed to have 
no effect on the character of the defense; the negotiations 
for an armistice, which had been carried on in the first days 
of November betweeh the headquarters at Versailles and 
the French Government, had been broken off after lasting 
for five days. 

Under these circumstances, the necessity of a regular 
siege or bombardment of the capital had become inevitable 
as the only means of bringing the war to a speedy conclu- 
sion ; but the preparations were on such a large scale, that, 
as regards the principal attack on the south front, we shall 
have to treat them separately. 

A large siege train had to be brought up for the attack, 
composed partly of guns from the home fortresses and 
partly from the trains which had been already employed 
against other French fortresses, but at the same time the 
sieges then in progress, which required a great amount of 
material, could not be interrupted. It was not surprising 
therefore, that, exactly the most appropriate guns should 
not have been used in the artillery attack on the south front, 
or that the Germans were unprepared for the extraordi- 
nary rapid wear of the guns, which influenced the progress 
of the siege. 

—587— 



Siege Operations 

The siege train contained about 300 pieces of ordnance, 
namely, 70 long 24-pdrs., 15 short 24-pdrs., 100 12-pdrs., 40 
6-pdrs., exclusive of rifled breech-loaders besides 20 25-pd. 
shell guns, 20 50-pr. mortars, and 6 rifled 21-cwt. mortars. 
Each gun was provided with 500 rounds for curved fire with 
the necessary side arms and stores; the carriages, platform 
wagons, gyns, etc., with all their gear had to be brought up. 

The Ballon guns of which there were twenty, and which 
were much spoken of at the time, were not guns but wall 
pieces, on a small four-wheeled wagon with a platform and 
spindle moved by means of a ball; they did not, however 
succeed. 

The parking of the siege guns for the south front oc- 
cupied much time as only one line of rail, that through 
Nancy, was available at first, and this could not even be 
used in its entire length most of the time, as several tun- 
nels and bridges over the Marne, between La Ferte and 
Meaux, had been destroyed by the enemy and had to be re- 
paired. All the other bridges on the line had to be carefully 
inspected and strengthened so that they should not break 
down under the immense loads ; more than 100,000 cwt. of 
stores and ammunition alone had to be moved, which for the 
reasons given above, had to be unloaded by road from Meaux 
and Lagny to the siege train park at Villa Coublay before 
Paris, a distance of 12 miles (56 English miles). Special 
roads had to be made for the transports and bridges built 
over the Seine. Several thousand draught horses were re- 
quired as the requisitioned teams were insufficient and the 
drivers were constantly deserting, sometimes with and some- 
times without their wagons, so that the necessary horses 
had to be provided from the troops; but the arrangement 
was not found convenient as a permanency. Twenty-four 
transport columns, each of 40 wagons, were therefore 
brought from Germany and equipped partly with the French 
wagons and harness taken at Metz. The transport for the 
first establishment of the siege train occupied several weeks, 
both night and day, and had even to be continued in the 
same manner during the siege. 

—588— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

Two of the Strousberg traction engines were brought 
into use. The hilly nature of the country, the soft roads, 
and the slipperiness in frosty weather and snow caused the 
greatest difficulties to the numberless wagons. Although 
the guns, ammunition, and other stores were all safely con- 
veyed to the artillery park, still it was necessary to have 
special escorts to protect them against the hostile population. 
These circumstances increased immensely the difficulties of 
preparing for the attack on the south front, for whilst on the 
east and north fronts everything brought from Germany was 
delivered by rail close up to the parks, in the other case all 
the material had to be transferred to the wagons and carried 
from for four to five days by road before reaching its des- 
tination. No person without a knowledge of the extensive 
organization required for a siege park can form any idea 
of the vast preparations, or the energy and foresight neces- 
sary to carry out such an undertaking. The establishment 
of the engineer park and depots presented similar difficul- 
ties. 

To the right rear of the gun park, were the store sheds, 
the empty shells and other projectiles, the laboratories, 
a fuze magazine, and six powder magazines, with their 
proper guardhouses, all screened from the enemy's view by a 
wood. The situation of Villa Coublay was very convenient 
for the purposes of the siege, but it required some addi- 
tional security against hostile enterprise, and three field 
works were constructed on the plateau of Moulin de la Tour, 
of which the center one was armed with 12, and the other 
two each with 6 rifled 12-pounders. The rocky chalk soil, 
frozen later to a depth of 1| feet, made the construction of 
the batteries a work of great difficulty; the laying of the 
platforms had to be executed in the rock with crowbars and 
miner's tools. On the other hand the presence of the woods 
and the material they afforded were of great service in 
building the batteries. In consequence, of being thus hidden^ 
they were not unmasked until the moment of opening fire; 
in one case an artificial screen was formed by planting 
trees and boughs, behind which the construition of the bat- 
teries proceeded quite unperceived by the enemy. Countless 

—589— 



Siege Operations 

vehicles with the baulks and platforms (both of which had 
to be brought from Germany) fascines and gabions which 
were made by the Vth and Ilnd Bavarian corps, filled the 
roads and paths leading to the batteries for months, gen- 
erally at night so as to be unobserved by the French. The 
production and accumulation of the different materials were, 
under the circumstances, works of uncommon difficulty ; for, 
although the equipment provided the greater part of the 
tools, still a considerable quantity had to be obtained by re- 
quisition or forwarded from Germany. All these prepara- 
tions required much time, both on account of the variety of 
difficulties that had to be encountered, and the shortness of 
the days; but until everything necessary for carrying out 
the siege thoroughly was in its place, the opening of the 
attack could not be thought of. 

It is hardly necessary to add that the time and manner 
of carrying out the siege had already been decided by the 
authorities; and if there was any delay in opening the at- 
tack, it was on account of circumstances, which have been 
already been noticed, a detailed account of which would be 
beyond our province. 

Paris was to be attacked on three sides simultaneously, 
so as to force the enemy to use his heavy guns on more than 
one front. It is worthy of remark, that the most broken 
ground had to be selected for the artillery attack, and that 
in order to reach the body of the place, several of the outer 
forts would have to be engaged first and perhaps have to be 
captured. 

A short account of the different attacks in the east, 
north and south, under the direction of Major-General 
Prince Kraft, of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, commander of the 
guard artillery brigade, will follow here, in the order in 
which they were carried out. 



■ I. Artillery Attack on the East Front 

The object of the French position on Mont Avron was, 
in conjunction with the forts in rear, to prepare sorties, and 

—590— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

to support them with the fire of the guns ; it commanded 
the valley of the Marne and covered the assembly of troops 
there, as well as the passages over the Marne, and at the 
same time it flanked the greater part of our eastern line of 
investment. These favourable circumstances induced the 
enemy continually to strengthen this position, so that in the 
end there were six 30-pounders, six short 24-pounders, 
twenty-three 7-pounders, thirty-four 12-pound8rs, seven 
mitrailleuses, altogether 76 guns distributed in eight bat- 
teries; the latter, however, were imperfectly constructed 
and unprovided with bombproofs and traverses, on account 
of the difficulty of working in the frozen ground. The com- 
mandant on the plateau of Mont Avron was the well-known 
and able Colonel Stoffel, who before the war had been at- 
tache to the French embassy in Berlin. There was no in- 
tention on the German side of 03cupying Mont Avron, es- 
pecially as it lay under the cross-fire of Forts Rosny, No- 
gent, and Noisy, and of the redoubts Montreuil, La Boissiere, 
and Fontenay, situated in the intervals. Our positions were 
so close that our heavy guns could engage Mont Avron as 
well as the forts lying behind it. 

The following batteries were constructed : 

A. On the Plateau of Raincy 

Batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, armed respectively with 
six 24-pounders, six 12-pounders, six short 24-pounders, and 
four short 24-pounders, altogether 22 guns, directed chiefly 
against Mont Avron, Fort Rosny and other lass important 
places, such as the \illages of Avron, Rosny, Villemomble, 
and the redoubts of la Bossiere and Montreuil. 

B. On the Plateau of Mont Fermeil on the Side 
Nearest to Gagny 

Batteries Nos. 5,"^ G, 7, and 8, armed respectively with 
six 12-pounders, six long 24-pounders, six 12-pound3rs, and 
six 12-pounders, total 2 1 guns, to fire over the sama ground 
as the other batteries, and also to sweep the valley of the 



*In the plate No. 5 battery is shown on the plateau of Raincy. 

—591— 



Siege Operations 

Marne. To destroy any bridges that might be thrown over 
the river and prevent a passage. 

C. In Position Between Noisy and Gournay 

Batteries Nos. 9 and 10, armed respectively with six 12- 
pounders, and six long 24-pounders, together 12 guns. To 
fire on the Marne valley and the valley of Villemomble and 
prevent the assembly of troops in these localities. 

D. In Position Southwest of Noisy-Le-Grand 

Batteries Nos. 11, 12 and 13, each armed with six long 
24-pounders, making a total of 18 guns to sweep the sides of 
Mont Avron the villages of Villemomble and Neuilly, the 
railway junction, the Fontenay redoubt and Fort Nogent. 

The distances of the different batteries from Mont Av- 
ron varied from 3,500 to 6,000 paces. 

The park of artillery was established at Brou, half a 
league to the east of Chelles, to which were brought 36 rifled 
12-pounders, 30 rifled 24-pounders, 10 rifled short 24- 
pounders, altogether 76 siege guns. 

A transport column of 700 wagons was cantoned there 
in improved barracks and stables. Ten companies of gar- 
rison artillery were available. The whole was placed under 
the command of Colonel Barsch as chief of the siege artil- 
lery while Colonel Oppermann superintended the works of 
the engineers. 

On the 13th of December the construction of the bat- 
teries was begun; it had to be carried on almost entirely at 
night, with the exception of the batteries on the plateau of 
Raincy, which were screened by the woods. 

Trench communications were made, where necessary, 
between the batteries, covered by traverses; roads and 
bridges were constructed, as well as bombproofs of all de- 
scriptions. 

Fire opened on the morning of the 27th of December 
at half -past 8 o'clock from 76 guns, and it succeeded by the 
next day in silencing Mont Avron after a good resistance 
and considerable loss among the gun detachments ; only the 

—592— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

works in rear continued to respond to the fire, and the Ger- 
man artillery succeeded in driving the French garrison out 
of Bondy and out of the railway station at Noisy le Sec. 

The French evacuated the position of Mont Avron on 
the night of the 28th-29th of December. They had thrown 
a garrison into it on the previous night, of two divisions 
under the command of General d'Hughes, with the intention 
of occupying it defensively. Their withdrawal during the 
night, together with the removal of the artillery materiel 
took place under the eyes of General Trochu who had hurried 
to the spot, and was performed in wonderfully good order, 
covered by the marines and three field batteries. On the 
30th of December, Mont Avron was occupied by Saxon de- 
tachments. Supported by a covering party they levelled the 
enemy's works and destroyed the ammunition and other ma- 
teriel found there; the magazine had been prepared for 
demolition. The next thing was to drive the French out of 
the villages of Drancy and Bobigny, which they held in 
force, and for this purpose emplacements Nos. 14 and 15 
were constructed. Two other batteries, Nos. 16 and 17, 
were built at Chennevieres to command the plateau of Vil- 
liers. To oppose the French position of Courneuve, Le Bour- 
get, and Drancy, No. 1 battery at Blanc Mesnil, and Nos. 2 
and 3 batteries* at Pont Iblon were constructed, and armed 
altogether with 18 guns, so as to render an offensive move- 
ment from that direction impossible. Some of these latter 
batteries were advanced afterwards as far as Le Bourget, 
and were thus in a position to cooperate against St. Denis 
in the attack on the north front. 

On the 2nd and 3rd of January a heavy fire from the 
siege batteries was continued against the whole of the east 
front, and was only replied to feebly from Fort Nogent. 

As the east front had always been considered the 
strongest of the Paris defenses, our successes against Mont 
Avron had raised a great alarm in the city, and ignorance 
of the military circumstances had caused an unreasonable 
despondency, as well as distrust in their military chief. 



* These three batteries formed at the same time the left wing of 
the attack on the north front. 

—593— 



Siege Operations 

Meanwhile the enemy remained in possession of the villages 
of Bondy, Bobigny, Drancy, and Rosny, and disturbed our 
outposts from those places by frequent alarms ; thus, on the 
nights of the 10th and 15th of January, the Saxon outposts 
were attacked on the railway in advance of Aulnay and at 
Nonneville, whilst the same thing happened to the Guards in 
Le Bourget three times during the night of the 14th of Jan- 
uary. On account of these offensive "movements, the siege 
batteries bombarded those places for 48 hours on the 16th 
of January, the results of which could only be ascertained 
by a reconnaissance of detachments of the 2nd div^ision of 
foot guards against Drancy, and of the 23rd infantry divi- 
sion against Groslay farm, on which occasion 6 officers and 
130 men were taken prisoners. 

On the night of the 25th-27th of January the batteries 
of the attack ceased firing. 



II. Artillery Attack Against the 
South Front 

The command here was entrusted to Colonel von Rieff, 
President of the committee on artillery experiments. This 
officer had arrived before Paris towards the end of Septem- 
ber; the special reconnaissances, and all arrangements for 
the preparation and execution of the attack had been car- 
ried out under his orders. There were at his disposal 80 
companies of garrison artillery, with their staff, and a 
numerous body of belonging to the store department for 
duty in the various parks and depots. 

The following batteries were constructed: 

A. Left Wing 

Battery No. 1 (St. Cloud) for six 12-pounders. 
Battery No. 2 (Meudon) for eight 12-pounders. 

Both these batteries to act against Bullancourt, the Bois 
de Boulogne, and the islands in the Seine. 

Battery No. 3 (Meudon) six 24-pounders. 
Battery No. 4 (Meudon) six 24-pounders. 

—594— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

These batteries to counter-batter and enfilade the south 
and west fronts of Fort Issy. 

Dismounting battery No. 16 (Meudon) four 12-pound- 
ers to fire against the gun emplacements at Fort Issy. 

Dismounting and breaching battery No. 19 (Fleury and 
Clamart) armed with four long and four short 24-pounders, 
against the south front of Fort Issy, the long 24-pounders 
against the Paris enceinte. 

Dismounting battery No. 20 (Clamart) for six long 
24-pounders, to fire against the south front and the north- 
west bastion of Fort Vanvres. 

B. Centre 

Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 5 (Clamart) six 
24-pounders, against the southwest curtain and the south 
bastion of Fort Issy. 

Enfilade battery No. 6 (Clamart) six 24-pounders, 
against the southeast front of Fort Vancres. 

Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 7 (Moulin de la 
Tour) for six 24-pounders, against the south front and 
the southwest bastion of Fort Issy. 

Dismounting battery No. 17 (Moulin de la Tour) for 
six 12-pounders, against the emplacements between Forts 
Issy and Vanvres. 

Dismounting and breaching battery No. 8 (Moulin de la 
Tour) for six 24-pounders, against the south front of Fort 
Vanvres. 

Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 9 (Moulin de la 
Tour) for eight 12-pounders, to fire on west front of Van- 
vres and its southwest bastion. 

Enfilade and breaching battery No. 10 (Moulin de la 
Tour) for six 24-pounders, against the south and v^^est front 
of Fort Vanvres. 

Dismounting battery No. 21, (Chatillon) six short 24- 
pounders, directed against the southwest front of Vanvres, 
and the neighbouring gun emplacements. 



—595- 



Siege Operations ] 

C. Right Wing 

Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 11 (Fontenoy) 
with eight 12-pounders, to fire on the west front of Fort 
Montrouge. 

Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 12 (Fontenoy) 
eight 24-pounders, also to fire against the west front of Fort 
Montrouge. 

Dismounting battery No. 18 (Chatillon) for six 24- 
pounders to fire against Fort Montrouge, the emplacements 
to the west of it, and the city. 

Dismounting and enfilade battery No. 22 (Chatillon) 
for six 12-pounders, with the same object as No. 18. 

D. Batteries for Vei'tical Fire 

Mortar battery No. 13, for two rifled mortars at the 
Tour des Anglais to fire against Fort Issy. 

Mortar battery No. 14, armed like No. 13, to fire against 
Fort Vanvres. 

Mortar battery No. 15, armed like No. 13, against Fort 
Montrouge. 

Mortar battery No. 23, for four 50-pounder mortars 
against Fort Issy. 

Mortar battery No. 24, armed like No. 23, against Fort 
Vanvres. 

In order to secure the right flank of the artillery attack, 
against which the French made particular exertions, es- 
pecially from Villejuif, and to occupy the enemy's batteries 
there continuously a flank attack was organized on the line 
La Rue-Chevilly, under command of General von Ramm, 
to be carried on independently. The park attached to it 
was at Rungis, and t.vo batteries, eajch for six 12-pounders, 
were at first built in the given line, but afterwards advanced 
somewhat nearer to Villejuif. 

The original armament of some of the batteries was 
changed in the course of the siege operations to meet the al- 
terations in the range; the greatest distance was 4,000 
paces and the smallest 1,700 paces ; during the last days of 
the bombardment, the interior of the city was the object of 

—596— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

attack of nearly all the batteries some of which sent their 
projectiles to a distance of 12,000 paces. 

The garrisons of Forts Issy, Vanvres and Montrouge 
observed the ground in their front, by means of outposts and 
piquets, patrols from which had frequently small collisions 
with ours, thus on the 16th December 1870, two companies 
advancing from Fort Issy attempted to occupy the village 
of Meudon, but were repulsed by the Prussian outposts, 
leaving five wounded behind them. 

With the object of gaining some ground on our side, 
the French outposts were driven out of Bas Meudon, Le 
Moulineaux, and Fleury shortly after midnight on the 3rd 
January ; strong reserves had been brought up for the occa- 
sion. During the same night, the arming of the German 
batteries was completed ; but the opening of the fire on the 
4th January had to be postponed on account of the fog. In 
order to take off the attention of the enemy from the attack 
on the south front, the Xllth Corps received orders to make 
demonstrations on the east side. In accordance with these, 
on the 4th January, the 24th Division undertook a recon- 
naissance from Chelles against Fort Nogent, whilst at the 
same time, the demolitions on Mont Avron were carried on 
with great activity, to create the impression on the enem.y 
that German batteries were to be established there. Two 
battalions of the 101st regiment, and a light battery ad- 
vanced against Neuilly sur Marne, and occupied a part of 
the village and evacuated it again during the night; as a 
consequence, of this, the enemy increased his force in the 
front, and remained under arms till morning. 

On the 5th of January there were more demonstrations, 
principally against the villages of Nogent and Rosny. The 
2d battalion of the 105th regiment and the 3rd battalion of 
the 108th regiment, accompanied by a light battery, were 
directed against Nogent, whilst the enemy's outposts were 
threatened from Mont Avron, and the 3rd Battalion of the 
101st regiment was sent against the garrison of Bondy. 
Other movements of troops also occurred in this district. 
The Saxon detachments retired from all points to their 
original positions, after accomplishing the tasks with which 

—597— 



Siege Operations 

they had been charged, whilst the French maintained an 
extremely heavy fire from 31 guns against the German artil- 
lery position on the plateau of Raincy. From the 31st of 
December until the 5th of January the artillery of the de- 
fense on the east front remained almost silent. 

During these occurrences on the east front, the arming 
of the German batteries on the south front had been com- 
pleted without molestation ; on the 5th of January, towards 
morning, the French made several small sorties against the 
outposts on the hill of Clamart. The latter had occupied the 
summit of the hill, and were attacked during the previous 
night, three times in succession, on the last occasion, with 
one battalion, which, however, retired when the bombard- 
ment opened. The 80th regiment also repulsed a sortie made 
against Meudon. 

On the 5th of January, as soon as the fog permitted a 
good view of the enemy's position, the batteries opened their 
fire, which had been ordered to commence at half past 8 
o'clock. The principal attack fired this day on Forts Issy, 
Vanvres, and Montrouge, from battries No. 1 to 17 ; the col- 
lateral attack directed its fire against the entrenchments at 
Villejuif and the gunboats that appeared on the Seine. 

For the sake of brevity, we cannot give all the details 
of the artillery fight which had now commenced ; it is suffi- 
cient to remark that everywhere the French artillery, but 
particularly from the main enciente, and from the batteries 
at the Point du Jour, showed the greatest activity, and 
proved itself to be an opponent worthy of our respect, forc- 
ing us often enough to give up the tasks originally assigned 
to single batteries, in order to meet him with united strength. 

January 6th. — Clear weather; the fire from Fort 
Issy was temporarily silenced. The enemy fired into St. 
Cloud, Bougival, and Vaucresson from Fort Mont Valerien, 
and unmasked four new batteries at the Point du Jour ; the 
guns on both sides of the aqueduct engaged No. 1 battery 
and fired on to the plateau of Meudon ; Forts Issy and Van- 
vres only fired slowly; on the other hand Fort Montrouge 
directed a heavy fire against the redoubt of Moulin de la 
Tour, which was occupied by the Bavarians, as well as 

—598— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

against the village of Clamart. Our fire was chiefly against 
Fort Issy and beyond that towards Paris against the Point 
du Jour and the adjoining batteries on the railway embank- 
ment and the aqueduct. In the neighbourhood of Point du 
Jour the flames broke out in several places. 

January 7th and 8th — Thick weather; the firing was 
continued and set the barracks in Forts Vanvres and Mont- 
rouge in flames ; our projectiles ranged from 9,000 to 9,500 
paces up to the gardens of the Luxembourg Palace. The 
revetments and buildings inside Fort Issy were being de- 
molished ; the fort answering the fire but feebly. From Fort 
Vanvres there was only a dropping fire. Montrouge was en- 
gaged with the Bavarian batteries at Moulin de la Tour; a 
barrack in the fort was set on fire. Against the Point du 
Jour and the adjoining batteries the artillery fight contin- 
ued. Some of the batteries were silenced, but the well- 
conducted defence and extended front of the fortress en- 
abled them soon to be replaced. 

The authority of the Governor, General Trochu. over 
the Parisian populace was beginning to be shaken; he 
yielded to the pressure put on him and allowed himself to be 
hampered by a council of eight members ; in a proclamation 
issued he repudiated the idea of a capitulation. 

January 9th. — The object of our fire now was to pre- 
vent the enemy from constructing new earthworks for gun 
emplacements, communications, etc. ; the reply to it from his 
positions was less energetic ; it seemed as if the enemy were 
engaged in withdrawing the heavy calibres from the ad- 
vanced positions. As the day was foggy with continuous 
driving snow, the batteries of attack were ordered to 
slacken their fire. The government of Paris made a protest 
against the bombardment of the city, which, considering 
that the siege had now been in progress for three months 
and a half, and that in the conduct of the defense neither 
towns, villages, nor palaces on their own soil had been 
spared, was naturally rejected; on the 8th-9th of January 
some of the batteries received orders to bombard the inner 
portions of the town. At half past 8 in the evening Le Val 
was attacked by the 10th company of the 87th regiment, and 

—599— 



Siege Operations 

a subdivision of the 11th Company of the same regiment 
was sent against Moulineaux, as the enemy had located him- 
self again in these places; after a good resistance he was 
driven out, and the besiegers by the capture of these places 
were enabled to approach from 1,500 to 1,600 paces nearer 
to Fort Issy. 

January 10th. — At 3 o'clock in the morning, some chas- 
seurs managed to penetrate into a new battery on the hill 
of Clamart, which only opened fire on this day, but the cov- 
ering party drove them out again. This spot was of the 
utmost importance both for the attack and the defense, and 
for weeks the ground had been disputed by the outposts. 
Similar small affairs occurred at other places evidently with 
the intention of making our approach more difficult. Our 
fire, which was continued without intermission, was an- 
swered by the enemy, but only to a limited extent. Paris was 
burning in several places. The battery at St. Cloud fired 
into Billancourt and the Bois de Boulogne. 

On the 11th of January, a heavy fire was maintained 
against the enemy's works and gun emplacements. The 
barracks in Fort Issy were set in flames, as well as several 
houses in the suburbs of Gentilly and Vaugirard, and in the 
northeast part of the city; German projectiles ranged as 
far as the church of St. Sulpice a distance of 10,000 paces ; 
in the more exposed streets of Paris, the stone paving was 
torn up. The enemy made a skilful use of the entrench- 
ments in front of, between, and in rear of the forts connect- 
ing the gun emplacements to construct new batteries and 
change the position of the guns. The garrison of Fort Mont 
Valerien undertook a reconnaissance against our outposts 
at St. Germain, but were soon compelled to retreat. 

January 12th. — The fog which had been continuous 
for the last two days, still interfered with our fire. The 
enemy replied to it vigorously from the main enceinte. Cov- 
ered by the fog, the garrison of Montrouge managed to 
mount some fresh guns. The besiegers threw their pro- 
jectiles far into the town beyond the Luxembourg Palace, 
but the storming of the south forts, which at one time was 
considered a necessity by some of the authorities, was aban- 

—600— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

doned. In view of the original intention, a parallel had been 
constructed between Clamart and Chatillon, at a distance of 
1,500 paces from Forts Issy and Vanvres ; which would have 
formed the basis of a regular attack against those forts. 

A decree published by the provisional government se- 
cured to citizens wounded by the enemy's shells, the same 
claim to pension as the military. 

January 13th. — On account of the continued fog the 
iire on both sides was slack. During the previous night 
a vigorous sortie of the French by a force of about 4,000 
mobiles stationed in and behind the forts, was repulsed 
by detachments of the Xlth corps at Meudon and by the 
Ilnd Bavarian corps at Clamart. 

January 14th. — The fire from the besiegers batteries 
was continued ; the three forts of Issy, Vanvres, and Mont- 
rouge had almost ceased to fire, but the latter made an at- 
tempt to reply with field guns when there was a favourable 
opportunity. 

January 15th. — After great labour and exertion bat- 
tery No. 1 (St. Cloud) managed to silence the French bat- 
teries established at the Point du Jour in the south bastion, 
and was enabled now to continue its fire against the three 
batteries in the north bastion and the town. Prussian pro- 
jectiles were thrown as far as the church of Notre Dame and 
the Jardin des Plantes. The dissatisfaction and ferment in- 
creased to such an extent in the town, that General Trochu 
had publicly contradicted the report that several generals 
had been committed for treachery. 

January 16th. — Battery No. 21 opened fire today to de- 
molish the casemates in Fort Issy. 

January 17th and 18th. — The enemy showed great en- 
ergy in re-arming along his front and in the unexpected un- 
masking of guns which had been mounted in emplacements 
within the entrenchments. 

Then occurred that momentous event in the history of 
the world when King William, within sound of the thunder 
of the siege batteries, accepted for himself and his descen- 
dants the title of Emperor, offered him by the German 
princes and free towns, with the vow to uphold in German 

—601— 



Siege Operations 

faith, the rights of the empire and its members, to preserve 
peace, and by the help of his people to maintain the indepen- 
dence of Germany, as had been done gloriously by Prussia's 
kings for 170 years. This ceremony took place on the 18th 
of January 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, in the 
presence of the German princes and surrounded by repre- 
sentatives of the German Army. 

January 19th. — Notwithstanding the sortie from Fort 
Mont Valerien against the heights of Garches, the guns on 
both sides kept up an uninterrupted fire. 

January 20th. — There was a slackening of the fire from 
the artillery of the defense, probably in consequence of 
the failure of the sortie of the previous day; thus, the fire 
from Montrouge where the guns had been admirably fought, 
almost ceased towards midday ; in the batteries at the Point 
du Jour the fire ceased altogether for a time; the eastern 
barracks in Fort Vanvres were set in flames. General Tro- 
chu sent General Count d'Herison to the commander of the 
3d army to demand an armistice of 48 hours, which, how- 
ever, was only conceded on the line from St. Cloud to Gar- 
ches for a sufficient time to bury the dead. 

January 21st and 22nd. — Heavy fire from the batteries 
and adjoining Point du Jour and the emplacements between 
the three south forts; among the latter a French redoubt 
constructed in the interval between Forts Vanvres and 
Montrouge distinguished itself particularly; it required 
nearly a whole day for our batteries to master it. A pow- 
der magazine in rear of Clamart was blown up. Insurrec- 
tionary movements of the Parisian populace were observed. 

January 23rd. — Lively fire from the enceinte of the 
city; fresh batteries were unmasked by the French at the 
entrance to the Bois de Boulogne. The artillery of the at- 
tack did not allow itself to be troubled by this, but managed 
to silence several batteries of the main enceinte, and sub- 
due the fire of the field battery which had been so active on 
the previous day. 

January 24th. — The fire of the besiegers' batteries 
could only be continued at intervals on account of the fog, 

—602— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

the enemy replying but feebly. A serious outbreak occurred 
in Paris in which the prison of Mazas was stormed, the 
prisoners liberated and the granaries with supplies of bread 
and wine plundered by the mob; in front of the Hotel de 
Ville the national guard fired on the insurgents. 

January 25th. — The enemy attempted, under cover of 
the fog to construct earthworks in and round Fort Issy, but 
were prevented. The bombardment continued as on the 
previous days. 

January 26th. — Clear weather, the bombardment was 
only weakly answered from the enceinte of the city, from 
Fort Montrouge and from the emplacements between Forts 
Vanvres and Issy ; notwithstanding the weather being clear 
the artillery of the defence were unable to accomplish any- 
thing. Equally futile was the heavy fire from the battery 
at the Point du Jour against No. 1 battery. The batteries 
in front of Clamart were fired at but slightly from the forti- 
fications of the town and from Fort Montrouge and the 
neighbouring mortar batteries scarcely at all. 

January 27th. — After midnight the batteries on both 
sides ceased firing by common consent. 

The losses of the German artillery in the 22 days' 
bombardment were 12 officers and 200 men killed and 
wounded; the field hospitals were established at Malabry 
and Sceaux, the chief hospital at Igny, between Versailles 
and Palaiseau, Lieutenant General von Kamecke, who had 
been in command of the 14th Division during the campaign, 
was ordered from Mezieres to Paris to take over the chief 
command of the engineering works of the attack. The works 
which had been carried out by the engineers during the ar- 
tillery bombardment were covered communications be- 
tween the batteries, shelter trenches, traverses, assistance 
in building batteries and powder magazines, shell stores, 
posts of observation, underground storerooms (all bomb- 
proof) rendering the barracks which were not bombproof 
secure as guard houses, preparation of defences, construct- 
ing and maintaining roads, etc. Although the trenches were 
filled in some places with water which increased the diffi- 
culties of using them, it was an evil which could only be 

—603— 



Siege Operations 

partially remedied ; it must always occur at a siege carried 
on during the winter, as the trenches follow the lie of the 
ground and become the natural points of accumulation for 
the surface and subsoil drainage. 



III. Artillery Attack Against the North Front 
(St. Denis) 

The intricate works of St. Denis are among the strong- 
est of the defences of Paris, but they have one defect, that 
they have not a sufficient command to be defiladed from the 
hills in front, consequently they can be seen into, and in 
some places even the works of the gorge can be fired at. 

On the 21st of December, there was a sortie at Epinay 
le St. Denis against the troops holding the investing line at 
that place ; the gunboats on the Seine co-operated, but 
eventually it was successfully repulsed by Prussian batteries 
of position at Orgemont and Enghien. 

As long as Mont Avron continued in possession of the 
French, it was impossible for the German batteries on the 
northeast front to approach nearer, because the German 
position on that side of Paris as well as the strong French 
position La Courneuve, Le Bourget, and Drancy, was 
brought under an effective flanking fire. The capture of 
Mont Avron which was of the utmost importance, as well 
as the unsuccessful sortie of the French against Le Bourget 
on the 21st December, must have proved to the enemy that 
any attacks against the position of the Guards there could 
lead to no result. In consequence of these occurrences the 
French defense at that point lost its energy, and the fire of 
the Prussian batteries was therefore turned against the vil- 
lages of Drancy, Bobigny, Bondy, and Rosny, with good ef- 
fect ; the forts of Noisy and Rosny were only fired at occa- 
sionally. In the meantime, a number of other German bat- 
teries were built on the line Livry-Garches, with the inten- 
tion of making a frontal attack against the French position 
of La Courneuve-Drancy. Two batteries at Garches were 
directed at the same time to enfilade the works of St. Denis. 

—604— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

For the actual bombardment of St. Denis, on the cap- 
ture of which great value was very properly set at head- 
quarters, it was necessary, exclusive of the 24 6-pounder 
field guns, to organize a special siege train, made up from 
the guns which had been employed at Mezieres and Peronne ; 
namely : 

26 long 24-pounders, 10 short 24-pounders, 32 12- 
pounders, and 3 rifled mortars. 

The necessary preparations for the attack on St. Denis 
began on the 10th of January ; the siege train park was es- 
tablished at the railway station of Gonesse, a new trans- 
port park for 700 wagons was prepared at Ecouen, and a 
sufficient materiel, which was already partially prepared, 
for the construction of the batteries was collected in depots 
at Arnouville and Montmorency. In order not to postpone 
the building of the batteries until after the arrival of the 
siege artillery companies, from Mezieres, the emplacements 
were constructed by men from the field artillery and by 
the pioneers of the guard and 4th corps. The following 15 
batteries were made: — 

Batteries Nos. 1, 2, and 3, armed each_vdth six long 24- 
pounders, and six 12-pounders to fire against Drancy, Bo- 
bigny, and La Courneuve. 

Battery No. 4, armed with eight long 24-pounders, 
against Fort Aubervilliers and the suburb of La Vilette. 

Batteries Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 armed respectively with 
six long 24-pounders, six short 24-pounders, eight 12-pound- 
ers, and three rifled mortars against the fort and village of 
Aubervilliers, Fort de I'Est, Double Couronne, Fort de la 
Briche, and St. Denis. 

Batteries Nos. 10 and 11, each armed with six long 24- 
pounders and eight 12-pounders, against the fortifications 
of St. Denis and the Seine. 

Battery No. 12, armed with six long 24-pounders to 
fire at the same objects. 

Battery Nos. 13, 14 and 15, armed with eight 12-pound- 
ers, four short, and six long 24-pounders, against Forts de 
la Briche, Double Couronne, and the whole fortress of St. 
Denis. 

— 605— 



Siege Operations 

All these batteries opened fire on the 21st of January. 

A glance at the map is sufficient to show that the be- 
siegers' batteries had the advantage of a concentric fire 
against St. Denis, the collateral forts, and the French posi- 
tions generally. As early as the 22nd of January, the fire 
from St. Denis was almost silenced. The town was in flames 
in several places. The repulse of the sortie on the 19th of 
January and the effect of the bombardment against the 
whole circle of Paris fortifications, with the exception of 
Mont Valerien, had produced the greatest discord and dis- 
satisfaction among the populace of the capital. Serious ris- 
ings occurred among the people, which led, on the 23rd of 
January, to a severance of the functions of President of 
committee of national defense from those of commander- 
in-chief of the army, General Vinoy was appointed to the 
chief command of the army of Paris, whilst General Trochu 
continued to be a member of the government only. 

In the meantime, on the 25th and 26th of January, the 
bombardment of the north front went on without inter- 
ruption until the night of the 26th-27th of January, when 
the fire on both sides ceased here also. 

On the evening of the 28th of January an armistice of 
three days was declared, for the negotiation of which Jules 
Favre, the minister of foreign affairs for the Paris Govern- 
ment, had during the last few days visited Versailles, and 
been backwards and forwards between that place and Paris. 
The conditions with regard to Paris was settled with a mili- 
tary commission which arrived from the capital. They were 
as follows : 

All forts to be given up; the main enceinte to be dis- 
armed. 

The troops of the line, marines and guards mobiles to 
become prisoners of war, with the exception of 12,000 men 
for the preservation of order in the city. The prisoners to 
remain within the gates of the city during the armistice and 
to hand over their arms ; the garde nationale and the gens- 
darmerie to retain their arms. All franc-tireur corps to be 
disbanded. The Germans to assist the French commissaries 
as far as possible in the reprovisioning of Paris. Persons 

—606— 



Campaign Against France 1870-71 

desirous of quitting Paris to obtain a permit from the 
French authorities with a German visa. The municipality 
of Paris to pay a contribution for the town of 200 million 
francs within 14 days. Public property not to be removed 
during the armistice. 

In accordance with the above stipulations, on the 29th 
of January, at 11 o'clock in the morning, all forts, with the 
exception of Vincennes, were, after a previous reconnais- 
sance for mines, etc., occupied by the besieging army ; Mont 
Valerien, and Fort Issy by the Vth Prussian corps; Fort 
Vanvres and Montrouge by the Bavarian corps. Fort Char- 
enton by the 1st Bavarian corps. Forts Ivry and Bicetre by 
the Vlth Prussian corps, the redoubts of Gravelle and Fais- 
anderie by the Wurtemberg division, Forts Nogent, Rosny, 
Noisy, and Romainville by the Xllth Saxon corps, Fort 
d'Aubervilliers by the guard corps, and the works of St. 
Denis by the guard and IVth corps. At the same time the 
outposts were brought within from 500 to 700 paces of the 
enceinte of the town, and the main positions advanced in a 
corresponding degree. In all the forts occupied by the Ger- 
mans, the necessary works were commenced that might be 
required if the bombardment had to be continued at the re- 
duced range. In the intervals between the south forts, and 
other suitable positions, six new batteries were erected be- 
sides emplacements, which were armed with the necessary 
guns and prepared for opening fire. 

The execution of the convention with Paris, and the dis- 
armament, was carried out without interruption; though 
the delivery of a large portion of the arms did not take place 
on account of the angry feeling of the inhabitants, and for 
other reasons. However, near 200,000 Chassepot rifles, 600 
field guns, and 1,350 garrison guns fell into the hands of 
the victors. The total loss of the Paris army during the 
siege is given as 17,000 killed. 

On the 1st of March 10,000 men from each of the Vlth 
and Xlth Prussian corps, and the Ilnd Bavarian corps 
marched into the Bois de Boulogne, where they were to re- 
main two days for a review which the Emperor King was to 

—607— 



Siege Operations 

hold in the Champs Ely sees and the adjoining' part of the 
town. 

Lieutenant General Kamecke acted as commandant of 
that part of Paris which was occupied by the German troops. 
The latter were to be relieved on the 3rd of March by a body 
of equal strength from the guard corps, the siege artillery, 
and pioneers, and the King's grenadiers which had been spe- 
cially recalled from Orleans for the purpose. 

This, however, never took place, as the ratification of 
the preliminaries of peace by which the town was to be 
evacuated at once arrived from Bordeaux on the day before. 
His Majesty nevertheless, held a review on Longchamps 
and on the same day, our troops marched out of Paris. 

The German armies now retired behind the line of the 
Seine; those troops which were prevented by the circum- 
stances mentioned above from passing in review before His 
Majesty in Paris, namely, the Xth Saxon corps, the 1st Ba- 
varians, and the Wurtemburg division, were inspected by 
the King of Villiers. 

This brings to a close the description which we have 
given in broad outline of the glorious siege of Paris, which 
was carried on during four months and a half with an expen- 
diture of men and material on both sides, quite without par- 
allel in the history of war; no other siege can be compared 
with it either for military importance or political conse- 
quences. 



—608— 



r 




PjjrmL 



ruzfp 

of th/e 



SIEGE OF PARIS 

1870-1871 



sT" 



^fe O* ?■ Ml*/«y \ 



Jjoitntml j^'' 



' Spina^ 






^Ou^ny 



TP.r'ti ; ^.'^'« 



<^h 



r^o^ 



=2T* 






i>^. 



tv 



^ 






~. :i-fi!*^ 






\i 



OfiamifeA 






^ 



X-^^' 






l«t Saliifn lff\ I'M tre 



~ — ^--. 3t 



rja A 



'TT'Tr'^- 



1' 






PARIS 



L 



hM)ttil^4arf IttAfxil d-^t 



kff< 



AuU-u 



.♦ 









"^ 



'"'^^"4 



,>^ 



\ 



:l^^ 






VS'^LA _^^^>^" 






V' 



hmUUi/- 



■m 






Guhn 



|ji(21 Sejt.lO 






alfib If 






&./y^ 



^ t 






TO 






firrti 



e 






# 



^i^^&S^^Jruinifati.i!n. cm. fha-Trench sid* 
.^^^^^^^^ flfj) on iheCvrnMn'side' 

'^l-^a, do of&ie yo-m'Irmt 



T!Ue/iwe-!*-Ocor<l^. I 



Leng/un 



^ 



German G2^Estimates of the Situ 
ation. Shown Graphically 

These nia^ys are corrected maps origirially drawn by Colonel 
Bird, British Ai^my. 



Redrawn by 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza 

Field Artillery 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



30^July 



POSITIONS or FRENCH. 







£at4mho'lder 



fSaaricuij 



( 




Kaia t rsla uZtm, 



Zweidrurh en 






(V) (» 




^(XJ\^) 



V' 



S^ashuT^g 






-610— 



Positions of French 



3 ..Aufiut 



POSITIONS OF FRENCH 




—611- 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



gOaiTlQNS OF rRENCM. 




-612- 



Positions of French 



7^ August 



POSITIONS OF FRl^NCH. 




-613- 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



Jl^'^Jluffusl 



POSlTIOINa O? FRENCH. 



Jca.le 



LUXE 




I^fiarmKe^jHj 












■*^*'<»<'<» , 




-614- 



I 



Positions of French 



15^?^ August 



POSITIONS OF FUCNCH. 



BELGIUM 



F'HJF.NCff : O 




•Scale 'tf AfUm> 



South JUh*trto4 



(ATti^i 




—615- 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



Jfyi^Auyutt,^-^^ ^'^- _ , POSITIONS OF FRENCH 




-616- 



Positions of French 



SeV^AuguJl,^^-*^^*^ 



POSITIONS OF FRCNCH. 




—617— 



■)eaa/ SkcM Position Sketches isrArmy 

"3- First Army ,.,JS^V, 




hi Brig. 



^d horses 



IST.DlV. ■■■^^/'orjes 

5rd.Re^i I 
2ndBrig. V-ed horjfs 

MkRe^i wfack horses tr earh. 



l^fie/dfaroes. 
'thme/. 



\I6 D/V Auq.3. 
HeuSYveiter 



. fq.M^ns. 

Iythmm higher Hqrs 
(5. ft: Hasp, if combai exprcM. 

^rot.anq. 'i Led horses 
P..O.D.. '^^'^%,,,,,^, 

4-f/t. Brig \^«d horses 

--^■Led horses. 

I ft Fhck horses &Mrh. 
I \z.Fi«ld forces. 

^1 j-*- naiJions of higher Hqrs. 
%\ \s.}EHosp.ifcombaiexpechfd 

_ I (l Wa^s.of Corps Hf&Staffuru 
^ \ Orders Cornel. Tn. Brt. 



i"]. Medicine carh. 
2.Carhidcje m^s. 
S.Officers bagja^e 
^.Eauipmen-I- rfaas. 
f>.naa.Cols.AH.hDiii. 
6.F. Hasps. AH h Diy. 

7 Medicine car/j. 
ZCariridae i/yo^. 
Tn. H-Officers ba^^a^e. 
2nd. Di^. I ^- Ffuipmen / na^s. 

\5.na^.Co/3 AHhDiV 
\bd: Hosps. AH.h DiV 

(/■ MSec//on, /\m.Col. dei 
) CJcols.j.rarfherfronfif 
1 necessary. 

\1 2nd. Section Am. Co/.tlat. 
j C6 dots) (0/s lance asma// 
I days march. 
\2. Pon-hn co/. 

ff. Horse depol 
J 2. Protris. Co/s. 
ii.Unaff.F. Hasps. 
\t Field Bakery Co/. 
K^.TnPk.Cok. 



Page 618^ 



Position Sketches 
First Army 



Jjtp^^/a/ J/f^^^^ 



Trier 
Morst D«p. am Auq. 15^ JHL 



Auq.'^. 



l?*Army 




-619— 



Position Sketches 



Jpif>cml Skekh 



Auq.5. 



l^Army. 




ESec Tns W. 



2nd Sec Am Cols. SM 
Cas+el 

ISecAm.Coti SIE 
Me++nich 
hlfeia 



ISDrv 



Tni 



zweilep -.,, -, _, - 
•OIBQivy^rft Our. m Corps 

Neumunster 



ch ,i^ec 
f'^% Mam 

O+tweilen^- 

m: 



—620- 



First Army 



Spec/a/ Jk^f-C/7 .Her^eske.l 



• Kell 



Aug. 6 



l».*Arf«y 



Tns. 7 Carps Hat 
a//, fo Diys. 



Cas+el 



2ntlJee.AmCohJM 

dern jR>1e++nich 



2nd Sicrns ML 

Sec.AmX 




linJy^eller 

Neumuns+er 

iWeibelskirchen 
Neunkirchen 



Saarlo 



13 a 



-621— 



Position Sketches 



J/>^c/aI SM<c/^ 




^my 



Neunkirchen 



G-- Rossein' 



—622— 



First Army 



Jpea^/ J/re/c/h 



Saarloui 



Auq. 8. 




UdwcllcrtQ- 

Gr Rossein 



IftiArmy 



-623— 



PART III 
French Accounts 



Proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon to the French Nation 
ON the 23rd July 1870 

There are solemn moments in the life of nations when national 
honour, violently roused, attains to an irresistable force, dominates 
all other interests and assumes the sole direction of the country's 
destinies. One of these decisive hours has struck for France. 

Prussia, towards whom we testified nothing but the most concilia- 
tory feelings, both during and since the war of 1866, has paid no at- 
tention to our good will and forbearance. Launched on the stream 
of invasion, she has provoked mistrust everywhere, necessitated ex- 
cessive armaments, and turned Europe into a camp where uncertainty 
and fear for the morrow reign supreme. 

A recent incident has revealed the instability of international 
relations and exhibited the whole gravity of the situation. We have 
entered our protests against the last pretensions of Prussia. They 
have been evaded and followed by contemptuous acts. Our country 
was pervaded by a deep sense of irritation, and at once a cry for war 
echoed from one end of France to the other. There remains nothing 
for us but to entrust our destiny to the decision of arms. 

We war not with Germany, whose independence we esteem. We 
wish that the nations forming the great German nationality may freely 
dispose of their destinies. As for ourselves, we demand the estab- 
lishment of a state of things which shall guarantee our safety and 
give us an assurance for the future. We desire to gain a lasting 
peace based on the true interests of nations, and to put an end to this 
precarious state in which one nation employs its resources to arm 
against another. 

The glorious standard, which we once more unfurl against those 
who challenge us, is the same which bore throughout Europe the 
civilizing ideas of our great revolution. It represents the same prin- 
ciples and will inspire •the same spirit of freedom. 

Frenchmen ! I am about to place myself at the head of that 
valiant army which is animated by love of duty and of country. It 
knows what it can do, for it has seen victory accompanying its march 
in all quarters of the globe. 

I take my son with me despite his youth. He knows the duties 
which his name imposes upon him, and he is proud of sharing the 
dangers of those who are fighting for their country. 

May God speed our efforts! A great people defending a just cause 
is invincible. 

Napoleon. 



—625— 



Order of Battle of the Army of the Rhine 

Order of Battle of the Army of the Rhine at the 
Beginning of August 1870 

Commander-in-Chief Napoleon III 

Chief of Staff Marshal le Boeuf 

Sub-Chiefs General Lebrun and General Jarras 

Commander of Artillery General Soleille 

Commander of Engineers General Coffinieres de Nordeck 

Director-General of Parks General Mitrece 

Intendant-General Wolf 

Commandant of Head-quarters General Letellier Blanchard 

Total of the Troops 



Number of 



Imperial Guard 

1st Corps McMahon __. 
2nd Corps Frossard _- 

3rd Corps Bazaine 

4th Corps Ladmirault 

5th Corps Failly 

6th Corps Canrobert ^ 
7th Corps Douay, Felix 

Cavalry Reserve 

Artillery Reserve 

Total 



24 
52 
39 
52 
39 
39 
49 
38 



332 



24 
28 
16 
28 
16 
16 
24 
20 
48 

220* 



m 



12 
20 
15 
20 
15 
15 
20 
15 
6 
16 
154 



O 



60 
96 
72 
96 
72 
72 

114 
72" 
30 
96 

780 



12 
24 
18 
24 
18 
18 

6 
18 

6 



■ *It appears doubtful whether the four squadrons per regiment, 
the number here assumed, has as a general rule been exceeded. 

After the mobilization of the Army of the Rhine, there remained 
behind in France and Italy: 

3 battalions of light infantry in Algiers. 
The foreign regiment in Algiers. 

4 infantry regiments in Algiers. 

4 infantry regiments near Toulouse. 
2 infantry regiments in Civita Vecchia. 
115 Fourth battalions in process of mobilization in the in- 
terior. 
6 Cavalry regiments in Algiers. 

2 Cavalry regiments near Toulouse and in Civita Vecchia. 
10 batteries (8 in Algiers, 2 in Civita Vecchia) . 



-626- 



PART III 

French Accounts 



French G2 Estimates of the Situa- 
tion. Shown Graphically 

These maps are corrected maps originally drawn by Colonel 
Bird, British Army. 



Redrawn by 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza 

Field Artillery 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



26. July 








1 60000 

btwn Ca^tfh. 



f^aumMvi^^er 



MMiarAauitTn' 



• Landuu 



UAft 






—630- 



Positions of Germans 



i<;^./w?y 



pr>«tiTIQN 3 Of GERM ANS. ^^^ 
VlBhr*. S^ ^^ locaUd Bingtti 




rs// 



% fiorfy 



.»«.> 



EH p(T| 

Moving l^taf by Kail 

1X1 \^A /^sTT^ 

"*^ {JiU 

P n /v J/Jirej 

Z-weiiriicTieny ^ ^ ^ 



CharltiJ 



(t) 



5-*iv] 



ffu' 



ft •"' I 



ri»ru?ur 



-a 



-631— 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



3'^Auffust 



POS#riONS or GERMANS. 




//o/« : ^/f\ mformafitn rtcen'td 
/'ncf/'caf*3L^trm^ns art nof Cafiobft 




'anov&r Julif 3} Sreultnach {^ 



."•^ .(' jaaijerjlautrrn, 

>0 Lartjdau 

(V) ■ ' ^ 



—632— 



Positions of Germans 



'^^^Ati^rml,6oo Pl< POSITIONS Or CeWMAN3 




,CarU' ulw 



—633— 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



.Evening of 6 'f^ Aui/usl 



POSITIONS OF CERMAISS 



GERM.4JVS CD 
Scale o/'MUcs 

£ 'f^ J£ if 

LUXEMBURG 



Thwriytl/e 



wts^ 




•CarU'-uixe 



-634— 



Positions of Germans 



POSITIONa O^ GERMANS 




—635— 



f 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 




—636- 



I 



Positions of Germans 



26"" Ai^jujt 



POSITIONS or CF.RMAMS. 




Aftjywri.s 



^ 



-T \i(!liftlu»s 



GCHMANS \^ 



^ 



ScqU cI'MileJI 

f-—. 'I 1" V 



-637- 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



2SV^Au^usf, 



POSITIONS or CEf^MAINS. 




•Scale ofJSlUei 



\^.}^% 



—^38- 



Positions of Germans 



ioV^Au^uJl 



POSITIONS OF GERMANS. 



Meineret 



edak. BELGIUIVE 



^5 'Mohtmedy 




LU3<yEMBUKO y 



FRENCH 

GERMLAI^S 



Srule of Miles 




-639— 



G2 Estimates, Graphic 



if^Auyust- 



POSITION* OF CITRMANS. 




J=-R£JWC» O 
Scale ofMutj 



-640— 



French 
Messages and Orders 

RELATING TO 

THE BATTLE OF SPICHEREN 

August 6th 1870 



TRANSLATED BY 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza 

Field Artillery 



Orders : 



G. H. Q. 4. August. 



It must always be assumed that the enemy will do that which 
is most reasonable. English newspapers state that General von 
Steinmetz occupies a central position between Saarebruck and Sarre- 
louis; he is supported, in rear, by the corps of Prince Frederick- 
Charles, while his left rests on the army of the Crown Prince, which 
is in Rhenish Bavaria. The enemy intends to advance on Nancy. 

In view of the foregoing, I order the following troop disposi- 
tions : 

4th Corps: headquarters, General Ladmirault, to Boulay; one 
division to Boucheborn, the third division to Tererchen. 

3d Corps: headquarters, Marshal Bazaine, to Saint Avoid; one 
division to Marienthal, the third division to Puttelange, the fourth 
division, at the discretion of the marshal, either in front or in rear 
of the other divisions: The 2d Corps (Frossard) will remain in its 
present positions. 

4th Corps: General de Failly, will march to Bitche, uniting with 
the division now there; there two divisions will be under the orders 
of Marshal MacMahon, while the division at Sarreguemines will 
maintain connection with the division at Puttelange, and will be un- 
der the orders of Marshal Bazaine. 

The Cavalry Division (Forton), now at Pont-a-Mousson, will 
proceed to Faulquemont. 

Marshal Canrobert, with three divisions of the 6th Corps, will 
proceed to Nancy. 

It is to be understood that the division which General Ladmirault 
is to send to Boucheborn will not proceed to this place until the 6th 
instant. 

Napoleon. 



—641— 



French Messages and Orders 

G. H. Q. 4 August. 
Telegram 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

Tomorrow the 5th instant send Decaen's division to Saint Avoid, 
where your headquarters and reserves are also to be; send Metman's 
division to Marienthal, Montaudon's division to Sarreguemines, Cas- 
tagny's division to Puttelange. 

Napoleon. 



^:J,0 A. M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To General Frossard : 

Prepare against a serious attack, which may take place today. 
Remain at your PC and do not report to the Emperor. 

Bazaine. 

(NOTE: The Emperor Napoleon had ordered the corps com- 
manders to report to him for a conference, to be held at Saint Avoid 
at 1:30 P.M., August 6th.— C.H.L.) 



"' ; 6:00 A. M. 6th August. 

Telegrajn 

To General Frossard: 

The Chief of Staff, 1st Division, 3d Corps, not yet fully arrived 
at Sarreguemines, reports that he is expecting an attack. On the 
other hand, the sub-prefect at Sarreguemines reports "The telegraph 
line and the railroad has just been interrupted at Bliesbrucken, on 
the line to Bitche." 

I have asked for more precise information. 

If the enemy really makes a serious offensive movement on Sar- 
reguemines, it will be necessary to send the division now at Spich- 
eren towards Grossbliederstroff. 

Bazaine. 



9:10 A.M. 6Xh August. 
Telegram 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

I hear artillery fire on my outpost line, and I am going there at 
once. Would it not be well if Montaudon's division would send a 
brigade towards Grossbliederstroff, and Decaen's division advance to- 
wards Merlebach and Rosbruck? 

Frossard. 



-642- 



The Battle of Spicheren 

10:10 A.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

Strong- hostile reconnoitering forces of infantry and cavalry have 
advanced against us from the heights of Sarrebruck; but no attack 
has yet developed. We have taken position on the high ground, and 
across the road; I am not going to Saint- Avoid. 

Frossard. 



10 -.W A.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

I am informed that the enemy is at Rosbruck and at Merlebach, 
that is in my rear (half way between Sorbach and Saint-Avoid), you 
should provide forces in this direction. 

Frossard. 



11:15 A.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To General Frossard: 

Although I have very few troops available to guard the Saint 
Avoid position, I am sending Metman's division (from Marienthal 
towards Macheren and Bening; this last place is at most but 9 kilo- 
meters from Forbach) ; and Castagny's division (from Puttelange) to- 
wards Farswiller and Theding (this last place is but 9 kilometers 
at most from Forbach, and about 3 kilometers east from Bening) . I 
can do no more, but as you have your three divisions united, it 
appears to me that the one at Oeting might very well send a brigade 
or even more towards Morsbach, in order to observe Rosbruch from 
this direction, that is the road through Emersweiller and Grande- 
Rossel (Gross-Rossel) to Sarrlouis — Our line is unfortunately very 
thin on account of the last dispositions made, and if the movement is 
really so serious, it would be well for us to concentrate at the Caden- 
brun position. Keep me well informed. 

Bazaine. 



6th August. 
Telegravi 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

I am heavily engaged along the road, as well as in the woods 
and heights of Spicheren, and a serious battle is under way. 

Frossard. 



—643- 



French Messages and Orders 

(NOTE: The foregoing telegram, taken in connection with the 
following one, and the descripiton of events, would seem to have been 
sent about 1:30 P.M.— C.H.L.) 



2:00 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegram, 

To General Fbossard: 

I am sending Montaudon to Grossbliederstroff. The Dragoon 
Brigade is proceeding to Forbach. 

Bazaine. 



2:00 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To H. M. The Emperor: 

In connection with my despatch of noon today, I have made the 
following dispositions: General Metman, with one brigade is march- 
ing to Betting-les-Saint- Avoid (a little more than a kilometre west 
of^ Bening), the other brigade is proceeding towards Macheren and 
Mittenberg. General Castagny is sending a brigade to the Theding 
position, to the left of Cadenbron, and he will support it by proceed- 
ing in person with his other brigade to Farschweiler, General Montau- 
den will proceed to Rouhling and Grossbliederstroff, leaving to Lapa- 
set's brigade of the 5th Corps the mission of covering Sarreguemines, 
as it is occupying that place. 

This morning's reconnaissance reported nothing; nevertheless 
about eight-thirty this morning, while I was on the Carling road 
visiting the outposts of the 85th Infantry, we received some shots 
from cavalry patrols. 

I will keep your Majesty advised. 

Bazaine. 



Jt:S0 P.M. 
Telegram 

To Bening: 

If General Metman is at Bening, direct him to proceed to For- 
bach at once. 

Frossard. 



6th August. 
Telegram, 

To General Frossard: 

To reassure me, send me news; do not forget Montaudon's divi- 
sion, which should be at Sarreguemines. 

Bazaine. 



—644- 



The Battle of Spicheren 



(NOTE: The foregoing telegram appears to have been sent 
about 5:00 P.M. The following telegram appears to be the reply. — 
C.H.L.) 

Forbach, 5:45 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegravi 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

The battle which has been very lively is declining; but it will 
undoubtedly recommence tomorrow; send me a regiment. 

Frossard. 



5:50 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

My right on the heights, has been obliged to retreat. I find my- 
self seriously compromised. Send me troops as quickly as possible. 

Frossard. 



6:15 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To General Frossard: 

I am sending you a regiment by rail; General Castagny is 
marching towards you; he will be ordered to rejoin you. General 
Montaudon left Sarreguemines at 5 P.M. for Grossbliederstorif (on 
the road to Spicheren). General Metman is at Betting. You should 
have already received Juniac's Dragoon Brigade. 

Bazaine. 



7:22 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegram . 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

We are turned through Werden; I am sending all my troops to- 
wards the heights. 

Frossard. 



8:05 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To General Frossard: 

I have sent you everything I can. Explain clearly which posi- 
tions you think you should occupy. 

Bazaine. 



—645— 



French Messages and Orders 

(NOTE 1: This message appears to relate to the indefinite ex- 
pression as to "the heights" in the preceding telegram. — C.H.L.) 

(NOTE 2: No reply was sent to this telegram. Frossard ap- 
pears to have been busy in making a retreat. — C.H.L.) 



G. H. Q. 8:20 P.M. 6th August. 
Telegram 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

The enemy's movements tend to separate you from General Fros- 
sard; order General Ladmirault's entire corps to join you. Take 
necessary measures to direct the retreat of General Frossard and 
troops at Sarreguemines to a point in rear, which I believe should 
be Puttelange. The Guard should be half way between Courcelles- 
Chaussy and Saint-Avoid. 

Napoleon. 



7th August. 
Message. 

To Marshal Bazaine: 

In compliance with a telegram received yesterday at 7:30 P.M., 
I proceeded from Bening to Forbach. I tried all night to find General 
Frossard. This morning I marched from Forbach to Puttelange. The 
men are without rations. 

Metman. 



Extract from the War Diary of Montaudon's Di- 
vision FOR August 6th 

(NOTE: This division arrived at Sarreguemines at 6:00 A.M., 
August -eth.— C.H.L.) . 

Towards noon while at Sarreguemines we heard lively 
artillery firing in the direction of Sarrebruck. At 3 :00 P.M. 
the division received orders from Marshal Bazaine to march 
to Grossbliederstorff to cover the right flank of the 2d 
Corps, which was engaged beyond Forbach. The division 
left Sarreguemines at 4:00 P.M. At 7:00 P.M. it arrived 
on the high ground near Rouhling, and went on a little fur- 
ther to the left, to a position on the high ground of Caden- 
bron. After arrival here, General Montaudon found a staff 
officer of the 2d Corps looking for him ; but as it was already 

—646— 




I 



The Battle of Spicheren 

too late to arrive in time on the battlefield, the division re- 
mained on the position. The division commander sent a 
captain of the General Staff with the 2d Corps officer to 
Forbach to inform General Frossard that he (Montaudon) 
would be at his disposition for the following day. At mid- 
night these two officers returned with the information that 
the 2d Corps was retreating towards Sarreguemines. The 
division was called to arms, and by a night march pro- 
ceeded to Puttelange, where between 9:00 A.M. and 10:00 
A.M., August 7th, it went into camp. 



-647— 



MARCH OF THE FRENCH 5 th 
CORPS TOWARDS WORTH 



Augiist Uh to 6th, 1870. 



SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTS 

Compiled By 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, 

Field Artillery. 

The French 5th Corps, August 4th to 6th, 1870 

1. On August 4th, 1870 the 5th Corps (General de 
Failly) was stationed as follows: 

3d Division (General de Lespart), three regiments cavalry 
attached, at Bitche. 

5th Corps (less 3d Division), three regiments cavalry at- 
tacked, about Sarreguemines. 

Hostile patrols had been observed on the frontier for 
several days. 

2. In view of the result of the battle of Wissembourg 
on this date, which was a defeat for the French, who retired 
from that point southwards, GHQ on the afternoon of the 
4th wired General de Failly "Support your division at 
Bitche with your other two divisions." 

3. In compliance with this telegram the 5th Corps 
issued orders on the 4th for: 

1st Division (General de I'Abadie) to march at once as far 
as possible towards Bitche via the main road; 

2d Division (General Goze) to march on the 5th by brigades. 

4. The 1st Division marched on the 4th to Wissing 
farm, about 4 miles distant and bivouacked. It continued 
its march on the 5th instant to Fremenberg farm, about 12 
miles further, and about 2 miles west of Bitche, arriving 
about dark. The long time taken for this march appears to 



-649- 



March of French 5th Corps 

have been due to the fact that the march was made in one 
column, neither a flank guard nor an advance guard being 
used. 

5. On the 5th, the leading brigade (Maussion) 2d 
Division, left Sarreguemines with the Corps Artillery (6 
batteries) and the 1st and 5th Lancers attached. The 
remaining brigade (Lapasset) of the 2d Division with the 
Corps Trains and 1 regiment cavalry remained at Sarregue- 
mines awaiting relief by a division of the 3d Corps, which 
General de Failly had arranged for, as in his opinion it was 
inadvisable to abandon Sarreguemines. As the relieving 
division did not arrive until late in the day, the 5th Corps 
detachment at Sarreguemines remained there until the, 
following day. 

6. Maussion's detachment having sent the' 5th Lan- 
cers out to reconnoiter, arrived at 12:00 noon at Rorbach 
without incident. He found the inhabitants to be greatly 
excited, and learnt that a Prussian cavalry regiment had 
been near there on the preceding evening, and had searched 
neighboring villages. Shortly after information was re- 
ceived that hostile infantry and cavalry were in sight. A 
party of the infantry brigade at once deployed and opened 
fire, when it was discovered that the supposed enemy was 
the 5th Lancers with a few men of the 3d Division (68th 
Infantry) returning from reconnaissance. In view of the 
foregoing facts the detachment commander decided it was 
inadvisable to continue his march, and remained at Ror- 
bach. The Corps commander being advised of the decision 
approved of it. In the 5th Corps reports this approval is 
based on the importance of the Rorbach valley — Maus- 
sion's detachment remained overnight at Rorbach. 5th 
Corps headquarters moved to Bitche. 

7. On August 5th, GHQ issued an order placing the 
5th Corps under the orders of Marshal MacMahon. The 
latter believing that the 5th Corps would be found at 
Bitche, telegraphed at 8:00 P.M. to the Corps commander 
"Move at once to Reichshoffen with your entire corps. I 
expect you to assist me tomorrow." 



—650- 



Summary of Accounts 

8. At 3:00 A.M. August 6th, General de Failly 
wired Marshal MacMahon in reply to the effect : 

a. That only the 3d Division could be sent on the 5th to Reichs- 

hoffen. 

b. That the 1st Division v^^ould remain at Bitche on the 5th, 
marching on the 7th to Phillippsbourg. 

c. That Maussion's detachment would march to Bitche on the 

7th. 

d. That the balance of the 5th Corps was at Sarreguemines, 

completely cut off from the troops previously mentioned. 

9. The 5th Corps issued orders early on the 5th as in- 
dicated 'in preceding paragraph. The detachment at Sarre- 
guemines (Lapasset) was ordered to remain there because 
its rail communications had been cut by hostile cavalry at 
Bliesbrucken. Maussion was ordered to proceed to Frem- 
denberg, 2 miles west of Bitche. 5th Corps headquarters 
remained at Bitche. 

10. The Division (Lespart) received its order at 6:00 
A.M. to march via Niederbronn about 13 miles distant, and 
moved out at 7 :30 A.M. The inhabitants reported hostile 
troops in the vicinity. The 12th Chasseurs marched at the 
head of the division without distance. There was no ad- 
vance guard nor any flank guard. At each cross roads the 
column halted while the cavalry and sometimes the infantry 
searched the vicinity. No hostile troops were seen during 
the march. Artillery firing was heard towards the east 
since early in the morning. As the columns approached 
Niederbronn, wounded and stragglers were met, becoming 
more and more numerous and bringing discouraging reports 
as to the battle near Worth. At 5:00 P.M. the column ar- 
rived on the high ground overlooking Niederbronn in time 
to witness French troops retreating south through that 
town. 

11. Communication was now established for the first 
time with Marshal MacMahon, who ordered the division to 
deploy one brigade on each side' of the road, and its artil- 
lery to take position for action. This being done the Prus- 
sians stopped their pursuit and did not proceed beyond 
Neiderbronn. 



—651- 



March of French 5th Corps 

12. The 5th Corps commander having learnt at Bitche 
of the loss of the battle at Worth, convened a council of 
war at 7:00 P.M. on August 6th to discuss: 

a. Was it possible for the troops at Bitche, about i of the 
corps, to accept battle at that place? 

b. Should the 1st Corps be followed in its retreat? 

The council decided on the latter alternative. 



—652- 




^x ^ 3a/f/ff/?/^ of nhr//7 



1:100000 

lOpO 2000 3000 ,000 SOOO SOOOn 



v.Sirs^i^al Skm, 





Ba/f/ef/?M of lYorf/r 



]: 100000 



'HAGENAU 



FRENCH ORDERS 

AND 

MESSAGES 

August 13-15, 1870. 



Translated By 

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza 

Field Artillery. 
Orders: G.H.Q. 13 August, 1870. 

{Extract) 

The 1st and 3d Reserve Cavalry Divisions will march at 1:00 P M. 
August 14th from their bivouacs towards Verdun; the 1st Divi- 
sion will take the road from Gravelotte to Doncourt and Conflans; 
the 3d the road from Gravelotte to Mars-la-Tour. 

The 3d and 4th Corps will take the first of these roads; the 2d 
and 6th Corps will follow the last. 

The Guard will follow the 6th Corps. 

Bazaine, 

Note: The French Army on the morning of the 14th appears 
to have been in a defensive position about 11 or 2 kilometers east 
of the Metz forts, in the following order from south to north — 6th 
Corps; 2d Corps (Frossard) ; 3d Corps (Decaen) ; 4th Corps (Lad- 
mirault). The Guard Corps (Bourbaki) was in army reserve in 
rear of the center. — C.H.L. 



Orders: August 15, 1870. — P.M. 

At 4:00 A.M. tomorrow morning soup will be served. At 4:30 
A.M. troops will be ready to march, horses saddled and tents rolled. 
The 2nd and 6th Corps will probably have a hostile force of about 
30,000 men in their front, and should expect an attack tomorrow. 

Bazaine. 



War Diary. Army of the Rhine. 

August 15. 

The army continued its movement on Verdun. The Marshal, 
C-in-C gave orders to occupy the following positions: 

—653— 



French Orders and Messages 

GHQ to Gravelotte; 

2d Corps to Rezonville and Vionville as far as Mars-la-Tour. 

3d Corps, in rear of the 4th, as far as Verneville, across the road 
Verneville; Saint-Marcel. 

4th Corps to Doncourt-les-Conflans; 

5th Corps in rear of the 2d at Rezonville; 

Guard Corps in vicinity of Gravelotte. 

1st Reserve Cavalry Division (du Barail) tow^ards Jarny; 3d 
Reserve Cavalry Division (de Forton) to Mars-la-Tour. 

Upon arrival at Mars-la-Tour this division met hostile forces 
at 9:30 a.m. After a little artillery firing the enemy retired towards 
Puxieux. 

The Srd Reserve Cavalry Division remained in position at Mars- 
la-Tour until 1:00 P.M. and then retired to Vionville where they found 
the 2d Corps Cavalry. 

On account of the delay caused by the battle of the 14th instant, 
the 3d and 4th Corps were unable to occupy the positions ordered. 

The 3rd Corps has only the 1st Division (Montaudon) at Saint 
Marcel*; the 2nd and 4th Divisions rejoin during the night,t and 
the 3rd Division (Metman) remains at Haison de Planches. The 
4th Corps is at Devant-les-Ponts and Woippy; only the 3rd Divi- 
sion camps at Lessy. 

The 1st Corps is proceeding to Saint Dizier; no information as 
to the 5th Corps. 

Marshal Leboeuf has been detailed to command the 3rd Corps, in 
place of General Decaen, wounded at the battle of Borny. 



War Diary. • 2d Corps 

August 15. 
{Extract) 

At daybreak the 2d Corps continued its movement towards Mars- 
la-Tour, but on account of delays caused by other Corps, an order 
was received from the Marshal C-in-C to halt at Rezonville. 

Lapasset's Brigade at the head of the column was followed by 
Verge's Division which arrived at a point 1 kilometer beyond Rezon- 
ville, and camped on the left of the main road in two lines. 

Bataille's Division also camped in two lines in front of the 2nd 
Division. 

During this time, Lapasset's Brigade faced to the rear and left 
and camped; its right on the high ground overlooking and command- 
ing the exit of the Gorze valley; its left at Rezonville. The large 
woods of Saint-Arnould and des Ognons which covered this exit 
were carefully observed. 

After resting some time at Longeville, the Cavalry Division 
continued its march, being always the extreme rear guard of the 
Army. It arrived about mid-day a little in rear of Vionville, where 
it camped, with outposts on the Verdun roads and roads to the left, 
leading into the Valley of the Rupt de Mad. 

The reserve and the Corps Artillery camped at Rezonville, on 
the left and close to the road. 



*This division was really at Montigny-la-Grange and Verneville. 
fThese divisions really stayed all night at Verneville and Devant- 
les-Ponts, respectively. 

—654— ■ 



August 13-15, 1870 

■ The Engineer Train with the Reserve Company remained at 
Gravelotte; the 6th Corps moved up on our right on the other side 
of the road and beyond Rezonville. Headquarters of the 2nd and 
6th Corps were at Rezonville. 



Diary of A. Q. M. Bouteiller, 2d Corps: 

August 15, 1870. 

{Extract). 

The 2d Corps continued its movements towards the West, at 
daybreak on the 15th; but at the moment when the Headquarters 
Train was about to start its march, Army General Staff officers came 
down the road, and caused all wagons to get off to the right and 
left, in order to leave space for the Emperor's baggage train. * * * * 
All our wagons had to take to the fields; our convoy, which we had 
had so much trouble to get in order, was cut in several places, and 

the head of the convoy had to wait more than — * hours at 

Maison-Neuve before being able to resume the march. 



Message Gravelotte, 15 August. 

To General Frossard, Rezonville: 
Please give orders to have soup served at 4:00 a.m. tomorrow, 
and be ready to march at 4:30 A.M. Tents are to be struck and 
horses saddled but not bridled until ready to leave bivouacs. 

Please let me know the exact location of your headquarters, in 
order that my orders, should I have any to give, may certainly reach 
you in the quickest possible manner. 

Bazaine. 

Note: A similar message was sent to the Guard Corps. — C. H. L. 



To Marshal Bazaine: Midnight, 15th August. 

In compliance with your Excellency's orders the 2d Corps will 
be ready to march at 4:30 A.M. 

My headquarters, together with that of Marshal Canrobert are 
at Rezonville. 

The 2d Corps is camped between Rezonville and Vionville. 

Forton's Division and the Cavalry Division is beyond Vionville. 

The Corps Artillery is camped at Rezonville. 

I beg your excellency to let me know in ample time the direction 
and the order of march for the 2d Corps. Forton's Division which 
occupied Mars-la-Tour this morning, fell back to Vionville before 
Prussian forces which appeared on its left. 

A Prussian detachment of about two regiments (infantry and 
cavalry) commanded by a general and coming from Noveant passed 



*Number of hours left blank in the original document. — C. H. L. 

—655— 



French Orders and Messages 

through Gorze at 9:00 p.m. where they inquired how far it was from 
there to the Verdun road. Immediately afterwards they retired 
suddenly by the same route. They attempted to avenge themselves 
on the inhabitants who had refused to give them information. 

Frossard, 

Note: GHQ informed the Guard Corps as to the above infor- 
mation concerning the enemy. — C. H. L. 



3rd Corps War Diary. 15th August. 

On the morning of the 15th, the 3rd Corps crossed the Moselle, 
and was massed in a very restricted space on the side of the Plappe- 
ville hill. 

On the 15th, the Army was to commence its march on Verdun; the 
road via Doncourt and Jarny had been assigned to the 3rd and 4th 
Corps, while the road via Mars-la-Tour was to be followed by the 
2nd, 6th and Guard Corps. In order to avoid congestion in the 
Rozerieulles defile, the 3rd Corps was sent via Lessy, Chatel-Saint- 
Germain and Verneville to the positions where it was to bivouac 
which extended from Saint Marcel to Amanvillers. 

On the morning of the 15th, as the heads of the colimins moved 
out, Marshal Leboeuf who succeeded General Decaen joined. 



The march of the 3rd Corps was considerably delayed by the lack 
of width of roads, which lead from the high ground of Lessy to 
Chatel-Saint-Germain, and by detachments of troops and materiel, 
among which a ponton train, belonging to other corps. 

On the evening of the 15th the Divisions of Montaudon and Nay- 
ral took position between Amanvillers and Verneville with their left 
extending towards la Caulre. The Marshal established his Headquar- 
ters at Bagneux Farm. Aynard's Division was unable to occupy its 
position on the Doncourt road opposite la Caulre until the morning 
of the 15th. 

The Cavalry Division also took position on the morning of the 15th 
in rear of Verneville. The Corps Artillery went to near Villers-aux- 
Bois. As for Metman's Division, this was first cut by 4th Corps 
troops, then ordered afterwards by the Marshal C-in-C until the 17th 
instant in cooperating with the concentration of the Army, and did 
not rejoin the 3rd Corps until the evening of that day. 



Orders. 3rd Corps Near Metz. 

Monday, 15th August. 

{Extract) 

At 1:00 P.M. the four divisions of the 3rd Corps will break camp, 
to follow one another in the order in which they are now camped. They 
will take the road via Plappeville to Chatel-Saint-Germain where they 
will receive orders from the Chief of Staff as to the road to take. 

—656— 



August 13-15, 1870 



The infantry will march at a slow and moderate gait, halting as 
Division commanders deem best. 

Lebouef. 



Message. 3rd Corps-Bagneux. 

15th August. 

(Extract) 
To G. H. Q.: 

I have just arrived at my headquarters at Bagneux after having 
reconnoitered the position from Amanvillers to Verneville extending 
as far as Saint-Marcel, across the Gravelotte; Doncourt road and 
returning by Rezonville. 

This is the position the 3rd Corps is to occupy under instructions 
from your Excellency. It is a fine position and easy to defend although 
a little wooded. 

Unfortunately at this moment (6:30 p.m.) Montaudon's Division 
on the extreme right is the only one in position, besides the Corps 
Artillery which arrived via Gravelotte. 

As to my other three divisions and the cavalry they will not 
arrive until 7:00 or 10:00 p.m. today. 

As soon as I can get hold of a regiment of dragoons I will push 
them forward to Doncourt to protect the 4th Corps Trains.* 

Leboeuf. 



War Diary. 4^th Corps 

Lille, 15th August. 

(Extract) 

The 4th Corps bivouacked on the morning of the 15th before 
Fort Moselle, at Devant-les-Ponts on both sides of the road to Thion- 
ville. 

This day the Corps received the order to proceed to Doncourt- 
en-Jarnisy; but the troops were tired from the marches they had 
just made, and the battle they so gloriously fought on the 14th. In 
addition it was necessary to draw ammunition. It was therefore 
impossible to reach Doncourt on this date. But the Corps commander 
in order to comply with the orders received, started the 3rd Division, 
which had suffered the least at the fight of the 14th on its march at 
about 3:00 P.M.f 

As the road by Longeville was as congested as on the preceding 
day, this Division marched via Plappeville, between the fort of that 
name and Fort Saint-Quentin. It had to camp near Lessy with a 
view to marching the next day via Gravelotte to Doncourt. 



*Note: At this time the 4th Corps Trains were really at Metz. 
The C. G. 3rd Corps appears to have been under the impression that 
they were en route to Verdun, which they should have been, but were 
not.— C. H. L. 

fNote: The 4th Corps had been ordered by the C-in-C to march 
via Longeau; but the War Diary omits all reference to this. — C.H.L. 

—657— 



French Orders and Messages 

On the following morning the two other divisions were to follow 
at daybreak; but in the evening the corps commander learning that 
the road to Plappeville was jammed with the 3rd Corps Trains de- 
cided to march on Doncourt via Briey, thence via Habonville and 
Jouaville. 

He advised the Commanding General, 3rd Division as to his 
decision, in order that the former might reconnoiter the roads lead- 
ing to Doncourt. 



Diary of General Henry, Chief of Staff, 6th Corps. 

15th August. 

About 11:00 P.M. on the 14th, an officer from GHQ arrived with 
verbal orders for the 6th Corps to move out at daybreak on the 15th; 
Tixier's Division to cross the. Moselle by the railroad bridge. This 
movement was completed by 5:00 a.m. (on the 15th) ; several minutes 
after the engineers blew up one arch of this bridge; but the blowing 
up of the bridge at Jouy and at Noveant was entirely forgotten, and 
the enemy crossed over them at once. The division halted on the 
Longeville-Moulins road where it received some shells from a Prus- 
sian battery which had followed and which fired from across the 
river. Marshal Canrobert took post at daybreak at the Porte de 
France; he did not find there any officer from GHQ to inform him as 
to the direction to take; he directed his own staff to supervise the 
march. 

The Imperial Guard took the road to Longeville; its cavalry was 
at Ban-Saint-Martin. A large part of the 6th Corps infantry was 
routed over the road Plappeville and Lessy hill on Gravelotte. 

At noon, the entire 6th Corps was assembled about Gravelotte, 
v/aiting for orders.* 

Between 4:00 P.M. and 5:00 P.M. the Emperor arrived at this 
village and the 6th Corps was ordered to Rezonville; the 2nd Corps 
was already beyond this place on the left of the road; the 6th Corps 
was to take position beyond this village on the right of the road. 
The Marshal reconnoitered the terrain; upon arrival he sent some 
farmers to reconnoiter the woods towards Ars and Gorze; the Mar- 
shal recognized the fact that the position could be turned by the 
defiles through the Bois des Ognons, and therefore directed the Divi- 
sion of Levassor-Sorval to observe them, remaining in second line. 

The remainder of the Corps formed with its right at the Bois de 
Saint-Marcel, and the left on the Rezonville road. Marshal Can- 
robert returned to his quarters at night time. 

Forton's Cavalry Division is covering our front at a great dis- 
tance; we received information as to this on August 14th. 

During the evening the Marshal received the order to be ready to 
march at 4:30 A.M. on the 16th, tents to be struck and horses saddled. 



*Note: This is an error. From the War Diaries of the 6th 
Corps, it appears that the leading division (the 3rd) at noon was 
halted at Point-du-Jour. — C.H.L. 



—658- 



August 13-15, 1870 

War Diary. Imperial Guard. 

15ih August. 

The Prussians having placed a battery on the high ground com- 
manding the right bank of the Moselle, shells fell in the 1st Divi- 
sion camp, which thereupon moved closer to Moulins. 

One battalion, 3rd Grenadiers, was detailed to guard the rail- 
road bridge, of which one arch was blown up. 

In compliance with an order received about 1:00 P.M., the Guard 
was placed in march for Gravelotte, in the following order: 

Via Longeville to Moulins-les-Metz : 

At 2:30 P.M., the entire Cavalry Division; 

At 3:00 P.M., the Corps Artillery with their field trains; 

At 3:15 P.M., the Engineers, the Engineer Train. 

preceding Headquarters and the Headquarters Train, and the artil- 
lery Park; Picard's Division forming a rear guard consisting of a 
regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and a battery of artillery. 

Deligny's Division left in advance under verbal orders of the 
Guard Commander, and went to Point-du-Jour. His foot chasseur 
battalion with one battery was posted on the left of the Gravelotte 
road, in order to observe the exits of the Bois de Vaux. 

Picard's Division was posted to the south and east of Gravelotte, 
observing the same ravine and wood. 

The Cavalry with the Corps Artillery and Artillery Park was 
north of this village. 

The Corps Supply Train, an attached train, remained at Ban- 
Saint-Martin. 

The last troops arrived at Gravelotte at 11:30 p.m. 

The Emperor was at Gravelotte with his headquarters. 



Memorandum on. preceding document submitted by General 
Bourbaki to a Court of Inquiry. 

15th August. 

The Voltigeur Division left its camp to march via the Verdun 
road and bivouac according to the orders of the Marshal on the 
right of this road on the high ground at Moscou farm. The rest of 
the Guard camped in the vicinity of Gravelotte, on the right bank 
of the Mance ravine, as far as the Ars ravine, which separates Grave- 
lotte from the Moscou farm. 

It is beyond question that on that day we had in our possession 
the two roads to Verdun, via Conflans and via Mars-la-Tour, and 
that if we had received the least order, or the least indication regard- 
ing the intentions of the Marshal, we could have thrown the Prus- 
sians back into the Moselle. 



Message. 1st Cavalry Division, 

Doncourt-les-Conflans; 
6:15 P.M., 15th Atigust. 
To GHQ: 

I have just this moment (6:15 P.M.) received your message, and 
I beg to advise you that in compliance with the order sent me by 

—659— 



French Orders and Messages 

Captain Jung, I proceeded this morning from Gravelotte to Jarny. 
Just as I was proceeding to bivouac my attention was attracted to 
quite lively artillery firing in the direction of Mars-la-Tour. I at 
once proceeded in this direction and on the way met a staff officer 
of General Forton who asked that I support an offensive movement 
which he had started against hostile cavalry. 

Just as I arrived on the high ground overlooking the village 
the enemy retired to the woods south of the village. 

I therefore returned to Jarny, where I arrived at 4:00 p.m., and 
not seeing any infantry arriving and learning that the hostile cav- 
alry had reoccupied Mars-la-Tour, I retreated to a point in front of 
Doncourt, where I am holding a good position, with an advance 
guard at Jarny. 

Our patrols which have just returned, have brought in a few 
prisoners, whom I am sending to GHQ. 

In engagements between the hostile cavalry and our men, about 
twenty of the former were struck down by our fire. 

I am sending Lieutenant Lorain to you to supplement my re- 
port. 

Du Barail. 



Message. GHQ. Gravelotte, 

15th August. 

To General du Barail: 

I have just received your report. I am much pleased with your 
success of this morning and I congratulate you thereon. I have re- 
ceived with pleasure the information transmitted through your staff 
officer. 

General Frossard and Marshal Canrobert, who are at Vionville 
and Rezonville inform me that from information received a hostile 
force estimated at 30,000 men is in front of them, and that they 
expect to be attacked tomorrow. I suggest you watch carefully to 
your front and as far out as possible, and inform me without delay 
of everything that occurs. 

Please give orders to have soup served at 4:00 a.m., and be 
ready to march at 4:30 A.M. Tents are to be struck and horses sad- 
dled but not bridled until time of departure. 

Bazainb. . 



War Diary. 

3rd Cavalry Division {de Forton) 

15th August. 

At 5:15 A.M., the 15th, the Division left for Mars-la-Tour. It 
arrived at this village at 9:00 A.M., reconnoitering and searching all 
neighboring ground. The 1st Brigade was sent out to reconnoiter 
beyond Tronville, towards Puxieux, through which it passed looking 
for the enemy, who the Brigade found in rear of that village; the 
Brigade then retired. At 9:15 a.m. patrol and artillery fighting com- 
menced and lasted about an hour. 

Being faced by hostile infantry, and on the advice of the Com- 
manding General, 2nd Corps, this Division after having held its posi- 

—660— 



August 13-15, 1870 



tion until 2:00 p.m. left Mars-la-Tour, and at 3:30 P.M. camped at 
Vionville. 



Telegram. War Dejoartment, Pa7'is. 

9:15 AM., 15th August. 
To Marshal Bazaine. 
Metz. 

The mayor of Vigneulles reports that at 3:00 A.M. today small 
parties of Prussians arrived there, stating that 20,000 more men 
would arrive later today. 



Telegram. War Department, Paris. 

3:50 P.M., 15th August. 
To Marshal Bazaine. 
Metz. 

Prussians have arrived at Commercy. Prussian Uhlans and 
Wurttemberg Dragoons. No information as to their numbers. 



Telegram,. War Department, Paris. 

U:SO P.M., 15th August. 
To Chief of Staff. 
Metz. 

A farmer from the Vosges* has arrived at Bayon and reports 
that he saw 1000 or 2000 Prussians constructing several bridges 
across the Moselle for the use of important bodies of troops. 



Telegram. Verdun, 

5:08 P.M., 15th August. 
To Marshal Bazaine. 

Metz. 
The mayor of Saint-Mihiel reports as follows: 
"At noon I was at the railroad station at Commercy with the 
Prefect; a Prussian patrol arrived at the station. 

"I am expecting each instant orders to blow up the bridges and 
tunnels." 

The Commanding General. 

Note: The above information from the mayor of Saint-Mihiel 
was confirmed separately by a despatch from the Prefect. — C. H. L. 



*Note: Probably Vosges department, not mountains. — C. H. L. 



—661— 



French Orders and Messages 

Telegram. ' Verdun, 

6:05 P.M., 15th August. 
To Marshal Bazaine. 
Metz. 

(Extract) 

I have just received the folloviring message from Saint-Mihiel : 
"A man from Nonsard, Vigneulles township, informs me that 
Prussians have arrived at that place. They have made requisitions: 
he saj^s they are very numerous about Nonsard, Pannes, Essey." 

The Commanding General. 



Message. Thionville, 15th August. 

To Marshal Leboeuf. 

Metz. 

(Extract) 

I have the honor to advise you that at about 4:00 A.M. this morn- 
ing a Prussian Corps, estimated at 7,000 to 8,000 men, consisting of 
the 23d, 68th, and 69th Infantry, the 8th Artillery and the 1.2th 
Engineers with several squadrons of cavalry, principally hussars, 
made a raid on Thionville. 

The alarm having been given in time, we opened fire to such an 
extent and so promptly that the enemy who came via Boulay, 
Kedange, Metzervisse, etc., and who attempted to take position on 
the edge of the Klange forest, about 2 1 kms. from the town con- 
sidered it best to retreat. * * * * 

- - These troops consisted largely of Landwehr. They retired 
towards the frontier via Metzervisse. Many of the soldiers appeared 
completely discouraged. They asked for news from Metz, and com- 
plained of hunger, and of being compelled to fight against their 
wishes, etc. 

The enemy had thirteen guns with them. - - - 

No further news from Treves, Gonz and Sarrebourg. 

Special Agent. 



Message. IJfth August. 

(Received on the 15th). 

An army corps, said to be about 35,000 strong, appears to be 
concentrating up to this evening between Perl, Merzig and Sarre- 
bourg, to cover the retreat of the Prussian army in case of defeat, 
or to support its movement forward in case of victory. 

Prefect of Moselle. 



15th August. 

Memorandum by the General Staff. (G2) : 

Between August 12th and 16th, we concentrated about Metz, 
halting our march on Verdun. The country people gave us informa- 
tion willingly but of little value, as no one ever came in from vil- 

—662— 



August 13-15, 1870 

lages within the Prussian lines. On August 15th, the enemy was 
reported at Rezonville, as passing through Ars-la-Moselle and as 
concentrating via the defile at Gorze ; but at Gorze itself there are 
as yet but in very small numbers. 



Metz, 15th August. 

I am sending to GHQ a Prussian who has just been captured. 
From questions asked him by the post commander it appears that 
an army of more than 200,000 Prussians is marching on Nancy. This 
army is commanded by Prince Frederick. 

A force of 150,000 men is advancing on Metz to attack it. Ac- 
cording to the deserter the advance guard of this force is on the 
battlefield of yesterday, and another force of 130,000 men is con- 
siderably in rear, but will join this advance guard. 

The troops which fought yesterday have retired (Xlllth Divi- 
sion) . The XlVth Division has replaced them and is awaiting an 
attack. 

It is 3 kms. from Metz. 

Lieutenant, 
Outpost Commander. 



Telegram. Signal Post, Me'tz Cathedral. 

11 -.30 A.M., {15 August) 

No enemy in view on either bank of the Moselle. 

Note: Haze appears to have prevented earlier observations. — - 
C. H. L. 



Telegram. Signal Post, Metz Cathedral. 

1 :15 P.M., {15 Aug.) 

Considerable hostile troops in march along the cross road Petit- 
Marais; Colligny. They are passing in rear of Flanville, towards 
the Saarebruck road. * * * * 



Telegram,. Signal Post, Me'tz Cathedral. 

2:20 P.M., {15 Aug.) 

Prussian columns are marching beyond Marly and d'Augny to- 
wards the Moselle at Jouy and Corny. 



Telegram. Signal Post, Metz Cathedral. 

3:50 P.M. {15 Aug.) 

No artillery firing heard. 

Hostile troops passing in rear of Augny, moving towards our 
right. A long column is moving along the road beyond Coin-sur- 
Seille, towards the upper Moselle. 



-663- 



French Orders and Messages 

Telegram. Signal Post, Metz Cathedral. 

Jf-.SO P.M. (15 Aug.) 

A column is marching away from us on the Metz; Nomeny road 
beyond Verny. The movement is apparently towards Pont-a-Mous- 
son. Should not the bridges be destroyed? 

A column, with cavalry at a trot at its head, is marching from 
Luppy to Lechy and beyond on a road not shown on our map leading 
towards Pont-a-Mousson. 



Telegram. Signal Post, Metz Cathedral. 

5:20 P. M. (15 Aug.) 

The Ars bridge has just been blown up. 

The Prussian rear guard appears to be on the road from Col- 
ligny to Domangeville bridge .towards Marsilly. The entire army 
is making a flank march towards Pont-a-Mousson. The advance 
guard is approaching that town. 



Telegram. Signal Post, Metz Cathedral. 

6:JfO P.M. (15 Aug.) 

Two hostile columns are marching away from us on the Pontoy; 
Basse-Beux road and are disappearing in rear of the telegraph hill; 
a third column is ascending Mecleuves hill, taking the Strasbourg 
road. Are these the troops which yesterday attacked the Mercy 
position ? 



Telegram. Queuleu, 6 :UU P.M., 15 August. 

I have been watching for an hour through my field glasses an 
enormous body of Prussian troops ascending the Mecleuves hill on 
the left of the road: cavalry is marching on the right of the road. 
They are going in the direction of Nancy 

Commanding Officer. 



—664- 



EXTRACT FROM 

BATTLES AROUND METZ 

The Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and 

Saint Privat August I 7th and 

18th, 1870 

ACCORDING TO THE 

FRENCH GENERAL STAFF ACCOUNT 

DISCUSSED BY 

E. VON SCHMID, 

Colonel, Reserve List, Wurttemberg Army 



(This Is Part 7 of "Truth and Falsity of the French General Staff 

Account") 



Leipzig, 1907 



Translated by 

Harry Bell, 
Army Service Schools, July 1915. 



The French Army the Morning of August 1 8 

Even the day after the battle* Marshal Bazaine did not 
have any reliable information of the enemy ; he believed that 
in that battle he was opposed by the combined armies under 
Prince Frederick Charles and General von Steinmetz and 
that the King of Prussia had arrived with an additional 
100,000 men in the vicinity of Pange and that he had made 
his headquarters in the Chateau at Aubigny, 

From the reports and information received it was 
believed that the Second Army under General Steinmetz 
( ! ! ) had crossed the Mosel at Ars and that the enemy 
occupied the road to Verdun. The morning of August 17th 
the War Minister had telegraphed that a large corps of 
troops were at Apremont and that 5000 cavalry with some 
infantry and artillery had reached St. Mihiel. 

On the other hand, on August 17th the observation 
posts on the exterior forts Queuleu and St. Quentin and 
that on the Cathedral, reported that throughout the day 
large columns of troops were marching from the vicinity 
of Marly, Augny and Verny towards the Mosel and were 
crossing that stream. Marshal Canrobert reported that 
according to the statements of inhabitants 10,000 men had 
arrived in Gorze the evening of the 17th and that an attack 
would undoubtedly be made the next morning. 

It was reported erroneously by the 3d Corps, Leboeuf, 
that Gravelotte was occupied by the Germans and that 
these were throwing up defensive works there. 

All these messages, contradicting each other in part, 
had a most unfavorable influence on the Marshal, for al- 
ready now, on the 17th of August, he had come to a con- 
clusion to draw back to a position still closer to the walls 
of Metz. 

He had directed Colonel Lewal of the general staff 
to locate a position farther to the rear together with the 



*This refers to the battle on August 16th. 

—667— 



Battles Around Metz 

assistant chief of staff of the army, and in the forenoon of 
the 18th of August these two staff officers rode over the 
position until the thunder of cannon coming from Verne- 
ville brought the reconnaissance to an end. 

On August 18th, very early in the morning, Marshal 
Bazaine received a report from Marshal Leboeuf that 
hostile troops were marching on Doncourt, but merely 
replied to that message: "that he should hold himself in 
his strong position." 

When towards 9 o'clock in the morning the Marshal 
was busy with his chief of staff, Jarras, in considering 
recommendations for promotion, he received the report of 
the march of larger bodies of troops on St. Marcel and of 
the appearance of fresh columns from the woods of St. 
Arnould. Thereupon the Marshal merely remarked that 
his position was completely secured against any attack, that 
no serious attack was to he feafed and that such an attack 
could not succeed in any case. The Marshal expressed this 
opinion to all officers sent to him in the course of the fore- 
noon. 

To go somewhat deeper into the matter, the Marshal's 
intentions can be seen in an order he sent to Marshal Can- 
robert at about 10 o'clock. This order deserves to be pub- 
lished, because it best shows how deficient the Marshal was 
in the qualities that go to make a leader of troops. The 
orders read (extract) : 

"Marshal Leboeuf reports to me that strong hostile forces 
are marching against his position. However this may be, you 
should arrange yourself firmly in your position and maintain 
good connection with the riglit wing of the 4th Corps. The 
troops should camp in two lines and on as a narrow a front as 
possible. 

"If the enemy appears to be deploying in your front and 
appears also to make a more serious attack on St. Privat, you 
should take all necessary security measures so as to hold your 
position until the entire right wing of the army can execute, if 
necessary, a change of front to occupy the positions situated 
farther in rear, which are at the present moment being recon- 
noitered. 

"I do not like to be forced by the enemy to take that step; 
but if the movement is going to be made it will be done for the 
purpose of facilitating subsistence matters, to get more water 
for the horses, and to give the troops an opportunity to wash 
themselves. 

—668— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

"Utilize the momentary rest pause to bring up everything 
you still need. 

"I am told that the meat was rejected yesterday because 
it smelled; however, this is no time to be stingy and the supply 
department undoubtedly could procure fresh meat by butchering. 

"I sent to you the Brigade of Bruchard — Mounted Chas- 
seurs — which will remain with you until another cavalry division 
can be formed." 

The French General Staff says the following about 
these orders : 

"These orders, if nothing else, show clearly why the battle 
had to be lost. The carelessness of the Marshal, his indifference 
to the reports coming in, the inexplicable task he set his right 
wing corps and the already expressed intention of falling back 
with the entire army, sufficiently explain the conduct of the 
commander-in-chief on this unfortunate day." 

If we do not consider at all the incorrect or faulty 
composition of these orders, it still appears to us inexplicable 
for the Marshal to order the retreat of a part of his army 
of 150,000 men on the flimsy pretext of giving the soldiers 
an opportunity to wash themselves. Such a reason for re- 
treating probably was never before stated in military his- 
tory. 

The general conduct of the Marshal on this day was 
entirely inexplicable, for even when the cannon commenced 
to thunder he remained tranquilly in his quarters and when 
General Jarras caused the horses to be saddled and urged 
the Marshal to start, the latter requested him, his chief of 
staff, to put his best efforts in getting ready the promotion 
lists, on which the army was waiting. Thus the chief of 
staff was chained to his office at the very commencement of 
one of the biggest battles and when the Marshal finally — 
after 2 o'clock — mounted his horse— not to ride to the bat- 
tlefield, but to exterior fort Queuleu — and when the chief 
of staff made arrangements to accompany him, he said that 
he needed neither the chief of staff nor his staff and that 
the clerical work should be continued. 

This conduct of the Marshal is the more inexplicable, 
as toward 2 p.m. hundreds of guns were in action, for which 
reason alone the Marshal could not be in any doubt as to 
the seriousness of the battle. 

—669— 



Battles Around Metz 

While French headquarters thus performed its usual 
routine work the morning of the battle, as if in the midst 
of peace, the greatest excitement reigned among the troops 
and entire divisions worked like ants to fortify their posi- 
tions. 

As mentioned above the army corps had reached their 
positions the evening of August 17th, which they main- 
tained on the 18th with the utmost tenacity throughout the 
bloody, heavy battle. The night of August 17-18th had 
been a very restless one, as probably half the army was 
under arms since one o'clock because of false alarms. 

Concerning this false alarm. Lieutenant Colonel Rous- 
set writes in his History of the 4th Army Corps : 

"Because the 6th Corps had to march from Verneville to 
St. Privat and the 4th Corps from Doncourt to Amanvillers 
crossings and stoppages in the march resulted, and the troops 
reached their bivouac places only late at night. 

"When thereafter Cissey's Division arrived at the Jeru- 
salem farm it had to be drawn back to Amanvillers because 
troops of the 6th Corps arrived at St. Privat. 

"A new position was taken up in the dark and outposts 
placed out on the east while a few cavalry regiments went into 
a bivouac facing Metz and thus offered their rear to the enemy. 

"Those very important points for the defense like St. Marie- 
aiix-Chenes, St. Ail, and the woods de la Cusse and Champenois 
situated in front of the position, had not been occupied and not 
a single picket was posted west of the bivouacs. 

"Thus it happened that stragglers from the 6th Corps, 
wandering around the field, entered in the dark the tents of the 
troops of the 4th Corps and made such a noise there that every- 
one was called to arms and that that alarm spread throughout the 
entire army." 

The French General Staff has the following to say of 
the positions the different corps took the morning before 
the battle: 

In the 2d Army Corps, forming the left wing of the 
line on the "heights of Point du Jour, the advanced posts 
opened at daybreak a hot fire on the German outposts in the 
opposite woods and all troops of the corps stood under arms 
very early in the morning. Hostile troops had been observed 
the evening before south of Gravelotte and in the ravine 
running to Ars, and in the morning it was believed that 
Germans could be observed intrenching at Gravelotte. From 



-670- 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

this General Frossard concluded that an attack was immi- 
nent and issued orders to the divisions to reinforce their 
positions as much as possible. 

On both sides of the 3d Jager Battalion, defending 
the farm of Point du Jour were four batteries — 5th, 6th 
and 12th of the 5th and 11th of the 5th Regiment — were in 
position on both sides of Point du Jour which was held and 
prepared for defense by the 3d Chasseur Battalion; 3 bat- 
teries of the 2d Infantry Division — 7th, 8th and 9th of the 
5th Regiment — were on the Roman road on Hill 346; and 
the 10th Battery of the 5th and 7th of the 2d Regiment 
stood on Hills 334 and 332. The batteries on the Roman 
roael and on Hills 334 and 332 had a clear field of fire on 
the forest de Vaux and towards Rozerieulles and Jussy. 

These nine batteries did not go into position under 
cover as the French account expressly states, so that they 
must have been seen by the enemy ; but they stood, however, 
in complete readiness for action in the emplacements pro- 
vided by the engineers, while 4 additional batteries were 
in reserve about 400 meters behind Point du Jour. 

Fourteen battalions deployed while the batteries went 
into position. Commencing at 10 A.M. seven battalions — 
1st of the 32d Regiment, 3d Chasseur Battalion, 1st and 2d 
of the- 55th, 1st of the 76th and 1st and 2d of the 77th Regi- 
ment — occupied the skirmish trenches and ditches along- 
side the road prepared for defense, running from the bend 
in the road east of St. Hubert farm to beyond the large 
quarry of Point du Jour, while the other battalions of those 
regiments were in the second line a few hundred meters 
behind the firing line. The other regiments of the 2d Corps 
stood under arms on their bivouac places. 

On the extreme left wing the Brigade of Lapasset oc- 
cupied the nose of the hill facing Rozerieulles with five 
battalions — 84th Regiment and 2d Battalion, 97th Regi- 
ment — ^the 3d Battalion of the latter regiment being at St. 
Ruffine. 

In rear of the left wing of the 2d Corps three cavalry 
divisions — 13 regiments — stood entirely inactive in the 

—671— 



Battles Around Metz 

ravine at Longeau; they merely sent out a few patrols 
towards Jussy and St. RufRne ; but these patrols did not go 
very far ahead. 

Thus, before any attack took place, the entire 2d Army 
Corps was in readiness to meet any attack ; the commanding 
general, Fossard, had proceeded to the hill at Point du 
Jour at about 11 a.m., observing from there the approach 
of the Vllth Corps. 

The 3d Corps was in close connection with the right 
wing of the 2d Corps, and had occupied the battle positions 
by 10 A.M. In that corps the cavalry showed a little more 
activity ; the cavalry division had struck their tents as early 
as five o'clock and was ready to march off. One platoon of 
each regiment was sent out for reconnaissance, and these 
platoons reported by 8 o'clock that strong hostile masses 
were marching on St. Marcel and that columns were march- 
ing from the St. Arnould forest to the heights west of 
Rezonville. Other patrols reported hostile columns on the 
march to Verneville and along the Gravelotte road to 
Malmaison, and finally large masses were seen behind 
Gravelotte from the hills near the Moscou and Leipzig 
farms. 

Even before these reports of the cavalry reached corps 
headquarters oh the hill near the "Arbre mort," that head- 
quarters had seen columns marching in the direction of 
Doncourt and even the officers in front of them could be 
clearly distinguished, as stated in the French account. Mar- 
shal Leboeuf , as stated above, reported the approach of the 
enemy to army headquarters, and had sent at the same 
time orders to the divisions to occupy the woods in front 
of their lines and to entrench themselves as well as possible. 

Under the supervision of General of Engineers Vialla 
the Moscou, Liepzig and La Folie farm buildings were pre- 
pared for defense and numerous strong battery emplace- 
ments were constructed and trenches dug along the entire 
front. 

While these reinforcements were under way, the 
troop vehicles and ammunition carts had been sent back to 

—672— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

bring up provisions and ammunition, and these vehicles 
were mistaken for marching columns of troops by patrols, 
and caused a belief that the army was retreating. 

The troops of the 3d Corps occupied their positions at 
about 10 A.M. ; in close connection with the right wing of 
the 2d Corps at the great bend in the road, two battalions 
of the 4th Division — 1st of the 80th and 1st of the 85th 
Regiment — occupied the trenches; the 2d Battalion, 85th 
Regiment, was sent to St. Hubert farm which had been pre- 
pared for defense ; the other three battalions of these regi- 
ments being in the second line. 

The fortified Moscou farm was occupied by the 3d 
Battalion, 44th Regiment, and the 2d Battalion, 60th Regi- 
ment; the trenches in front of those farm buildings were 
occupied by three battalions — 1st and 2d, 59th and 1st, 44th 
Regiment — while three additional battalions — 1st Chasseurs, 
1st of the 60th and 2d of the 44th Regiment — were on the 
Roman road in second line while the 3d Battalion, 60th 
Regiment, was sent into the woods in front of the St. Hu- 
bert farm building. 

The three batteries of the 4th Division — 8th, 9th and 
10th of the 11th Regiment — were in position between Mos- 
cou and the main road, three additional batteries — 5th, 
6th and 7th of the 11th Regiment — north of Moscou — and 
thus the entire 4th Division and two battalions of the 59th 
Regiment of the 3d Division were deployed for battle close 
to the Moscou farm building. 

West and southwest of the "Arbre mort" (dead tree) 
the 3d division Metman had deployed two battalions — 1st 
of the 7th and 1st of the 29th Regiment — in the trenches : 
behind them in second line 6 battalions — 2d and 3d of the 
7th, 3d of the 29th and the 71st Regiment. 

The 7th Chasseur Battalion was sent to the western 
edge of the Forest of Genivaux and occupied the road lead- 
ing to Malmaison. The 2d Battalion, 29th Regiment, and 
three companies of the 71st Regiment were sent into those 
woods. 

—673— 



Battles Around Metz 

The 2d Division, Nayral, had struck camp at 9 A.M. 
and occupied its combat positions. Two battalions of the 
19th Regiment occupied the trenches south of the Leipzig 
farm building, that farm building itself being occupied by 
two companies of the 69th and 3 companies of the 19th 
Regiment, while one and two-third battalions of the 69th 
Regiment occupied the western edge of the woods at Leip- 
zig. 

The remaining battalions of the division — 15th Chas- 
seurs, 3d of the 19th Regiment and the 41st Regiment — 
were in second line behind the hill and the 3d Battalion, 
69th Regiment, was also sent into the Genivaux forest. 

The three batteries of the division — 9th, 11th and 12th 
of the 4th Regiment — ^went into position between Leipzig 
and the "Arbre mort." 

In the 1st Division, Montaudon, the entire infantry was 
under arms by 10 o'clock, one brigade occupying La Folie, 
the other the Genivaux forest. 

La Folie was occupied by three companies of the 51st 
Regiment, while Hill 343 northwest thereof was occupied 
by two battalions of that regiment and two batteries — 6th 
and 8th of the 4th Regiment — the 18 Chasseur Battalion 
and the 62 Regiment stood south of the buildings in reserve. 

The de la Charmoise woods, southwest of La Folie, were 
occupied by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 95th Regiment, and 
the 2d Battalion, 81st Regiment, facing the I'Envie farm 
building. The other two battalions of the 81st Regiment 
remained as reserve at the south corner of the de la Char- 
moise woods. The 3d Battalion of the 95th Regiment oc- 
cupied the northeastern corner of the Genivaux forest oppo- 
site the Chantrenne farm and the three battalions of the 
90th Regiment were deployed within the forest, facing Mal- 
maison. 

The 1st Battalion, 69th Regiment, also went from Leip- 
zig into the Genivaux forest, had crossed the Chantrenne 
brook and occupied the northern edge of the woods opposite 
Verneville, but very soon thereafter fell back again. 



-674- 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

A little in rear of the Leipzig farm were six batteries 
of the corps artillery in position, as well as four regiments 
of the cavalry division of the 3d Corps. 

Thus, the 3d Corps was deployed on a line 3.5 kilometers 
long from La Folie to the large bend in the road, and had 
but few troops in reserve. 

When Marshal Leboeuf reported the approach of the 
enemy to Marshal Bazaine, the latter informed the com- 
manding general of the Guard that strong masses were 
marching against the positions of the 2d and 3d Corps and 
that a serious battle might be expected. He requested Gen- 
eral Bourbaki to place one Guard brigade on the ridge — 
Hill 313 — projecting towards St. Germain, as a reserve, and 
so two Voltigeur regiments arrived there at about 11 o'clock 
with the remarkable orders from General Bourbaki that 
they should take orders from no one except himself or Gen- 
eral Devigny, the division commander. 

Thus, before 11" o'clock seven divisions, 4 cavalry divi- 
sions, and 34 batteries were on the line from La Folie to 
Point du Jour, in a position which was difficult to approach 
on the left because of the steep slopes and natural obstacles 
and which was almost impregnable in the center because 
of artificial works. 

While the 2d and 3d Corps had entrenched their posi- 
tions exceedingly well, no fortification works of any kind 
were undertaken by the 4th Corps camping on both sides 
of Amanvillers. All troop vehicles and ammunition wagons 
had left at 7 A.M. to refill at Metz. No outposts had been 
placed in front and the cavalry division remained inactive 
behind Amanvillers, sending merely a few patrols towards 
Verneville and a hussar squadron toward Gravelotte. To- 
wards 9 A.M. General Ladmirault received copies of the re- 
ports which had reached the 3d Corps; some individual 
soldiers, looking on their own hook for provisions in Verne- 
ville, reported the approach of hostile detachments. A 
camp picket, posted west of the Montigny farm building 
also reported hostile detachments at Verneville, and, finally, 
large clouds of dust were perceived opposite St. Vincent 

—675— 



Battles Around Metz 

and in the direction of Malmaison — Verneville. In spite of 
these reports and observations General Ladmirault took nj 
special measures, he did not want to interfere with the rest 
of the troops, and merely sent word to the division com- 
manders to be prepared for an attack, but not to inform the 
troops so as to avoid any and every excitement among them. 

When General Ladmirault received additional infor- 
mation from Marshal Bazaine between 10 and 11 o'clock, 
together with the request to have the forest roads leading 
to the rear in direction of Norroy reconnoitered, he still 
did not believe that the situation was serious — however he 
ordered the divisions to throw up defensive works. But 
nothing was done in that line even then; the infantry did 
not dig trenches, and only the corps artillery hitched up ; 
all other troops remained tranquilly in their bivouacs so 
that — as stated in the French. account — they were actually 
taken by surprise in their unprepared position just when 
the noon roll was called. 

Shortly before the opening of the battle the engineer 
companies started to prepare Amanvillers and Montigny 
for defense. 

In the 6th Corps also no defensive measures were ar- 
ranged for because there were no entrenching tools avail- 
able and because no one had thought of procuring them 
from the surrounding villages. 

That old war-horse. Marshal Canrobert, occupied him- 
self during the morning of the battle with minor details; 
he had issued a lengthy order in which division comman- 
ders were requested to at once submit casualty lists cover- 
ing the 16th of August, as well as recommendations for 
promotion; recommendations for promotion to general offi- 
cer, for award of medals, etc. At the same time it was 
ordered that lists of lost camp utensils, lost knapsacks and 
boots be sent in, and that arms should be cleaned ; the orders 
closed with directions to entrench as well as practicable. 
But nothing was done in spite of these orders, and the most 
important portion of the entire position remained devoid 
of artificial strengthening. 

—676— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

The evening before Marshal Canrobert had received 
two regiments of mounted Chasseurs as reinforcement and 
he issued orders at 5 o'clock in the morning to General du 
Barail to send out patrols ; these patrols returned very soon 
without any news. Between 7 and 8 o'clock patrols — con- 
sisting of one corporal and four troopers each — were sent 
into the country in front of St. Privat and officers' patrols 
towards Montois, Auboue and St. Ail. Finally, after 9 
o'clock, three squadrons of Chasseurs were sent towards 
Auboue which discovered hostile troops in the valley of the 
Orne brook as well as at Moineville and Valleroy and finallj 
also at Batailly — they discovered the approach of the Sax- 
ons. 

These patrols returned to St. Privat before 11 o'clock, 
''satisfied with having obtained this information," and so 
touch with the enemy was again lost. 

But General du Barail had learned in the morning 
from the chaplain of the division, who had accompanied 
wounded to Gorze, that the entire hostile army was ap- 
proaching and that a battle was imminent. A patrol of 
Chasseurs d'Afrique had arrived from Chalons with a re- 
port from General Margueritte — who had accompanied the 
Emperor with two squadrons — stating that he would re- 
main with both squadrons in Chalons. The arrival of this 
patrol proved that the road to Chalons was free of the 
enemy. 

The troops of the 6th Corps remained in their camps 
ready to start and only a few minor shiftings of troops took 
place. At 11 o'clock Marshal Canrobert received definite 
information that the Saxons were coming up the valley of 
the Orne; he knew that they had occupied Moineville and 
that patrols had been pushed out as far as St. Marie and 
that strong bodies with artillery were marching on Batilly. 
He had to expect that the enemy would appear at any mo- 
ment in front of his position, but nevertheless his troops 
were no more ready than those of the 4th Corps. No out- 
posts had been pushed out and there were merely a few 
interior guards posted ; the main position was not prepared 

—677— 



Battles Around Metz 

for defense and could be plainly seen by the hostile patrols 
on the hills opposite Roncourt and St. Privat. The troop 
vehicles and ammunition wagons had been started at 8 
o'clock for Plappeville under guard of a Hussar squadron. 

No changes occurred in the Guard Corps during the 
forenoon except that two Voltigeur regiments were sent 
to the 3d Corps; the troops remained quietly in their 
bivouacs on the heights of Plappeville. 

The Guard Corps had sent a few patrols towards Ars 
in the valley of the Mosel, which there encountered German 
outposts, but they did not discover anything new besides 
that. Marshal Bazaine subsequently sent to the Guard 
the remarkable orders not to send out any further patrols, 
as that was the duty of the cavalry of the line. General 
Bourbaki at the same time was requested to secure the road 
from Moulins to Longeau, so that ammunition trains for 
the 2d and 3d Corps would not be interfered with by hos- 
tile raiders. 

Thus, five French corps, of 188 battalions and 79 bat- 
teries, of a total strength of 167,600 men were ready for 
defense before noon. 

With the occupation of that position the fate of the 
French army was sealed, for now the necessary time had 
been given the Germans to block, with greatly superior 
force, the retreat of the French Army to Chalons. 

The French General Staff Account is justified in blam- 
ing Marshal Bazaine for bringing the 6th Corps to St. 
Privat instead of to Amanvillers, which caused crossings 
of the troops and consequent long delays in the march. The 
account further blames him for having the 6th Corps 
occupy the most endangered wing, because that corps, not 
having any artillery of its own, was specially weak in that 
arm. 

However, the greatest error committed was undoubtedly 
the Marshal's placing the entire Guard Corps and three 
cavalry divisions in rear of the left wing, instead of the 
right wing or at least near the center, from where they 
could have met the envelopment through Roncourt. 

—678— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

In regard to Bazaine's measures for the retreat, Col- 
onel Rousset writes : 

"The fact that the Marshal had 140,000 men in one body execute 
this retrograde movement under the ridiculously small protection af- 
forded by only one infantry division, shows clearly that the com- 
mander-in-chief was totally lacking in the most elementary knowledge 
of tactics. Had a single army corps, or only cavalry with some artil 
lery encountered this mixed up mass of troops, columns and vehicles, 
enormous confusion undoubtedly would have resulted, the army 
would have been forced to halt and to fight under the worst kind of 
conditions." 

And at another place he writes with full justification : 

"On August 17th Bazaine should have continued the march very 
early and without interruption, for though Prince Frederick Charles 
had brought up the principal part of the IXth Corps the evening of 
the 16th and the Vllth and Vlllth Corps the morning of the 18th, 
the Germans could not think of renewing the attack immediately in 
view of the exhaustion of the troops of the Illd Corps and other 
troops." 

The trains should have been sent back during the 
night or else destroyed, as the country was rich enough in 
supplies to sustain the army passing through for a few 
days. The 4th Corps completely assembled and plentifully 
supplied with ammunition, should have covered the retreat, 
the 2d Corps, Guard and 6th Corps could have marched 
across country if necessary and could have reached by Moine- 
ville and Auboue the Orne sector, while the 3d Corps 
marched from St. Marcel to Doncourt and Hatrize. 

Making a march of only 20 kilometers the entire army 
could have reached the strong position behind the 40 to 50 
meters broad Orne, which then if the bridges were de- 
stroyed, would have formed a strong obstacle. 

Once behind the Orne, Bazaine would have had no cause 
to fear anything, he could have pei^mitted the enemy to 
run his head against the position and then attack him in 
turn. If the army were not attacked on the Orne, it could 
resume the retreat on the morning of the 18th and have 
reached that same evening a strong position on the Meuse, 
where good resistance could have been offered and reinforce- 
ments awaited. 

The French General Staff Account concludes the de- 
scription of the French position with the little complimen- 

—679— 



Battles Around Metz 

tary judgment which General Jarras passed on Marshal 
Bazaine. The former stated: 

"The Marshal was absolutely devoid of firmness of character^ 
his words and deeds did not coincide; what he praised today he 
would blame tomorrow and vice versa; and these contradictory ac- 
tions were quite natural with him. He was unscrupulous. The 
Marshal was incapacitated by his ignorance, faulty military educa- 
tion and weakness of character from saving the Army of the 
Rhine in the perilous position in which it found itself when he as- 
sumed supreme command. He was mainly deficient in one character- 
istic, indispensable in difficult situations, and that is the energy to 
order things; he could not say I WILL, and he could at no time issue 
a definite order. In addition he felt that his abilities and power were 
unequal to the situation and events and he succumbed to this depress- 
ing truth." 

The account of the enormous battle is divided in the 
French General Staff Account into three main chapters, i. e., 

1. The combat at Amanvillers between the Prussian IXth 
Corps and the French 4th Corps; 

2. The combat at Gravelotte between the Prussian Vllth, 
Vlllth and lid Corps and the French 2d and 3d Corps; 

3. The combat at St. Privat between the Xllth (Saxon) and 
Prussian Guard Corps and the French 6th Corps. 

The French General Staff Account, which has taken 
the events on the German side mainly from the German 
General Staff Account and the works of the German mil- 
itary writers Hoenig and Kunz, describes the fights on the 
different points of the battlefield, not as whole, but sub- 
divided into sections according to definite hours, which di- 
visions we will adhere to also. 



Deployment of the French 4th Corps 

Already before noon the cavalry videttes sent out by 
the 4th Corps come galloping back into camp, reporting the 
approach of hostile columns from Verneville. The few in- 
fantry outposts soon after reported the same, soon after 
the first cannon shot was fired. By that time the infantry 
of Grenier's Division had just assembled for the noon roll- 
call and stood in rear of the line of stacked arms. The 
general, completely taken by surprise by the enemy attack- 
ing his unprepared position, at once had his batteries go into 

—680— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

position and had his infantry advance from its camps, so as 
to give the artillery a chance to sweep at least the slopes of 
the L'Envie and Champenois farms. 

Even before the infantry was deployed, all batteries of 
the 4th Corps were in position. Six batteries of the corps 
artillery, which had stood with teams hitched up in the 
camp since early morning, were the first to be in position in 
the ridge immediately west of Montigny; five other bat- 
teries went into position to the right of the former on the 
ridge 327 — 331 on the La Folic road. On the left wing 
of this long artillery line and south of the La Folie road 
the 6th and 8th Batteries, 4th Regiment, of Montaudon's 
Division of the 3d Corps, had gone into position, covered 
by two battalions of. the 51st Regiment in trenches, the 3d 
Battalion of that regiment holding the La Folie farm build- 
ing. On the extreme right wing the 5th, 9th and 12th Bat- 
teries of the 15th Regiment of Cissey's Division had gone 
into position north of the railroad on Hill 323, covered by 
the 20th Chasseur Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 73d Regi- 
ment, the latter having dense skirmish lines on both sides 
of the railroad. 

All these batteries fired first on the infantry coming out 
of Verneville and the few companies in the La Cusse woods, 
there they took up a duel with the Prussian batteries and, 
though the French batteries were instructed to keep up only 
a slow fire, a heavy artillery battle ensued, lasting for hours. 

Shortly after 1 o'clock the nine Prussian batteries were 
opposed by 16 French, which soon thereafter were rein- 
forced by four additional batteries of the 3d Corps going 
into position on the left wing of the long artillery line. 
(These were the 7th and 10th of the 4th and 3d and 4th 
Horse Batteries of the 17th Regiment.) 

While the batteries went into position and opened the 
battle, the French infantry also went to its positions. 

The Division of Grenier occupied the road from La 
Folie to St. Ail running across ridge 343 — 331 and which 
was lined with poplars. On the right wing the 5th Chas- 
seur Battalion occupied the defile and served at the same 

—681— 



Battles Around Metz 

time as artillery guard; this battalion opened a long con- 
tinued fire fight with hostile detachments in the La Cusse 
woods. To the left of the Chasseurs and south of the road 
the 13th and 43d Regiments of Bellecourt's Brigade had 
advanced some 400 meters beyond their camps, had de- 
ployed on one line and had occupied the road with strong 
skirmish lines. To the left of this brigade Pradier's Bri- 
gade (64th and 98th Regiments) deployed. The 64th Regi- 
ment had advanced somewhat beyond the road and had sent 
two companies to Knoll 332, from where these companies 
effectively fired on the Prussian batteries going into position. 
To the left of that regiment the 1st and 2d Battalions, 98th 
Regiment deployed in a dense skirmish line, the 3d Battal- 
ion at the Chateau of Montigny. 



The Action Between the IXth Corps and Grenier's 
Division up to 2:00 p.m. 

The situation of the Prussian batteries soon became 
very difficult as they received an exceedingly hot fire from 
the superior French Artillery and from numerous infantry 
battalions, and they soon had great losses. 

The five batteries of the French right wing on ridge 
324 — 331 and the chasseur companies there fired on the left 
flank batteries of the Prussian position. In a short time 
the 4th Heavy Battery, receiving the machine gun fire of 
the 8th Battery, 1st Regiment, at 800 meters range, lost 3 
officers, 45 men and all horses except eight, and then a dense 
skirmish line of the 3d Battalion, 13th Regiment, started 
for that battery. Only with great difficulty did the wounded 
battery commander succeed in bringing back two pieces be- 
behind the La Cusse woods, the other pieces were captured 
by a platoon of the 3d Company, 13th Regiment, under Lieu- 
tenant Parent. This French officer requested General 
Bellecourt to send him teams to bring the guns away, but 
as the battery, charged with complying with that request 
(the 9th, of the 8th Regiment) did not send sufficient horses. 



—682- 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

only two of the guns could be taken to the rear, whereupon 
the French infantry returned to its original position. 

In order to relieve the endangered artillery, the 1st 
Company, 84th Regiment, advanced from the southeast 
corner of the La Cusse woods to a depression in front of the 
woods; it however, was so rapidly fired on by three bat- 
talions of the 73d Regiment and the 5th Chasseur Battalion 
that it had to retreat into the woods again, being received 
by the 3d Company, Though General Bellecourt did not 
understand, as the French account states, how to take ad- 
vantage of this evident sign of weakness of the enemy, the 
situation of the Prussian batteries was nevertheless a very 
precarious one. 

The 2d Horse Battery as well as the 3d and 4th Light 
Batteries had heavy losses and only the batteries on the 
right wing did not suffer too much; still, towards 2 p.m. the 
Prussian batteries were hardly able to continue the fight 
as the bringing up of the ammunition wagons was extremely 
difficult because of the nature of the ground. 

But in spite of all this the batteries of the 18th Division 
gained one advantage over the French batteries, for the 6th 
and 8th Battery, 4th Regiment, of Montaudon's Division 
on Knoll 343 had fired away almost all their ammunition, 
the breechlocks of the machine guns no longer worked 
smoothly, and so these batteries went back to behind La 
Folie. 

Hov/ever, their places were immediately taken by the 
7th and 10th Battery, 4th Regiment, of the 3d Corps, while 
to the right of them the 3d and 4th Battery, 17th Regiment, 
of the 3d Corps went into position at the gallop. Thus there 
were shortly after 2 p.m. fifteen batteries of the 4th and 3d 
Corps in action between La Folie and Amanvillers against 
nine Prussian batteries, but there was among the French 
batteries an absence of united leadership, each battery com- 
mander acted as he saw fit, picked his target as it suited 
him, and some of the batteries fired on targets offered by 
chance, such as very small infantry detachments. 

While the French batteries, though twice the number 
of the German batteries, had not yet succeeded in silencing 

—683— 



Battles Around Metz 

the latter, the infantry regiments of Grenier's Division 
opened fire on them also. Still the French infantry suf- 
fered under the fire of the Prussian guns, and even before 
2 P.M. the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 64th Regiment, having 
fired away their ammunition, were drawn back to behind the 
park at Montigny. 

Now General Pradier caused the 3d Battalion of the 
98th Regiment, which up to then had been in reserve at 
Montigny to advance, and it prolonged the left wing of its 
regiment which extended a little beyond the road and also 
had suffered losses by the Prussian artillery fire. 

Between one and two o'clock, as already mentioned, 
Lorencez's Division of the 4th Corps deployed in rear of 
Grenier's " Division. Thereafter General Ladmirault had 
the 33d Regiment deploy on both sides of the Montigny 
park with orders to "hold itself there at all costs during the 
entire battle." On Knoll 331 the 2d Chasseur Battalion and 
the 1st Battalion, 54th Regiment, prolonged the skirmish line 
of the 5th Chasseur Battalion, while the 3d Battalion, 54th 
Regiment, took position behind the 13th Regiment and the 
2d Battalion, 54th Regiment, at the west entrance of Aman- 
villers. 

The 65th Regiment and two battalions of the 15th 
Regiment — the latter having been called up from St. Vincent 
— deployed in one line between Montigny and Amanvillera 
and thus formed a second line for Grenier's Division. 

The machine gun battery — 9th of the 1st Regiment — of 
Grenier's Division went into position on the road from 
Amanvillers to Habonville, and thus two complete infantry 
divisions were deployed before two o'clock between Montigny 
and the railroad with Cissey's Division to the right of the 
railroad. The entire 4th Corps and the 1st Division of the 
3d consequently were deployed against the few troops of 
the IXth Corps and in action with them. 



—684— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

The French Batteries Fall Back at 4 p.m. 

Between 4 and 4:30 p.m. nearly all French batteries, 
which up to then had been in action against the IXth Corps, 
departed. Concerning this the French account says : 

"The 5th Battery, 4th Regiment on Hill 343 fell back towards 
4 o'clock to behind the La Folie farm building though it had lost 
but nine men and 12 horses. The machine gun battery (8th of the 
4th Regiment), which was under better cover, held out a little 
longer; it lost 11 men and 13 horses, and fell back because the 
breech blocks of the machine guns refused to work longer. 

"On the right the 7th and 10th Batteries of the 4th Regiment 
were again in position after having replenished their ammunition. 
But when the batteries of the Prussian Hid Corps went into 
position, they also went back to the woods. 

"Several batteries at Montigny were forced to drive off. The 
5th Horse Battery of the 17th Regiment had enormous losses, 
though the soft ground decreased the effect of the hostile shells. 
The batteries at Verneville and the horse batteries on the left 
wing of the batteries of the 18th Division were threatened with 
annihilation and therefore fell back. The 6th Battery, 17th Regi- 
ment had suffered less, being out of the enemy's sight on account 
of the poplars along the La Folie road. But after the bat- 
teries had left Knoll 343 and when the batteries had only 50 to 
60 shells left after having fired more than 1000 rounds, they 
fell back to behind the park of Montigny, its place being taken by 
the 18th Battery of the 4th Regiment, coming up again. The 10th 
Battery, 1st Regiment, which had gone into position close to 
Montigny on the road, had difficulty in seeing the Prussian bat- 
teries because of the poplars in front. It fired at random and 
expended much ammunition with but negative results. It drove 
off at. 4 P.M. to replenish it's ammunition. 

"Shortly thereafter the 9th Battery, 88th Regiment, having 
replenished its ammunition, again went into position at Montigny, 
but it had again fired away its ammunition after half an hour's 
firing and fell back to the railroad station at Amanvillers. 

"The 11th and 12th Batteries, 1st Regiment, had been in 
action since noon; by 2 P.M. they had suffered material loss, but 
they held their position. After a part of the Prussian batteries 
had fallen back, the 11th Battery fired on hostile infantry in the 
La Cusse woods; but when the batteries of the Prussian Illd Corps 
appeared, the battery at once fired on these, but was forced to 
cease its fire after fifteen minutes, as no observation was possible. 
Toward 4:30 P.M. General of Artillery Lafaille directed the two 
batteries to remain in their position for the present but not to 
fire until further orders. From 4:30 P.M. on only 4 batteries 
of the 12 remained in position on the heights of Montigny, eight 
having driven off. 

"On the right wing of the 4th Corps the situation of the 
batteries was as bad — "disastrous." The Hessian batteries, after 
having driven off the 8 batteries of Cissey's Division directed 
their fire on the 6 batteries on Hills 331 to 327. Shortly after 
4:30 P.M. the 6th Battery, 8th Regiment, departed, having fired 
off all its ammunition and having lost 16 men and 17 horses. The 
machine gun battery (8th of the 1st Regiment) had fired on the 

—685— 



Battles Around Metz 

left wing of the Prussian artillery until that artillery drove off 
and then directed its fire on the infantry in the woods. When 
the batteries of the lid Corps appeared, they fired on them, 
but with little effect as the range was 2500 meters. The bat- 
teries fell back to Amanvillers at about 4 P.M. 

"The 9th Battery, 1st Regiment, in position on the road from 
Amanvillers to Habonville, suffered much from the Hessian 
batteries; within half an hour it lost 24 men and 18 horses and 
was put out of action. One caisson exploded, and at 4:30 P.M. 
the battery went back to behind Amanvillers. 

"The three batteries of Grenier's Division — 5th, 6th and 
7th of the 1st Regiment — were soon silenced by the Hessian bat- 
teries in position behind the railroad embankment and, having 
fired away their ammunition and suffered material losses they 
fell back to behind Amanvillers. 

"Thus before 5 o'clock the French infantry was left to itself 
as the six batteries of the right wing had also fallen back to be- 
hind Amanvillers, and only four batteries remained in position at 
Montigny." 

According to this French statement, 21 Prussian bat- 
teries — nine of the IXth Corps, six Hessian and. six batter- 
ies of the Hid Corps — succeeded in forcing 19 batteries to 
abandon their positions before 5 P.M. 

The unusual bravery and stubbornness of the Prussian 
batteries is shown by a comparison of the losses, for while 
the Prussian batteries, which fell back, lost 17 officers, 187 
men and 370 horses, the 19 French batteries lost a total of 
12 officers, 218 men and 250 horses. 

Thus the Prussian IXth Corps had achieved a great 
success by five o'clock by forcing five hostile battalions and 
19 batteries to cease fighting. 



The Battle at Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes 

During the time the IXth Corps was hotly engaged in 
battle with the French 4th Corps, Prince August of Wurt- 
temberg promised good support to General Manstein by the 
entire Guard Corps. The latter, however, declared that the 
attack on St. Privat was the most necessary thing and re- 
quested for the present only one Guard brigade as support ; 
this brigade soon arrived and went into position behind the 
left wing at Anoux-la-Grange. 

Shortly after noon Prince Frederick Charles had ridden 
to Habonville and there seen that the enemy extended to St. 

—686— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Privat ; he at once gave orders to the Guard Corps to make 
an enveloping attack. 

Prince Albert of Wurttemberg, hastening ahead of his 
corps, also arrived at Habonville at 1 o'clock; he also saw 
that the enemy extended to St. Privat and intended to pre- 
pare the attack with his entire artillery but to engage his 
infantry only when the Saxon envelopment became effec- 
tive. 

Prince Frederick Charles had in the meantime received 
information that the 24th Infantry Division was advancing 
on St. Marie-aux-Chenes, the 23d Division advancing by 
Coinville and the woods between Coinville and Roncourt, 
and would attack the French right wing. 

During this time the troops had continued on the march ; 
General von Pape arrived toward 12 :45 P.M. south of Habon- 
ville with the advance guard of the 1st Guard Division and, 
while the infantry continued the march on St. Ail, he placed 
his batteries in position for the present, at one o'clock, south 
of the railroad and the village of Habonville. But as these 
batteries achieved no material effect from there, they crossed 
the railroad cut, fenced in with wire, at the gallop and 
went into a position south of St. Ail. 

Shortly thereafter Prince August of Wurttemberg had 
five additional batteries of the corps artillery cross the rail- 
road to prolong the line of guns as far as Hill 284 south of 
St. Ail, so that now nine batteries of the Guard were in po- 
sition southwest of St. Ail, firing on the artillery of the 
French 6th Corps, though themselves receiving a hot fire 
from the 93d, 25th and 26th Regiments at 1000 meters 
range. 

To cover the Guard artillery, the 1st Battalion of the 
Guard Fusilier Regiment occupied the northeastern edge of 
Habonville, while the other three battalions of the advance 
guard continued the march on St. Ail. 

When these battalions, advancing along the ravine 
running northward, approached St. Ail, they observed what 
seemed to be strong hostile 'infantry detachments running 
towards the village from the north. The 3d Battalion of 
the Guard Fusilier Regiment succeeded however in occu- 

—687— 



Battles Around Metz 

pying in time the village of St. Ail, gaining a very impor- 
tant supporting point thereby. | 

The Deployment of the French 6th Corps 

Prior to these movements on the German side the en- 
tire French 6th Corps stood under arms, ready for battle, in 
its bivouac places. 

As early as 11 o'clock Marshal Canrobert had learned 
from his cavalry patrols with certainty that an attack was 
imminent and when the artillery commenced firing he at 
once rode along the road south of St. Privat, giving orders 
to the Division of Levassor-Sorval to advance. 

The 25th and 26th Regiment deployed in one line on 
ridge 312 — 326 — 308, behind them in second line were the 
70th and 28th Regiments, with the right flank in rear of 
Hill 333, and with the left flank 800 meters from the rail- 
road, in close touch with Cissey's Division of the 4th Corps 
and its batteries. 

The batteries of the Division — 7th and 8th of the 18th 
Regiment — brought forward by Marshal Canrobert in per- 
son, went into position on Ridge 333 — 326 and from 1 o'clock 
on fired on the four Prussian Guard batteries south of St. 
Ail as well as on the Hessian batteries and the infantry 
advancing along the railroad east of Habonville. But as 
the French batteries had hardly any effect on the hostile 
batteries at the railroad, the former moved off at 2 P.M. 
and took a new position north of St. Privat. 

When Marshal Canrobert shortly after one o'clock saw 
Prussian infantry appearing also at Habonville, he feared 
that his left wing would be pierced and now caused Tixier's 
Division to advance from its bivouacs. The 1st Brigade 
— 9th Chasseurs, 4th and 10th Infantry Regiments — de- 
ployed on one line 300 meters west of the St. Privat — Aman- 
villers road, while the 2d and 3d Battalions, 12th Regiment 
and the 100th Regiment halted in massed battalions east 
of the road, right flank at the Jerusalem farm building. 
The 1st Battalion, 12th Regiment, held the south edge of 
St. Privat. 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

At the sound of the first cannon shot the Division of La 
Font de Villers took up arms, the 1st Brigade — 75th and 91st 
Regiments — occupied the space between St. Privat and Ron- 
court, the 2d Brigade — 93d and 94th Regiments — taking 
position about 200 meters west of the first houses of St. 
Privat. 

Thus, before even a single German grenadier had 
passed St. Ail, 25 Battalions of Canrobert's Corps and 18 
battalions of Cissey's Division — 20th Chasseurs, the 1st, 
6th, 57th and 73d Regiments — were deployed between the 
Ste. Marie — St. Privat road and the railroad. There was 
in addition a full cavalry division at the Amanvillers rail- 
road station, but the majority of these troops remained, as 
the French account expressly states, inactive for hours, 
without firing a single shot. 

While the right wing of Marshal Canrobert's force was 
threatened with envelopment, he feared more for his left 
wing and employed only one infantry division north of the 
main road, and a single infantry regiment in addition, which 
was to hold the advance position at Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes. 

When the enemy appeared at Habonville, Marshal Can- 
robert decided shortly after one o'clock to push his right 
wing forward to meet any envelopment. He therefore is- 
sued orders to General Colin to occupy Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes 
with one regiment and with his other regiment block the 
space between the road and Levassor's Division. 

The other brigade, Sonnay, occupied Roncourt with the 
1st Battalion, 75th Regiment, and then deployed the other 
battalions of the 75th and 91st Regiments on Hills 304 and 
296 west of the road from St. Privat to Roncourt, the 3d 
Battalion, 91st Regiment standing close to the road. 

The 93d Regiment deployed two battalions on Hills 295 
and 312, facing St. Ail, the 3d Battalion being in reserve on 
the main road. 

In second line, on the St. Privat — Roncourt road, stood 
two battalions, 9th Regiment, to their left the cavalry divi- 
sion of Barail — 3 regiments of chasseurs with 2 horse bat- 
teries, while the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, stood close to 
the northern edge of St. Privat. 

—689— 



Battles Around Metz 

General Colin led 2i/^ battalions of the 94th Regiment 
to Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes and caused the west and north 
edge of the village to be occupied and prepared for defense, 
while three companies of the regiment were kept back to 
occupy the west side of St. Privat. 

When the 94th Regiment arrived at Ste. Marie, Colonel 
Geslin sent one company to the low ridge 283, 600 meters 
south of the village, where it had a short fire fight with 
Prussian skirmishers from St. Ail, and then withdrew at 
once by direct orders from the division commander. The 
regiment in Ste. Marie was supported by the 5th Battery 
of the 14th Regiment, which had gone into position on knoll 
312, southwest of St. Privat. 

Within St. Privat portions of the 91st and 94th Regi- 
ment occupied the west side; the 3d Battalion, 9th and 1st 
Battalion, 12th Regiment, were in reserve close to the vil- 
lage. 

Even before the infantry of the 6th Corps was fully 
deployed, Marshal Canrobert caused all his batteries to go 
into position. The 7th of the 14th, the 6th of the 19th, the 
8th of the 8th Regiment went into position, their right flank 
on Knoll 304, their left on the road. The 5th Battery, 19th 
Regiment, went into position at the West entrance of the 
village behind a garden wall ; the 7th and 8th Batteries, 18th 
Regiment north of St. Privat, after these two batteries had 
been in action south of Hill 333, where they produced but 
little effect, however. 

Five batteries under Lieutenant-Colonel Montluisant — 
7th of the 8th, 9th of the 13th, 5th of the 8th, 12th of the 
8th and 10th of the 13th — went into position on ridge 333 
to 327 south of the road, in close connection with the three 
batteries of Cissey's Division north of the railroad. 

The batteries on the left fired partly on the Prussian 
Guard batteries and partly on the Hessian batteries; they 
had but little effect in spite of the large amount of ammuni- 
tion expended, as the range was too great and their shells 
exploded in most cases far in front of the hostile batteries, 
as is expressly stated in the French account. In addition, 

—690— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

the French batteries had been ordered to fire very slowly, so 
as to husband the ammunition. 

Marshal Canrobert had only two batteries of the Cav- 
alry Division of du Barail in reserve, all the other l;l bat- 
teries were in action. 

Thus, at the very opening of the battle at Ste. Marie-aux- 
Chenes the nine batteries of the Prussian Guard and the 14 
of the IXth Corps were opposed by 15 batteries between hill 
304 at Roncourt and the railroad and by 18 additional bat- 
teries between the railroad and La Folie, so that 23 German 
batteries were engaged against 33 French batteries, until 
an additional 12 batteries (Saxon) entered the action at 
about 4 P.M. 



The Artillery Battle Between 1:30 and 4 p.m. 

While Marshal Canrobert had engaged only a small 
portion of his infantry for the defense of Ste. Marie, all 
batteries of the 6th Corps were engaged in the battle. 

When the nine Prussian Guard batteries went into 
position south of St. Ail, they were immediately opposed by 
all the batteries of the 6th Corps and several of the 4th 
Corps, which up to then had not fired a shot. Though the 
batteries were ordered to fire only very slowly, so as to 
husband the ammunition, the 5th Battery of the 14th Regi- 
ment, which had taken an advanced position on Hill 312 
southwest of St. Privat, could not resist the temptation to 
shoot the hostile guns to pieces as it could enfilade them 
at close range. The 5th Battery of the 19th, and the 6th 
Battery, 14th Regiment, also fired on the Prussian Guard 
batteries and were very soon reinforced by the 6th Battery, 
19th Regiment, which however, had but little effect because 
of the long range from north of the road. The 5 batteries 
—8th of the 7th, 8th and 9th of the 13th and 7 and 8th of 
the 18th Regiment — which Marshal Canrobert had person- 
ally directed to go into position on knoll 333, had different 
successes. The 8th Battery, close to the road, had hardly 
fired 10 rounds per piece on the hostile infantry, when the 

• —691— 



Battles Around Metz 

Marshal drew it back to St. Privat, where it took a new po- 
sition south of the road, its right at the first houses. The 
7th Battery, 8th Regiment, and the 9th of the 13th Regiment 
on knoll 333 fired first on the infantry appearing between 
Habonville and La Cusse, and later on against the Hessian 
batteries; the 7th and 8th Batteries of the 18th Regiment 
also fired on the Hessian batteries. 

Of the three batteries on the left — 6th and 12th of the 
8th, and 10th of the 13th Regiment — only the 10th bat- 
tery kept up a slow fire on the Hessian infantry attempting 
to cross the railroad, the other two batteries went back under 
cover behind the ridge. 

Thus the five batteries north of the road — 5th and 6th 
of the 14th, 5th and 6th of the 19th and 9th of the 8th Regi- 
ment — were in action with Prussian Guard batteries from 
1 :30 P.M. on, while the other seven batteries — 7th of the 
8th, 9th of the 13th, 7th and 8th of the 18th, 5th and 12th of 
the 8th and 10th of the 16th Regiment — joined their fire 
with that of the batteries of Cissey's Division against the 
batteries between Habonville and La Cusse. In spite of the 
rapidity of the fire at the start, which soon decreased in 
order to husband the ammunition, the hostile batteries suf- 
fered but little under the fire of the French guns. 

On the other hand, the hostile artillery at St. Ail was 
greatly harassed by the fire of the skirmishers of the 2d 
Battalion, 93d Regiment, and 3d Company, 2d Battalion, 
28th Regiment, but in spite of this the Prussian batteries 
fired but little on the French infantry, mainly firing against 
the batteries. Therefore the French batteries furthest ad- 
vanced between Ste. Marie and St. Privat, soon gave up the 
fight. When the 5th Horse Battery of the 19th Regiment 
had fired about 200 rounds, it was forced by the constantly 
increasing hostile artillery fire to take a new position be- 
hind the road embankment, but after firing a very few 
shots from there the battery received orders from Marshal 
Canrobert to come closer to the village. Two guns remained 
in the position to the flank, while four guns went into po- 
sition on the road behind low garden walls. 



—692- 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

The 5th Battery, 14th Regiment, on knoll 312 also be- 
lieving it necessary to save its ammunition, fell back with 
the 6th Battery of the same regiment in a northerly direc- 
tion. 

The 7th and 8th batteries, 18th Regiment, suffered ma- 
terial losses. In a very short time the 7th Battery lost 
10 men and 18 horses ; 2 pieces had but one horse left, and 
both batteries drove off through the village of St. Privat 
and took up a position north of the village to be able to 
sweep the road to Ste. Marie. 

Towards 3 P.M., when the Saxon batteries were in 
position and when 22 German batteries were in action north 
of Habonville, the situation with the French batteries was 
about as follows : 

On knoll 333 the three left wing batteries — 5th and 
12th of the 8th, and 10th of the 13th Regiment — had almost 
completely ceased firing in front of the Hessian batteries; 
they had but 10 to 15 rounds per gun and fired a shot 
only every quarter of an hour. Only the 9th Battery, 13th 
Regiment, on the left wing of the ridge continued a slow 
fire in the direction of Habonville. North of Knoll 333 six 
batteries— 7th of the 8th Regiment on Hill 333, 8th of the 
8th and 5th of 19th on the main road ; 8th of the 19th on 
Hill 293 northwest of St. Privat and 7th and 8th of the 18th 
north of that village — remained in their positions and kept 
up a very slow fire. 

Even before the artillery battle started Marshal Can- 
robert had feared for his ammunition supply; but it was 
impossible to bring up ammunition from the rear. On his 
several requests to Marshal Bazaine for an ammunition 
column, a number of ammunition wagons were sent off, but 
entirely too late, so that they did not arrive until the battle 
was over, and only four ammunition wagons were received 
by the 4th Corps. 

Thus at 3 P.M., the German artillery was master of 
the battlefield and the few French batteries still in position 
were not in a situation to play an important role in the de- 
fense of Ste. Marie, so that that defense was a special phase 

—693— 



Battles Around Metz 

in the battle, from which all troops of the 6th Corps, except 
the 94th and portions of the 93d Regiment, kept aloof. 

After Marshal Canrobert had observed the deployment 
of the hostile infantry masses at Ste. Marie and had seen 
numerous batteries go into position north of Habonville, 
it appeared to him — though the enemy had been delayed 
by the 94th Regiment in Ste. Marie — that an attack on St. 
Privat was imminent, and he therefore decided to assemble 
all of his troops on the heights of St. Privat, abandoning his 
advanced post of Ste. Marie. 

Towards 2:30 P.M., General Tixier received orders to 
lead two of his regiments to St. Privat to oppose on the 
right an attack indicated by the progress of the hostile fire. 

While the engineer companies of the division prepared 
the walls of the village for defense, five battalions of the 
10th and 12th Regiments — though belonging to different 
brigades — were thrown into the village. The 2d and 3d 
Battalions, 12th Regiment, took position behind hedges and 
garden walls at the west edge of the village and there rein- 
forced the seven companies of the 93d and 94th Regiments. 
On the run the battalions of the 10th Regiment then ad- 
vanced under the hostile artillery fire; the 1st Battalion 
took position at the northwest corner of the village behind 
low garden walls, the 3d Battalion prolonged the right 
wing, while the 2d Battalion formed the extreme right 
wing with three companies. The remaining seven battal- 
ions of Tixier's Division, 9th Chasseurs, 4th and 100th 
Regiments — remained for the present south of Jerusalem. 

When towards 3:30 P.M. the hostile infantry, pushing 
forward from the south and west against Ste. Marie, be- 
came denser and denser, General Colin sent a message to 
St. Privat that he could hold his position only if reinforced 
on the right. 

Up to then the skirmishers of the 2d Battalion, 93d 
Regiment and two companies of the 1st Battalion, which 
had advanced across Knoll 312, had furnished the only sup- 
port, by firing on the right flank of the Prussian Guard bat- 
talions. 



-694- 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Now General Tixier received orders to assist the en- 
dangered 94th Regiment, but he contented himself with 
sending the 10th Regiment and the 2d Battalion, 12th Regi- 
ment, some few hundred paces ahead, where these bat- 
talions remained inactive however. 

By 3:30 P.M. 11 battalions were deployed in two lines 
north of the main road opposite Roncourt, which had not 
yet fired a shot. Behind them the 6th Battery of the 19th, 
the 7th and 8th of the 18th and the 7th of the 14th Regi- 
ment were still in position. South of the main road also 
were 12 battalions of Levassor's Division deployed in two 
lines about 2000 meters from the hostile artillery, but so 
far only a few of the skirmish groups had become engaged. 
Seven batteries — 5th of the 19th, 8th of the 8th, 1st of the 
8th, 9th of the 13th, 5th of the 12th and 10th of the 13th 
Regiment — were still in position, but they did not fire any 
more. St. Privat itself was occupied by 25 companies of 
different regiments, while seven battalions of Tixier's Di- 
vision and 2 Battalions of the 9th Regiment were south 
of Roncourt, and three cavalry regiments of the Division of 
du Barail were between Roncourt and St. Privat. 

Counter Attack by Sonnay's Brigade 

When the Saxon battalions, pursuing the 94th Regi- 
ment toward Roncourt left Ste. Marie in a northeasterly 
direction, General La Font de Villers ordered his 1st Bri- 
gade to advance to effective rifle range. 

The 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment remained observing 
the forest exits (Auboue) at the west exit of Roncourt. 
The other five battalions of Connay's Brigade — 75th and 
91st Regiments — advanced from their positions where they 
had remained three hours without firing a shot. 

With dense skirmish lines in front of the 2d and 3d 
Battalions, the 1st Regiment, followed by the 2d Battalion, 
12th Regiment, advanced close to Ste. Marie, while south 
of the road the 2d Battalion, 93d Regiment, protected itself 
against the artillery fire from hill 295, while the fire action 
with the Guard Jagers increased. 

—695— 



Battles Around Metz 

But even before then, on the German side, the 2d 
Battalion, 105th Regiment, which had been joined on the 
right by the 4th Company, 105th Regiment, and the four 
Jager companies, and on the left by the 7th and 8th Com- 
panies, 104th Regiment, had forced Colonel Geslin to re- 
treat with the remnants of his regiment to Roncourt. 
Shortly thereafter the third battalions of the 104th and 
105th Regiments prolonged the fighting line on both wings, 
which now extended to the depression 243. The 3d Battal- 
ion, 105th Regiment, on the left wing formed a hook, fac- 
ing north towards the Auboue woods. 

The battalions of the 91st Regiment and the companies 
of the 93d south of the road, delivered a rapid fire on the 
companies in front of Ste. Marie, while on the extreme right 
wing the battalions of the 75th Regiment forced two Saxon 
batteries in position north of Ste. Marie to fall back to be- 
hind the road. 

One battery of the du Barail's Cavalry Division — 6th 
of the 19th Regiment — had come up to within 700 meters 
of the hostile infantry. 

The position of the Saxon companies became the more 
untenable as the range of the opposing skirmish lines was 
within chassepot, but not within German rifle range. The 
Saxon battalions could hold their own only under heavy 
loss ; and when General von Nehrhoff observed that the bat- 
tle assumed larger and larger proportions — not at all in 
accordance with the intentions of army headquarters — he 
ordered the 47th Brigade to break off the battle and retreat 
to behind Ste. Marie. 

Thus the Saxon brigade, having first occupied the woods 
of Auboue as a supporting point, had suffered through the 
hostile infantry fire a reverse in the open, having met fresh 
infantry and the two Saxon batteries on the left were also 
compelled to withdraw to the rear. 

Though the Brigade of Sonnay assumed merely a de- 
fensive attitude, breaking off the battle was not an easy 
matter for the Saxons ; the battalions fell back in echelons, 
and again assembled northwest of Ste. Marie about 5 

—696— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

o'clock. The 3d Battalion, 108th regiment, marched into 
the woods of Auboue and there joined the other battalions 
of its regiment. 

The French Brigade of Sonnay also fell back on St. 
Privat, as it received too hot a fire from the German bat- 
teries after the French batteries had withdrawn, and be- 
cause it feared, in addition, of being enveloped on the right. 
The skirmish lines of the 75th regiment were the first to 
fall back, for the receiving of which the 2d Battalion, 10th 
Regiment, had come up on the run. Then followed the bat- 
talions of the 91st, and the 2d Battalion, 12th Regiment, 
all of them taking position about 600 meters west of the 
village edge. Five companies of the 93d Regiment re- 
mained in their position south of the road. The other com- 
panies had fallen back into St. Privat after having fired 
away their ammunition. 

In order to get ahead of the envelopment making itself 
felt through the Auboue woods. Marshal Canrobert per- 
sonally led the 9th Chasseur Battalion and the 1st Battal- 
ion, 12th Regiment, into a position west of the village, the 
left resting on the road to Ste. Marie. The 4th Regiment and 
the 3d Battalion, 100th Regiment, took position on the other 
side of the northern edge of the village, while the 1st and 3d 
Battalions, 100th Regiment, remained at Jerusalem. 

Of the 9th Regiment the 1st Battalion occupied Ron- 
court, and the 2d was with the Cavalry Division of du Bar- 
ail on the road from Roncourt to St. Privat. 

Thereafter, when the Saxon batteries had gone into 
position north of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, the French bat- 
teries again opened fire at about 3 :30 P.M. but the expendi- 
ture of ammunition merely hastened the moment when the 
batteries had to fall back to behind the ridge. The 5th 
Battery, 19th Regiment, at the entrance of the village, had 
procured some ammunition from the 4th Corps, one of its 
pieces, somewhat advanced ahead of the others, was de- 
stroyed; the other pieces had gone into position with two 
meters interval, on the road, leaving their limbers and cais- 
sons under cover of the houses. But when the Saxon bat- 
teries north of Ste. Marie swept the entire length of the 

—697— 



Battles Around Metz 

road, the battery suffered severe loss in a very short time, 
one shell smashed two guns/ another one killed or wounded 
all the men of another piece and thus the battery had to 
fall back to behind the houses to escape utter annihilation. 

The six batteries under Colonel Montluisant bravely 
held the position on Hill 333 until about 5 P.M., part of 
them on the crest, part behind it, waiting a favorable mo- 
ment for fire. But when the Saxon batteries took position 
on the ridge north of Ste. Marie, these six batteries suffered 
severely under a fire to which they could not reply. When 
Colonel Montluisant observed the infantry falling back on 
St. Privat, he had his batteries fall back by echelon. The 
three batteries — 5th and 12th of the 8th and 10th of the 
13th Regiment — of the left wing fell back first to the quar- 
ries at La Croix, taking a position in echelon to cover the 
infantry should it retreat from St. Privat. Immediately 
thereafter the other three batteries fell back, the 7th and 
8th of the 8th Regiment taking position at La Croix, while 
the 9th of the 13th Regiment, going around St. Privat on 
the south, took up a new position south of Roncourt near 
the 9th Regiment. 

The 7th and 8th Batteries, 18th Regiment, had again 
opened fire north of St. Privat, but when their last shell 
was fired at 3 :30 P.M., they fell back as far as Plappeville. 

The 5th and 6th Batteries, 14th Regiment, having re- 
plenished ammunition, had again gone into position on 
knoll 328 with the 7th Battery and now fired on the Saxons 
north of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes. 

The hostile shells did not burst in the soft ground, and 
thus the batteries suffered but little. The 6th Battery, 
19th Regiment which had gone into position to the left of 
the just mentioned three batteries, took part in repulsing 
the Saxon Brigade, and then went to behind St. Privat. 
Thus the greater part of the French batteries had left the 
battlefield by 4 P.M. only a few batteries were still in posi- 
tion, while at the same time 12 Saxon Batteries were in 
position between Ste. Marie and the Auboue woods. 



—698- 



Battles at Gravalotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Retreat of the Regiments of Lavassor's 
Division 

Ammunition very soon ran short in the 25th Regiment 
and a premature retreat brought the larger portion of the 
regiment back to St. Privat; it appears that the 1st Bat- 
talion in position on the left at the road crossing on Hill 
326 was the first to fall back, as it was threatened in the 
flank by the right of the Prussian Grenadiers. The 2d 
Battalion at once joined the retrograde movement ; it had de- 
ployed one company as skirmishers when the Prussians 
started the attack, which had opened a rapid fire in con- 
junction with the skirmish lines of the 9th Chasseur Bat- 
talion deployed on the road. Though that firing line was 
reinforced by two additional companies from the 2d Bat- 
talion, 25th Regiment, the weak lines kept falling back be- 
fore the oncoming 2d Grenadier Regiment. But when the 
Prussian companies stopped their advance on the road, the 
retreat of the battalions on the left created a very favorable 
impression on the 2d Battalion. However, this battalion fell 
back in excellent order, firing volleys from time to time. The 
skirmishers of the 9th Chasseur Battalion and of the 1st 
Battalion, 70th Regiment, whose commander — Major 
Bergebier — had been killed, retreated also to St. Privat, so 
that no troops were left on the main road as far as the 
village. 

In the center some 3 to 400 men of the 25th Regiment 
again led forward by their officers, assembled around the 
colors and continued the fight. But when a few minutes 
later the skirmish lines of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 70th 
Regiment, appeared this detachment of the 25th Regiment 
also fell back, after having fired away its last round of am- 
munition. 

So far the battalions of the 70th Regiment had stood 
in readiness behind knoll 333; now the 2d Battalion de- 
ployed along the hedge road and threw a rapid fire on the 
4th Grenadier Regiment. Farther to the left was the 3d 
Battalion; it had one company deployed as skirmishers. 
The 1st Battalion was in readiness at Jerusalem. At the 

—699— 



Battles Around Metz 

time the 25th and 70th Regiments commenced the fire fight, 
the eight batteries on knoll 333 had long since left their po- 
sition; five of them were led back to the quarries of La 
Croix by Lieutenant Colonel Montluisant — these were the 
5th, 7th, 8th and 12th of the 8th and the 10th of the 13th 
Regiment, while the 9th of the 13th, and the 7th and 8th 
of the 18th Regiment, together with the 6th of the 19th, 
again went into position south of Roncourt. 

When the 4th Guard Brigade started its attack there 
were no batteries in position south of the St. Privat — Ste. 
Marie road. After the battalions of the 70th Regiment 
had deployed, three batteries again went into position south 
of the road. The 8th Battery of the 8th Regiment, after 
having left its position, replenished ammunition and again 
went into position at Jerusalem. Shortly thereafter the 
6th and 7th Batteries, 13th Regiment, of the main reserve 
went into position on the left of the 8th about 3 to 400 
meters south of the road on Hill 333; these batteries had 
finally been sent by Marshal Bazaine as support. 

Unfortunately these batteries could not fire on the 
hostile infantry, because that infantry was then too close 
to the 70th Regiment and could be only partly seen by the 
batteries in position some 50 meters behind the hedge road. 
They therefore fired mainly on the Guard batteries that 
had gone into position southeast of Ste. Marie. This des- 
perate battle with the far superior hostile artillery was 
the more unfavorable, as the gunners had the sun in their 
faces and could hardly aim correctly or observe the shots. 
In spite of the great superiority of the hostile artillery the 
three batteries suffered little. 

While the 25th Regiment was engaged with the charg- 
ing Guard companies, the 26th Regiment in position on the 
eastern slope of Hill 326 took no part in the action, except 
that some of its sharpshooters fired at long range on the 
Hessian infantry in the La Cusse woods, and when subse- 
quently the Prussian Guard advanced to the attack, com- 
pletely hidden from sight of the 26th Regiment, only the 
skirmishers on knoll 326 were able to fire on the charg- 
ing Guard. When thereafter the 25th Regiment started to 

—700— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Piivat 

fall back, the 62d Regiment was endangered in flank and 
was thus carried along in the general retreat to St. Privat. 

Colonel Lamothe, informed by the brigade commander, 
Colonel Gibon, of the attack against the 25th and 26th Regi- 
ments, now led the 2d and 3d Battalions, 28th Regiment, as 
relief as far as the hedge road at hill 326, the battalions 
prolonging the line of the 70th Regiment which had ar- 
rived there about the same time. The 3d Battalion, 28th 
Regiment, remained in second line behind the left wing. 
Thus, before the last charge of the Prussian Guard com- 
menced, the hedge road was occupied by four battalions. 

Under the annihilating artillery fire, and being hotly 
fired on by the hostile skirmishers lying behind small nat- 
ural cover at close range, the freshly brought up battalions 
of the 28th and 70th Regiments suffered such heavy loss 
that their resistance was of short duration. These bat- 
talions were also not better supplied with cartridges 
than were the others ; soon detachments, having fired away 
all their ammunition, fell back one after the other and in 
a short time the entire line was retreating without the offi- 
cers being able to maintain order. The 3d Battalion held 
out until the last cartridge was expended when Captain 
Astier led it back to St. Privat. The 2d Battalion retired 
in more disorder, but the officers succeeded in keeping to- 
gether a small detachment to guard the colors of the regi- 
ment. The 1st Battalion, so far in the second line, at- 
tempted a charge when the other two battalions fell back; 
this charge brought the enemy to a stand ( ?) ; thereafter 
the battalion also fell back on St. Privat. 

The three deployed battalions of the 70th Regiment 
fell back simultaneously with those of the 28th Regiment, 
assembling on the east side of St. Privat. 

With the departure of the infantry, the 6th and 7th 
Batteries of the 13th Regiment also fell back because the 
regimental commander, who was with them, feared that 
they would be captured by the hostile infantry. The 8th 
Battery of the 8th Regiment on the road had also retired 
to behind St. Privat, and when towards 6:30 P.M. the 

—701— 



Battles Around Metz 

Prussian Grenadiers charged the hedge road, the entire 
ridge had been abandoned by the defenders. 

While the greater portion of the 4th Guard Grenadier 
Regiment charged and captured in conjunction with the 
9th and 12th Companies, 2d Guard Grenadier Regiment, 
the hedge road, the 3d, 4th and 5th Companies of the 4th 
Guard Regiment and the 2d and 4th of the 1st Grenadier 
Regiment on the extreme right advanced against the French 
left wing, occupying ridge 310 — 326, where they laid down 
and rained a rapid fire on the now approaching Division of 
Cissey. These companies were hard pushed by the enemy 
until Captain von Prittwitz brought on his own responsibil- 
ity the 2d Heavy Guard Battery to knoll 310. Three of the 
guns of that battery remained for a time stationary under 
the enormous rapid French fire, the others unlimbered and 
now fired on the infantry of Cissey's Division. The effect 
of the fire of the approaching infantry, delivered at 700 
meters range, was such that all further advance was out 
of the question, and a hot fight ensued. The other three 
guns shorty after also came into position and about 10 
minutes later the 3d and 4th Heavy Guard Batteries went 
into position on the left of the 2d. In the meantime the 
3d Light Battery had also come up and gone into position, 
by orders of General von Berger, on knoll 326, firing on 
the battalions of Levassor's Division fleeing in all haste 
to St. Privat. 

The situation of the infantry was entirely relieved by 
these batteries going into position, and they were subse- 
quently joined on the right by the 1st and 2d Light, and 
1st Heavy Guard Batteries. In spite of the hot enfilading 
fire coming from St. Privat, these batteries held their posi- 
tions and it is mainly due to their fire that the attack of 
Cissey's Division subsequently failed. 

After the hedge road had been captured General von 
Berger received orders not to advance any further but to 
hold the captured position. 

Even before the hedge road had been stormed by the 
Prussian Guard a portion of the French Division of Cissev 

—702— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

entered the fight, making a short charge against the 4th 
Guard Grenadier Regiment, which is described as fellows: 

Counter Attack of Cissey's Division 

When the Prussian artillery again increased its fire in 
support of the 4th Guard Brigade, General Cissey caused 
his three batteries — 5th, 9th and 12th of the 15th Regi- 
ment — to again go into position to help out his infantry 
which suffered much — "elle souffrait cruellement." Though 
the 57th and 73d Regiment, except the 3d Battalion, 73d 
Regiment, on the railroad embankment, had not yet become 
engaged in the infantry fight, they remained behind the 
knoll at the swamp, exposed to the fire of the Hessian bat- 
teries at La Cusse which caused them much loss. The shells 
of these batteries also struck among the 6th Regiment which 
was held in reserve behind the ridge. 

General Cissey had in vain awaited orders to advance 
until 5 P.M. ; he had observed the advance of the Brigade 
of Sonnay in the direction of Ste. Marie and believed it his 
duty to support them. In his report he says: "No one 
doubted but what the victory would be ours ; the left wing 
of the 6th Corps still held the ridge west of St. Privat and 
even appeared to make progress. All of a sudden the hos- 
tile artillery fire, which had died down before them, in- 
creased in intensity along the entire line; the infantry of 
the division suffered enormously under it; the batteries of 
the division again went into position under a perfect hail 
of projectiles and opened fire." 

When General Cissey observed the advance of the 4th 
Guard Brigade at 5 :30 P.M., which threatened the left wing 
of the 6th Corps with envelopment, he ordered his 2d Bri- 
bade, commanded by General Goldberg, to execute a right 
turn. That movement was executed as if on the drill ground 
and the hostile advance halted thereby. 

At 5:45 P.M. the skirmish lines of three battalions of 
the 57th and 73d Regiments advanced against the slope 
leading down to depression 308; the battalions themselves 
followed the skirmishers in close order, while the other two 
battalions halted behind the crest at the swamps. When 

—703— 



Battles Around Metz 

these battalions advanced against the right wing of the 
4th Guard Regiment the Prussian battery of von Prittwitz, 
had just gone into position on knoll 310 and was firing on 
the machine gun battery — 5th of the 15th Regiment — 
while the two other batteries of Cissey's Division fired on 
the Hessian Batteries. 

When the French infantry appeared in the open, a 
few Prussian companies directed a rapid fire on them, and 
these companies, having no support behind them, soon fell 
back. 

Again the long skirmish line of Goldberg's Brigade 
executed a rush forward to near depression 308 ; but, taken 
by surprise by the fire of the batteries of von Prittwitz, the 
men threw themselves down, while the battalions of the sec- 
ond line also stopped and fired over the skirmishers who, 
lying down, suffered great loss. The advance was not con- 
tinued ; the three battalions kept up a lively fire fight, three 
companies of the 6th Regiment participating in this action 
on the right wing. 

In spite of his enormous superiority General Cissey 
stopped the advance, because he was satisfied in having 
stopped the advance of the enemy and because he consid- 
ered it unnecessary to demand larger sacrifices of his brave 
troops, though those troops clamored, in spite of their 
losses, to be allowed to charge the enemy with the bay- 
onet. 

The report of Cissey's Division which is very indef- 
inite, merely shows that the general made a short counter- 
attack with only three battalions when he could have em- 
ployed fourteen battalions just as w^ell — and to better pur- 
pose. Had he inserted his entire division, it would have 
been an easy matter for him to almost annihilate the 4th 
Guard Regiment. 

By 6:30 P.M. 10 companies of the 2d Guard Regiment 
of the 4th Guard Brigade had gained a firm foothold along 
both sides of the main road; two companies of that regi- 
ment and seven of the 4th had captured the hedge road, and 
three companies together with the 4th of the 1st Guard 

—704— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Kaiser Alexander Regiment and the above mentioned bat- 
teries held the southwest slope of the ridge. 

In spite of enormous losses the 4th Guard Brigade and 
5 batteries had succeeded in not only forcing the Division 
of Levassor and three batteries to retreat and captured their 
positions, but also in driving back the battalions of the 93d 
and 91st Regiment from: the main high road. The brigade 
had been in action not only with the Division of Levassor 
but also with Cissey's Division, but the French generals 
did not understand how to correctly use their immense su- 
periority in numbers. 

Just as General Levassor inserted one regiment after 
the other, resulting in their being defeated singly, so Gen- 
eral Cissey committed the same error, so that the two di- 
visions did not advance to the attack simultaneously and 
together and with their approximately twenty-six battal- 
ions they failed to drive back the Guard Brigade. 



The Attack of the 1st Guard Brigade 

Marshal Canrobert, in the midst of the first line, di- 
rected the defense in the village personally. 

Though there was plenty of infantry available for de- 
fense, there was a shortage of artillery, for most of the 
batteries of the 6th Corps, as mentioned above, had fallen 
back at 5 P.M., to the quarries at La Croix and only four 
batteries— 9th of the 13th and 5th, 6th and 7th of the 14th 
Regiment — were in position between St. Privat and Ron- 
court, while three other batteries — 8th of the 8th and 6th 
and 7th of the 13th Regiment— were still in action south 
of the St. Privat— Ste. Marie road. 



While Marshal Canrobert made arrangements for re- 
treat, he directed General du Barail to relieve the hard 
pressed infantry by a cavalry charge. The general had at 
his disposal three regiments of chasseurs; but he consid- 
ered a charge useless and impossible of execution, because 

—705— 



Battles Around Metz 

he was only 600 meters distant from the infantry and 2000 
meters from the Saxon artillery. He did not know that 
the Prussian Guard was completely exhausted, but on the 
other hand he observed the Saxon artillery massed in posi- 
tion between Montois and Roncourt, as well as the 4th 
Guard Regiment which formed a strong supporting line for 
the Prussian firing line. 

General Bruchard now received orders to attack the 
infantry with the 2d and 3d Chasseur Regiments. The five 
squadrons of the 3d Regiment, in close column of squadrons, 
followed by the 2d Regiment, charged against the ridge ; the 
two leading squadrons took up the gallop and charged de- 
ployed across the ridge, while all other squadrons errone- 
ously remained behind the crest. 

The troops were first fired on by the 2d Battalion of 
the 1st Guard Regiment, then by the entire line, and the 
thin line of troopers went back behind the ridge. In his 
report General Bruchard erroneously states that his charge 
caused the hostile infantry to halt and he did not think it 
necessary to have the other squadrons charge also; that 
he caused the two regiments to fall back to the east side of 
St. Privat, where they took position facing Roncourt, which 
place had in the meantime been occupied by the Saxons. 

Marshal Canrobert personally sent the 2d Regiment 
Chasseurs d'Afrique forward; it did not become engaged 
however and fell back to the forest of Jaumont, where it 
subsequently became engaged in a short fire fight with the 
Saxons. 

On the German side, the 2d Guard Ulan Regiment, 
standing at Ste. Marie, rode against the French cavalry; 
but it did not become engaged and fell back again to Ste. 
Marie. 

The XIIth Corps 

The 4th Heavy Guard Battery had gone into position 
on knoll 307 ; the 3d Light on knoll 326, and farther south 
on knoll 310, the 2d Heavy, as well as the 1st and 2d Light 
and 1st Heavy Guard Batteries. The first named five bat- 

—706— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

teries fired on the French in front of Amanvillers and were 
very soon reinforced by the 1st and 2d Hessian batteries. 

When the Crown Prince of Saxony observed at 5:45 
P.M. the dangerous situation of the Prussian Guard, he gave 
orders to the Saxon Batteries between Ste. Marie and the 
Auboue woods to advance more to the front and fire on 
St. Privat. 

Shortly after 6 P.M. seven batteries of the corps artil- 
lery went into position on the Ste. Marie — Montois road, 
being shortly afterwards followed by four batteries of the 
24th Division, which were reinforced by three of the 23d 
Division when the Saxons started from Montois, all of them 
going into position on both sides of the road. These 14 bat- 
teries at once opened fire on St. Privat and on the hostile 
batteries near there. 

Starting at 7:15 P.M. 150 German guns threw their 
shells into the village, which was soon changed into a 
smoking ruin. Not a single French battery answered that 
fire, as all the batteries of the 6th Corps had long before 
then retreated to the quarries of St. Croix. 

The Defense of the St. Privat — Roncourt Ridge 

After the French account has recited the first attack of 
the Prussian Guard and Saxons in the above little satis- 
factory manner, the account of the defense of the heights 
of Roncourt — St. Privat is taken up in a special chapter, in 
which many statements discussed in previous chapters are 
repeated about as follows: 

As stated, the five companies of the 93d Regiment, 
which had fired on the approaching 2d Guard Grenadier 
Regiment from the Ste. Marie road, very soon fell back on 
the 3d Battalion, 93d Regiment which was deployed about 
400 meters west of St. Privat on both sides of the road. 
But this latter battalion also shortly retreated to the edge 
of the village. When then the 1st Guard Brigade advanced 
north of the road, it appears that it was fired on for a short 
time by the companies of the 93d Regiment and by the 1st 
Battalion, 91st Regiment deployed a few hundred meters 

—707— 



Battles Around Metz 

north of the road and about 400 meters west of St. Privat; 
however all these troops went back to St. Privat very short- 
ly after six o'clock. 

When the Brigade of Sonnay had fallen back after 
making its short counter attack on Ste. Marie — as has al- 
ready been stated — the 1st Battalion, 91st Regiment and 
on its right the 2d Battalion of the 10th Regiment had held 
their positions a short time west of knoll 304 and fired on 
the 100th (Saxon) Regiment when it advanced from the 
Auboue woods. When the hostile fire commenced to get 
stronger and stronger, soon all companies of the 1st Bat- 
talion, 91st Regiment, were deployed in the firing line and 
still the battalion was soon forced to fall back in front of 
the superior hostile attacking forces, as the artillery fire 
had greatly shaken it. 

Thereupon the 2d Battalion, 10th Regiment, on the 
right was threatened on its left by the advancing 1st Guard 
Brigade and on the right by the advancing Saxons and 
it was thus forced to fall back to the ridge west of St. 
Privat, on which the 2d and 3d Battalions, 75th Regiment, 
had again deployed. 

During this engagement with the Saxon Brigade the 
1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Regiment, which were at St. 
Privat, had also become engaged although they had not 
yet fired a single shot though exposed to a hot artillery 
fire. After the 1st Guard Brigade had crossed the high 
road and commenced its attack on St. Privat, nine com- 
panies of the 10th Regiment had advanced and opened an 
enormous fire at point blank range, which brought the ad- 
vance of the Guard Brigade to a halt. The companies of 
the 10th Regiment probably arrived on the crest of the 
ridge — ^terrace — just when the 2d and 3d Battalions, 91st 
Regiment, were deployed there; still small detachments of 
the last named regiment had already commenced to re- 
treat on St. Privat. Even the last three companies of the 
10th Regiment had deployed on the right of the battalions 
of the 75th Regiment onto which the 1st Battalion, 10th 
Regiment fell back after having been driven off by the 

—708— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Saxons. Soon the battalions of the Dlst and the nine com- 
panies of the 10th Regiment commenced to retreat slowly 
to the walls of St. Privat, where by that time numerous 
troops were deployed. From there they went to behind 
the village, and left the garrison of St. Privat to meet the 
1st Guard Brigade. 

In the meantime the defenders of the heights of Ron- 
court had been hard pressed by the 45th Brigade coming 
from the west, and by the 48th Brigade coming from Mon- 
tois and after a short engagement were forced to fall back 
on the Jaumont forest. 

While the French infantry fell back to St. Privat, the 
batteries in position on the ridge south of Roncourt — 5th, 
6th and 7th of the 14th and 9th of the lath Regiments- 
commenced to leave their position, though they suffered 
but slight loss. By about 6 o'clock the 9th Battery had only 
a few rounds left; it received orders to fall back on the 
batteries under Colonel Montluisant at the La Croix quar- 
ries so as to cover, in case of need, the retreat of the infan- 
try in the Saulny woods. The other three batteries remained 
in position until the infantry had gotten to behind St. Pri- 
vat whereupon they also fell back to the quarries where by 
then most of the batteries of the 6th Corps were assembled. 

When the Saxon 48th Brigade advanced in direction of 

Montois toward 6:15 P.M. and threatened the defenders of 
Roncourt, already hard pressed by the 45th Brigade — Mar- 
shal Canrobert considered a retreat unavoidable. He in- 
formed General Ladmirault at about 6:30 P.M. that he 
was forced to abandon St. Privat and that he would fall 
back on the Saulny woods. At the same time he sent an 
officer to the commander of the Guard, General Bourbaki, 
to inform him of the situation and to request him to cover 
his retreat. 

The Marshal undoubtedly considered the time past for 
further defense of the supporting point of his right wing; 
he believed he would have to confine himself to holding 
St. Privat, to which point all troops rolled back; and by 



-709- 



Battles Around Metz 

doing so he believed that that would be the only means to 
cover an unavoidable retreat to Metz. 

The garrison of the village of St. Privat was again 
reinforced. 



CHAPTER V 
The Fight in Front of Amanvillers, 5 to 7 P.M. 

Shortly after 4 P.M. relative quiet reigned on the bat- 
tlefield west of Amanvillers. Only after 5 P.M. when the 
Prussian Guard and the Saxons started the attack on St. 
Privat and Roncourt the infantry fight broke out anew be- 
tween the Prussian IXth and the French 4th Corps. Con- 
cerning this the French account says : 

At the time a pause in the fighting occurred along the 
entire line of the French 4th and 6th Corps, seventeen 
French battalions stood west of Amanvillers and Montigny 
on the road leading from La Folie to Ste. Marie; their 
right on the railroad, their left on hills 326 and 366 opposite 
the L'Envie farm which was but weakly held by the enemy. 

General Ladmirault had more than six fresh battal- 
ions in position as reserve between Amanvillers and Mon- 
tigny; therefore his situation was not at all unfavorable 
as his fighting line was not yet shaken and he had a strong 
reserve. In addition, the 1st Guard Division was at St. 
Vincent, only 2000 meters off. 

On the other hand, the artillery of the 4th Corps had 
been placed out of action, "reduite a rien," for of fifteen 
batteries of the corps only the 11th and 12th of the 1st 
Regiment were in position at Montigny; the 10th of the 
4th Regiment of the 3d Corps was there also. But these 
batteries had so little ammunition left that they could not 
offer any material resistance and they soon had to retire. 

At 5 P.M. General Ladmirault was informed by Gen- 
eral Bourbaki that he was approaching with the 1st Guard 
Division on Amanvillers and General Ladmirault at once 
transmitted this cheering news to his generals. But as will 
be shown later the Guard did not appear. 

—710— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

In the meantime the 13th Regiment on the right wing, 
which had kept up firing for hours and had fired away al- 
most all of its ammunition^ had suffered heavy loss. It fell 
back on the 43d Regiment of its brigade which had re- 
treated earlier, and its place was immediately taken by 
the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 15th, and the 3d of the 
54th Regiment, while the 3d Battalion, 65th Regiment, 
reinforced the center of the 98th Regiment. At the same 
time the 11th Battery of the 1st Regiment in front of Mon- 
tigny had retreated and by 5:30 P.M. there was only one 
French battery in action. 

After the 13th Regiment had fallen back there were 
only 14 French battalions deployed in the first line, which 
had advanced their skirmishers somewhat across the road 
on the right, while on the left the battalions of the 64th 
and 98th Regiments were advanced to opposite Hill 332, 
from where they could fire on I'Envie and Champenois. 
Five battalions were still at Montigny. The 3d Brigade of 
the Prussian Guard advanced against that position. 



The French Guard Between 5 and 7 P.M. 

Before recounting the activity of the French Guard in 
more detail it will be best to revert to the activity which 
Marshal Bazaine showed during the battle. As mentioned 
before this, Jarras, the chief of staff, had caused the horses 
to be saddled at the first cannon shot and was ready to depart 
with the entire staff. However, the Marshal ordered the 
chief to keep on preparing the promotion lists in all haste, 
because the army was awaiting them with impatience. The 
Marshal further explained that the matter could not be so 
very serious and he adhered to that opinion, on the one 
hand so as not to have to take any measures as commander- 
in-chief, and on the other hand, because he believed that 
a reverse would best justify the retreat which he had long 
since decided on. As a matter of fact he merely sent a 
few artillery orderlies to St. Quentin to observe the Mosel 
valley and one of these non-commissioned officers reported 

—711— 



Battles Around Metz 

to him at 1 P.M. that strong hostile columns were crossing 
the Mosel and were appearing in the Gorze valley. Shortly 
thereafter an aid sent by Marshal Canrobert arrived with 
a request for men and ammunition, and now Marshal Ba- 
zaine sent word to Marshal Canrobert that he would send 
him one Guard Division, two batteries and ammunition 
and that the latter should send his ammunition wagons to 
Plappeville for replenishment of ammunition. 

Though Marshal Bazaine knew that a battle was in 
progress, he remained at his headquarters in Plappeville, 
and mounted his horse only between 3:30 and 4 o'clock. 
Before them, that is at 3 P.M., one of Marshal Canrobert's 
aids had arrived and reported to Marshal Bazaine to have 
the departure of the division and ammunition hastened. 
This officer pointed out to the Marshal on the map where 
the 6th Corps was, and explained what a dangerous situa- 
tion it was in, and still the Marshal merely replied that he 
had taken all necessary steps to start the troops. But when 
shortly thereafter a division general of the 6th Corps said 
that the situation was not so precarious, the division was 
not started and the aid merely was authorized to go and 
get four ammunition wagons in Plappeville ( ! !) . 

The Marshal finally mounted, but did not proceed to 
either the 6th or the 3d Corps, but to the fortress of St. Quen- 
tin, where he personally aimed two pieces that fired for a 
long time on the 26th Prussian Brigade coming from Ars. 

While Marshal Bazaine was almost a complete failure 
as a commander-in-chief, General Bourbaki at least arrived 
at a decision. During the course of the forenoon the Volti- 
geur Brigade of the Guard, under General Brincourt, had 
been sent to the projecting hill, nose 313, northwest of Cha- 
tel to serve as a reserve for the 3d Corps, and had intrenched 
itself there immediately. General Bourbaki in Plappeville 
had learned nothing of the battle that had started at Aman- 
villers and Pont-du-Jour, but when Marshal Bazaine told 
him that Marshal Canrobert was being attacked, he had 
issued orders to the Guard to hold itself in readiness, and 
had ridden with his chief of staflf to the hill at St. Vincent 
to reconnoiter. From there he observed thick clouds of 

—712— 



Battles at Graveiotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

smoke on the other side of the woods, and this left him in no 
doubt as to the importance of the battle, and he now gave 
orders to General Picard to advance with the Grenadier 
Division on Gros Chene. 

Leaving its tents and knapsacks, the division started 
at once, and later deployed in two lines at the farm build- 
ings of St. Vincent ; this was at about 4 P.M. When then 
General Bourbaki observed dense clouds of dust on the St. 
Privat — ^Woippy road, he at once caused the division to ad- 
vance in the direction of Amanvillers, but had it stop at 
5 P.M., behind the piece of woods connecting the forests of 
Rappes and Saulny. 

Thus, as the French account specially points out, be- 
fore the attack against the French 6th Corps had com- 
menced, the entire Guard Division remained halted less 
than 4 kilometers from Amanvillers, and no advantage was 
taken of the independent decision arrived at by General 
Bourbaki. 

When General Ladmirault received information at 5 
P.M. that the Guard was approaching he sent out an officer 
to hasten its march on Amanvillers and to guide that di- 
vision. This officer was charged with notifying General 
Bourbaki "that the fire on both sides was slackening, that 
the enemy appeared to be exhausted, and that consequently 
fresh troops would win the victory." 

When this officer explained at 6:15 P.M., to General 
Bourbaki the situation of the 6th Corps, the latter had ob- 
served a very great number of dispersed men of that corps 
and showed little inclination to advance towards Amanvil- 
lers. 

Shortly thereafter another officer sent by General Lad- 
mirault urgently requested that the Guard Division be 
started, and now Bourbaki gave orders at 6 :25 P.M. for the 
division to continue the march and also caused the corps 
artillery to be brought up. General Ladmirault's aide rode 
back and reported that the division was starting and then 
again returned to Bourbaki. 

In the meantime Bourbaki, hastening ahead of his 
troops, arrived on Ridge 331 — 343 and observed the disorder 

—713— 



Battles Around Metz 

and events with the 4th Corps south of St. Privat. He con- 
cluded therefrom that the whole right wing was retreating 
and that the question was now not to help the 4th Corps 
to gain the victory, but to protect its retreat, and he then 
issued orders for a retreat. 

The Guard Brigade, advancing along both sides of the 
road filled with wounded and stragglers, immediately start- 
ed the retreat ; a large number of the dispersed men of the 
4th Corps believed that the Guard had been driven back and 
hastened off with loud yells, proclaiming that belief. A 
panic resulted ; vehicles, wounded, etc., fled in haste in di- 
rection of Lorry and came to a halt only when two batteries 
on the other side of the exit from the woods went into posi- 
tion on both sides of the road and completely blocked the 
road. 

Bourbaki succeeded at least with the use of the Regi- 
ment of Zouaves, in bringing this most unfortunate move- 
ment to a stand but the batteries and the Grenadier regi- 
ment no longer paid any heed to the voice of authority and 
the troops never stopped until St. Vincent was reached. 

When Captain de la Tour reported to General Ladmir- 
ault, that the Guard had retreated and when at 7 P.M. in- 
formation arrived of the retreat of the 6th Corps, General 
Ladmirault sent word to General Bourbaki that he now also 
was forced to retreat so as not to be enveloped. 

This conduct on the part of General Bourbaki, which 
is recounted plainly in the French account, plainly shows 
the absence of comradeship among the French generals, 
and even if the Guard Division had arrived too late to 
bring about a turn in the situation with the 6th Corps, it 
could at least have brought most material assistance with 
its numerous batteries to the 4th Corps which had no artil- 
lery of its own. 

"By this time, at 7 P.M., Roncourt was in the hands of the Ger- 
mans, Marshal Canrobert had sent a large number of his troops 
back to the Saulny forest, and only St. Privat was still occupied, but 
the resistance there could only be short-lived. 

"South of the highroad the Division of Levassor had retreated 
completely, and the batteries of Cissey's Division had also driven off. 

"South of the railroad the Division of Lorencez still held out and 
there was every expectation that it could hold that position until 
nightfall." 

—714— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

CHAPTER VI 

The Assault on St. Privat 

When the Saxons appeared in front of Roncourt, Mar- 
shal Canrobert considered it impossible to hold his support- 
ing point, St. Privat, any longer; all he now intended to do 
was to hold that village to cover his retreat. At 6:30 P.M. 
he sent information to General Ladmirault at Amanvillers 
that he could not hold out any longer, and that he was com- 
pelled to start the retreat to the forest of Saulny. At the 
same time he sent by another officer, information of his 
situation to General Bourbaki requesting him to cover his 
retreat. 

Thereupon the Marshal brought his last fresh troops 
to St. Privat. The 4th Regiment was led in person by Gen- 
eral Pechot to the west edge of the village, forming a second 
line of defense in rear of the 12th Regiment. The 3d Bat- 
talion, 100th Regiment, occupied the north edge of the vil- 
lage, while the 1st and 2d Battalions of that regiment de- 
ployed east of Roncourt as far as the forest of Jaumont, 
facing Roncourt. On its right extending to the edge of 
the woods five squadrons Chasseurs d'Afrique were de- 
ployed in echelon. 

By seven o'clock St. Privat was occupied by 10^ bat- 
talions which stood partly behind low stone garden walls 
or in trenches. Loopholes and passage ways had been cut 
in the houses so as to have connections towards all sides. 
A stone barn in front of the Jerusalem building was pre- 
pared with loopholes and a trench 100 meters long connec- 
ted the building with the village. 

East of the village were the 73d and 91st Regiment as- 
sembled at 7 o'clock, having formed squares by direction of 
Marshal Canrobert to meet any cavalry attack coming from 
Montois. The 93d Regiment soon joined these two regi- 
ments also. 

The 2d and 3d Mounted Chasseurs were deployed along 
the road from St. Privat to the Jaumont quarries, in rear 
of them was the 94th Regiment. South of the road and 
east of Jerusalem were the 20th, 26th and 28th Regiments 

—715— 



Battles Around Metz 

of Levassor's Division, while the 70th Regiment of that Divi- 
sion was at Marengo. 

12 batteries of the 6th Corps had gone into position in 
tiers at the La Croix quarry east of Marengo and on their 
left eleven batteries of the 4th Corps formed a hook on 
knolls 342 — 343 facing Amanvillers, so that 23 French bat- 
teries were in readiness to meet the advance of the Ger- 
mans out of St. Privat. 

However, all these troops of the 6th Corps were greatly- 
shaken and at the very start of the German attack disor- 
der reigned in the ranks of the different regiments. The 
25th and 26th Regiments had been halted, it is true, after 
their " flight from Jerusalem, but a number of dispersed 
men were in the woods. 

The panic had not taken possession of the troops north 
of the road; the entire right wing, however, had retreated 
to the Jaumont forest and even if some portions of the nine 
companies of the 10th Regiment still remained at the west 
edge thereof, the largest portion had fled to Marengo and 
only the companies of the 93d Regiment on the high road 
held their positions behind the low garden walls for some 
time longer. The 28th and 70th Regiments had also re- 
treated to Marengo at about 6 :45 P.M. in more or less dis- 
order. Though there are no details given of this retreat it 
is certain that a large amount of dispersed men fled along 
the high road. 

The movement eastward was so pronounced that as 
early as 6:30 P.M. General Ladmirault at Amanvillers had 
the impression "that his right wing was suddenly aban- 
doned by the troops" and General Bourbaki concluded there- 
from "that the right wing of the army was in complete 
flight." 

But in spite of all this the situation of the 6th Corps 
was not a desperate one at all, for a retreat to Metz was 
still feasible and there was every hope of bringing 
the exhausted enemy to a stand in front of the woods. But 
by 7 o'clock the battle was lost as far as the right wing was 
concerned and everyone felt that the only thing now left 
was to protect the retreat. 

—716— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

When the Saxons received the request of the Prussian 
Guard for help, Colonel von Schweidnitz led the 1st and 
2d Battalions of the 107th Regiment on St. Privat east of 
the Roncourt road. General von Craushaar had two bat- 
talions of the 101st Regiment turn to the right about 1500 
paces west of Roncourt and advance on the northwest 
corner of St. Privat, through which movement, these troops 
obtained a connection with the Guard, 

The Body Grenadier Regiment also had approached 
Roncourt and had then turned to the right and filled the gap 
between the 101st and 107th Regiments with seven com- 
panies, while the five other companies advanced southeast- 
ward against hill 327 with the 3d and 4th Cgmpanies of 
the 1st Guard Regiment, and engaged the Mounted Chas- 
seurs and the French 100th Regiment. 

Seven companies of the Prussian Guard — 3d and 4th 
companies of the 1st Guard Regiment, 1st Pioneer Company, 
and 1st Battalion, 3d Regiment — joined the right wing of 
the Saxons, while still farther to the right the 4th Guard 
Regiment in depression 278 approached the churchyard of 
St. Privat to within 800 paces and deployed with all three 
battalions against the northwest corner. 

When the assault commenced. Colonel von Schweid- 
nitz led the 1st and 2d Battalions, 107th Regiment on the 
left wing of the Saxons and in the first line east of the Ron- 
court road. But when these battalions had arrived to with- 
in 1000 paces of St. Privat they received a hot rapid fire 
from the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment, in position behind a 
low field wall. On the run, and without firing a shot, these 
battalions charged forward and occupied the wall, which 
the French had left in the meantime to take position behind 
a wall still farther to the rear. The Saxon battalions then 
deployed behind this wall and when thereafter the bat- 
teries of the 45th Brigade came up, the two battalions of the 
107th Regiment again advanced and stormed a field wall 
about 300 paces in front of St. Privat, but again suffering 
great loss. 

On their right the two Grenadier Battalions of the 4th 
Guard Regiment had charged up to a wall situated in front 

—717— 



Battles Around Metz 

of the northwest side of the village, while the Fusilier Bat- 
talions became mixed up with the Saxons. 

In the meantime the battalions of the 45th Brigade 
under General von Craushaar had inserted themselves be- 
tween the Guard and the 107th Regiment. Eight compan- 
ies of the 101st Regiment joined the left wing of the 4th 
Guard Regiment and on a line with them, but east of the 
Roncourt road, seven companies of Body Grenadier Regi- 
ment No. 100 had deployed — the 3d Battalion on the right, 
then the 7th, 8th and 4th Company. All these troops 
had reached the different walls on the run, but had suf- 
fered material losses. 

On the extreme left five companies of the Body Grena- 
dier Regiment — 3 of the 1st Battalion and the 5th and 
6th Companies — and the left of the 107th Regiment, had 
turned against knoll 327 and found here also cover be- 
hind field walls. They were opposed by two battalions of 
the French 100th Regiment and by dismounted Chasseurs 
dAfrique. There the Saxons joined the 3d and 4th Com- 
panies of the Prussian 3d Guard Regiment — here Colonel 
von Roeder fell. 

The 1st and 4th Companies of the 3d Guard Regiment 
had turned against the northern entrance of St. Privat and 
gained a firm foothold near the 101st Regiment. But soon 
the 4th Company started for Roncourt, where the 1st Bat- 
talion of the 101st Regiment had also taken position. 

While thus the Saxon and Prussian battalions had got- 
ten to within short range of St. Privat, Crown Prince Albert 
of Saxony, at Roncourt, had also sent forward his batteries 
by echelons. By 7 : 15 P.M., sixteen Saxon batteries were in 
position along an arc on knolls 321, 304, and 293 and sur- 
rounded St. Privat on the north and west at a range of 1400 
paces. To their right, south of the road, stood nine Guard 
batteries and 2 batteries of the Xth Corps, so that 25 bat- 
teries fired on the village. 

Shortly thereafter an additional five batteries of the 
Xth Corps went into position on the right wing of the 
Saxons. Even if, as the French account states, a portion of 

—718— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

these batteries could not see the low stone walls on the west 
edge of the village, still the left of the Saxon batteries held 
an excellent position and could fire on the exterior de- 
fensive line, while most of the other batteries could fire on 
the houses, of which a large number were soon set afire. 
Concerning the defense of the village the French ac- 
count gives no details. It is mainly based on the German 
account and merely says: 

"Unfortunately it is impossible to give the exact deployment 
of the battalions defending the village. According to the scant 
information at hand we can only conclude that the 9th Chasseur 
Battalion, reinforced by portions of the 25th Regiment, held 
Jerusalem and adjoining trenches. On its right three companies 
of the 1st Battalion, 94th Regiment, held the low garden walls. 
The remainder of the west edge was occupied, presumably, by 
men of the 12th Regiment, of which regiment some companies 
were in the streets or occupied houses. 

"On the north edge the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Regiment, 
continued the defense, especially against the 107th Regiment, 
which had pushed into the gardens. 

"The 3d Battalion, 100th Regiment, was more to the right. 
The 4th Regiment, which arrived in the village very late, was dis- 
tributed clear around the village and formed the second line. 

"These troops were joined by a number of dispersed men, 
who had again bravely halted, but that number is offset by the 
losses. Though the defenders formed a double line — about 1000 
meters in circumference — there were still strong reserves in 
the streets. 

"But before the assault proper commenced, i.e., at 7:30 P.M., 
the German artillery had fired on the village for 20 minutes. All 
cover had been destroyed, numerous houses were in flames, roofs 
and walls were falling. It may be assumed therefore, that within 
a quarter of an hour, preceding the assault, a large number 
the defenders left their position, which had been made untenable 
by the hostile shells." 

This in the entire statement of the Official Account, and 
the individual reports of the regiments which participated 
furnish no additional or better details, except that the 4th 
Regiment states in its report : 

"The regiment hastened up on the run and dispersed through- 
out the village; the fire was annihilating; the enemy, advancing 
anew, retreated again to 300 meters from the village, throwing 
himself to the ground, his artillery redoubling its fire. Shells 
came from all directions, the walls of the village tumbled down 
but our men held their ground. The bursting of the shells, the 
horrible noise made by the falling roofs and walls, the cries of 
the dying, the rattle of the infantry fire and the shrieking of the 
shells and shot made an absolute inferno out of the streets. We 
have to admire the valor and self-sacrifice displayed by our men, 

—719— 



Battles Around Metz 

which remained in position facing certain destruction, rifles aimed, 
fingers on the trigger. The Prussian officers attempted to get 
their men to charge by calls and signs. Incendiary shells struck 
the roofs from all sides, a hospital was soon afire as well as other 
buildings and very soon the entire village was enveloped in flames. 
One battery near Ste. Marie swept the main street, the shells 
cleared everything away in that street and still our men retreated 
only step by step. Now the colonel ordered all to retreat, the 
men leave the village in all directions, pursued by the fire of the 
enemy, who does not dare to attack us with the bayonet. 

"At the quarries our officers assembled a portion of the regi- 
ment, whereupon it marched to Woippy. 

"The insignificant number of wounded is a clear proof that 
the regiment showed but little tenacity in the fight." 

While the Saxon Battalions and the battalions of the 
4th Guard Regiment had gotten close to St. Privat and pre- 
pared for the final assault, other fresh troops arrived. 

The 108th Rifle Regiment came from Roncourt, behind 
it the 46th Brigade, while the 20th Infantry Division, having 
arrived at St, Ail after 7 p.m., received orders to advance 
on St. Privat also. 



The French 6th Corps After the Assault 
AND THE Artillery Fight 

Concerning the departure of the French from St. 
Privat and the subsequent artillery battle, the French ac- 
count says : 

When Marshal Canrobert, remaining until the very last 
in St. Privat, perceived that the Saxons approached the vil- 
lage, he sent Major Caffarel at 7:30 P.M. to inform Mar- 
shal Bazaine at Plappeville that he was forced to fall back 
to Woippy, as his ammunition had run out. This report 
did not seem to surprise the Marshal in the least; he re- 
plied to the officer : 

"You need not be so downhearted about this retreat, for the 
movement just now started would in any case have been made to- 
morrow, we only make it some 12 hours earlier and the Prussians 
will not be able to brag that they forced us to retreat." 

Simultaneously with sending Major Caffarel to Marshal 
Bazaine, Marshal Canrobert issued orders for the retreat. 

—720— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Though numerous men left the village of St. Privat in 
disorder, detachments of the 4th, as well as the 2d and 3d 
Battalions of the 9th Regiment offered a most brave resist- 
ance on the north side ; they retired only step by step when 
the Prussian Guard advanced from the south and threatened 
them in rear. The 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, was the last 
battalion in the village streets, while the 2d took up a cov- 
ering position some few hundred meters east of the village. 

With the 9th Regiment the 3d Battalion of the 100th 
Regiment also fell back from the northwest corner and 
joined its 2d Battalion so as to receive the individual men 
still fighting in the village. 

In the meantime General Pechot had caused the two 
battalions of the 100th Regiment, the Regiment of Chas- 
seurs d'Afrique and the 94th Regiment to front against 
St. Privat. But these troops also fell back very soon. 

Four regiments of the Division of La Font de Villiers 
and three of the Division of Levassor-Sorval remained for 
a short time in front of the woods, but they also started the 
retreat at about 8 p.m., or a little thereafter. When they 
learned that Marshal Canrobert was still at St. Privat 
they halted at the woods ; but when after 8 p.m. the Marshal, 
accompanied by a few officers, arrived where they were, 
they continued the retreat. 

Shortly after St. Privat had been stormed by the Prus- 
sians, numerous German batteries went to St. Privat and 
fired from there on the retreating French infantry. First 
three horse batteries of the Guard went into position on 
ridge 326—333, towards 7 :30 P.M. the batteries of the 2d 
Guard Division — 6th Light and 5th and 6th Heavy — to- 
gether with the 3d Horse Battery of the Xth Corps advanced 
by echelons to Hill 333, their left on the road. The 1st 
Horse Battery of the Xth Corps could not find any room 
and went into position north of the road with the batteries 
of the 20th Division. 

The four batteries of the corps artillery of the 6th Corps 
— the 4th and 5th Heavy, 6th and 5th Light — went into po- 
sition on knoll 326. On their right, in the intervals between 

—721— 



Battles Around Metz 

the batteries of the 1st Guard Division and the Russian bat- 
teries, the Horse Batteries — 1st of the 4th, 2d of the 10th 
Regiment — and those batteries of the 10th Division — 1st 
Light, 1st and 2d Heavy of the Xth Corps — went into posi- 
tion. The 2d Light Battery of the Xth Corps went into posi- 
tion farther north and to the left of the 2d Horse Battery of 
the Guard. 

North of the railroad and east of Habonville were the 
3d Battery of the IXth Corps and the 1st, 2d and 3d Light 
and 1st and 2d Heavy of the Hessian Division. 

Thus, 20 German batteries were in position along the 
St. Privat road between the railroad and the high road, all 
of them in action. 

North of St. Privat and along the road leading to the 
Jaumont quarries seven Saxon batteries had gone into po- 
sition, which were soon joined by four from the Xth Corps, 
going into position on the right of the Saxons. When these 
German batteries went to the front, they were immediately 
opposed by 23 French batteries between the Amanvillers 
railroad station and the quarries of La Croix. 

Arrival of the French Guard at Amanvillers 

Shortly after the final artillery battle had commenced 
one Guard Brigade finally arrived on the left of the French 
batteries. The Grenadier Division of the Guard and seven 
batteries deployed at St. Vincent after 7 :45 P.M., and four 
batteries immediately trotted to the front by orders of 
General Bourbaki, taking position on the road from the 
Amanvillers railroad station leading to the La Croix quar- 
ries, covered by one battalion of the Zouaves and one of the 
1st Grenadier Regiment. These batteries opened fire before 
8 o'clock on the Prussian batteries at Jerusalem, but that 
fire, delivered at 3500 meters range appears to have had no 
effect. 

The larger part of the Grenadier Division — 1st Bat- 
talion Zouaves, two battalions each the 1st and 3d Grenadier 
Regiments and two batteries— remained at St. Vincent in 
reserve. 

—722— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Though 30 French batteries could have gone into ac- 
tion, most of them were short of ammunition, so that only 
from ten to twelve participated in the battle. The batteries 
of the 4th Corps especially remained in a waiting position 
and did not fire. 

When the four French Guard batteries opened fire, the 
5th and 6th Light Batteries of the Xth Corps left the long 
artillery line and went into position on hill 328 — at "Mares" 
on the map — and opened fire on this newly appearing enemy. 
But these batteries were irnmediately fired on by the skir- 
mishers of Cissey's Division of the railroad until they, with 
the help of other Prussian batteries, succeeded in driving 
these hostile skirmishers away. 

Shortly after 8 P.M. the French batteries fell back, most 
of them having fired their last shell. The French account 
expressly states that in this last artillery fight their own 
batteries had but a small loss, while the Prussian batteries 
at St. Privat, being vividly illuminated by the flames of the 
burning village, suffered much loss by the fire of the French 
skirmish lines retreating into the forest. In most cases the 
French shells fell too short and caused very immaterial 
losses. 

Long before this last artillery fight took place an inde- 
pendent, short action took place north of St. Privat between 
the 1st Battalion 9th Regiment and dispersed men of other 
regiments which had occupied the edge of the Jaumont 
woods. 

The 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, retreating from Ron- 
court into the woods was pursued by the left wing of the 
Saxons — 1st Battalion and 12th Company of the 106th Regi- 
ment. The French were lying down along the edge of the 
woods and along the ditches of the road leading into the 
forest. The 3d Battalion, 107th Regiment, soon joined the 
5 companies of the 106th and after a short fire fight the 
Saxons took the edge of the woods under the leadership of 
Colonel von Abendroth, who was severely wounded in this 
charge. The French fell back to the Jaumont quarries, but 
were driven away from there also and then commenced their 
retreat through the forest into the Bronvaux ravine. Even 

—723— 



Battles Around Metz 

before the edge of the woods was captured, the three com- 
panies of the 106th Regiment, which had been sent to Malan- 
court, and the 13th Jager Battalion as well as the 3d Bat- 
talion, 103d Regiment also came up and formed a strong 
reserve. 

The battle around St. Privat ceased with these fights. 

Concerning the subsequent retreat of the French 6th 
Corps, the French account has but little to say; a few ex- 
tracts are quoted from regimental reports and the most 
material of these extracts is about the following: 

It is impossible to describe the valorous fighting that 
took place in the streets of St. Privat until dark. When the 
Germans forced their way into the village disorder seemed 
to be more pronounced among the defenders than among the 
attackers, for all cohesion between platoons, companies and 
battalions was lost and only single groups of heroes de- 
fended the smoking ruins step by step, inspired to action by 
Marshal Canrobert in person. The bravery and self-sacri- 
fice of the last defenders cannot be doubted and it is not con- 
sidered necessary to prove it further. 

The time when fighting finally ceased also cannot be 
correctly ascertained ; the retreat commenced towards 7 :30 
P.M., and it appears that the last defenders left the village 
with the Marshal at about between 8 and 8 :30 p.m., every 
one who remained behind them being captured. 

Toward 8 o'clock Colonel Gibon led a few hundred men, 
who had been gathered together around Marengo and who 
belonged to the 25th Regiment, with band playing against 
Jerusalem; but Marshal Canrobert, who rode to the rear 
with General Levassor-Sorval personally ordered him to 
retreat. 

Even before the German batteries went into position on 
both sides of St. Privat, the regiments of the Divisions of 
Levassor-Sorval and La Font de Villers had started to re- 
treat, being covered by the 94th Regiment, which had re- 
ceived personal orders from Marshal Canrobert to hold 
out on the left of the road until the last limber had de- 
parted. When the last battery had finally departed at 
dark, this regiment also retreated. 

—724^ 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

The retreat seems to have been carried out in great 
disorder by some organizations for the Official Account says : 

The long road defile between Marengo and the village of 
Saulny was filled with vehicles of all sorts from the com- 
mencement of the battle on ; ammunition wagons of the ar- 
tillery, ambulances, regimental baggage wagons and farm- 
ers' wagons abandoned by their drivers were crowded to- 
gether along the road. Draft horses with traces cut and led 
horses, cattle, and dispersed men fled in all haste in the 
direction of Metz and the steadily increasing number of 
fugitives augmented the disorder among the troops re- 
treating along the road. 

A few retreating batteries increased the confusion. 
Thus the batteries of the Division of Levassor-Sorval, after 
having traversed Saulny, driving at the highest gait, caused 
a senseless panic among the subsistence columns on the 
road, for the artillery men called in passing: "Save your- 
selves if you can, the Prussians are behind us" — whereupon 
200 men of the convoy simply fled in wild haste, and the 
drivers cut the traces and rode off in haste on the animals. 

All along the road were capsized artillery vehicles, 
train wagons, etc. The officers did their best to assemble 
the men at all free spaces along the road, but many of the 
men first plundered the provision wagons on the road. 

The Official Account quotes several other instances of 
such confusion, and arrives at the conclusion that such in- 
stances never happened before in the French Army, but that 
the panic which took hold of the columns and trains was 
caused by nervousness, exhaustion and mental excitement 
and that the plundering of the provision wagons was due to 
hunger. 

The very inexact French Official Account closes with a 
short extract taken from General Kessel's report, about as 
follows — leaving out all unimportant details : 

"The village was completely in our possession; considering 
the darkness and general exhaution it was very difficult to find 
the men of my regiments; the very first group of men I gathered 
together, I at once dispersed again with instruction to direct all 
men of the brigade they encountered to the road. I also sent men 

—725— 



Battles Around Metz 

to Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes. The rest of the brigade bivouacked 
partly at Ste. Marie, partly at Roncourt. I omit describing the 
exhaustion of the troops. 

"At noon we had sent for water in vain, the hot day passed 
without a drop of refreshment. The well men could bear this, 
but the wounded, lying in the fields, suffered greatly. 

"The greatest confusion reigned in the villages; the streets 
were overcrowded with vehicles, guns, and men. Everyone strove 
for Ste. Marie, where the confusion reached the highest degree. 
Many wounded men were in the crowd; all endeavors to create 
order, to bring help, were in vain, there were not enough officers. 
The broad and deep ditches along the roads proved very danger- 
ous to many; the shouts and curses of the teamsters drowned 
the call of the wounded, many of whom had sought safety in the 
ditches. I reached Ste. Marie after great exertions and found the 
streets and squares filled with such a disorderly crowd that I 
abandoned all hope of being able to find any of my men. I passed 
the night on straw at the bivouac of the 1st Guard Regiment." 

That is all the French General Staff account has to say 
of the Battle of St. Privat and, what is remarkable, it con- 
tains no discussion of the tactical measures taken. But 
it shows clearly that the 7 Prussian Guard Regiments, 
supported by 9 Saxon Battalions and by the fire of 30 bat- 
teries, completely defeated the French 6th Corps, which held 
an excellent and fortified position with 40 battalions, and 
that notwithstanding the fact that towards the end of the 
battle that corps was supported by Cissey's Division of the 
4th Corps. 

Still, the losses were unusually heavy for the Prussian 
Guard regiments and the Saxons lost a total of 313 officers, 
9224 men, of these 132 officers and 2147 men killed. 

The loss of the French was comparatively small as com- 
pared with that of the Germans, for the 6th Corps lost 195 
officers and 4616 men, inclusive of 3106 missing. 

As, according to German official reports about 2000 un- 
wounded French were captured, the French loss in dead and 
wounded was about 6500 men, or a little less than one-third 
of the German loss; this is a clear proof of the value of a 
fortified position. 

If we compare the loss of the infantry with that of the 
artillery, we are surprised at the small effect the artillery 
of both sides produced. The batteries of the Prussian 
Guard lost — mainly through infantry fire — 17 officers, 185 

—726— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

men and 275 horses ; while the 16 Saxon Batteries had a loss 
of only 5 officers, 32 men and 50 horses. 

Most of the 13 batteries of the Xth Corps — ^which of 
course were in action only a short time — had no losses at all 
— their total loss being only 6 men and 18 horses. The loss 
of all the batteries was 22 officers, 223 men, and 343 horses. 
And withal a very enormous amount of ammunition was 
expended, for the 44 German batteries in action in front 
of St. Privat, expended a total of 11,800 shells. 

The batteries of the French 6th Corps and those of 
Cissey's Division expended a total of 12,179 shells and had 
a total loss of 6 officers, 113 men and 137 horses. 

At the present day it is an absolute mystery to us how it 
happened that 12,000 shells fired by the Germans disabled 
only 100 cannoneers and the same amount fired by the French 
disabled only 220 cannoneers, we are justified in stating 
that the artillery effect was next to nothing, as it took about 
one hundred shells to disable one cannoneer. But we must 
not overlook the fact that the effect of the Guard artillery 
on the infantry of the French left at Jerusalem was most 
excellent, and that several regiments — especially the 25th, 
26th, and 28th — were driven back mainly by artillery fire. 

The Prussian Guard has many times been blamed by 
military writers for having adhered too long to mass forma- 
tion in its advance, thus causing its enormous loss. This 
blame is probably justified and may be explained by the 
teachings of the drill ground, but the main error the Guard 
committed was in starting their attack entirely too soon, in- 
stead of waiting for the effect of the Saxon envelopment 
making itself felt, and that there was insufficient artillery 
preparation and that — as the French account correctly states 
— not all the cover offered by the terrain was thoroughly 
utilized. 

Though we cannot be satisfied with the tactical leader- 
ship of the Guard, we must give due measure of apprecia- 
tion to the bravery of the troops; they had performed an 
almost superhuman task, and the case probably will happen 
very seldom in future of such decimated troops not only 
holding the battlefield but also taking up the offensive. 

—727— 



Battles Around Metz 

However, the premature attack of the Guard was not 
alone due to the impatience of the leader, but it main cause 
is to be sought in the fact that the cavalry failed to clear up 
the situation as to the French right wing. Had it been 
known at noon that the French right extended far beyond 
St. Privat, then the Saxon Corps could have been started 
earlier and along a shorter route to Roncourt. Failure to 
reconnoiter the situation brought in its wake the subse- 
quent heavy consequences. 

Now, if tactical errors were committed on the German 
side, the conduct of the higher French leaders is absolutely 
inexplicable; for though Marshal .Canrobert and General 
Ladmirault several times urgently requested help from 
Marshal Bazaine, the latter left the entire Guard corps with 
its 12 Batteries, and with 16 batteries of the artillery re- 
serve, inactive in the vicinty of Plappeville until late in 
the evening. 

Marshal Bazaine remained the entire day in his quar- 
ters in Plappeville, where he said of the most important 
reports sent to him by his corps commanders nothing but: 
"That is nothing, I know that it is nothing!" 

At 4 P.M., Marshal Bazaine, leaving his entire head- 
quarters staff in Plappeville, proceeded to St. Quentin with 
a couple of officers where he personally aimed a few guns on 
the village of Jussy. He returned to Plappeville at 6 P.M., 
but at no time did he go to the decisive point. 

The fact that a commander-in-chief of a large army 
personally aimed a few guns, probably never happened be- 
fore nor since — excepting the case of Napoleon I at Mont- 
ereau; but the fact that Bazaine kept more than 150 guns 
inactive in bivouac is absolutely inexplicable. 

Had the French Guard entered the battle with 15 to 20 
batteries between 6 and 7 o'clock north of St. Privat, which 
was entirely feasible, those fresh troops would have had 
no difficulty whatever in defeating the Saxon Corps and 
thus changing defeat into a great victory. 

Therefore Marshal Bazaine alone is responsible for the 
fact that his 6th Corps was defeated, and thereby the en- 
tire battle lost. 

— 72&— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 
CHAPTER VII 

THE END OF THE FIGHT ON THE HEIGHTS OF 
AMANVILLERS AFTER 7 P.M. 

Retreat of Cissey's Division 

The batteries of Cissey's Division had expended their 
ammunition before 7 P.M. and could no longer support their 
infantry, which General Cissey had sent forward as far as 
depression 308. On the other hand, the Prussian batteries 
now redoubled their fire. 

There was no sense in remaining any longer under the 
hostile fire ; the batteries saw themselves obliged to retreat 
and that was, as the report of one battery reads, the most 
frightful stage of the day, in the 5th Battery a shell shat- 
tered the limber of one piece, so that it had to be left behind. 
In the 12th Battery three caissons remained behind, the 
teams having been killed ; and so the batteries fell back to 
the La Croix quarries where they joined the batteries of 
the 8th Corps in position there. 

Detachments of the Prussian 4th Guard Regiment had 
reached the hedge road on knoll 326 — 333; they threatened 
the right of Cissey's Division, for which reason the 1st 
Regiment in the second line executed a right turn and 
met the Grenadiers. 

The division had been under artillery fire for the past 
five hours and now General Cissey requested orders from 
General Ladmirault. 

In front of Amanvillers the troops, shaken by the shell 
fire of the Guard and Hessians, showed signs of unrest ; the 
1st and 2d Battalions, 16th Regiment, and the 2d Chasseur 
Battalion had fallen back somewhat and though they were 
led forward, their conduct caused apprehension. 

It was now plainer and plainer that the retreat of 
the 6th Corps was approaching, and soon the right wing of 
the 4th Corps would be entirely unprotected. 

General Ladmirault had received information that the 
6th Corps was falling back and that the French Guard Divi- 
sion had turned about ; he had to take up a covering position 

—729— 



Battles Around Metz 

northeast of Amanvillers to prevent being enveloped. Three 
times he had asked General Bourbaki for support but re- 
ceived no answer; he therefore ordered General Cissey to 
fall back to the edge of the Saulny woods. 

The 57th and two battahons of the 73d Regiment, as 
well as half of the 20th Chasseur Battalion, retired in good 
order in spite of the heavy artillery fire; the 6th Regiment 
and the other Chasseur companies with it followed, so that 
only the 1st Regiment remained. This- regiment, fired on 
from the rear and flanks, could not however, hold its posi- 
tion ; it again took up a position at the railroad embankment 
facing north and then retreated one hour later. 

The other troops of the division fell back under shell 
fire; and that fire prevented them from getting the knap- 
sacks they had left back in their camps. General Cissey as- 
sembled his troops at the edge of the Saulny forest, and at 
the Saulny quarries, but he perceived "that many men were 
completely exhausted and that hunger drove them to sneak 
in the dark through the woods in small groups toward Metz." 

Before 7 o'clock and before Cissey's Division had fallen 
back, General Ladmirault had informed Marshal Leboeuf 
of his desperate situation and begged him for a few battal- 
ions to help out. At the same time he directed General Lor- 
encez to hold the heights of Amanvillers to the last man ; he 
then rode to the quarries where his batteries were and 
where the 57th and 73d Regiments were about to assemble. 

Towards 7 o'clock — on the German side — Prince 
Frederick Charles encountered at the La Cusse woods Gen- 
eral von Manstein, who wanted to get hold of Amanvillers at 
all cost. By this time numerous battalions, more or less 
mixed up, were at La Cusse, and these had suffered great 
loss ; only the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 4th Hessian Regi- 
ment and the 2d Battalion of the Elizabeth Regiment were 
still fresh. As, on the other hand, the companies of the 3d 
Guard Brigade appeared to be completely exhausted and 
unfit for further offensive action, Prince Frederick Charles 
ordered that one brigade of the Illd Corps should support 
the attack on Amanvillers. 

—730— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Very early that day General von Alvensleben had in- 
tended to start from Verneville with his entire corps against 
the woods and the farm of La Folie, thinking to meet with 
great success in doing so; but under existing conditions he 
could not procure the sanction of the army commander for 
that. But when he received orders to send off one brigade, 
he caused his entire infantry to advance between Champ- 
enois and the woods of La Cusse, the 6th Division being the 
first, and the 5th in the second line. 

At this time the fight between Leipzig and Moscou had 
again flared up ; General von Bulow sent word that the bat- 
teries at Chantrenne were heavily fired on. In order to 
prevent the French from breaking out of the woods, both 
divisions were sent in that direction and the 12th Brigade 
received orders to capture the woods in front at the point of 
the bayonet. But as the enemy had stopped his forward 
movement, no fighting resulted at this point. 

By 7 o'clock the Prussian Grenadiers had approached 
the French position to within 400 meters, but they were 
hardly able to get farther without support. 

On the French side, more and more batteries were seen 
going into position after 7 o'clock — two Hessian batteries 
had gone to knoll 315, while Hessian battalions were sent 
even to the front of these batteries. 

By the retreat of Cissey's Division the right wing of 
the 5th Chasseur Battalion was uncovered and the situation 
became very precarious for the defenders of knoll 331. The 
shells of a Prussian battery, which swept the entire length 
of the French position, struck in continually larger numbers 
among the ranks of the Chasseurs standing elbow to elbow, 
many houses in Amanvillers were in flames; the camps 
there were ploughed up by the Prussian shells — several 
sentinels being killed. An hour earlier an orderly retreat 
would have been still possible, but now it was too late and the 
commanding officers of the three wing battalions — 1st of the 
54th Regiment and 5th and 2d Chasseur Battalions — saw 
that the only thing left for them was to retreat on the run to 
the heights near the quarries east of Amanvillers. The en- 
tire line rose up and fell back on Amanvillers under a hail of 

—731— 



Battles Around Metz 

shells; in that village several dressing stations were shot 
into flames before all the wounded could be removed. 

The two Chasseur battalions assembled behind the 
village, while the 1st Battalion, 54th Regiment, stopped on 
this side of the village where the 2d Battalion was and later 
on joined the 3d Battalion, whereupon the entire regiment 
took up the retreat. The remaining battalions belonging to 
Generals Lorencez' and Pradier's divisions remained in 
their positions while the Chasseurs fell back, the 2d Bat- 
talion, 65th Regiment, onlj'' fell back when it had no ammu- 
nition left ; but it was at once replaced by the 3d Battalion 
of that regiment. 

The 2d Battalion of the Elizabeth Regiment in the 
woods of La Cusse received orders at 7 o'clock to attack, 
and soon the entire Guard Brigade again charged forward. 
But even before that another French counter-attack took 
place against the 2d Battalion of the 1st Guard Grenadier 
Regiment. 

Under the apprehension that the right of the Prussian 
Grenadiers would advance across knoll 330, the 1st Batta- 
lion of the French 65th Regiment executed a right turn and 
charged the ditches along the road to Verneville, from where 
it fired rapidly on the 2d Battalion, 1st Guard Grenadier 
Regiment. This was a critical moment, as stated in the 
history of the Alexander Regiment, for nearly all cartridges 
had been expended, nearly all officers had been killed or 
wounded, but the cry "Do not fire at more than 100 meters 
range" resounded along the ranks; and the French were 
received with a hot rapid fire. The French battalion turned 
about and fell back on Amanvillers, carrying along the 3d 
Battalion of the 54th, and the 1st of the 33d, and the 3d of 
the 64th Regiment. The Grenadier battalion pursued the 
fleeing French with the bayonet for no ammunition was left 
to keep up a pursuit by fire. 

Shortly before that time the 2d Battalion of the Eliza- 
beth Regiment, the 6th and 7th Companies in the first, and 
the 5th and 8th in the second line, advanced to the charge 
with drums beating to the left of the Fusilier Battalion; 

—732— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

the other portions of the brigade joining the attack on both 
sides. 

Without firing a shot, the 2d Battalion charged with 
the bayonet like a wedge into the French line, during which 
charge the 6th and 7th Companies also participated in the 
hand fighting close to Amanvillers. 

On the French side, both battalions of the 15th Regi- 
ment and the 3d of the 64th on their right and the 1st of the 
33d Regiment immediately fled ; the 1st Battalion, 65th Reg- 
iment, was mixed up with the companies of the 15th Regi- 
ment and its colors were in great danger of being captured. 

Immediately in front of the village the French made a 
stand again and by 8 p.m. 6 (sic) battalions— 1st and 3d of 
the 54th, 1st and 2d of the 15th, 1st of the 65th, 3d of the 
64th and 1st of the 93d Regiment — stood immediately west 
of the village. 

Finally additional support arrived for the French, for 
Marshal Leboeuf sent the 41st and 71st Regiments and 
two batteries as a support as soon as he learned of the 
dangerous situation of the 4th Corps. But only a small 
portion of these troops got as far as Amanvillers, for the 
71st Regiment took up a covering position in the Chatel 
woods about two kilometers south of Montigny, and the two 
batteries, which had been previously in action at Leipzig, 
received orders en route from the artillery general Berckein 
to return, because he believed that the Prussians had fallen 
back. 

The 41st Regiment under Colonel Saussier has- 
tened as rapidly as possible towards Montigny, arriving 
there at 8 P.M. Then the regiment deployed in two lines for 
battle and with bugles sounding the charge and shouts of 
"Vive la France" it charged the right wing of the Prussian 
Grenadiers. But no contact resulted ; however, the defenders 
of Amanvillers were greatly encouraged by the appearance 
of a fresh regiment on their left wing. 

The evacuation of Amanvillers commenced between 8 
and 9 o'clock, the 15th Regiment, two battalions of the 65th, 
the 1st Battalion of the 33d and the 3d of the 64th Regiment 
proceeded to the bivouac places of the morning; a few 

—733— 



Battles Around Metz 

hundred paces west of the village two battalions of the 54th 
Regiment and on the left of them the 41st Regiment and 
the 2d and 3d Battalions, 33d Regiment, covered the re- 
treat. 

At 9 P.M. the left wing of the Prussian Guard Brigade 
again made a short attack and drove the skirmish line of 
the 54th Regiment off ; it then occupied the French position 
and thereafter there was no more fighting along the entire 
line. 

After this final blazing up of the battle, the 54th Regi- 
ment and the other troops went back to the heights 
of St. Vincent and thus the French position at Amanvillers 
was completely evacuated by 10 P.M. but — as the French 
Official Account states — the Prussian 3d Guard Brigade was 
in such a condition of exhaustion, that it fell back to be- 
hind the woods of La Cusse, leaving only a few pickets from 
the 3d Grenadier Regiment in the captured position. 

The troops at the north edge of the Saulny forest also — 
1st Guard Brigade with three batteries, Cissey's Division, 
and the 7th Hussar Regiment — started the retreat to Plap- 
peville, Woippy and St. Vincent between 9 and 10 P.M. 

The troops at St. Vincent— Lorencez' Division of the 
4th Corps — resumed their retreat on Metz at midnight. 

A few regiments of the 4th Corps remained at the 
Montigny Chateau. The 41st Regiment and two battalions 
of the 33d, which had fallen back from Amanvillers to 
Montigny, halted on the north side of the park, but started 
off again at 1 A.M. 

West of the chateau, facing Champenois — I'Envie there 
remained two battalions of the 64th and the 96th Regiment 
— they had received no orders whatever. 

To the left of the 98th Regiment, on hill 313 and in the 
La Folie farm yard were the battalions of the 51st Regi- 
ment, connecting with the troops of the 3d Corps between 
La Folie and Leipzig. The line of the 51st Regiment was 
prolonged behind the southeast corner of the Charmoise 
woods by six battalions of different regiments and between 
the woods of Charmoise and the Genivaux forest by the 
third battalions of the 69th, 81st and 95th Regiments. 

—734— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

All these French troops left before break of day, as 
will be shown later. 

On the German side, Prince Frederick Charles had 
ordered that the troops should bivouac in the captured po- 
sitions and place out strong outposts, so as to prevent any 
attempt made by the French to pierce through the German 
line. Accordingly the line of outposts ran in front of the 
IXth Corps from the I'Envie farm and Champenoise along 
the defensive position the French had occupied, i.e., across 
hills 327 — 331 connecting with the outposts of the Hessian 
division and the Guard south of St. Privat. 

The Hessian Division and 3d Guard Brigade camped 
west of the La Cusse woods, the 18th Division between 
Verneville and Chantrenne. 

The French account closes with the following com- 
ments : 

"Though the 3d Guard Brigade had achieved the great suc- 
cess of driving back the right wing of the 4th Corps on Aman- 
villers, that supporting point was actually abandoned only because 
of the defeat of the 6th Corps, which latter brought about the re- 
treat of the Division Cissey. Had Marshal Canrobert held out 
until night, Ladmirault also would have held out. 

"As a matter of fact, the attack of the Saxons on the ex- 
treme French right wing brought about the decision in the battle, 
for it robbed the 6th Corps of all thought of resistance and forced 
all troops on the five kilometers long line from Montigny to 
Roncourt to fall back in rapid succession. Thus the Germans 
had gained an actual victory, while General von Moltke — chained 
to the heels of his Sovereign — had stopped the entire day on an- 
other part of the battlefield and already thought of resuming the 
battle the following day and to regain the fortune of arms which 
he thought lost for quite a time." 

Though this comment is about correct in a general way, 
the credit due the 3d Guard Brigade is not lessened thereby — 
it stormed the French position. 

The heavy battle which the Prussian IXth Corps car- 
ried on against three divisions of the French 4th and the 
Division of Montaudon of the 3d Corps, was at the end, but 
the cost was enormous. According to the French account the 
4th Corps and the Division of Montaudon of the 3d Corps 
lost a total of 286 officers and 5672 men. 

It is very remarkable that the losses of the attacker 
were smaller than that; and this was presumably caused 

—735— 



Battles Around Metz 

by the French making several counter attacks on this part 
of the battlefield for according to French statements, the 
German batteries caused the French infantry enormous 
losses. 

The losses of the IXth Corps and of the 3d Guard Bri- 
gade was 248 officers, 5741 men and 671 horses. A com- 
parison of losses and expenditure of ammunition of the 
artillery on both sides might be of special interest. 

The 21 French batteries had a total loss of 16 officers, 
278 men and 298 horses ; they fired 16,800 shells. 

The losses of the German artillery were far heavier, for 
the 14 batteries of the IXth Corps alone lost 36 officers, 400 
men and 680 horses, so that the total loss, including the 
batteries of the Hid Corps and the Guard battery 
amounted to 41 officers, 471 men and 779 horses. 

The batteries of the IXth Corps fired 9,697 shells, the 
10 batteries of the Hid Corps fired 2,586, the Guard bat- 
teries 375 shells, a total of 12,658 shells. 

As in prior battles we again see the peculiarity that the 
ratio of shells to loss is very large. On the German side 
the losses were caused mainly by infantry fire — 5800 men 
were placed out of action and still the French fired more 
than 16,000 shells. 

On the French side the loss was 5,835 men and the 
Germans fired 12,600 shells. 



The Retreat of the French Right Wing (266) 

As Marshal Canrobert received no reply to his several 
messages sent from St. Privat, he independently ordered 
the retreat, as mentioned before this. He had received a 
general outline from the assistant chief of staff of Bazaine's 
orders for August 19th and intended to execute the old or- 
ders. But the haste with which the troops were started, 
the disorder among the troops, the impossibility of distin- 
guishing between friend and foe in the dark brought it 
about that the troops of the corps were dispersed over the 
whole stretch between Ban-St. Martin and Woippy. 

—736— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

The infantry of Tixier's 1st Division arrived at Woippy 
toward 11 o'clock and camped between the railroad and 
the road from Metz to Woippy, only the 10th Regiment of 
the division camping at the Thionville gate. 

The 9th Regiment, having been the last to leave the 
Jaumont forest, was separated into two parts and camped 
with two battalions at the St. Elroy farm building east of 
Woippy, and with one battalion at the Devant-les-Ponts rail- 
road station. 

The 4th Division, Levassor-Sorval, was assembled at 
the commencement of the retreat and in spite of the blocked 
condition of the roads arrived at 1 o'clock between Woippy 
and the railroad. 

On the other hand, the 3d Division of La Font de Vil- 
liers was badly split up ; its 1st Brigade had arrived south of 
Woippy around 11 o'clock, while the 93d Regiment camped 
on the glacis of the fortress in front of the Thionville gate 
and the 94th Regiment at the Red House east of Woippy. 

The regiments of the Cavalry Division of du Barail were 
separated from each other because of the blockades along 
the road; the regiments of African Chasseurs camped at 
Ban-St. Martin, the two French Chasseur regiments at the 
Thionville gate. 

On the other hand, the Dragoon Brigade of the 4th 
Corps had followed the 6th Corps and after 12 o'clock 
camped amongst the troops of that corps south of Woippy. 

The artillery of the 6th Corps, which had remained in 
action at the quarries of La Croix until its ammunition was 
exhausted was much split up. Of the corps artillery four 
batteries — 5th, 7th, 8th and 12th of the 8th Regiment — 
arrived. south of Woippy at 2 o'clock in the morning, while 
on their left the corps artillery of the 4th Corps camped 
and two batteries — 9th and 10th of the 13th Regiment 
— and the 6th Horse Battery of du Barail's Division camped 
at Ban-St. Martin. Three batteries — 5th, 6th and 7th of 
the 14th Regiment — of the 3d Division camped at Devant- 
les-Ponts, the 7th and 8th of the 18th Regiment, having 
left the battle very early to get fresh ammunition 

—737— 



Battles Around Metz 

from Plappeville and who had lost several wagons in the 
general panic, camped north of Plappeville. In addition to 
the troops of the 6th Corps Cissey's Division of the 4th 
Corps also camped at Woippy. 

As mentioned earher, the 2d Brigade of this corps left 
the northern fringe of the Saulny woods at 8:30 P.M., ar- 
riving near Woippy at about 2 A.M., while the 1st Brigade 
with which the commanding general, Ladmirault, was, ar- 
rived there at 4 A.M., having marched by St. Vincent and 
Lorry. 

The batteries of Cissey's Division also were separated 
the 12th of the 15th Regiment was at Lorry, under protec- 
tion of two chasseur companies, while the 5th and 9th bat- 
teries of the same regiment camped at Sansonnet. 

Of the 4th Corps, one brigade of the Grenadier's 2d 
Division — 64th and 98th Regiments — remained back at Mon- 
tigny, the other brigade of that division was at the north- 
ern edge of the Saulny woods and marched from there with 
the three battalions of the division at 9:30 o'clock via 
Lorry to Sansonnet. Pradier's Brigade having remained 
on the battlefield, had received no orders up to 4 
o'clock in the morning; but when the commanding general 
observed the troops of the 3d Corps on his left marching 
off, he decided at 6 :30 A.M., to also march off, and marched 
by Amanvillers and Lorry to Sansonnet, joining his division 
there. In this retreat a squadron of Hessian Dragoons ad- 
vanced against the departing French, but it was driven off 
by the fire of two companies of the 98th Regiment. 

The 3d Division of Lorencez, which had marched close 
to the Bellecourt's Brigade of the 2d Division at St. Vincent, 
received orders for the start at 11 :30 o'clock and had 
started at 'about 12 o'clock via Lorry, followed by the 7th 
Hussar Regiment. The latter regiment arrived at Sanson- 
net at about 3 A.M., where also the batteries of the divi- 
sion — 8th, 9th and 10th of the 1st Regiment — camped, 
while the infantry of the division and three batteries of 
the 2d Division went into camp at 4 A.M. south of Sanson- 
net, their right wing at the railroad. 

—738— 



Battles at Gravelotte, Amanvillers and Saint Privat 

Thus the troops of the 4th and 6th Corps were assem- 
bled at daybreak between Woippy and the fortress; with- 
out reference to the orders issued by Marshal Bazaine they 
had taken up the position offered them by the chances of 
a night march. 

The Guard Division Picard, reaching with 6 Batteries 
the northern edge of the Saulny forest late in the evening, 
also left its positions shortly after 9 P.M. and reached its 
old camping places again at Plappeville by about 11 o'clock, 
so that the entire right wing of the French army had with- 
drawn to beneath the guns of the fortress by midnight. 



—739— 



PART IV 

Miscellaneous Accounts 



THE DAILY NEWS CORRE- 
SPONDENCE 

OF 

THE WAR BETWEEN 
GERMANY AND FRANCE 

1870-71 

London and New York 

MacMillan & Company 

1871 



Extract 



Weissenburg 

A correspondent at Weissenburg of the Daily News, who 
was with the French army, transmitted the following brief 
account of the action : 

"Whilst General Douay's division, composed of the 74th 
and 50th Regiments of the Line, the 16th Battalion of Chas- 
seurs on foot, one regiment of Turcos, and a regiment of 
mounted Chasseurs, were encamped in the neighbourhood 
of Weissenburg, they were startled by a tremendous dis- 
charge of artillery. As the patrols, which had been posted 
all along the line of the frontier, had not signalled the pres- 
ence of any Prussian troops, the men believed for a moment 
that they were surrounded by the enemy. This was not the 
case; but the Prussians, in great force and well supplied 
with artillery, appeared on the heights of Schweigen, occu- 
pying the whole of the country near the small Bavarian vil- 
lage. General Douay ordered his troops to advance before 

—743— 



War Correspondence 

the enemy, keeping as much as possible behind Weissenburg, 
which lay just between them and the Prussian forces. But 
this precaution proved quite useless, for the guns were pour- 
ing a tremendous fire upon them, and the troops were fall- 
ing in great numbers in the village of Weissenburg itself. 
The French retired from their former position, and com- 
menced marching on the right side of the village. The 
Prussian guns were firing at a tremendous rate, and three 
rounds fell partly in the town and partly among the troops. 
Several of the houses were set on fire and a good number of 
soldiers lay dead or wounded. At about eleven o'clock Gen- 
eral Voscan's division began to retire. However, a new at- 
tack was ordered. The Turcos led the way, and, bayonet in 
hand, threw themselves on one of the Prussian batteries of 
artillery. All proved useless. Had the French insisted on 
attacking the enemy any longer, there would not have been 
one of them left alive on the ground. 

"As soon as what was left of General Douay's forces 
began retiring, the Prussian artillery pursued them. About 
twelve o'clock General Douay himself fell a victim to the 
Prussian artillery. The French troops commenced running 
without order, crossing roads and vineyards until they 
reached the farthest part of Weissenburg. The number of 
dead and wounded must have been very large indeed. The 
remaining troops are eager to revenge the death of their 
general. The country people seem to be in great conster- 
nation. The roads which lead to Hagenau are covered 
with peasants carrying their goods and cattle with them, 
and lamenting over the sad fate reserved for their humble 
cottages." 



Worth 

The Special Correspondent of the Daily News with the 
army of the Crown Prince wrote, on the 10th of August, 
from headquarters: 

"The swift and skilful movement against Weissenburg 
resulting in complete success to the German arms, was but 

—744— 



War Between Germany and France 

a foretaste of the storm which threatened the northern 
part of Alsace. On the second day after Weissenburg 
came the battle of Worth, and the Crown Prince gained a 
great victory over the ablest generals in France. It is ad- 
mitted that the French fought with reckless courage, and 
that they inflicted heavy loss on their opponents, but the 
fact of this hard fighting and of this heavy loss shows how 
serious a defeat was sustained by MacMahon. I traversed 
the battle-field whilst the dead still lay unburied on the 
trampled ground, and could form a good notion of how the 
fight had gone by the ghastly evidence which remained. 
Worth is at the bottom of a fertile valley between two 
ridges of cultivated ground. There is a quantity of wood- 
land in the neighbourhood, and especially behind the French 
position, or on the western side of the valley, there is a 
strip of forest which forms a cover for retreating troops. 
The little River Bruder, not deep enough in summertime 
to float a skiff, flows through the village, and a high road 
comes winding down towards it on the eastern side of the 
valley, flanked by trees. Here was the German position, 
stretching far to right and left. Along this road were heaps 
of spiked helmets to be seen, and cart-loads of needle-guns 
collected under the trees. At a distance the French mus- 
ketry fire had told more heavily than the German, and I 
heard that the French artillery had been very well served. 
But though the burying parties were busy with the Ger- 
man dead on this eastern side of Worth, there was more 
than an exchange of slaughterous work on the western side. 
Here the Prussians and Bavarians had pushed forward in 
strong force, and their fire had told fearfully upon the 
French. The high spirit and rigid discipline of the one 
army had been more than a match for the desperate re- 
sistance of the other. Whole companies of Frenchmen had 
been mowed down in their wild attempts to check the ene- 
my's advance. It had been a tolerably equal fight in some 
places, for the ground was strewn with German dead. But 
more and more Frenchmen had fallen in proportion. Black 
Turcos and wide-trousered Zouaves lay thick at many 
points, and the Cuirassiers had suffered much. There were 

—745— 



War Correspondence 

steel breast-plates and brass helmets scattered thickly on 
the line of the retreat, whilst the dead horses in all direc- 
tions might be counted by hundreds. And so, westward 
through the wood, went the traces of increasing disaster: 
officers and men lying grimly where they had fallen, some 
of them in quiet, shady spots, as though they were pick- 
nickers asleep; pools of blood where the wounded had been 
found; knapsacks, riifles, and overcoats, either thrown away 
in flight or left by the wounded on the field. Then came 
a spot where the French had rallied, and where the dead 
of both sides lay thick. Turcos might be seen who had 
evidently fought to the last, and had tried to fire their 
pieces as they lay. Frenchmen of the line regiments had 
here and there fallen in numbers, as though they had halted 
and faced about in regular order. But the aspect of the 
fields beyond the wood seemed to indicate a hasty retreat. 
Wagons were overturned, baggage was thrown out upon 
the roadside, and many knapsacks were to be seen. No 
one who had passed over that battle-ground of Worth when 
I did could have failed to realize that a great disaster had 
befallen the French arms, though, at a time when most of 
the wounded had been removed and on so large a scene of 
action it would have been impossible to judge of the exact 
loss sustained. However, I see no reason to doubt the oflft- 
cial return on the German side, which gives about 10,000 
Frenchmen and 7,000 Germans hors de combat, and about 
7,000 prisoners taken by the victors — 4,000 in the battle, 
and 3,000 more in the pursuit. These losses, with the fur- 
ther loss of cannon and colours, made Worth an evil day 
for France. Well might the wounded Germans raise them- 
selves to cheer the Crown Prince as he passed, and cry 
that Germany was safe. It will often be told how the 
armies met on the 6th of August, and how MacMahon made 
his unsuccessful effort to repel the invasion of Alsace, how 
the Prussians held the left of the line, the Bavarians and 
Wurtembergers the right, and how a few Baden troops, 
held in reserve by the Crown Prince, were brought up just 
in time to share the honours of the day. There was a 
fierce attack on both sides, it being difficult to say which 

—746— 



War Between Germany and France 

party began, and gradually, as the German troops pressed 
round upon their opponents' line of retreat, the French 
were forced to make so hasty a retrogade movement that 
the retreat became very nearly a rout. The Crown Prince 
handled his army so as to make the most of the deadly fire 
of his infantry. The cavalry was not used for an attack in 
the first instance, but was sent in pursuit when the enemy 
began his retreat. It was a victory due to the patriotic ar- 
dour of the German troops, as much as to anything in 
their discipline or tactics ; but we must not forget that the 
French showed ardour likewise, and that the scale was 
turned for the Germans at Worth by their intelligent un- 
derstanding of the breech-loader drill, and by their steadi- 
ness in firing. These matters take time to learn, and I 
hope that our volunteers will have a chance of learning 
them before they are called upon to face a foe who may 
have learnt the new weapon at his leisure. We see the 
glorious results which Germany is reaping from her care- 
ful preparation. 

"The prisoners were assembled near the first station 
of the reopened railway through Weissenburg. I could see 
many Turcos and Zouaves among them, though the greater 
part were soldiers of the line. We drove past them very 
slowly, for the road was blocked with ammunition wagons, 
and I noticed that they seemed wofully discouraged. There 
were no songs and no laughter to be heard among them, 
and the few that were occupying themselves with pick- 
ing fruit on trees that they had climbed had not a very 
lively air, for Frenchmen in such a position as fruit-pick- 
ing. Then came the convoys of wounded moving to the 
rear. Suffering had made them brothers in misfortune. 
The mingled Germans and Frenchmen, with such opposite 
ideas about the Rhine in their heads all the while, sat or 
lay quietly side by side, as if they were old comrades. The 
only enemy, and the common enemy too, was the jolting 
wagon. As we neared Worth there was a constant stream 
of wagons bringing down wounded men. Prussians and 
Bavarians, Turcos and Frenchmen, bore the agony of the 
road with equal silence. It was rare to hear a cry, though 

—747— 



War Correspondence 

the poor fellows' faces showed much pain. They were sad- 
der to see in their blood-stained bandages, with suffering 
still about them, than the men who lay grimly on the hill- 
sides. Worth itself was a mere hospital, and all the in- 
habitants were either nursing the wounded or burying the 
dead. It was an evil fate for the picturesque little place 
that more than a hundred thousand men on one side and 
the other should have settled their quarrel so near at hand. 
"Of coming movements, I must say not a word. The 
event of yesterday was the capture by Wurtemberg troops 
of the little fortress of Leuchtenberg, where a large amount 
of military stores is reported to have been found. The 
assailants fired heavily into the place, and we heard their 
guns booming all yesterday forenoon." 

Two days afterwards the same correspondent wrote: 
"The more we gather of the details of the battle of 
Worth, the more clearly does it appear that there was no 
miracle about the affair, no sudden surprise to military crit- 
ics — as though a new weapon had been discovered. From 
the villages in rear of the field I gather far more of the 
French movements than could be learned from the prison- 
ers or the villagers upon the field itself. It would seem 
that the Imperial commanders in this quarter were alto- 
gether outmaneuvered h(y the Crown Prince; and that, 
whatever the merits of the respective small-arm fire, there 
was no comparing the tactics of the two armies. The 
French allowed themselves to be so placed as to have re- 
quired no common degree of fighting to save them. First 
we hear of their blind confidence, and of their cries of "To 
Berlin" ! whilst they were really in desperate danger. Then 
came the news of the surprise at Weissenburg and of the 
death of General Douay. He was posted in a corner of the 
French territory with masses of German troops collected 
on both his flanks, and was much farther from his supports 
than prudence warranted in face of such an enemy. It 
can never be known whether the French commander would 
have extricated his men with less loss than they actually 
sustained, had he lived to direct them, for he fell by one 

—748— 



War Between Germany and France 

of the first discharges of artillery. Thus was a step gained 
by the Germans. They had gallantly stormed the position 
at Weissenburg, and had begun to shatter the enemy in 
detail. MacMahon and De Failly were now called on to 
act. The former marched against the Crown Prince with 
his whole corps d'armee, and expected De Failly to support 
his left in case of a check. Here again was displayed the 
impetuous over-confidence which Frenchmen are apt to 
show. The second opportunity of beating them in detail 
was given to the Germans, and a bloody battle was the re- 
sult. The Prussians and Bavarians together far outnum- 
bered the corps of MacMahon, and before the French Mar- 
shal had been long engaged he was sending aide-de-camp 
after aide-de-camp to beg help from De Failly. The dis- 
tance was not great to Bitsche, and the message must have 
arrived in time to bring the needed help, if only everything 
had been ready. But here again over-confidence had pre- 
vailed. One French corps was destroyed before 'the other 
came to its support. People who saw it tell with wonder 
of the rush of MacMahon's beaten army westward, and the 
advance of angry and almost incredulous troops coming to 
their aid, towards the front. It was too late to renew the 
battle, too late to save the fine regiments which lay strewn 
over the fields at Worth. The more desperate the resis- 
tance, the greater had been the slaughter, until at last 
there had been a sort of panic. Frenchmen seldom retreat 
in good order after a defeat. The fugitives from Worth 
were in great disorder as they passed through villages 
more than ten miles in the rear. The corps of De Failly 
could only have sacrificed itself uselessly when once Mac- 
Mahon's soldiers had been demoralized, and to have fought 
a second battle of Worth would have been to play into the 
hands of the Crown Prince, who would like nothing better 
than to engage the while French army in detail, and beat 
them by degrees. We must remember that he is the better 
general who has the larger force present in the nick of 
time." 



—749- 



War Correspondence 

At Metz 

At Metz the excitement of the heterogeneous multi- 
tude which had been collected there, was extreme. A Special 
Correspondent of the Daily News, who arrived there in 
the midst of it, wrote on the 7th of August: — 

"I reached Metz this morning at six o'clock from Nancy. 
On my alighting at the Hotel de I'Europe I immediately 
perceived that something was going wrong. The scene at 
the hotel presented a most exciting aspect. The waggons 
of the Etats-Majors, which for several days had been 
filling up the whole courtyard, were being got ready for 
leaving. The officers were packing up their things in great 
haste. Some of them seemed very busy giving orders; 
others were taking breakfast in the table-de-hote room ; 
others again, seemed ready for starting, and were discussing 
with great passion the issue of late events. Though I was 
about the only bourgeois there, and saw that the officers 
looked at me in a very suspicious sort of way, I did not 
stir from my place. I had not been sitting down an hour 
at the cafe before the hotel, when up came a veterinary 
officer whom I had known not long ago, and whom I knew 
to belong to General Ladmirault's corps. The news he gave 
me was sufficient to justify the terror and panic one read 
in everybodys' face. A fierce battle had been going on 
ever since Thursday. The rest of the army was completely 
en deroute, and notwithstanding the valour shown by the 
troops, it seemed impossible to arrest the progress of the 
Prussians. The 76th and 77th Regiments of the Line had 
kept for four hours their position against something like 
fifty thousand men. One regiment of Chasseurs and an- 
other of Cuirassiers had been completely destroyed. One 
battalion of the 40th, a thousand strong, had retired with 
105 men. Of the three other battalions, it was with the 
greatest difficulty that two could be formed with only one 
officer per company. As to the feeling in the whole army 
against General MacMahon and the leading officers, it is 
something tremendous. What was your plan? They keep 
asking. Why weaken our forces by occupying such a long 

—750— 



War Between Germany and France 

line when the enemy was only a few miles distant, and it 
would be impossible for us to concentrate at a given point 
when the enemy might be upon us at any moment? Why 
march against Saarbruck when the whole army was not 
yet in a position to engage in separate battles? Not half 
of the African corps had arrived. Thousands of men had 
not yet joined their regiments, and as to speaking of the 
commissariat department, it has proved truly inefficient. 
It is not a question of time — it is a question of military 
organization. The Prussian system is so easy and so simple, 
that an army, however numerous it may be, is sure to meet 
with no such inconveniences as have been experienced on 
this occasion by the French. What moral influence can a 
general such as MacMahon have on his army, when the 
men, even the most uninstructed, see with their own eyes 
the mismanagement of the whole undertaking? What can 
men think of their generals, and with what heart can they 
combat to invade a hostile country, when food and straw 
and hay, and all that is requisite for an army, is wanting 
them in their own country? 

"How is it possible that the general officers immediately 
under the commanders of this miserable war can execute 
with zeal and with punctuality the orders they receive, 
when a general like MacMahon is heard to say, after having 
fought for so many hours, that he must stop because they 
have no more ammunition? The fact is, that the morale 
of the whole army has greatly suffered. When on the field 
of battle, soldiers will never lament much at seeing a regi- 
ment returning from the fight reduced to a half or a quarter 
of its number, as long as they are assured that some good 
has come out of it. But when they perceive that valour 
and elan are useless before an enemy who only acts accord- 
ing to strict strategy, they lose their spirits. The people 
at Metz are in a most excited state of mind. They have 
not one man in town, and the Prussians are reported to 
have occupied St. Avoid, which is only about fifteen miles 
from here. The Prussians have now the line to Forbach, 
and have taken possession of it. Some friends of mine 

—751— 



War Correspondence 

were at the railway station all night yesterday, waiting to 
see the arrival of the wounded, but not one appeared. Where 
are they ? In whose hands ? Some of the officers who have 
made their way back here, say they lost all their baggage. 
"While I was writing I heard a great row going on in 
the courtyard. I went down and saw that the guards at 
the gate had been ordered off. The servants were putting 
the officers' baggage in the waggons and they all seemed to 
be in a great hurry. I am told that the Emperor intends 
removing his headquarters, perhaps to Nancy, as the Prus- 
sians appear to be directing themselves towards that town. 
* * * * Great excitement prevails. The Emperor's carriage 
and horses are being brought to the railway station." 



With German Third Army 

The Special Correspondent of the Daily News with 
the Crown Prince wrote, on the 11th of August: — 

"There has been a shifting of quarters from village to 
village since I last wrote ; indeed, the army of the Crown 
Prince is so active that this shifting of quarters is an almost 
daily occurrence. Everything is done in perfect order. The 
carriages are told off in a slow moving column, with mounted 
troopers at intervals to regulate the line of march, and 
when all are placed there is a halt of a few minutes to 
allow the Prince and his Staff to pass. Well may the vil- 
lagers stare at the show, for they are not likely to see 
again so many fine horses and bright uniforms. Old and 
young crowd the wayside as His Highness goes by, and doff 
their caps respectfully, but without any sign of welcome. 
It is curious to see these German Frenchmen, or rather 
these Gallicized Germans, dealing with the invaders. The 
powers of understanding one another makes their inter- 
course much less disagreeable than might be suspected. Yet 
nevertheless, there is a strong sympathy with France among 
the Alsatian peasants, because they have, thanks to the 
conscription, such a number of their sons serving in the 
French Army, I notice that the younger folks can all speak 

—752— 



War Between Germany and France 

a little French, though they answer the question of the 
soldiers, "Parlez vous Chassepot?" with a sententious 
"Nein," which seems to imply utter ignorance of the lan- 
guage referred to. Poor Souls! they are very much fright- 
ened by this astounding invasion, and make the most of their 
rough Alsatian dialect, as a means of propitiating the new 
and dreaded invaders of the empire. I must say, in justice 
to the German troops, that this dread of the invaders is 
founded on a notion of what might be, rather than on what 
really happens. Beyond compulsory service in country 
waggons to carry wounded men, or loads of hay, and com- 
pulsory sales of provisions to the military authorities, there 
is little to complain of. It is as with Wellingtons' Army 
in Southern France in 1814, rather than as with the Allied 
Armies in that memorable year. No invasion can be pleas- 
ant to the conquered people, but this one of 1870 is con- 
ducted on the humane principles of modern warfare. The 
Crown Prince of Prussia has resolved to strike only at the 
French Government, and at the armed forces which oppose 
him, and to spare as far as possible the unfortunate people 
who inhabit the scene of hostilities." 



The Battle of Borny 
August 14, 1870 

Some of the aspects of the battle were thus described 
by a Correspondent of the Daily News, who was shut up 
in Metz, in a letter dated August 15: — 

"Yesterday we thought all chance of sending letters 
gone, for we got nothing even from Paris. But this morn- 
ing I hear a post will start for the capital, and I take my 
chance of your getting what I am able to tell from the 
inside of a town which is surrounded by armies — whether 
French or Prussian does not much matter so far as news 
is concerned. At eleven o'clock yesterday Bazaine effected 
a reconnaissance with one division. At two, a battle com- 
menced on the right, at Borny. Till four it was of no great 



-753— 



War Correspondence 

importance, but then the 4th Army Corps, forming the first 
line of battle, accomplished a manoeuvre intended to deceive 
the Prussians into the belief that it was retreating. This 
was at a quarter past four. The Prussians rushed forward 
and attacked with surprising vigour. Then the 4th Corps 
whose retreat to the left was a mere feint, fell at once on 
the enemy's flank, while Canrobert, on the right, attacked 
simultaneously. The Prussian attack meantime had been 
developed in great force on the French centre. The move- 
ments on both sides were effected with singular precision, 
and the whole spectacle was like a review at Chalons. The 
Prussians advanced in close column against the French 
line, which their artillery, splendidly served as it was, had 
vainly attempted to shake. The French officers consider 
that the Prussian infantry is relatively inferior to their 
artillery. The needleguns is heavy, and appears to incom- 
mode them greatly when climbing a height or moving rapidly 
over broken ground. The soldiers themselves are active. 
They fire lying flat on the ground seeking cover from every 
irregularity, but do not put their knapsacks, as the French 
do, to make little ramparts in front of them, and rests for 
their guns. The Prussians fired with great deliberation, 
while the French rattle away as fast as they could discharge 
their Chassepots. The regiments most closely engaged were 
the 69th, 90th, 44th, 60th, 80th, 33rd, 54th, 65th, and 85th 
of the Line, the 11th and 15th Foot Chasseurs, and the 8th, 
9th, and 10th Batteries of the 1st Regiment of Artillery. 
Those which suffered most were the 44th and 90th of the 
Line, and 15th Foot Chasseurs. The 44th especially was 
terribly shattered, while the 85th, though in the thickest 
of the action, lost but thirty-five men killed and wounded. 
The colonel of the 44th was killed. The colonel of the 3rd 
Horse Chasseurs, and Generals Duplessis and Castamar, 
were wounded. The above details are mostly gathered from 
officers coming into town after the fight was over. At the 
beginning I followed a troop of Hussars as far as permitted, 
and what I saw of the fight was from a hillock, close by the 
walls. A Staff officer came to summon the Hussar regiment 

—754— 



War Between Germany and France 

with some officers of which I was seated in a cafe. In five 
minutes they were off, and halted at first on the hillock 
above mentioned. On a sudden signal they went tearing 
away to the front, and in a moment more the artillery on 
both sides had covered the valley of the river, and the whole 
works in front and the ground beyond, with a thick cloud 
of smoke. There was nothing to do but to return to town. 
By half-past eight in the evening a bulletin was placarded 
in the streets, saying : "Firing is nearly over. The Prussian 
lines extended three leagues. Ground gained in every 
direction." It does not say by whom ground was gained. 
Officers who came back later from the field maintained 
that victory rested with the French, that the Prussians had 
been out-generalled and lost heavily, while the French were 
comparatively little exposed. But a Prussian officer who 
had been taken prisoner and who came into my cafe on 
parole with a French officer, told a different story. Said he, 
"You had better surrender at discretion. We are more 
than 200,000 strong. You will be crushed. As to the battle, 
you had your own way at first, for we believed we had only 
a division in front of us, but you know what the end was." 
It was difficult to question even officers closely, so keen are 
still the suspicions about spies; and to ask whether the 
French army had suffered a defeat would be to expose 
myself to instant expulsion, or worse. Hence I can give you 
only such particulars as are collected in the ways I have 
mentioned. I do not know why the advanced columns have 
returned again under the walls of the fortress. 

"This morning, Monday, there were reports of heavy 
artillery towards Thionville, but all is again quiet. We only 
know that Sunday's conflict was not decisive, and that 
another battle is imminent. The troops are never at rest, 
manoeuvres in one direction or another are going on con- 
stantly. Orders have this moment been issued that no 
civilian shall leave the city on any pretext. Two shots from 
Fort St. Quentin have just demolished the head of the 
Thionville Railway bridge at Metz Station. I am told it 
was done to cut off a detachment of 500 Prussians encamped 

—755— 



War Correspondence 

at Montigny, who attempted to cross the Moselle, and were 
seen from the fort. At seven this morning two Prussian 
cuirassiers entered that town. They were followed by four 
others. Breakfast was served to the six, and paid for ; they 
promenaded the town till eight, and withdrew, not only 
unmolested by anybody, but carrying off two prisoners — a 
St. Cyr pupil and an orderly. All this, at a mile and a 
half from Metz, will give you some notion of the dash and 
boldness of the Prussian cavalry. Last night we thought 
we heard the Prussians shouting victory, notwithstanding 
the defeat we believe they suffered. But it seems some of 
their regiments sing hymns nightly, with accompaniments 
from their military bands, a custom they have preserved 
from the battle of Leuthen, where they advanced to the 
charge singing Luther's Hymn. They end with hurrahs. 
We heard them distinctly. The Emperor and his Staff, 
Prince Imperial and all, are at Longeville. As I write, 
there passes a closed carriage escorted by a picket of 
Hussars in command of a captain of the Staff. It contains 
a Prussian envoy, re-conducted to his own lines. French 
officers say he brought a request for an armistice, and 
admitted that Prussian losses were considerable. But he 
did not tell his errand to them nor to me." 



The Battles Near Metz 

A correspondent who witnessed the battle from the 
King's field headquarters — near the Prussian right — 
wrote to the Daily News the following account: — 

"The first realization we had at Pont-a-Mousson of the 
extent to which fighting had been going on at the front was 
the coming in of wounded men. At first it was surmised 
that these had been wounded in skirmishes; but on the 
16th, late in the evening, there were signs that the work 
was becoming warm. On that evening soldiers with ghastly 
wounds walked about the market-place in Pont-a-Mousson, 
surrounded by eager groups of their newly-arrived com- 
rades, and told a story of disaster. Poor fellows ! It surely 

— 756— 



War Between Germany and France 

was disaster to them — borne away as they had been from 
the field without having heard of any result. I stood among 
these groups, and the narratives of the men all amounted 
to their having been set to confront a much larger force 
than their own, and that their division had been cut up. I 
was struck by the fact that, though there was some dissatis- 
faction suggested by their tone of voice, I heard no word 
uttered by narrators or listeners which accused any one. 
They dwelt rather on the fact that a heavy blow had been 
dealt on the 14th; and that though the 10th Division had, 
as an available organization, been demolished, it had sold 
its life dear. On the 17th the wounded from the preceding 
day began to pour into Pont-a-Mousson. They were brought 
in long uncovered grain carts, lying upon hay. From my 
window, which overlooked the main street, and commanded 
also a view of the market-place, I counted more than 
ninety of these long carts, each holding on an average about 
ten men. Many more must have gone to the various hos- 
pitals. It was strange to see the French citizens unable to 
conceal their joy. But now came the other side of the 
account. The streets began to swarm with other waggons, 
with other wounded — the wearers of red trousers. Now 
and then a batch of prisoners. And at length a carriage 
came in with a French general. It was followed by a vast 
crowd of French, and for a little time it seemed as if there 
might be a collision between the inhabitants and the Prus- 
sians, so earnest were the demonstrations of the populace. 
"But it was now at least evident that the struggle was 
very serious at the front. At midnight, or a little after 
(17th-18th), all the trumpets for miles around began to 
sound. This was the first time we had been startled at 
that hour by such wild music. Trumpet answered to trumpet 
through all the bivouacs around the little city. For several 
days previous there had been troops almost perpetually 
marching through ; but now the tramp through every street 
and by-way made between midnight and dawn a perpetual 
roar. Hastily dressing, I ran out into the darkness, and man- 
aged to get a seat on a waggon that was going in the direc- 

—757— 



War Correspondence 

tion of the front — now understood to be a mile or two 
beyond the village of Gorze. Gorze is some twelve miles from 
Pont-a-Mousson. On our way we met a considerable batch 
of French prisoners, who were looked upon with great 
curiosity by the continuous file of German soldiers with 
whom we advanced; but only one or two offensive cries 
towards the prisoners were heard, and these fortunately 
they could not understand. The way was so blocked with 
waggons, &c., that I finally concluded that I could go the 
six or seven miles remaining better on foot. So I got out 
of my carriage and began to walk and run swiftly ahead. 
At Noveant-aux-Pres, on the Moselle, about half way to 
Metz, I found vast bodies of cavalry, Uhlans and Hussars, 
crossing the river by a pontoon bridge, and hurrying at the 
top of their speed towards Gorze. Hastening my steps, I 
soon heard the first thunder of the cannonade, seemingly 
coming from the heart of a range of hills on the right. Pass- 
ing through the village and ascending to the high plain 
beyond, I found myself suddenly on a battle-field, strewn 
(literally) as far as my eye could reach with dead bodies — 
the field of the battle of Vionville on the 16th. On one or two 
parts of the field the parties were still burying the dead, 
chiefly Prussians. The French, being naturally buried last, 
were still lying in vast numbers on the ground. A few of 
these — I saw five — were not dead. As I hurried on, a 
splendid regiment of cavalry came on behind, and when 
they came to the brow of the hill, they all broke out with a 
wild hurrah, and dashed forward. A few more steps, and 
I gained the summit, and saw the scene which had roused 
their cry, and even seemed to thrill their horses. It would 
be difficult to imagine a grander battle-field. From the 
particular hill to which I had been directed to come by good 
authority it was occupied by the Royal Headquarters — the 
sweep of the Prussian and French centres could be seen, 
and a considerable part of their wings. The spot where J. 
stood was fearful — it was amidst ghastly corpses, and 
burdened with the stench of dead horses, of which there 
were a great many. I was standing on the battle-field of 



-758— 



War Between Germany and France 

the 16th, on the Prussian side. On the left stretched like 
a silver thread the road to Verdun, to Paris also for the 
possession of which this series of battles had begun. It was 
between lines of poplars, which stood against the horizon 
on my'left, and on as far as the eye could reach towards 
Metz, with military regularity. Strung on this road like 
beads were the pretty villages, each with its church tower, 
which, although they have separate names are really only 
a few hundred yards apart — Mars-la-Tour, Flavigny (a little 
south of the road), Vionville, Rezonville, Malmaison, Grav- 
elotte. On my right were the thickly-wooded hills, behind 
which was the most important village of the neighbourhood, 
the one I had just left — Gorze. Such was the foreground 
of this battle, which should, one would say, be called the 
battle of Gravelotte, for it was mainly over and beyond 
that devoted little town that it raged. The area I have 
indicated is about four miles square. Owing to having 
come on foot rather than along the blocked road, I was for- 
tunate enough to arrive just as the battle waxed warm — 
that is, about noon. The great representatives of Prussia 
were standing on the same ground watching the conflict. 
Among them the only ones I recognized were the King, 
Count Bismarck, General von Moltke, Prince Charles, 
Prince Frederick Charles, Prince Adalbert, and Adjutant 
Kranski. Lieutenant-General Sheridan, of the United 
States, was also present. 

''At this moment the French were making a most desper- 
ate effort to hold on to the last bit of the Verdun road, 
that between Rezonville and Gravelotte — or that part of 
Gravelotte which on some maps is called Malmaison. Des- 
perate but unavailing! For every one man in their ranks 
had two to cope with, and their line, at the place indicated, 
was already beginning to waver. Soon it was plain that 
this wing was withdrawing to a new position. This was 
swiftly taken up under protection of a continuous blaze 
of their artillery from heights beyond the village. The 
movement was made in good order, and the position reached 
was one that, I believe, nine of ten military men would have 

—759— 



War Correspondence 

regarded as normally impregnable. My reader will observe 
that the battle-field was from this time transferred to the 
regions beyond Gravelotte. The fields in front of that 
village were completely covered by the Prussian reserves, 
and over it interminable lines of soldiers were perpetually 
marching onward — disappearing into the village, emerging 
on the other side of it with flaming volleys. This second 
battle-field was less extensive than the first, and brought the 
combatants into fearfully close quarters. The peculiarity 
of it is that it consists of two heights, intersected by a 
deep ravine. This woody ravine is over 100 feet deep, and 
at the top from 200 to 300 yards wide. The side of the 
chasm next to Gravelotte, where the Prussians stood, is 
much lower than the other side, which gradually ascended 
to a great height. From this their commanding eminence 
the French held their enemies fairly beneath them, and 
subjected them to a raking fire. Their artillery was sta- 
tioned far up by the Metz road, between its trees. There 
was not an instant's cessation of the roar; and easily dis- 
tinguishable amid all was the curious grunting roll of the 
mitraileuse. The Prussian artillery was to the north and 
south of the village, the mouths of the guns on the latter 
side being necessarily raised for an awkward upward fire. 
The French stood their ground and died, the Prussians 
moved ever forward and died — both by hundreds, I had 
almost said thousands ; this for an hour or two that seemed 
ages, so fearful was the slaughter. The hill where I stood 
commanded chiefly the conflict behind the village and to 
the south of it. The Prussian reinforcements on their 
right filed out of the Bois des Ognons and it was at that 
point, as they marched on to the field, that one could per- 
haps get the best idea of the magnitude of the invading 
army now in the heart of France. There was no break 
whatever for four hours in the march of the men out of that 
wood. It seemed almost as if all the killed and wounded 
had recovered and came again out of the wood. Birnam 
Wood advancing to Dunsinane was not a more ominous sight 
to Macbeth than these men of General Goben's army, 

—760— 



War Between Germany and France 

shielded by the woods till they were fairly within range of 
their enemies. So the French must have felt, for between 
four and five o'clock they concentrated a most furious fire 
upon that point, and shelled the woods perpetually. Their 
fire here took effect. The line of Prussian infantry became 
less continuous from that direction. About five o'clock, 
however, an infantry brigade emerged from the same point. 
As soon as they did so they advanced by double-quick time 
towards the point where their services were needed. I 
watched this brigade through a strong glass from the first. 
It resembled some huge serpent gliding out on the field. 
But, lo! it left a track behind it — a dark track. Beneath 
the glass that track is resolved into fallen, struggling men. 
"As the horrid significance of that path so traced came 
upon me I gazed yet more intently. Many of those who had 
fallen leapt up and ran forward, struggling to catch up with 
their comrades again. I did not see any running backward, 
though many fell in their effort to rush on. I do not know 
whether after that another movement was made from behind 
the wood ; but I do know that half an hour afterwards vast 
numbers of troops began to march over the southern edge of 
the hill where I was standing towards the battle-field, and I 
have an impression that these were General Goben's men 
moving by a less dangerous route. The conflict on the 
Prussian left was so fierce that it soon became nearly lost 
to us by reason of its smoke. Now and then this would 
open a little and drift under the wind, and then we could 
see the French sorely tried, but maintaining themselves 
steadily. In order to see this part of the conflict better, 
I went forward as near as I thought safe. It seemed to 
me that in the vicinity of Malmaison the French were hav- 
ing the best of it. But it must have been only because they 
were more visible on their broad height, and fought so ob- 
stinately — plainly silencing a battery now and then. But 
from this northern point also there are more forces to 
come; and from far behind them — away seemingly in the 
direction of Verneville — huge bombs are coming and burst- 
ing with terrible force upon the French ranks. These were 

—761— 



War Correspondence 

the men and these the guns of Prince Frederick Charles^ 
who was slowly veering southward to make his connection 
with Steinmetz's army, completing the investment of Metz. 

"The battle raged at this point with indescribable fury. 
The French Generals must have known the significance of 
these new guns, and known that, if their right retreated, 
the result must be that incarceration in Metz which now 
exists. How long they held out here I do not know. I could 
hear that the puff of their guns was from a gradually 
receding line; that the mysterious pillars of cloud from 
the north as steadily approached ; but the last fired on that 
terrible evening were on that side, and the point must have 
been yielded at about nine o'clock. 

"Perhaps I should here say something of the movements 
of the King, and those with him. The King's face, as he 
stood gazing upon the battle-field, had something almost 
plaintive in it. He hardly said a word ; but I observed that his 
attention was divided between the exciting scenes in the dis- 
tance and the sad scenes nearer his feet — where they were 
just beginning (what must yet be a long task) to bury the 
French who fell on the Tuesday before. On these he gazed 
silently, and I thought, sadly. Count Bismarck was intent 
only on the battle, and could not conceal his excitement and 
anxiety; if it had not been for the King, I am pretty sure 
he would have gone nearer; and, as it was, his towering 
form was always a little ahead of the rest. When the 
French completely gave up their hold upon the road up to 
Gravelotte, the horses of the grand head-quarters were 
hastily called, and the party mounting them, rode, with the 
King at their head, swiftly down to a point not very far 
from the village. Then shouts and cheers arose, which I 
could plainly hear from the point they had left, where, not 
having a horse, I was compelled to remain a little longer. 

"A little after four o'clock a strange episode took place. 
From the distant woods on the left a splendid regiment of 
cavalry galloped out. They paused a moment at the point 
where the Conflans road joins that leading to Metz; then 
they dashed up the road towards Metz. This road between 

—762— 



War Between Germany and France * 

Gravelotte and St. Hubert is cut through the hill, and there 
are on each side of it cliffs from forty to sixty feet high, 
except at the point where it traverses the deep ravine 
behind the village. When it is remembered that at this time 
the culminating point to which this road directly ascends 
was held by the French, it will not be wondered at that only 
a moiety of that regiment survived. What the survivors 
accomplished I do not know, nor could I learn the name and 
number of the regiment. The situation hardly admits yet 
of our asking many questions. But their plunge into that 
deep cut in the hill-side, where next day I saw so many of 
them and their horses lying dead, was of that brave, unhesi- 
tating, unfaltering kind, which is so characteristic of Ger- 
man soldiers, among whom cowards, stragglers, and 
deserters seem to be absolutely unknown, in whatever rank. 
"I must record, also, that what seemed an inexplicable 
thing. The army of Steinmetz was fighting very hard, and 
evidently suffering heavily. It was in the centre of Gravel- 
otte, though occasionally rallying to one side or the other. 
Though they had large reserves, these had been diminished 
to an important extent by the engagements of the 14th and 
16th. A considerable portion of his army required rest, 
and two divisions perhaps, certainly one, reorganization. 
There seemed at one time — about half-past four — some 
danger that the intensity of the fighting required on the 
right and left extremes would produce a kind of atrophy 
along that very central Verdun road for which the armies 
were struggling. At that time a vast army came from some 
region utterly mysterious to us who had been following the 
army for some miles. They came over the very point which 
had been the Royal head-quarters in the morning. Their 
march was begun at the time I have mentioned, and did not 
cease at all-^ — not even after dark — so long as the fighting 
was still going on upon the heights. This new army — 
whose was it? whence was it? It did not come from the 
direction of Goben, nor of Steinmetz, nor of Prince Fred- 
erick Charles. Of course it could not be said that it did not 
belong to either of these, but the cry and rumour went 

—763— 



War Correspondence 

around that these men were from the army of the Crown 
Prince. I do not know whether to beheve this or not, but 
it is freely said and beheved by many officers here that a 
detachment of the Crown Prince's army was sent up from 
Toul to help, if help were needed. To whosoever or where- 
soever this Army Corps (for it was about that in extent) 
belonged, its presence was nearly all that was required. It 
was laid along the road, out of immediate danger, so that if 
the French centre had defeated the troops with which it 
was contending, it must simply have fallen into the hands 
of a fresh and prepared corps. 

"The advance of this new corps must have been felt by 
them as a final, a fatal blow for that day. Like the spirits 
in the "Inferno," their enemies were consumed only to 
spring up to full stature again. They must have realized 
how hopelessly they were outnumbered. From that time 
the struggle at that part became very weak on the French 
side, and the Prussians got a decided hold farther up the 
Metz road — that is, on the southern side of it. But there 
seemed to be a redoubled fury on their left. From seven 
o'clock to eight there was little firing 43eyond the village, 
but a great tower of cloud and fire at each extremity of 
the battle-field. A little before eight a large white house 
on the heights beyond Gravelotte caught fire. It seemed 
through the gloom to be a church; its spire was now a 
mass of flame and it sent up a vast cloud of black smoke, 
which contrasted curiously with the white smoke of battle. 

"Darkness was now drawing on, and after eight we 
could trace the direction of troops by the fiery paths of their 
bombs, or the long tongue of fire darting from each can- 
non's mouth. The lurid smoke-clouds of burning houses 
joined with the night to cast a pall over the scene and hide 
it for ever. At half -past eight o'clock one more terrible 
attack by the French on the Prussian right — and that is 
over. At a quarter to nine a fearful volley against the 
extreme Prussian left, a continuous concert of artillery, 
and the growling whirr of the mitrailleuse above all — and 
then that is still. The battle of Gravelotte is ended, the 

—764— 



War Between Germany and France 

Prussians hold the heights beyond the Bois de Vaus — 
heights which command the surroundiitg country up to the 
limits of the gun-ranges of Metz. As I went back to the 
village of Gorze to pass the night, I turned at the last point 
to look upon the battle-field. It was now a long, earth-bound 
cloud with two vast fires — burning houses — at each end of 
it. The day had been beautiful, and now the stars looked 
down with splendour, except where the work of agony and 
death had clouded the glow of heaven." 



The Advance of the German Third Army 
August, 1870 

As the army was making its way past Phalsburg, the 
Special Correspondent of the Daily News wrote, on the 
15th of August : — 

"Since my last letter there has been marching to the 
front and spreading out on the flanks. There has been 
more and more French territory occupied by the Prussians, 
and yet no further fighting of importance, as far as we 
know, up to the present moment. It would appear that the 
French are concentrating their forces on Metz, and, per- 
haps, on Chalons. We see that they wish to avoid a contest 
until they have a better chance than at Worth, which is 
very wise on their part. Meanwhile the fortresses of Stras- 
burg, Phalsburg, and Bitsche, form islands in the sea of 
invasion. I will not say barriers against invasion but islands 
to impede the rush of the tide a little. They are the material 
holds which France still keeps on her semi-German province 
and in case of a check, might prove dangerous to the rear- 
guard of the great invading army. I set no high value on 
any but first-class fortresses. A place that would hold fifty 
thousand men in the neighbourhood of Worth would have 
saved Alsace from invasion — or saved all but the north- 
eastern part of it, at any rate — if only MacMahon had made 
his stand behind the works. But little fortresses like 
Bitsche and Phalsburg are useless, save as checks to the 

—765— 



War Correspondence 

invader. They cannot stop him for an instant, though they 
can and do occupy many of his troops. Here is Phalsburg, 
for example, which has already detained a number of Ger- 
man guns for two or three days, and which, when I last 
saw it, showed no signs of giving in. True, the guns thus 
detained are of light calibre. They are nevertheless kept 
from other work, and this is something for Phalsburg to do. 
"The town was sharply cannonaded this morning, and I 
went to see the German batteries open fire. There was a 
slight haze over the surrounding country at daybreak, but 
as the sun grew more powerful, the haze lifted into gently 
driving clouds. A breeze, just strong enough to temper the 
heat of the weather stirred the leaves of the tall poplar 
trees along the straight French chaussees, and it was alto- 
gether as fine a morning as you could wish to see. From a 
hillock behind the village of Zilling, there was a splendid 
view of both the attack and defence. Phalsburg could be 
seen among the trees at the top of a stretch of rising ground 
and we could distinguish a part of the old rampart with 
its shady avenue. To our left, across the open fields, dotted 
with red-roofed farm buildings, was some rising ground 
opposite to Phalsburg, and here were the besieging batteries, 
which could scarcely be distinguished at all until their fire 
commenced. The whole district, for miles away, was spread 
out like a map before us, and we saw the Vosges mountains to 
the eastward shutting us off from the valley of the Rhine. 
Had it not been such a deadly game that was to be played, 
such a terrible moment of anxiety for the people of the little 
town, there could have been no pleasanter excursion than 
this one to see the batteries begin their work. I tell no 
secret when I say that the German attack was made with 
field artillery, and that a great many of these light guns 
had been brought into position. The capture of Phalsburg 
is an important point for the Crown Prince, but not impor- 
tant enough to make the ar!my wait for heavy siege guns. 
Prussian tactics are to push forward and mask the fortresses 
which are encountered on the way, leaving a few battalions 
to watch them. 

—766— 



War Between Germany and France 

"From our positions on the hillock behind Zilling every- 
thing is to be seen. Now a puff of white smoke goes up on 
the left and a fierce rush through the air tells of a passing 
shell. It falls in the town. Poor souls within, they did 
not fancy when war was declared how soon their rafters 
would be crashing about their ears. Yet they live in a 
fortified place, and must take their chance. But we cannot 
help a wish that the shells may only damage public property, 
as shriek after shriek through the air tells of their passage. 
Now there is firing from the right. The French gunners 
have manned their pieces, and reply in excellent style. 
Flash after flash comes out from the old rampart. The 
smoke curls up among those shady trees where the garrison 
have often sat in summer evenings with pipe or cigar, and 
where the nursemaids have brought children to play. You 
know the look of these old ramparts in peace time, and can 
fancy them now, with only soldiers upon them who are in 
no sporting mood. There is flash after flash from the ram- 
parts and from the opposite rising ground. There is a con- 
stant whistling and shrieking across the space between, and 
a flying up of dust among the German guns, or a crash 
among the roofs of the town, as one side or the other makes 
a hit. If Phalsburg is in good order the determined com- 
imandant may earn promotion by a long defence but if his 
works once get disabled, he is lost. The Germans have a 
strong force, as we can see, ready to advance, and after 
Weissenburg we know that mere ramparts will not stop 
them. See the dark-coloured smoke rising above the trees 
and floating away behind the church tower. One column 
of smoke, then another. It is clear that houses are burning 
but not so clear that the French guns are silenced. They 
fire more slowly than their assailants, and seem to aim 
rather high. But there is heavy metal in the blooming 
reports which came from the Phalsburg ramparts. Three 
distinct columns of dark smoke rise from the town. It is 
sad to think of the suffering of any inhabitants who may 
have rashly remained. What would our friend the "Con- 
scrit" of Erckmann-Chatrian's delightful tales say if he 

—767— 



War Correspondence 

saw the days of the great war come back again, and the 
foe from beyond the Rhine besieging his dear old town? 
That big gun from the rampart booms forth again, and the 
smoke-clouds rise thicker than ever. It is a good defence. 
One can fancy how the hearts of the villagers round about 
must beat at each shriek of the besiegers' shells. They have 
doubtless friends and relations who may be injured in per- 
son or property by every shot that is fired. Would that 
the lesson of the "Conscrit" and its sequel had gone home in 
France, and that this war had not been brought about! 

"The people have become more and more French as we 
have advanced. They have gradually ceased to speak Ger- 
man at all, and the confusion of a veritable foreign conquest 
has arisen. From the stolid careless air of the Alsatian 
peasants we have come among men who are bitterly wounded 
at what is happening around them. The fluent, though 
rough, German dialect of a few days back is exchanged for 
a stray sentence of broken German, and a copious supply of 
clear metallic French, rattled out with an irreproachable 
accent. We are at least really in France. I have seen 
twenty cases of mistaken phrases, and of consequently mis- 
taken wrath. "Sagen sie mir wo ist das aupt-Quartier," is 
met by "Ah, Monsieur, nous n'avons plus du cognae;" and 
so on, with every variety of blunder. The soldiers are not 
inclined to be harsh, if only they get what they think they 
ought to have, and there is nothing to alarm the inhabitants 
in the demeanour of their terrible foes. But this difference of 
language begins to make the every day intercourse of con- 
querors and conquered far from smooth. The French 
accept their ill-luck fairly enough; what they are put out 
of temper by is being shouted at in strange tongues and 
shaken by the shoulder if they are dull. One of their fav- 
ourite theories is that all civilized men speak a little of the 
language of the world, and here are thousands of men, civil- 
ized enough to outshoot the Chassepot, who speak not a single 
intelligible word. It is very hard for our lively neighbours. 
Let me do them justice — let me do both sides justice — ^they 
bear it like sensible men, and the Germans are not angry or 

—768— 



War Between Germany and France 

vindictive. I cannot but think that the whole scene as we 
advance is a tribute to modern civilization. Here are young 
girls standing laughing at the cottage doors, not a bit 
afraid of violence; and we pass after a hundred thousand 
men, more or less, have gone by along that same road. It 
would not have been so in the Thirty Years' War. It would 
scarcely have been so some fifty years back. But here it 
is to-day. The village maidens stand half shy, half 
curious, to see the Prince and his Staff ride on their way; 
the old people sit basking in the sunshine, and shaking their 
heads over the evil days. One can remember 1814, with the 
Allies going to Paris; another has seen something of the 
army of the First Napoleon, and thinks that if the Old 
Guard were alive they would make a breakfast of these 
gentlemen. I notice that the younger and more active men 
look gloomily at the long columns which pass. The honour 
of La Belle France is involved in this affair, and they are 
sad to see her territory invaded. Take it as a whole, the 
conduct of the people is quiet and reasonable. They shrug 
their shoulders and say with a smile. We have not had our 
turn yet ; wait till the Emperor is ready ! 

"It is the Fete Napoleon and no flags or fireworks are 
allowed in honour of the day. Nevertheless I notice that many 
villagers are in holiday attire. The habit of the thing is 
followed without any particular care to compliment the Im- 
perial family, for, as you may imagine, I hear many curses 
against the policy of war. As we came along to-day through 
the harvest-fields, a few people were at work, in spite of 
the fete, and the invasion, and everything else, for, as one 
of the peasants said, it is such a hard time for them that 
they must earn all they can. A battle must soon occur, but 
we know so little of the French movements, that it is im- 
possible to say in which direction the blow will fall. "For- 
ward to Paris" is the cry of the German soldiers. The com- 
manders are content as yet to bear heavily against the 
French centre in Lorraine, and to threaten the road to 
Chalons." 



—769- 



; Wiar Correspondence 

The Morale of Paris, 
August, 1870 

In the middle of August, the Special Correspondent at 
Paris wrote : 

"A spirit has sprung up which will render the war a war 
of patriotism. The word "peace" is the last word that will 
be listened to in Paris. The Parisians will fight first, and 
settle their domestic difficulties afterwards. I have talked 
to a varied set of residents on the subject, and I may say 
that, not day by day, but hour by hour, the determination 
to stand by Paris to the last becomes more intensified. Bui 
the people are pathetically ignorant of the situation of af- 
fairs outside the walls. They are driven to imagining all 
sorts of routes and strategical feats on the part of Bazaine 
and MacMahon. The cafes on the Boulevard des Italiens are 
crowded each evening with quidnuncs, wh6 exchange speci- 
inens of the most profound geographical ignorance with 
each other. I heard a gentleman Who was enjoying that 
French beverage which, upon my word, I il^ver saw a 
Frenchman taking before — a glass of cold water with a 
dash of sugar in it — bring a large group around his table by 
insisting that some Uhlans had got within the lines of the 
fortifications and had been captured. This, indeed, was an 
exceptional display of credulity, and was heard with num- 
erous shrugs and interjections suggestive of disbelief. Spies 
and Uhlans are the ingredients with which most of the can- 
ards, or rather rocs, are stuffed. 

"I think by this time there ought to be proVisioiris enough 
here to stand a very long siege indeed; but the cattle still 
continue to arrive, and vast quantities of flour pass through 
the streets to the depots every hours. Wherever you move 
you come across carts piled with luggage, many of the 
household goods being exhibited with a candour and an ab- 
sence of vanity almost primitive. The horses attached to 
the vehicles are sorry, hollow-backed jades of a Wouvermans 
colour, and with the patient manner of broken-spirited 
donkeys. The men in charge are dusty and travel-stained, 
and there is always a dog and a bird cage amongst the ef- 

—770— 



War Between Germany and France 

fects. The children, must, I imagine, have been imported 
into the city in another set of ambulances, as I have not 
seen them with the van." 



The German Third Army at Sedan 

The special correspondent with the Crown Prince's 
army has thus described the advance of the Third Army, and 
the positions of the Germans, in a letter dated August 31st 
on the eve of the battle of Sedan : 

"There need be no hesitation or reserve as to speaking of 
tomorrow's possibilities. The plot has thickened since I last 
wrote, and the French must now be perfectly aware of the 
movement against their right flank. I necessarily write in 
such haste, and in the midst of such confusion, noise, dust, 
and trampling of feet, that it is difficult to give you a clear 
account of what is going on around me. On this bright 
August day, the last day of the month, hot, dry, and dusty, 
a great historical drama is hurrying to its close. How the 
trumpets ring out upon the evening air, as the long columns 
of cavalry clatter and jingle through the village streets! 
How ceaseless is the rumbling of waggons ! Battalion after 
battalion of Prussian infantry has come by hot and dusty — 
a whole army has passed through the village during this 
memorable day of the forced march. To put it in more 
exact and technical fashion, the French advance from 
Rheims towards Metz and Thionville has been thwarted by 
a movement of the 12th and 4th Corps af the Second Army 
in the enemy's front, and by wonderfully rapid marching of 
the Crown Prince's army against the right flank of their 
opponents. Picture to yourself two lines of road, running 
nearly parallel, the one considerably to the northward of the 
other. From Chalons to Metz is the first line, from Rheims 
to Thionville is the second. It would seem that the French 
abandoned their camp at Chalons, and left open the road to 
Paris, in order that they might take the second or northern- 
most of these two routes, and proceed to the relief of Metz. 
We have no reasoL to doubt but that they seriously intended 

—771— 



War Correspondence 

to cut their way through, and that four corps d' armee were 
assembled under the Emperor's orders. Where they seem 
to have been deceived was in the belief that a forward 
movement could be safely effected before the Crown Prince 
would be upon them. Never were plans better laid than 
those of the Prince and his chief of the Staff, General Blum- 
enthal. Many days ago this whole manoeuvre of doubling 
up the French line by swinging round upon it, "left shoulders 
forward," was arranged at the Prince's headquarters. It 
was calculated that, by almost superhuman efforts in the 
way of marching, the 5th and 11th Prussian Corps, the 
Bavarians, and Wurtembergers, might effect such a con- 
centration as would baffle the French design of relieving 
Metz. The 6th Corps was scarcely able to get up in time 
by any efforts — ^that is, to swing round in time in its wide 
circle to the westward — but it would be ready to guard the 
left flank of the Germans, and to act as a support to the 
Wurtembergers in case of need. Here was the trap ready 
laid. Here was a repetition of the shutting in of a French 
force northward of the main road, such as had been wit- 
nessed at Metz. But this time it was even more serious for 
those likely to be so shut in. The Belgian frontier was the 
rock ahead in case of defeat. The Belgian frontier and the 
frontier of neutral Luxemburg are not far off from our 
present position. One great defeat, one hard struggle, end- 
ing in favour of Germany, and the whole French army, 
baggage, artillery, military chest, may be driven into the 
unwilling embrace of our good allies of Belgium. I speak 
thus at length of the great shutting in of the French, of the 
wonderful forced march of the Crown Prince's army, to ex- 
plain a catastrophe of which you will have heard by tele- 
graph. The needle-gun may do as well as the Chassepot in 
a battle; but whichever weapon be the more destructive, 
there is no doubt that the dogged pluck of the Prussians in 
marching, their utter indifference to fatigue, has done more 
than their steady f usilade to win successes for King William. 
"First through rain and slush, then in milder weather, 
and with dust instead of mud under foot, the Third Army 
has swung round upon its foe. Had the French been strong 

—772— 



War Between Germany and France 

enough to have a well appointed corps of observation to the 
southward of Vitry — of say 80,000 men — this wheeling 
round of the Prussians could hardly have been risked. But 
the Crown Prince has disregarded the slight danger of an 
attack upon his rear by an ill-organized militia, and with 
the 6th Corps covering his left, more by necessity than 
choice, has closed upon MacMahon. There was hard march- 
ing to reach the point of vantage, but when we rode out 
yesterday to see the advance against the French position it 
was lovely weather. The bayonets of the infantry glittered 
in the sunshine. You must fancy yourself moving from hill 
to hill across valleys full of armed men. You must crowd 
the white straight roads with rumbling trains of artillery, 
and great masses of cavalry far to the front, where the 
farthest patches of woodland grow indistinct among the red 
and brown fields. The whole country southward of the road 
from Beaumont to Le Chene is alive with German troops. 
The Bavarians are near Beaumont ; the 4th Prussian Corps 
is farther to the right, and closes round upon the line of the 
Meuse. Immediately before us is the 5th Prussian Corps, 
pushing towards Stonne and Chemery. We see flashes of 
artillery near Beaumont. Then a heavy cannonade begins 
on the distant ridge behind that place — the 1st Bavarian 
Corps has surprised a French division in the little town, 
capturing a good deal of baggage. These "slow" Germans 
are to the fore again ! The French reply with vigour to 
their assailants, and white puffs of smoke break out in all 
directions. There is evidently a sjiarp struggle to our right 
front about Beaumont and Mouzon, but to the left and 
center the battle languishes. There is a little distant shell- 
ing, and some skirmishing in the extreme front, though the 
two parties are not in force near one another. Stonne is 
abandoned by the French, and we mount to its central po- 
sition, from which everything can be seen. That battle on 
the right grows fiercer — crash after crash of musketry re- 
sounds from the woods near Beaumont. We can see the 
flashes brightly on the hills, and as night comes on we hear 
with thrilling effect the sharp rolling volley of the mitrail- 
leuses. They must be fighting very hard, and the troops 

—773— 



War Correspondence 

bivouacked upon the hills near Stonne are eager to be among 
the combatants. But they cannot get there tonight, and 
must rest upon their position, with that dull rolling and 
grumbling of the cannonade to stir them round their spark- 
ling watch-fires. 

"The fighting of August 30th was a preparation for the 
decisive closing in of August 31st. The 4th Corps took sev- 
eral thousand prisoners, several French cannon, and checked 
all advance to the south-eastward. The Bavarians also took 
cannon and prisoners, and the Prussians of the Third Army 
pushed into a good position close to the enemy's outposts. 
It will probably be found that yesterday's battle was an im- 
portant affair — more important than one at first imagined." 

The battle of Sedan was described by the same Corres- 
pondent in the following letter, dated Chemery, September 
1st: 

"The German arms have today been crowned with won- 
derful success. The greatest triumph of the war has been 
achieved in this battle of Sedan, and the Emperor of the 
French himself is among the prisoners. I have not time to 
tell of the clamour and rejoicings of the soldiery round about 
me. Before the post goes out there will not be time enough 
to describe the battle in its barest details. An army cut off 
and surrounded — an Emperor taken prisoner! These are 
not common results. It is so overwhelming a catastrophe for 
France that one can excuse the tears in the old soldier's 
eyes, who dashes his crutch upon the floor, and will not even 
smoke his pipe. It is so overwhelming a catastrophe that 
one cannot but sigh over the evident pleasure of the ordi- 
nary villagers at seeing a hope of peace. 

"How did it come about that they were caught? Thous- 
ands of my countrymen will be asking this question. The 
answer is plain. The French were out-manoeuvred in the 
first rush of the war. They were beaten into a corner at 
Metz, blockaded in Alsace, and, generally speaking, "done 
for" by the splendid organization of their enemies. I have 
often spoken to you of the same organization — have often 
suggested that it must prevail. There is no need to go 
further back than the blocking of Bazaine at Metz to ex- 

—774— 



War Between Germany and France 

plain the capture of Napoleon at Sedan. It was felt that 
Bazaine must be relieved at any cost, and here is the price 
paid without success. Napoleon moved from Rheims to- 
wards Metz, along the northern frontier of his empire, in the 
desperate hope of fighting his way to the eastward, or of 
being allowed to pass without a battle. The Germans swung 
around their left wing with tremendous energy, brought up 
their center sharply into line, and pinned the French 
against the Belgian frontier in the little fortress of Sedan. 
Never was such marching seen as that of the 5th and 11th 
Corps. Whilst the 4th Corps, on the left of the Crown 
Prince of Saxony's army, and the Bavarians on the right of 
the Crown Prince of Prussia's army, were engaged in that 
sharp affair of August 30th, the 5th and 11th Corps, on the 
left of the Crown Prince of Prussia, were marching round 
the outside of the circle to the westward of the German 
forces. As we returned to head-quarters after the battle of 
the 30th, near Beaumont and Mouzon, we found thousands 
of men camped, or rather bivouacked, on the hills near 
Stonne. They cheered the Crown Prince loudly, and were 
full of spirit for whatever might be wanted of them. Though 
they had marched some five and twenty miles that day, they 
were in excellent condition. Their bivouacs were well or- 
dered ; their camp-fires were blazing bright and clear. The 
light of the camp-fires on one hill was as significant as the 
flashes of rifle and mitrailleuse on the other hill, which told 
of where Frenchmen and Germans were fiercely contending. 
These camp-fires to the extreme left, these crowded masses 
of men cheering the Prince, told of the energy with which 
Blumenthal was supporting the plans of Moltke, and of the 
determined shutting in which was destined to ruin the 
French. 

"They tramped along in light marching order, their 
knapsacks carried in waggons which followed at a distance. 
They rushed into cottages for water, or for a glass of wine, 
if any could be found. Tired and thirsty, the Prussian 
regiments thronged through Chemery on the 31st August. 
Tired and thirsty, they passed on to the front. As each 
battalion neared the Prince's quarters the drums rolled out, 

—775— 



War Correspondence 

the men held up their heads, and went by as at a review in 
Berhn, but that every one seemed to have been previously 
rolled in dust-bins. Dusty as they were, the infantry had 
a fine appearance. They all seemed to understand the need 
of hard marches, and to be buoyed up with the hope of com- 
plete victory. 

"So the net was spread, and the ends were drawn in, and 
the French army at Sedan was doomed to destruction. The 
battle of August 30th had shown that it would not be able to 
proceed eastward, as the Germans were everywhere so 
strong. Would it be able even to escape in a westerly di- 
rection? The French had got so near to Belgium that, as 
you might say of a ship, the least puff of wind would put 
them ashore. They had a chance of escaping on the morning 
of August 31st, by leaving their baggage and most of their 
artillery in Sedan, and making a running fight of it with 
the whole army towards Mezieres and Laon. But they were 
too proud to run away, too slow in their movements to re- 
treat with dignity, and were caught at a hopeless disad- 
vantage. 

"The battle of Sedan was begun by the Bavarians. 
General von der Tann, chief of the 1st Bavarian Corps, was 
ready in the grey twilight to open fire, and was only pre- 
vented from leading off the attack at 4 A.M. by the thick 
mist in the valley of the Meuse. When we came to the hill 
above Donchery, at about six o'clock, there was still a mist 
in the valley, but it had somewhat lifted, and the dull boom- 
ing of cannon told that the Bavarians were at work. You 
must fancy a great half circle closing in to form a complete 
circle of fire round the town. Place yourself in the Crown 
Prince of Prussia's station on the hill above Donchery, and 
take the corps in the order in which they stand. The 5th 
and 11th Prussian Corps are straining northward to close 
round to the left. The 6th Corps is coming round far be- 
hind, to the left rear, and will bear no part in the action, 
but the Wurtembergers also on the left, and in advance of 
the 6th Corps, will have a battle of their own with the 
French from Mezieres. Just before us there is Sedan, pro- 
tected by its ramparts and by an artificial inundation of the 

—776— 



War Between Germany and France 

meadows beside the Meuse. To the right of the hill above 
Donchery, Bismarck and Von Moltke are with the King, 
Blumenthal is with the Prince of Prussia. With the Prince 
are also several other men of note, attached to his Highness 
Staff. The Duke of Augustenburg and Prince Leopold of 
Hohenzollern are both serving on the Staff, the former in 
Bavarian uniform, the latter in Prussian. The Duke of 
Coburg Gotha is there, and so are the Princes of Weimar, 
of Mecklenburg, and Wurtemberg. It was natural that 
they should be present, because they have been on the 
Crown Prince of Prussia's Staff throughout the war. But 
their presence, together with fighting of Bavarians and 
Saxons side by side with Prussians on September 1st, and 
the fighting of the Wurtembergers on the same day, to- 
wards Mezieres, gives an additional stamp of German unity 
td the final effort. All Germany seems to be here: the 
Princess and the commonalty coming forth with equal zeal 
to repel an invasion. And here is the deadly counter-stroke 
by which it is being met. 

"The whole country as far as the frontier lies spread out 
like a map before us. Donchery is as clearly to be seen as 
though a biscuit could be tossed down into it, and where 
the mist rises still farther the course of the Meuse may be 
traced by stunted willows in the great bend northward 
which it makes hereabouts. There is no better way of re- 
alizing the features of the locality than by taking a horse- 
shoe, protruding one end straight to your left, and the other 
end somewhat backward to your right. On the part straight 
to your left is Donchery, with its line of hills across the 
back of the shoe. On the part prolonged to your right is 
Bezeilles, with a railway bridge in excellent condition. Se- 
dan lies on the river to the right hand, where the first nail 
would be, and the off-side of the horseshoe bend, Cazal 
and Floring are farther along on the right side, and St. 
Meuges is about at the front of the shoe. The villages of 
Daigny and Givonne lie back to the right, or behind the 
town, where the country is hilly and wooded. The great 
plain is to the left of the bend, and as the Prussian troops 
arrive on that side they move quickly forward across the 

—777— 



War Correspondence 

plain to turn round the end of the horseshoe and come back 
down its right side. The Belgian frontier is a little way 
beyond the front of the shoe, so that there is ample room 
for the 5th and 11th Corps to act upon the line of retreat 
from Sedan in that direction. We can hear a constant rum- 
bling of wagons and clattering of hoofs, as the German left 
is advanced, whilst there is a louder and louder roll of mus- 
ketry and booming of cannon where the Bavarians are hold- 
ing the French in play to the right. At first there is a line of 
white smoke puffs, forming less than a semicircle to the 
south, south-west, and south-east of the French. The battle 
is hotly maintained near Bazeilles, and the French respond 
with energy to the attack of the Germans. It is a very sultry 
day. The smoke-clouds hang lower and lower over the 
Meuse, as the mist was hanging a few hours earlier. Bright 
sunshine glitters upon the cuirasses of a Prussian regiment 
that trots down to the right to support the Bavarian guns, 
at the base of the horseshoe. A second and yet a third regi- 
ment of cavalry follow with great jingling and clatter. The 
scene upon the hill, near the Crown Prince's Staff, is one of 
active preparation. There are guns dragged lumberingly 
at the heels of the cavalry, and innumerable waggons follow 
as hard as they can go. Stragglers hurry up to join their 
corps, orderlies gallop away reckless of their necks, or gal- 
lop back with panting steeds up the steep road. It is 
thought better for the escort to dismount, and for the offi- 
cers' horses to be held a little to the rear, so as not to draw 
the French fire upon the Staff by an unnecessary display 
of force. That same French fire, is however, distracted 
and dispersed by numerous assailants. The roar of cannon 
grows more intense with each minute as noontide ap- 
proaches. It is clear that the army of MacMahon — we af- 
terwards learnt that the Marshal had been wounded — at an 
early hour, and that De Wimpff en had taken the command — • 
is in desperate peril. Like some ship labouring in the 
trough of the sea, the beleagured host of France is pitifully 
helpless. There was a time when a squadron of light horse, 
or even a travelling carriage at a brisk trot, might have got 
away to Belgium. The northern road was open when the 

—778— 



War Between Germany and France 

battle began, but the French seemed to have no idea of flight. 
Crushed and hampered as they are, they fight like brave 
men. The battle is a mere battue by one o'clock, and the 
circle of white smoke puffs almost shuts in the the French 
position. This is essentially an affair of artillery, and the 
German guns seem to be well served, besides being powerful. 
But there is a constant rattle of small-arm fire in the di- 
rection of Bazeilles, where flames and black smoke tell of a 
conflagration. The Crown Prince of Saxony, too, is coming 
steadily on. It has appeared for a moment that he was 
checked by the efforts of the despairing French; but the 
German right is growing evidently stronger, and the circle 
of white smoke puffs is very clearly defined to the north- 
westward. Then to the left there is a sharp engagement; 
as the 11th Prussian Corps forces its way into Cazal and 
Floing, a splendid artillery fire supports the attacks of the 
infantry. We can see that all escape has been cut off as the 
Prussians get from village to village towards the slope of 
rising ground behind Floing, and north-westward of Sedan. 
If that slope be once cleared of Frenchmen, the only thing 
for the French to do will be to cut their way out through 
the Crown Prince of Saxony's army, or to retreat almost 
within the walls of the town. They cannot fight on their 
present line with Prussians in their rear. 

"It is a sight of terrible interest. The hill-side behind 
Floing has been the scene of a regular stand-up battle be- 
tv/een lines of infantry, and there is a cannonade from an- 
other sloping ground more to the left, which smites the 
French wiith startling precision. Loud rattle the volleys 
of the mitrailleuses. Some four or five pieces are planted 
on the hill, and work hard to keep back the Prussians. But 
they seem to be silenced or withdrawn, and the dark masses 
of King William's soldiers gain several acres; all about the 
little cottage and two trees at the hill-top there is a fierce 
encounter. Lines of infantry stand firing at one another, 
and it is clear that the loss is considerable, for many m.en 
fall killed and wounded. What a wild confusion it is, now 
that the lines have advanced and retired several times! 
T'here are scattered parties of Frenchmen rallied by their 

—779— 



War Correspondence 

officers, and Germans brought back to the charge with 
hearty zeal. Both sides fight splendidly. But, on the whole, 
the Prussian fire seems to prevail, and the French wither 
before it. The shells are doing much that we cannot ap- 
preciate at a distance. Dust flies up now and then; but 
it is hard to see what has been done. Yet we notice that 
the efforts of the French reserves to restore the battle fail 
before the steadiness of the Prussian attack. When one 
Prussian battalion hesitates, when even there is a charge 
in line by a body of French infantry, which requires a good 
deal of ground, there is always a creeping up of more and 
more of dark-coated assailants. Their guns cease firing for 
fear of hitting them, and a gallant dash of French light 
cavalry is made to recover the hill-side. They ride forward 
half hidden in dust, and seem for a moment to succeed ; but 
the artillery re-opens, the infantry pour in a deadly fire, and 
we see the ground strewn with men and horses. The cav- 
alry wheel about, and go galloping back like a receding 
wave. That hill-side must remain in Prussian hands. No, 
there is another rally by the French Infantry. Once more 
they come on. The thin, blue smoke rises above the line, and 
they almost run in their wild attempt to push home. But 
the attack withers away, and nothing can be seen of the 
regiment which made it. There has been heavy loss it is 
easy to see, though the men who fall cannot now be well 
distinguished in the confusion. 

"There are other points carried by the Germans, and a 
closing in of the circle of white smoke round Sedan. Then 
a fresh attempt to break through, as though somebody of 
importance were to be cut out at any cost. We see numbers 
of Frenchmen making for the gates of the town, others wan- 
dering about as though not knowing what to do. There ^ is 
a gradual cessation of the cannonade, and by about five 
o'clock all is quiet, save for the dropping shots from the bat- 
teries near the King's position. There is a great outburst 
of flame and smoke in the town, as if some stores of com- 
bustibles had taken light, and there is a rumour that the 
white flag has been hoisted by the French. Then it is 
whispered that all these crowded troops — sixty, seventy, 

—780— 



War Between Germany and France 

perhaps eighty thousand men, must surrender, for that they 
have no food. They surrender? Not only they, the Im- 
perial soldiers, but the Emperor too. It is known that Gen- 
eral Rille, an aide-de-camp of Napoleon, has come out to 
King William with a letter from the Emperor to his Prus- 
sian Majesty. The troops are wild with joy; they have 
caught him then, and there will be an end to the war." 



—781- 



H144 79 «| 



W/A 



■^^m^-- -f-v' :mm-- rf r^p 



./<. 






V *l 



Map ! 






V }i ^p^^rM 




3 r ■--^ --^1 




Oyevations Jf ii..' i^Annv ^iRflfr Genera] vo.n SUviunelz 



General Plan 




Copyright. 
Scale 1:800/500, 



Theatre of Operations 

Franco -German VYar 



(Buutovni s'u 



» A SNsjt) E %C A LA I Si™> 



|"''''^T^°^/mussSS 






>. 


/ 


/ 


1 / '^. 


|\ MiiWhATLK\j^ 


4 


SSivv 




J \ 1 


/ \t^t'o5i ♦"'"'<'/' 


( 


1 


.i.UJIh 


^ KaolwTOaDr \J, 




He 


'"^ 


<f 


/ Staiherf J' 


\ noiCJtV 


-J* 


4iiiiT 


■mii/-^ 


Liiupen A 


\ ^ 



^S M MyE 



^fer^v" -^1 



- - A. 



RhUE 



P<'KS 



( """■': 



A 



4. r^L 






R D)E N N E S >S1 



^. 






-\ 






SEINE ET_g>6E 



MAR NVE 



(//SEINE ET MARNE 



\' 


■"t 




A^V , 


.-•;;^ 




^: 


1 




^. "% 


:±L, 


ij^l^ 


i~' 






ii 


->. 


.'' \Sr^- 








" L 


=4- "^^ 


aJSSS 




f" 


^^^W^ 


■^|#a*^ 




> 






JVI E u\ 
C 

■1,.D,.. 


3 E 








.ribrjkj^^ 







Jlaafsslab t ; l.OOnonO 



